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This thesis analyses Christian presentations of Christ for Muslims in the most creative 
periods of Christian-Muslim dialogue, the first half of the ninth and the second half of the 
twentieth century. In these two historical moments, Christians made a serious effort to 
present their faith in Christ in terms that fully take into account Muslim perceptions of him, 
with a view to bridging the gap between Muslim and Christian convictions. While these 
Christian writers gave reasons for their own Christological beliefs, they also attempted to 
argue for their Christology on the basis of Islamic concepts. Rather than merely expound a 
received Christology composed from within a totally Christian environment, they entered 
into a Muslim framework of thought to show the validity of a Christian view of Christ in 
terms that Muslims might understand as credible. 
Since Christians and Muslims have such different perceptions of Christ, it may 
appear to be futile for Christians to try to enter into dialogue with Muslims about him. 
However, there can be no escape from the fact that Christians understand their identity 
from the person of Christ, his teaching, his actions, his spiritual dynamic, and that the 
continuing life of the mainstream church has been bound up with the worship of Christ as 
the eternal Son become human. Given that Muslims think of Christ as a prophet who 
brought essentially the same message as Muhammad, that God is one and is to be 
worshipped alone, they have never understood their identity as being bound up with Christ. 
In Islam, Christ's words, work and spiritual dynamic were not unique among the 
messengers of God, but can be seen in other prophets too. 
The difficulty of establishing a dialogue is compounded by two denials of Christian 
faith in Christ: the rejection of the idea of divine sonship, and the denial of the death of 
Christ by crucifixion. Muslims have not accepted the title "Son of God" for Christ, and 
they have held that Christ was taken up to heaven without going through death. These 
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denials cut right to the heart of the developed faith of the church, where Christ is the 
Incarnate Son of God who gave his life to redeem others from sin. Christians have reacted 
to these Muslim ideas about Christ in three different ways. Firstly, they have regarded 
Islam as a completely false ideology and therefore have adopted an aggressive policy of 
propagating Christian truth without taking Islamic perceptions into account. Secondly, they 
have distanced themselves from Muslims so that no real communication arises on these 
contentious issues. Thirdly, they have attempted to take Muslims seriously as people of 
good faith whose views of Christ need to be understood and related to in a genuine attempt 
to make sense of Christian faith for them. This third approach is studied here, because it is 
imperative for Christians to learn to live with Muslims in the global community without 
falling into the errors of aggression or withdrawal. The approach of peaceful dialogue is a 
better way than defiant proclamation or complete indifference. 
The subject of Christian presentations of Christ for Muslims has not been studied in 
great detail. While the topic is referred to in recent treatments of Christian-Muslim 
dialogue, such as in Kate Zibiri's Muslims and Christians Face to Face, Montgomery 
Watt's Muslim-Christian Encounters. Perceptions and Misperceptions, and Chawkat 
Moucarry's Faith to Faith: Christianity and Islam in dialogue, no book length study has 
appeared to date. Some of the book length studies of Muslim attitudes to Christ have 
looked at Christian presentations of Christology for Muslims. Neal Robinson's Christ in 
Islam and Christianity. The Representation ofJesus in the Qur'dn and the Classical 
Muslim Commentaries, refers to Christian interpretations of the Qur'an but does not offer a 
detailed analysis of these Christian contributions. Oddbjorn Leirvik's Images of Jesus 
Christ in Islam: Introduction, Survey of Research, Issues of Dialogre, briefly outlines 
several Christian presentations of Jesus in dialogue with Muslims, but as the title suggests, 
the chief concern of the survey is with Muslim contributions. This thesis aims to fill the 
gap by examining the most creative Christian writing on Christ for Muslims from the long 
history of Christian-Muslim encounter. Only published materials are studied in the thesis 
and the research did not include field work. 
The outstanding Christian presentations of Christ for Muslims came from the ninth 
and twentieth centuries. By the ninth century, Middle Eastern Christians were engaged in 
oral and written dialogue with Muslims about their faith in exceedingly detailed terms. The 
fact of continuing Islamic rule of the largely Christian Middle East led Christian 
theologians to treat Muslim intellectuals as dialogue partners whom they needed to 
convince of the rationality of the Christian faith. By this time, the credibility of the 
Christian faith was at stake, with nominal Christians converting to Islam in increasing 
numbers. Thus the apologetic writing of the ninth century has both Muslim and Christian 
audiences in mind. It shows on the one hand that Christology was not completely alien to 
Islamic belief, and on the other, that it was acceptable for Christians to hold such views 
even in a society ruled by Muslims. 
Part One of the thesis expounds and analyses the writing of three apologists from 
the early ninth century, Theodore Abü Qurra, Habib ibn Khidma Abü RA'ita, and 'Ammar 
al-Bari. These writers arc the only ones known to have written on Christology for 
Muslims in the early ninth century, and helpfully they represent the three major Christian 
communities of the Middle East at that time that were divided by different views of the 
Incarnation. No other comparable writings are extant from the formative period of Islamic 
rule in the Middle East. Later apologists such as Yahyä ibn 'Adi from the tenth century and 
Paul of Antioch from the twelfth, have little to add to the innovative work of Abü Qurra, 
Abn Rä'ita and `Ammar al-Bari. It is regrettable that the Christological apologetics of 
these theologians remains virtually unknown. Seppo Rissanen's comparative analysis of 
the writing of Abra Qurra and Abü Rä'ita in his Theological Encounter of Oriental 
Christians with Islam during Early Abbasid Rule is exceptional. The absence of the three 
theologians from Kenneth Cragg's chapter on early Arab Christian apologists in The Arab 
Christian is an indication of the need for these writers to be better known. 
Part Two of the thesis studies the twentieth century Christian theologians, Kenneth 
Cragg, Hans King and John Hick, who engaged in oral and written dialogue with Muslims 
about Christ. Their desire to relate Christian thinking about Christ to Islamic 
presuppositions is a product of recent efforts to treat Muslims as genuine dialogue partners. 
While some Christians have thought that dialogue with Muslims should avoid discussion 
of Christology, these three have felt that tackling the differences between Christians and 
Muslims over Christ is essential to dialogue. Cragg, King and Hick are the notable 
representatives of creative Christological dialogue in recent times. There are a number of 
writers who have dialogued with Muslims from a fairly traditional Christological 
perspective like Cragg. The best examples are David Shenk's dialogue with B. D. 
Katercgga in Islam and Christianity, Robert Caspar's answers to questions posed by 
Tunisian Muslims Trying to Answer Questions, and Thomas Michel's Pour Comprendre le 
Christianisme: Un Chretien presente safoi aux Musulmans. However, they do not match 
Cragg's innovative approach to Muslims. Kling and Hick have no competition for 
inclusion, since they are the only twentieth century apologists to present Christ on the basis 
of modern gospel scholarship rather than the teaching of the Apostles or the Creeds of the 
church. 
There has not been much analysis of modern Christian dialogue about Christ with 
Muslims. Cragg's Christology in dialogue has been reviewed by Christopher Lamb in The 
Call to Retrieval: Kenneth Cragg's Christian Vocation to Islam. Hossein Nasr, who 
dialogued with Hans Kling in the 1980's, named only Hick and Kling as Christian 
theologians who have carried out serious dialogue with Muslims in an article in the 1998 
volume of The Muslim World, "Islamic-Christian Dialogue - Problems and Obstacles to 
be Pondered and Overcome". Yet the central Christological concerns of Hick and Kling 
still await a critical exposition. Therefore an analysis of the presentations of Christ for 
Muslims by Cragg, Hick and Küng is offered in this thesis, showing how these three 
theologians have contextualised Christology in an Islamic context. Since humanity lives in 
a global village at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is time to take stock of 
attempts to do theology in the Muslim sector of the village. 
The method employed in the thesis is to set the Christological apologetics of the six 
writers from the ninth and twentieth centuries in the context of writing on Christ for 
Muslims that preceded them. The ninth century Arab apologists were preceded by 
important contributions in Greek and Syriac, designed mainly to help Christians cope with 
life under Islamic rule. The new reality of the ninth century writing in Arabic is the effort 
made to reach a Muslim audience as well as a Christian one. The fact that Abü Qurra and 
Abü Rä'ita engaged in debate with each other over Christological differences enables a 
contrast to be drawn between inter-Christian dialogue and Christian-Muslim dialogue in 
the ninth century. By comparing their writing for a specifically Christian audience with 
that designed for Muslims, it is possible to understand their apologetic method. The 
apologetic method of each writer is then compared, in order to draw conclusions about the 
way in which Islamic concepts influenced their work and the Christology they advocated. 
The twentieth century theologians are studied in the light of the most important 
Christological writing for Muslims from the post-enlightenment era that preceded them. 
Knowledge of Islam that came in the wake of the enlightenment enabled dialogue to re- 
emerge after centuries of indifference or diatribe. By the nineteenth century, some 
Christians were beginning to make use of this knowledge to engage in debate about Christ 
with Muslims. The difference between the ninth century and the post-enlightenment 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is the situation of the two groups of writers. The ninth 
century apologists were living under Islamic rule with the constraints of censorship that 
this implied. However, their twentieth century counterparts are Western European 
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theologians, only one of whom has lived in the Islamic world. The fact that Cragg and 
Kling openly criticised Islamic beliefs is a mark of their freedom from constraint. Such 
criticism is absent from the ninth century writers. A need emerges from the analysis of the 
modern Western apologists for a more dynamic approach to dialogue that would enable 
Christians living in Islamic societies to relate their faith to Muslims. An attempt to do this 
has come from a dramatic version of the life of Christ, which combines material from the 
four gospels with language taken from the Qur'an, to create a portrait of Christ that relates 
to Islamic thought patterns. This approach to Christology may point a way forward for 
Christians in the global context in which they find themselves. 
The thesis is structured into two clusters of chapters, concerned in Part One with 
three ninth century theologians, and in Part Two with three twentieth century theologians. 
Part One is preceded by a study of Muslim beliefs about Christ, which create the context 
for dialogue, and Part Two is followed by a study of the future prospects for dialogue on 
Christ. Chapter One outlines the teaching of the Qur'an about Christ and the various ways 
in which Muslims have interpreted that teaching down to recent times, and establishes the 
main difficulties in the way of dialogue that arise from the Qur'änic denials of Christ's 
sonship and crucifixion. Chapter Two sets the scene for the study of the three ninth century 
apologists by examining the references to dialogue about Christ in the writing of John of 
Damascus from the first half of the eighth century. The earliest apology for Christianity in 
Arabic from the second half of the century provides evidence of the way the Islamic 
context was provoking a Christian response. The debate between Timothy I and the Caliph 
al-Mahdi in 781-2 points out the issues that Muslims raised in dialogue with Christ. 
Chapter Three is devoted to the Christological writing in Arabic of Theodore Abü 
Qurra. Short treatises written for catechetical purposes are compared with others addressed 
to Muslims, to show how he dealt with Christology in dialogue with Muslims. His aim was 
to defend a Christian account of Christ by showing that it is not inconsistent with Islamic 
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convictions. Chapter Four expounds the more detailed Christological writing of Abü 
Rä'ita. As a Jacobite miaphysite theologian, he debated with Melkite diophysites such as 
Abü Qurra, as well as with Muslims. A comparison is made between the two types of 
writing to discern how his Christology differs from one audience to another. Like Abü 
Qurra, he seeks to uphold the rationality of Christology for his Muslim audience. His direct 
appeal to the Qur'an in support of the Incarnation is an outstanding feature. Chapter Five 
studies the only two known pieces of writing by 'Ammar al-Basri. These are both 
apologetic works in which the Incarnation is defended in the face of Islamic doubt. 
'Ammar's aim is to show the internal coherence of the idea of the Incarnation as the best 
form of revelation. Chapter Six draws together the common themes of these ninth century 
apologists as well as their distinctive contributions to dialogue on Christology, and studies 
Muslim reactions to Christology in the ninth and early tenth centuries. This chapter acts as 
a summary of Part One of the Thesis, evaluating the importance of the early ninth century 
for Christological dialogue. 
Chapter Seven opens Part Two of the thesis with a summary of the subsequent 
history of dialogue up to the nineteenth century. Two innovative apologists are considered 
as suitable background to the writers of the second half of the twentieth century. The 
German missionary, Karl Pfander and the Egyptian Coptic Christian Ibrähim Lügä both 
attempted to present Christ from a Muslim point of view, arguing that a Christian 
perspective can be seen to grow out of a Muslim one. Their common approach differs in 
detail, but sets the tone for the creative apologetic of a later period. Chapter Eight gathers 
together the significant writings of Kenneth Cragg on Christology for Muslims. His 
innovative Christian readings of the Qur'an are analysed along with his insistence on the 
need for Muslims to rethink their concept of God's relationship with the world. Chapter 
Nine examines the dialogical activity of Hans Küng and John Hick, who entered into 
dialogue with Muslims after establishing a reputation as philosophical theologians. Their 
concern to write theology at a global rather than Western level is tested in dialogue, as is 
their capacity to represent their fellow Christians. Chapter Ten outlines the Christology 
behind an anonymous Life of Christ in Arabic, which seeks in an unusual and innovative 
way to combine material from the four gospels and the Qur'an. This is a significant event 
in contextualising Christology for Muslims, since the thought of the Qur'an is so 
thoroughly interwoven into the Christian story, and may point to a future method of 
Christian-Muslim dialogue. Chapter Eleven summarises Part Two by analysing the 
Christologies of the twentieth century writers in the context of dialogue in the light of 
Muslim response. 
Chapter Twelve is the conclusion of the thesis, which evaluates the ways in which 
different aspects of Christology have been dealt with in dialogue from both the early and 
recent periods. The significance of the apologetic method of those living in the Muslim 
world is noted in comparison with the approach of those living in the Western world. The 
chapter closes with a glance at future prospects for dialogue between Christians and 




The Islamic Context for Dialogue on Christology 
Christian dialogue with Muslims about Christ has always been affected by the portrait of 
him found in the Qur'än, which both affirms and denies convictions held about Christ by 
Christians. The Qur'an affirms that Christ was born of the virgin Mary, l that he had a 
special measure of God's Spirit, 2 that he healed the sick and raised the dead, 3 and that he 
brought God's message to his people Israel which confirmed the Torah previously given 
through Moses. 4 In addition, the Qur'an makes claims about Christ that the Christian 
gospels do not, that he made a bird from clay, s that he predicted Mubammad's coming, 6 
and that he was taken up to heaven instead of being put to death. ' The Qur'an denies that 
Christ sought for faith in himself, 8 that he should be called God's Son, 9 and that he died 
by crucifixion. '° 
I. Qur'anic affirmations of and additions to Christian convictions about Christ 
1.1.1 Born of the virgin Mary 
Sara 3: 45-49 contains a speech by a group of angels to Jesus' mother, Mary, announcing 
details about the baby she is to conceive by God's power. He is to be `a word' from God, 
1 Sara 19: 19-21. 
2 Süras 2: 87,253; and 5: 110. 
3 Süra 5: 110. 
4 Süras 3: 49-5 1; 5: 46; and 61: 6. 
S Saras 3: 49; and 5: 110. 
6Süra61: 6. 
Süra 4: 158. 
8 Süras 5: 116f; and 43: 57-64. 
9 Saras 2: 116; 4: 171; 6: 101; 9: 30; 10: 68; 17: 111; 18: 4; 19: 35,88-92; 21: 26; 23: 91; 25: 2; 37: 152; 39: 4; 
43: 81f; 72: 3; and 112: 3. 
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and is to be called `the Messiah'. He will be esteemed by men and by God as among those 
closest to God. He will speak to people while still a child before his adult work begins. He 
will be especially pure in character. In süra 19: 19-21 a solitary angel appears to Mary in 
human form and announces that God is giving Mary a `pure boy'. To Mary's retort that no 
man has touched her, the angel replies that it will happen because it is easy for God to do 
what he has decreed. 
Only Jesus has a beginning like this among the other messengers of God he is 
identified with in the Qur'an. Others had human fathers but he did not. Subsequent Muslim 
interpretation of the birth of Jesus has usually insisted on virginal conception. Qur'än 
commentator Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi (d. 1210) suggested that either God breathed into Mary 
so that she conceived or the angel Gabriel did, but there was no question of a human father 
being involved. 11 Yüsuf 'All confirms this view in recent times. "Mary the mother of Jesus 
was unique, in that she gave birth to a son by a special miracle, without the intervention of 
the customary physical means. " 12 A dissenting voice can be heard in the Ahmadi 
commentator, Muhammad'All, who held that Jesus was conceived in the same way as all 
women conceive. 13 
While it appears that Christ's conception is unique among the prophets, süra 3: 59 
makes a comparison between the conception of Jesus and the beginning of the human race. 
The conception of Jesus is like the creation of the first man Adam, since God created 
Adam from dust and said to him'be', and Adam came into existence. The context of this 
comparison is a dispute about the significance of Jesus` virginal conception. Muhammad is 
instructed to argue with those who doubt the comparison. The historian Ibn Ishäq (d. 767) 
reported that Muhammad debated with Christians from Najran and Ethiopia about the 
10 Sara 4: 157. 
11 Fakhr al-Drn al-Räzi, Al-Tafsir al-Kabir on süra 19: 16-22. See the discussion by N. Robinson, "al-Räzi 
and the Virginal Conception", Islamochristiana. (14,1988,1-16), 14E 
12 Y. 'All, The Meaning of the Holy Qur'än. Lahore, 1934, on süra 3: 42. 13 M. 'All, The Holy Qur'an. Woking, 1917, on süra 19: 22. 
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divinity of Jesus. The Christians argued that Jesus had a unique status among humans as a 
result of his conception without a human father. Muhammad replied that God created 
Adam without a male or female parent. Therefore the creation of Jesus was no more unique 
than that of Adam. 14 This use of the comparison as an argument against a Christian view 
of the virginal conception has reappeared throughout the history of Islam. The ninth 
century Muslim apologist 'All ibn Rabbän al-Tabar appealed to Adam's lack of human 
parents as a refutation of the Christian idea of the Incarnation. 15 The twentieth century 
Muslim apologist, Abdul Hamid, argued that the Christian conviction of the uniqueness of 
Jesus as a result of his virginal conception is flawed, since "God can create a man without 
a father, or even without father and mother. " 16 
Therefore, the Qur'änic account of the birth of Jesus seems to be coloured by a 
dispute between Muhammad and his Christian contemporaries over the interpretation of 
Jesus' conception. Jesus is conceived in an unusual way but this does not make him 
absolutely unique. This is because the first man, Adam, was also conceived in an abnormal 
fashion. The conception of Jesus demonstrates the continual ability of God to create 
without being tied to normal methods. When he chooses he needs only to say, `be', and it 
will take place. In the use of Adam as a parallel to Jesus, Christians are asked to accept that 
the conception of Jesus cannot be interpreted as the entrance of the divine nature into the 
human realm. The appeal to Adam serves to reduce the impact of Jesus' uniqueness. Jesus 
was uniquely conceived without a human father, but Adam was created in a unique way 
too with neither a father nor mother. Christians would be hardly likely to argue that Adam 
was divine as well as human. Thus, in the Muslim perception of Jesus, the virginal 
14 A. Guillaume, The Life ofMuhanemad: a Translation of(ibn) Islydq's 'Surat Rasül Alläle': London, 1955, 
657. 
is 'All ibn RabbAn al-Tabari, "AI-Radd 'ala al-nasara", in D. Thomas, "The Miracles of Jesus in Early 
Islamic Polemic", JSS. (39,1994,221-243), 221f 
16 A Ilamid, Islam and Christianity. New York, 1967,65. 
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conception is understood as confirming, not the entrance of the divine into the human, but 
the magnificence of the creative energy of the Lord of all worlds. 
1.1.2. Endowed with God's power. 
The unusual circumstances of his conception are actually a sign of God's power in Christ's 
life. As a newborn child he knows about his future work for God. In süra 19: 30 he defends 
his mother's integrity in the face of family disgrace by testifying to God's call on his life. 
"I am God's servant. He has given me the book and made me a prophet. " In other words, 
Mary's family must not think that his birth is disgraceful, but on the contrary, should 
honour her for bearing him. Jesus is a precocious personality in the Qur'an; not only is his 
conception spectacular, but his maturity of thought is beyond compare for such a young 
child. According to süra 3: 49, he knows that his future work will involve the performance 
of miracles of healing and raising the dead. These remarkable predictions by the newborn 
Jesus are not actually followed up by a set of stories describing these miracles, but they 
remain anticipated promises of what is to come. Nevertheless they are confirmed as having 
actually taken place in süra 5: 110, where God addresses Jesus after the completion of his 
prophetic ministry; "You healed the blind and the lepers by my permission and you gave 
life to the dead by my permission. " The infant Jesus went on to perform exactly what God 
commanded him. 
In süra 3: 49 the infant who prophesies his future work says he will make a bird 
model from clay, breathe on it, and it will become a real bird. The prediction is confirmed 
by the divine review of his life's work in süra 5: 110; "you created a clay model of a bird 
by my permission. You breathed on it and it became a (real) bird by my permission. " 
While references to Jesus healing lepers, giving sight to the blind, and raising the dead in 
the same texts confirm the testimony of the gospels, this transformation of a clay model 
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into a living bird is a different type of story from the miracle stories found there. 17 
Therefore the Qur'än both confirms aspects of Jesus' work in the gospels and gives 
supplementary information that alters the perception of his activity. Giving life to clay is 
not part of Jesus' ministry in the canonical gospels, but giving life to people is central to 
his mission. 
Some early Muslim interpreters of the infant Jesus' predictions noted that the 
Christian accounts of Jesus' life differed. The historian al-Yä qübi (d. 891/2) noted that the 
New Testament gospels omitted any account of Jesus speaking in infancy. However, he 
took the view that the four gospel writers tended to disagree with each other on important 
aspects of the life of Jesus. 18 In his Reply to the Christians, the Muslim philosopher al- 
Jähiz (d. 868/9) reported that Christians denied the accuracy of the Qur'änic account of 
Jesus speaking as an infant because "it is not found in the gospels, or stories of the life of 
Jesus, or in the prophecies of his coming. " 19 Al-Jähiz went on to affirm the veracity of the 
Qur'änic story. 
Muslim interpretation of the miracles of Jesus has focused particularly on whether 
Jesus had creative power in himself given by God, or whether he was merely a channel for 
God's creative work. Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 1240) held the first view. Jesus possessed the spirit 
of God in an unusual manner because God had endowed Jesus with a spiritual nature that 
enabled him to do work that would normally be done by God alone. "Jesus came forth 
raising the dead because he was a divine spirit. In this the quickening was of God, while 
the blowing itself came from Jesus ... Jesus' raising of the 
dead was an actual bringing to 
17 The story is found in The non-canonical Infancy Gospel of Thomas, and the Arabic Infancy Gospel, both of 
which may derive from fifth century Syriac sources. See J. K. Elliott, The Apocryphal New Testament. 
Oxford, 1993,75 & 103. 
18 Al-Ya qübi, llistoriae vol 1,77, in A. Ferro, "L'historien al-Ya giibi et les Lvangiles", Islamochristiana. 
(3,1977,65-83), 68. 
19 Abü 'Uthmän al-Jähiz, "Reply to the Christians", in I. S. Allouche, "Un Traite de Polemique Chrbtienne- 
Musulmane au IX'e Siecle", flesperis. (26,1939), 131 
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life. " 20 According to this interpretation, the miracle is attributed to both God and Jesus. 
Fakhr al-Din al-Mzi, held the second view. He notes that only in this context does the verb 
khalaqa have a subject other than God. Therefore, Jesus had in himself no creative power, 
since the expression `by God's permission', rules out such a possibility. The permission of 
God must mean `by God's causing and determining', so the breath of life does not belong 
to Jesus as an inherent power, but works through him at the point of the miracle. 21 These 
two ways of understanding Jesus' miraculous ability illustrate tensions within Islamic 
tradition over the relationship between God and Jesus. On the one hand, Jesus seems to 
have creative power in himself by virtue of a special possession of God's spirit. This 
appears to mark Jesus out from other prophets. The ability to breathe life into the inanimate 
or the dead is not the typical work of prophets. On the other hand, to isolate Jesus' role 
from other prophets is to open the door to a false estimation of Jesus. His activity was 
fundamentally the same as all the other prophets, to be God's instrument in whatever way 
he was summoned to be. If God causes all human action then it follows that all prophetic 
activity is actually God's work. Jesus cannot be given credit for the power of God at work 
through him. 
A minority view of the miracles of Jesus can be found in the writings of the tenth 
century mystical Brethren of Purity who read a spiritual message from them. When Jesus 
gave sight to the blind he applied "spiritual substances to the eyes". He told his disciples 
that he had come to heal them "from the sickness of disobedience, false thinking, bad 
character traits, and bad actions. " 22 A similar spiritualising of the miracles is found in M. 
'All's twentieth century commentary on the Qur'an. For instance he understands the table 
20 Ibn'Arabi, The Bezels of Wisdom, Trans., R. W. J. Austin, London, 1980,176. See also A. D'Souza, "Jesus 
in ibn 'Arabi's Fusüs al-Ilikam", Islamocltristiana. (8,1982,185-200), 194. 
21 Fakhr al-Din al-Räzi, Al-Tafsir al-Kabir on siira 3: 48. See N. Robinson, "Creating Birds from Clay: a 
Miracle of Jesus in the Qur'än and in Classical Muslim Exegesis", MW. (79,1989,1-13), 11. 
22 The Brethren of Purity, Epistles 3 and 4, in Y. Marquet, "Les Ihwän al-Safä et Le Christianisme", 
Islamochristiana. (8,1982,129-158), 144 and 150. 
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of food sent down from heaven at Jesus' request in süra 5: 114f as heavenly food for the 
heart that gives spiritual knowledge. 23 
Although the miracles of Jesus are outstanding, the Qur'än also records other 
prophetic miraculous activity. Moses produced water from a rock, 24 threw a rod on the 
ground, which became a snake, 25 which then swallowed up other rods that had turned to 
snakes. 26 If Moses performed miracles by God's permission, then it cannot be true that 
Jesus had creative power in himself. The ninth century Muslim apologist Abu 'Isä al- 
Warräq (d. 861) argued that if Jesus' miracles proved the presence of the divine nature in 
him as Christians claimed, then the miracles of Moses must prove that he had the same 
divine nature in him. Christians cannot single out Jesus from other miracle workers for 
divine status. 27 
1.1.3. Confirming the Torah given to Israel through Moses 
In süra 3: 49 angels announce that Jesus will have a specific message for the people of 
Israel, and this is confirmed in süra 43: 59, "We made Jesus an example for the children of 
Israel. " Jesus himself twice speaks to the children of Israel. In süra 5: 72 he challenges 
them to serve God; "Children of Israel, worship God, my Lord and yours", and in sara 
61: 6, he claims that God has sent him to them with a message about the past; "Children of 
Israel, I am God's messenger to you, to confirm the Torah which you already possess. " 
Confirmation of the Torah seems to mean clearing up disagreements that have arisen 
among the Jews concerning the correct interpretation of the Torah, according to süra 3: 48f. 
He will tell them what they are allowed to eat, making lawful what had been forbidden by 
23 M. 'Ali, The Holy Qur än. on sara 5: 114f. 
24 Sara 2: 60. 
25 Süra 7: 107. 
26 Sara 7: 117. 
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faulty understanding. He claims a God-given authority to interpret the Torah correctly. 
Nevertheless, there are no actual examples of Jesus' interpretation of food laws. 
Sara 5: 46 indicates that Jesus was given a book that contained God's message; "We 
gave Jesus the gospel in which is guidance and light. " The contents of the gospel are not 
specified as such, though in süra 43: 63 Jesus understands the book to contain wisdom for 
the children of Israel: "I have come to you with wisdom to clarify what you disagree about. 
Fear God and do what I say. " Yet the nature of these disagreements is not made clear. The 
following verse provides a possible context for disagreement; "God is my Lord and yours; 
so worship him. That is the straight path. " The straight path is total loyalty to God, and 
deviation from absolute commitment to him leads to disagreement. The way to avoid 
divergence of opinion is to wholeheartedly focus on God himself. This appears to be the 
heart of the message contained in the gospel given to Jesus. 
Jesus not only confirmed the messages of the past, he also predicted the coming of 
Mul ammad in the future. In süra 61: 6 Jesus proclaimed to Israel that he was God's 
messenger whose task was to confirm the law already given and also to announce the 
coming of a prophet "whose name is Ahmad. " The eighth century biographer of 
Mul}ammad, Ibn Ishäq (d. 767), connected this prophecy of Abmad with Jesus' promise of 
a `comforter' in the gospel of John 14: 16. He claimed that the Syriac word for `comforter' 
had the same meaning as the name `Muhammad', and therefore Jesus was looking forward 
to the arrival of the Prophet of Islam. 28 This connection of the Qur'an and the fourth 
gospel has become an accepted feature of Muslim apologetic addressed to Christians. 
Yusuf'Ali argues that Ahmad `the praised one' is a close parallel to the Greek word 
27 AN 'Isa al-Warraq, "Against the Trinity", in D. Thomas, Anti-Christian Polemic in Early Islam. 
Cambridge, 1992,92. 
28 A. Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad: a Translation of (ibn) Islraq's "S-trat Rasül Allah" : 103f. 
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Periklytos. In John 14: 16, the Greek word Parakletos is a corrupt reading for Periklytos. 
"In the original saying of Jesus there was a prophecy of our Holy Prophet. " 29 
1.2. Qur'änic denials of Christian convictions about Christ 
1.2.1. Christ did not seek for faith in himself 
In süra 5: 116f God interrogates Jesus about his teaching; "Jesus, Mary's son, did you say 
to people - take me and my mother as gods alongside God? " After rigorous denials Jesus 
professes, "I only told them what you commanded me; worship God, my Lord and yours. " 
Under cross-examination, Jesus testifies to the central message of the gospel that the 
children of Israel are to worship God to the exclusion of any other object of devotion. Jesus 
protests that the allegation is groundless, since he never put himself forward as a focus of 
devotion, nor did he present any other human being for the people of God to worship. 
Perhaps this is an example of the kind of disagreement mentioned in süra 43: 63. Jesus' 
impact on the people of Israel was such that some were offering him the kind of worship 
that ought to have been reserved for God alone. But it was not Jesus' intention to attract 
faith in himself. Possibly the authority with which he spoke led some to worship him, or 
maybe his powerful deeds led others to treat him as having divine power in his person and 
so to offer him worship as a divine being. Could the special status of Mary as bearer of 
Jesus have led some to think of her as worthy of worship? 
Muslim commentators have understood this dialogue between God and Jesus as a 
denial of Christian belief in the Trinity. Al-Räzi s discussion is the most thorough of the 
major Qur'an commentators. He believes that Christians invented the story that Jesus 
called on his disciples to regard himself and his mother as divine. This idea grew out of the 
29 Y. 'All, The Meaning of the Holy Qur'än. on süra 61: 6. 
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miracles they performed in the name of Jesus and Mary. Christians attributed the 
miraculous power to Jesus and his mother rather than to God 30 In his comments on süra 
4: 171, al-RAzi thinks that Christians developed a belief that God's attributes indwell Jesus 
and Mary. This lies behind the command not to speak of `three' when God is `one'. He 
sees a development in Christian thought based on devotion to Jesus and Mary in the first 
instance, because the concept of the threefold nature of God grew from that initial 
aberration. Christians believe "that it is possible for the attributes (siat) to indwell Jesus 
and Mary, and that is tantamount to blasphemy. " 31 What is attributed to God cannot be 
attributed to humans, but Christians failed to preserve adequate distinctions between the 
human and the divine. Therefore, the Qur'an corrects the false worship of Christ in the 
Christian tradition. This line of interpretation has become standard. Yüsuf'All's comment 
on süra 5: 116 is typical; "Jesus disclaims here any knowledge of the sort of things that are 
attributed to him by those who take his name. " 32 
1.2.2. Christ is not God's son 
This failure to hold to the unity of God is seen especially in the way Christians call Jesus 
God's Son. Sara 4: 171 connects false ideas about the trinity with the notion that Jesus is 
Son of God; "People of the book... Do not go beyond what is right in your religion. 
Confess God's truth; the Messiah, Mary's son, is only a messenger ... Do not speak about 
a trinity ... since God is one. Far be it for him to have a son. 
" Somehow Christians have 
erred from the truth given to them by Christ and have invoked the wrath of God. Sara 9: 30 
shows the limits of divine tolerance; "The Christians say the Messiah is God's son ... May 
God destroy them. " But the truth is that God does not have the sort of relationship with a 
30 Al-RäzI, A1-Tafsir al-Kabir on süra 5: 116. 
" Ibid., on süra 4: 171. 
32 Y. 'All, The Meaning of the holy Qur'än, on süra 5: 116. 
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man that the idea suggests, because God does not restrict himself to the world he has made 
by being connected with Jesus as if they were in the same family. "It is not for God to have 
a son. May he be glorified! When he decides anything he only has to say concerning it, 
`be', and it comes into existence. " 33 
For the Qur'an commentator al-Tabari (d. 923) the naming of Jesus as God's son 
undermines the unity of God. By introducing concepts of fatherhood and sonship, 
Christians take away from God's true nature, since the Christian idea introduces a 
necessary connection between God and Jesus that reduces God's freedom and power. But 
the truth is that "God created the heavens and the earth from nothing, and he created the 
Messiah without a father by his power and authority. " 34 Al-Räzi takes this insight further 
by arguing that a son would take some of the greatness from God because he would have 
to carry the seed of his father. It would be far better to call Jesus God's `servant' rather than 
God's son. 3s 
The truth cannot contain any hint of a biological connection between Jesus and 
God. Christians ought to give up naming Jesus as son in order to remove any suspicion of 
such a thing. Muhammad himself testifies in süra 43: 81 that the sonship of Jesus was an 
idea that he had encountered but had rejected as false prophecy; "if the Compassionate had 
a son I would be the first to worship [him]. " While Mubammad respected Christians he had 
met, he failed to understand how they could offer worship to a supposed divine son. Part of 
his mission was to try to bring sense to the Christians of his day. 
Recently M. M. Ayoub has questioned the longstanding tradition of interpreting 
sonship in a biological sense. He points out that the Qur'an does not use the term walad to 
refer to Jesus; "the Qur'än nowhere accuses Christians of calling Jesus the ivalad offspring 
33 Sara 19: 35. 
34 Abü Ja'far al-Tabari, Jämi' al-Bayän fi Tajsär al-Qur än, on süra 2: 116. 
3' Al-Räzi, Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, on süra 2: 116. 
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of God. " 36 The Qur'an uses the verb iltakhadha meaning `took to himself , which does not 
suggest physical generation but rather a relationship of adoption. 37 It remains to be seen 
whether this novel reading of the Qur'än will be adopted by other Muslims, but it does 
suggest a fertile approach to finding common ground with Christians over a title that is 
central to the portrait of Christ in the gospels. 
1.2.3. Christ did not die on the cross 
Sara 4: 157f clearly denies that Christ died on the cross; "The people of the book said, we 
killed the Messiah, Jesus, Mary's son, God's messenger. But they did not kill him. They did 
not crucify him. Rather it seemed so to them ... No, God raised Jesus to himself. 
" In the 
context, the people of the book were Jews in Jesus' day who sought for his death but who 
were denied the result they hoped for. Interpreters of this text have often followed al- 
Tabari in his view that the disciple who betrayed Jesus "took on the likeness of Jesus" and 
was mistaken for his master. "God raised Jesus and they only crucified the one that looked 
like him. " 38 For example, the twentieth century apologist Z. H. Assfy holds that after Jesus 
was taken from prison to heaven, Judas, who betrayed Jesus, was "miraculously 
transformed to resemble Jesus in all his physical features", and was crucified. 39 However, 
al-Räzi thinks that such an idea would lead to doubt in the transmission of reports, and 
doubt might follow concerning any sacred law. A better interpretation would be that the 
Jews took a man whom they killed and claimed that he was Jesus. Al-Räzi is aware of the 
strength of the Christian conviction that it was Jesus who died rather than another. "The 
36 M. M. Ayoub, "Jesus the Son of God: A Study of the Terms Ibn and walad in the Qur'an and Tafsir 
Tradition", in Christian-Muslim Encounters. eds. Y. Y. Haddad and W. Z. Haddad, Gainesville, 1995,65-81, 
65. 
s' Ibid. 
38 Abü Jä far al-Tabari, Annals 2: 735f, in M. Hayek, Le Christ de L'Islam. Paris, 1959,224. 
39 Z. H. Assfy, Islam and Christianity. York, 1977,56f. 
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only way Muslims can argue against this is to ask whether the disciples of Jesus at the time 
of the crucifixion were mistaken. " ao 
A minority view has been to accept the fact of his death but to deny that the 
spiritual reality of Christ was affected by the event. The tenth century Brethren of Purity 
thought that Jesus was actually killed by crucifixion, but that his soul was not harmed even 
though his body perished. 41 M. M. Ayoub has put forward a similar view. The Qur'an 
denies "the power of men to vanquish and destroy the divine Word, which is forever 
victorious. " He makes room for the crucifixion of Jesus as a historical fact. The Qur'an 
teaches that men cannot destroy the word of God even though they can kill the body of the 
messenger. 42 Nevertheless, the denial of the death of Jesus as a historical reality remains 
dominant in contemporary Muslim thought. For example S. H. Nasr believes that "the non- 
crucifixion of Jesus is the one irreducible fact separating Christianity and Islam. " 43 
A consequence of the denial of the death of Christ on the cross has been the 
assumption of the majority that Christ was raised up without going through the process of 
death. This is seen in al-Tabari's interpretation quoted above, that God raised Jesus before 
the one who looked like him was seized and crucified. Several of the sayings attributed to 
Muhammad assume that Christ was raised alive and will return again to bring God's 
message. 44 
40 Al-Rä21, Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, on süra 4: 157f. 
°t The Brethren of Purity, Epistle 44, in Y. Marquet, "Les Ihwän a1-Safa et Le Christianisme", 
Islamochrisliana. (8,1982,129-158), 146. 
42 M. M. Ayoub, "The Death of Jesus; Reality or Delusion", 111W (70,1980,96-117), 103. 
43 S. II. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought. London, 1981,210. 
as See for example $aliih Muslim, 1: 287, "Jesus son of Mary will come down to you and will break the cross, 
kill the pig, abolish the tax on non-Muslims, and provide an abundance of money so that nobody will need to 
accept charity. " 
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1.3. Conclusion 
The Qur'An affirms, adds to and denies aspects of the life of Christ found in the gospels. 
The virginal conception is accepted as true but a Christian understanding of the Incarnation 
is ruled out. The miraculous work of Jesus is affirmed, but not a Christian veneration of 
Jesus' miraculous power as proof of his divinity. His teaching does challenge Jewish 
convictions, but is essentially the same as that of Moses, since Jesus' authority is no greater 
than that of previous messengers. In his prophetic teaching he looks forward explicitly to 
the coming of Muhammad, whose authority he endorses. Christians are wrong to worship 
Christ since he called on his followers to worship God alone, they are wrong to use 
language of Jesus that implies a biological link with God, because God cannot be limited to 
a human level. They are also wrong to claim that Jesus died by crucifixion, because his 
exaltation bypassed the plans of his enemies. 
The implications for Christians of the three denials of the Qur'an are serious. If 
Christ did not seek for faith in himself then a major focus of New Testament and 
subsequent Christian faith is misplaced, and needs to be radically altered in favour of pure 
monotheism. If God did not have a son then many New Testament texts must be rewritten 
to avoid making the claim that God is the father of his son Christ. If Christ did not die on 
the cross then the ending of his life in the four gospels must be adjusted accordingly, and 
the teaching of the Apostles about the saving effects of his death on the cross must be 
abandoned. 
The following study of Christian dialogue with Muslims about Christ shows how 
Christian apologists have dealt with these challenges while maintaining a belief in the 
divinity and humanity of Christ. Since there will be an increasing need for Christians to 
take the Islamic context into proper account in articulating their faith in a plural world, 
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consideration of the most creative responses to these challenges should enable them to 
"give a reason for (their) hope in a gracious and respectful way". as 
45 The First Letter of Peter, 3: 15f. 
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Part One 
Ninth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
The first part of this study analyses three early ninth century writers who presented Christ 
for Muslims. Part One opens with a review in chapter two of eighth century Christian 
attempts to present Christ in the light of Islamic conceptions. The extant apologetic writing 
on Christology from this early period of Muslim rule in the Middle East consists of two 
brief pieces of advice to Christians on how to talk about Christ with Muslims along with 
two more substantial pieces of apologetics. The first of these is a discourse on the 
Incarnation that uses Qur'änic ideas to communicate a Christian view of Jesus, and the 
second is a debate between Muslim and Christian leaders in which the Christian answers 
questions about his Christology. Chapters three to five expound and evaluate the dialogical 
Christology of three ninth century writers, Abü Qurra, Abü Rä'ita, and 'Ammar a1-Bari. 
Chapter three examines Abü Qurra's brief treatises for Muslims that tackle questions such 
as how God can have a son, and why Christians think the death of Christ is important for 
their faith. These are single-issue tracts, which together show how Abü Qurra sought to 
give a reasoned account of the Incarnation and atonement for Muslims of his day. Chapter 
four turns to the more thorough treatment of Abü Rä'ita's questions and answers on 
Christology produced in the style of debate between a Muslim and a Christian. His 
apologetical approach is to argue from Muslim premises to Christian conclusions, openly 
quoting from the Qur'an to establish the basis for some of his arguments. His creative use 
of Islamic ideas makes him one of the two outstanding apologists of this early era of 
Christian-Muslim dialogue. The other one is 'Ammar al-Ba5ri, whose questions and 
answers on Christology are more detailed than Abü Rä'ita's. His method is not to appeal 
directly to Islamic premises arising from the Qur'an but to the internal coherence of 
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Christology as the best form of divine self-revelation. Together, Abü Rä'ita and 'Ammar 
erected the most formidable defence of Christian faith in Christ in the first Muslim 
centuries. Chapter six closes Part One with a comparative evaluation of the dialogical 
Christology of the eighth and ninth centuries, which also examines how Muslims in the 
ninth and early tenth centuries responded to Christian arguments in defence of the 
Incarnation. As a result, conclusions are made about the nature and goals of dialogue about 
Christ in the early centuries of Muslim-Christian interaction. 
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Part One. Ninth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Two 
The Beginning of Dialogue on Christology in the Eighth Century 
The arrival of Muslim rule in the traditionally Christian sectors of the Middle East, in the 
fourth decade of the seventh century, brought a direct challenge to the churches to give an 
account of Christ in the light of the Islamic understanding of him. If the Qur'an offered a 
correct account of Christ then Christians would sooner or later have to defend their 
conviction that Jesus Christ was the eternal Son of God who had become human to rescue 
humanity from the results of sin through his death on the cross. Incarnation and atonement 
were at the heart of Christian faith but these central doctrines were under attack from the 
new religion that had taken control over this section of the Christian world. 
This chapter examines two major and two minor contributions to dialogue about 
Christ in the eighth century. While there are indications of dialogue about Christ between 
Muslims and Christians from the seventh century, 46 the earliest known written defence of 
Christian belief about Christ comes from John of Damascus (d. c. 750), after his retirement 
from service in the Muslim government in the second decade of the eighth century. John 
was a member of the Greek speaking churches that followed the Christological 
affirmations of the councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon, and was later to be regarded as one 
of the doctors of the Eastern Orthodox churches for his systematic account of the faith 
John referred to Islam as one of many heresies of his era, which may reflect a widespread 
view of the new movement among Christians. 47 
46 There is a report in Syriac of a dialogue between John Sedra, the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch (631-48) 
and a Muslim leader, in which the Patriarch is asked to justify his belief that Christ is God. John appeals to 
the prophecies of the Messiah in the Old Testament, but does not engage with specifically Muslim 
convictions about Christ. See F. Nau, "Un colloque du patriarche Jean aver L'6mir des Agareens et faits 
divers des annoes 712 ä 716, " JA. (5,1915,225-79) 
47 See D. J. Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam. Leiden, 1972,42-44; and S. 11. Griffith, "Melkites, Jacobites, 
and the Christological Controversies in Arabic in Third/Ninth-Century Syria", in Syrian Christians Under 
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An anonymous defence of the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation 
in Arabic came from the Greek speaking Chalcedonian churches in Palestine possibly 
before 750, showing that Christians were beginning to adopt the language of Islam at least 
to engage in debate with Muslims. It most probably was the work of the monastic 
communities of South Palestine, which John had joined after his retirement, and shows a 
familiarity with the Qur'an that demonstrates a willingness to approach Muslims on their 
terms in order to uphold Christian truth. 48 
From the eighth decade of the century comes the written report of a dialogue 
between the Caliph al-Mahdi and the Patriarch of the Nestorian churches in Baghdad, 
which seems to have taken place just after Timothy was consecrated Patriarch in 780.49 
Timothy was invited by al-Mahdi to give an account of a range of Christian beliefs that 
differed from Islamic teaching. Timothy's grasp of Muslim thought is evidence of a 
climate of dialogue cultivated by the early 'Abbasid Caliphs in which Muslim and 
Christian theologians developed extensive knowledge of each other's beliefs. The dialogue 
has been preserved in Syriac and in Arabic, and for the most part shows Timothy offering 
answers to al-Mahdi s questions, with occasional counter-questions raised by Timothy. Al- 
Mahdi s questions concentrate on the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Scriptures and the status 
of the prophet Muhammad, since these were the most significant areas of disagreement 
between Muslims and Christians. 50 
The Nestorian community had a substantial presence in the region of Baghdad, 
which had become the seat of the 'Abbasid Caliphs, and this accounts for the way that al- 
Islam. Leiden, 2001,19-22. For a convenient introduction to the apologetic methods of John of Damascus, as 
well as Timothy I, Abü Qurra and 'Ammar al-Basri see J-M. Gaudeul, Encounters and Clashes. Vol 1, 
Rome, 1984,28-38. 
48 See S. K Samir, "The Earliest Arab Apology for Christianity (c. 750), in Christian Arabic Apologetics 
during the Abbasid Period (750-1258). eds. S. K Samir and J. S. Nielsen, Leiden, 1994,57-60; and S. 11. 
Griffith, "The Monks of Palestine and the Growth of Christian Literature in Arabic", MW. (78,1988,1-28) 
21f. 
49 Timothy describes his debate with the Caliph in a letter to the priest Sargis in 782/3. See Epistle 59 in Les 
Lettres du Patriarche Nestorien Timothee I. ed. R. J. Bidawid, Studi e Testi, 187, Rome, 1956,42f. 
so See 11. Putnam, L'Eglise sous Timothee 1: 780-832. Beirut, 1975. 
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Mahdi treated Timothy as the leader of the Christians. Nestorians had been forced to live 
beyond the borders of the Roman Empire during the fifth century and had settled mainly in 
Mesopotamia, from which they established churches further east. Their language was 
Syriac, but the fact that an Arabic version of the dialogue became available in the last 
decade of the century shows that the language of Islam was becoming important not just 
51 for communication with Muslims, but also for Christian instruction. 
2.1. John of Damascus: Dialogue with Muslims about Christ 
During his retirement from public office, John wrote three treatises, which he put together 
under the title Pege Gnosis `The Fount of Knowledge'. The first treatise, Dialectica, is a 
study of philosophy, the second, De Haeresibus, describes one hundred heresies, and the 
third, De Fide Orthodoxa, expounds orthodox belief. The hundredth heresy in De 
Haeresibus is `the Heresy of the Ishmaelites', and includes answers to questions posed by 
Muslims on the Trinity, the Incarnation and Scripture. 52 
2.1.1. Dialogue on Christ in The Heresy of the Ishmaelites 
John's treatment of Christology in this chapter on Islam refers to an accusation made by 
Muslims that Christians associate Christ with God in an unacceptable way "by saying that 
Christ is the Son of God and God. " 53 John suggests two ways of replying to this challenge. 
Firstly, it could be mentioned that the prophets that preceded his coming foretold the 
divinity of Christ, since Muslims accept them as genuine prophets of God. However, he 
realises that Muslims might deny the validity of such prophecy on the grounds that the 
51 See A. S. Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity. London, 1968. For further details see chapter 5.1. page 
95. 
52 Greek text with English translation in D. J. Sahas, op cit. 
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prophetic writings have been tampered with to such an extent that they can no longer be 
trusted to contain original prophetic utterance. This is early testimony for the Islamic 
conviction that the Jews tampered with their scriptures. sa 
John thinks a second type of response may be more fruitful. Christians could quote 
the Muslim belief that "Christ is Word and Spirit of God. " 55 and say "if the Word is in 
God it is obvious that he is God as well. " Denial of this argument by Muslims would result 
in an inadequate understanding of the nature of God, so that the Christian can say; "if, on 
the other hand, this is outside of God, then God, according to you is without word and 
without spirit. " In John's logic, since Muslims wish to deny that Christ is God they have to 
accept that the word and spirit are split off from God as a result of the appearing of Christ. 
Christians can drive the point home; "thus trying to avoid making associates to God, you 
have mutilated him. " 56 
John has chosen to avoid dealing with the sonship of Christ raised in the original 
allegation that Christians associate Christ with God in the wrong way by calling him Son 
of God. He has focussed instead on the Qur'änic affirmation that Christ is word and spirit 
from God in order to put Muslims on the defensive over their understanding of God's 
attributes of word and spirit. However, a Muslim may have replied that Christ carried the 
word of God, which he declared to the Jews, and was empowered by the spirit of God in a 
similar way to other prophets. As a result no association of Christ with God need be made. 
53 John of Damascus, The Heresy of the Ishmaelites, in Sahas, 137. 
54 The Qur'än speaks of corruption of the Scriptures in the possession of the Jews. Sara 3: 78, "There is a 
group (within the People of the book) who distort the book with their tongues ... They say this 
is from God, 
but it is not from bim" along with süra 7: 162, "Evildoers (among the People of the book) changed the word 
that was spoken to them", have been widely understood by Muslims to demonstrate the unreliability of the 
Jewish Scriptures. It is clear from John's argument that appeal to Messianic prophecy, which was 
characteristic of New Testament and Patristic Christology, could not be used with ease in an Islamic context. 
55 See süras 3: 45 and 5: 110. 
56 John of Damascus, The Heresy of the Ishmaelites In Sabas, 137. 
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2.1.2. Dialogue between a Muslim and a Christian attributed to John 57 
Though attributed to John, this dialogue is found among the writings of Abü Qurra (d. c. 
829) who may have edited the work. Since the content of this dialogue corresponds more 
closely to De Haeresibus than the writing of Abü Qurra, it is likely that it comes from the 
eighth century even if not from John himself. This dialogue concerns Christology and the 
source of good and evil. 58 Since the Muslim is addressed in the third person as he and the 
Christian in the second person as you, it is clear that this is a piece of advice for Christians 
in their encounter with Muslims rather than an apology written directly for Muslims. Once 
again it is suggested that the Christian refer to Christ as word and spirit of God, but now 
the argument turns on whether word and spirit are created or not. If the Muslim says that 
the word and spirit are created, the Christian should ask; "before God created the Word and 
the Spirit, did he have neither Spirit nor Word? " In reply, the Muslim asks the Christian 
whether the words of God are created or uncreated. The Christian is warned to be careful 
in making a response. If he says that God's words arc uncreated, the Muslim might argue 
that this does not make the words of God, "gods to be worshipped". Likewise, Christ is not 
a god to be worshipped, even if he is an uncreated word of God. In the light of this, the 
Christian is advised to make a clear distinction between the words of God and the Word of 
God. The words of God are gathered in the Scriptures, but the Word of God is Christ who 
is the true uncreated Word of God. 59 
57 Sahas (p. 102) believes that although the text in its present form does not come from John's hand, the 
content is a product of his thought. However, S. 11. Griffith (Melkfites, p. 22) doubts whether the attribution 
can be supported. R. G. IIoyland thinks that it may have been constructed from John's teachings, but not 
written by John himself. See his Seeing Islam as others saw it. Princeton, 1997,489. 
58 Sahas gives the Greek text with an English translation by J. W. Voorhis from "The Discussion of a 
Christian and a Saracen", MW. (25,1935,266-273). 
59 Dialogue Between a Christian and A Muslim, in Sahas, 151. 
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Here the use of the Qur'änic title "a word from him" throws up problems for the 
Christian. Discussion of the eternity of the Qur'än among Muslims seemed to provide a 
useful parallel for talk about the eternal Word becoming human. However, though 
Muslims might believe in the eternity of the Qur'än, they did not think of the word of God 
as existing in time in the way that Christians believed that Christ was the eternal word in 
time. The appeal to this Qur'änic title for Christ is not repeated in ninth century apologetics 
probably because the lesson taught here had been learnt. The dialogue also advises 
Christians how to speak about the divine and human natures of Christ. If a Muslim 
wonders how God can eat, drink and sleep, Christians should reply that the human nature 
performed those actions but that the divine nature did not. If the Muslim asks whether the 
divine nature died on the cross then the Christian must say that only Christ's human nature 
died. 60 
2.1.3. Evaluation 
John's approach to dialogue on Christology is firstly to recognise the way Muslims see 
Christ. Rather than repeat the affirmations of Orthodox Christology he builds his case on 
foundations acceptable to Muslims. While they refuse to speak of him as God's son, they 
call Christ God's word and spirit, therefore John begins his answer to the question about 
sonship with this Muslim affirmation about Christ. If Christ is word and spirit from God 
then surely he shares attributes of God in such a way that makes him divine as well as 
human. 
Secondly, John avoids areas of outright denial, thus he does not discuss why 
Christians call Jesus God's Son. He also declines to appeal to Christian Scripture since he 
is aware of Muslim hesitation about the authenticity of the text. The issue of tahrif had 
60 Ibid., 153. 
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become important in Muslim attitudes to the Jewish and Christian scriptures. Rather than 
appeal to the authority of the sacred text, John counsels Christians to develop arguments 
that depend on ideas acceptable to Muslims themselves with a view to reaching Christian 
conclusions. This type of apologetic argument that seeks to make a reasonable case for 
Christology on grounds acceptable to Muslims comes to full flourish in the early ninth 
century writing studied in chapters three to six. 
2.2. An Anonymous Apology for Christianity 61 
From the same Palestinian region in which John wrote comes an apology not in Greek, but 
in Arabic, which attempts to explain Christian faith to Muslims. The date of the apology is 
not certain, but it may have been written in the 740's. 62 The apology differs in style from 
John's dialogue framework, since here Muslims are not addressed in the third person as in 
John's writing, but in the second person as `you', with Christians in the first person as `we'. 
This apology is more of a long discourse addressed to Muslims rather than a debate with 
questions and answers. The context of the work is Muslim criticism of Christian belief just 
as it was in John's work, but the writer quotes from the Qur'An in order to defend Christian 
faith to a much greater extent than John's single Qur'änic reference to Christ as word and 
spirit from God. If this apology is the product of the generation following John then 
Christians were beginning to use Arabic to formulate theology by the mid eighth century. 
61 The Arabic text (Sinai 145) is edited with an English translation by M. D. Dunlop as A Treatise on the 
Triune Nature of God. London, 1899. 
62 Gibson's version of the treatise omitted "a few pages from the end" (introduction vi). S. K. Samir 
discovered on one of those pages the following statement; "If this religion was not truly from God, it would 
not have stood firm nor stood erect for seven hundred and forty-six years. " See S. K. Samir, "The Earliest 
Arab Apology for Christianity (c. 750)" in Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period (750- 
1258). eds. S. K. Samir and J. S. Nielsen, Leiden, 1994,57-116,61. Samir's belief that this statement 
probably reflects a date just before 750 is accepted by S. I I. Griffith in "The Monks of Palestine and the 
Growth of Christian Literature in Arabic", MW. (78,1988,1-28), 21. This presupposes counting 746 years 
from the birth of Christ, but if the beginning of the church is in mind then a date in the 780's is more likely, 
according to M. Swanson, Folly to the 11unaja', PhD thesis presented to P. I. S. A. I. Rome, 1992. He specifies 
788 in "Some Considerations for the Dating off tatet allah al-wäMd (Sinai Ar. 154) and al-gmni' ivugah al- 
imän (London, British Library op. 4950)" in PO. (18,1993,118-141), 140. 
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The treatise opens with an explanation of Christian belief in the Trinity in terms governed 
by the Muslim concern for the worship of one God; "we do not worship another God 
alongside God in his Word and Spirit. " 63 The writer responds to the allegation made 
against Christians that they do this with Christ. The proof that only one God is worshipped 
is found in "the book God sent down on his prophet Moses" where God created the world 
by his word and his spirit. 64 
2.2.1. The Sending of the Word 
When the writer comes to the relationship between God and his Word he deals with the 
Qur'änic denial of the sonship of Christ. "We do not say that God brought forth (walada) 
his Word, as humans give birth to offspring. " 65 Christians think of the Father bringing 
forth the Word as the sun produces rays, or the human mind words, or fire heat. Just as 
there cannot be heat without fire or rays without sun, or words without a mind, so there 
cannot be the Word of God without God. The writer quotes from the Qur'an to support this 
view. "Believe in God and his word; and also in his spirit, who is sent down from your 
Lord as mercy and guidance. " 66 
The sending of the Word is set in the context of the Biblical account of the creation 
and fall of humanity and the history of Israel. Figures common to the Bible and the Qur'än, 
Noah, Abraham, Lot, Moses and David, are all referred to, and no incidents in Old 
Testament history are mentioned that do not occur in the Qur'än. The weakness of Israel 
lies in the power of the Devil who continually succeeds in drawing the people away from 
God, so the Word is sent to deal with Satanic power once and for all, "by putting on weak 
63 A Treatise on the Triune Nature of God. ed. M. D. Gibson, 75. 
64 For the Qur'änic phraseology see scsras 3: 4 and 5: 44. 
6s Ibid., 77. 
66 Ibid. The quotation is an amalgam of süras 4: 171 and 16: 102. 
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human nature taken from pure Mary. " 67 The purity of Mary is emphasised in the 
succeeding section, enabling the writer to show that the Word took on a human nature that 
was undefiled by any weakness. "Christ was born of the pure Mary by the Holy Spirit 
without her being touched by a man. God from God, light from light, Word and Spirit; a 
perfect human, with mind and body, yet without sin. " 
68 Expressions from the Nicene creed 
"God from God, light from light" and also from the Chalcedonian definition "a perfect 
human, with mind and body, yet without sin" are built into the presentation. 69 Here is a 
weaving together of Islamic and Christian ideas to produce the elements of a Christology 
that might appeal to Muslim readers, or at least not seem totally removed from Islamic 
principles. 
Qur'änic support for the divinity of Christ is found in Jesus' creative power. "Christ 
created whereas only God creates. You will find in the Qur'an that Christ spoke and 
created from clay what looked like a bird, then blew on it and it became a [real] bird by 
God's permission. " 
70 Further proof for the divinity of Christ comes from his forgiving sin, 
feeding the hungry, casting out evil spirits, giving the Holy Spirit to his disciples, 
ascending to heaven, judging humanity and granting eternal life to the righteous. None of 
these could be performed by a human being, but only by God who "veiled himself in a 
sinless human being". 71 The author attaches data from the New Testament to the miracle 
story from the Qur'än to create a composite account of Christ's divine power in a bid to 
anchor the idea of divinity in the creative actions permitted him by God. 
67 Ibid., 83. 
6s Ibid. 
69 The Nicene Creed composed in 325 stated that Christ was "the Word of God, God from God, Light from 
Light. " See the text in J. Stevenson, A New Eusebius. (rev. ed. ) London, 1987,344. The Chalcedonian 
definition written in 451 confirmed the Nicene Creed and added statements about the human and divine 
natures of Christ; "perfect in Godhead, perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting of a 
reasonable soul and a body ... 
like us in all things apart from sin. " See the text in J. Stevenson, Creeds, 
Councils and Controversies. London, 1966,337. 
70 Gibson, 84; referring to saras 3: 49 and 5: 110. 
71 Ibid., 85. 
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There is no treatment of the death and resurrection of Christ. The notion of a 
sacrificial death for sin is not prominent elsewhere in the treatise. This may be accounted 
for by the facts that the edited document is incomplete, and that the subjects of the extant 
treatise are the Trinity and Incarnation. The salvation of humanity from the power of Satan 
seems to come through the Incarnation of the Word without reference to the cross; "God 
defeated Satan by clothing himself with human nature". 72 The cross releases humans from 
the consequences of sin rather than the power of the Devil; "He crucified sin by his 
crucifixion and put an end to death, which was inherited from Adam's disobedience, by his 
own death". 73 The author mentions the cross only this once, but often refers to salvation 
from Satan. At one point the coming from heaven and the returning to heaven takes place 
without reference to Christ's death and resurrection. "He came down from Heaven to save 
Adam's descendants from Satan and his evil, and then he ascended to Heaven where he 
had come from". 74 Perhaps there is a deliberate attempt to play down the significance of 
the cross in order to avoid losing the Muslim reader. 
2.2.2. Evaluation 
This early apology in Arabic firstly seeks to defend Christian beliefs by addressing Muslim 
criticisms found in the Qur'an. Christians do not associate Christ with God as another god, 
they do not speak of three divine beings, and they do not think of God bringing forth 
offspring as humans do. Secondly, there is an attempt to find positive support for Christian 
beliefs in the Qur'an. Muslims are to believe in God, his Word and his Spirit, therefore the 
Qur'an teaches the unity of God in his Word and his Spirit, which is what Christians hold. 
Christ had the power to create according to the Qur'an, so this is a proof of his divinity. 
72 Ibid., 83. 
" Ibid., 84. 
74 Ibid., 86. 
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The Qur'än teaches that Christ is raised to a position of greatness in God's presence, which 
supports the Christian belief that he sits at God's right hand to rule the world. 
Thirdly, Christology is presented positively from three sources; prophesy from 
before the coming of Christ, the gospel accounts of him, and the tradition of the church 
about Christ. About half of the extant document expounds prophesy of Christ and its 
implications for Christology; Christ is "God with us", he will rule the nations, he will guide 
them into all truth, and all nations will come to serve him. He also takes away the sin of the 
world. Much of the rest of the treatise appeals to the gospels to show Christ's divine power 
and authority; his authority to forgive sin, his power to feed the hungry, his authority over 
evil spirits and illnesses: all are proof of his divine nature. The creeds sum up the Biblical 
evidence by declaring that Christ is "God from God", but also a perfect human who never 
sinned. The author does not elaborate on the sinless human character of Christ but his 
concern is to demonstrate Christ's divinity. The relationship between the divine and human 
natures of Christ is only briefly touched on. Christ honoured all humanity by clothing 
himself with human nature, which in Christ's case had already been purified before "he put 
it on". 75 
The treatise is addressed to Muslims, but is not a dialogue as such. It is a discourse 
that attempts to give an explanation of Christian faith for a Muslim readership by 
incorporating Muslim conceptions of Christ that are not impossible to reconcile with 
Christian ones. However, Muslim counter-argument is not really included in the 
presentation, so it is not easy to determine what kind of response might have been made to 
the treatise. Nevertheless, this merger of Qur'änic data with Christian faith is noteworthy, 
setting an example for future generations of a respectful discourse between Christians and 
75 Ibid., 94. The image of the Word of God clothing himself with human nature goes back at least to 
Tertullian's Against Praxeas, 27, written around 213. "The Word was in flesh; but we must ask bow the 
Word was made flesh; whether by transformation into flesh or by being clothed therewith. The latter surely. " 
Text in H. Bettenson, The Early Christian Fathers. London, 1969,123. See also Athanasius (c. 296-373) 
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Muslims about Christ. While the course of ninth century apologetics was to follow a 
debate format, the discourse approach re-emerged in the modem era. Chapter seven shows 
that the discourse method of the Anonymous Apology was favoured alike by a European 
missionary in the nineteenth century and an Egyptian Copt in the twentieth, and chapter ten 
examines a late twentieth century life of Christ that blends Qur'änic and gospel texts 
together in the manner of this apology. 
2.3. Dialogue between the Caliph Al-Mahdi and the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I 
This dialogue, which took place shortly after Timothy became Patriarch of the Nestorian 
church in Mesopotamia in 780, exists in Syriac and Arabic. Timothy no doubt produced 
the longer Syriac version for fellow members of the Nestorian community, whereas he 
probably had a shorter Arabic text made for Muslims as well as for Christians who were 
more familiar with Arabic than Syriac. It is possible that Timothy wrote the Arabic version 
himself, but it is more likely that he supervised the translation, since the rest of his extant 
writing is in Syriac. While these written versions may not be transcriptions of the oral 
debate, it is hardly likely that the questions posed by the Caliph were put on his lips unless 
he actually asked them. The reality of Muslim rule set limits to the use of the Caliph as a 
literary device to show the pre-eminence of the Christian case. 76 
The Caliph asks virtually all of the questions, allowing Timothy the occasional 
counter-question. The fact of Islamic rule meant that although Christians were numerically 
Against Arius, 1: 42, `The Word was not degraded by receiving a body ... 
Rather he deified what he put on", 
and 2: 7, "just as Aaron put on his robe, so the Word took earthly flesh. " Text in Bettenson, 279 and 281. 
76 The Syriac text is edited and translated into English by A. Mingana as The Apology of Timothy the 
Patriarch before the Caliph Mahdi. (Woodbrooke Studies II, 1928,1-162). Mingana believes that the 
dialogue took place in 781/2, and that the Syriac text followed soon after. The Arabic text is edited by L. 
Cheikho in Al-Machriq, (19,1921,359-374, and 408-418). This version is reproduced with a French 
translation by 11. Putnam in L'Eglise sous Tiniothee I. Beirut, 1975. Putnam thinks that the Arabic version is 
a later summary of the Syriac one from around 794/5. See IIoyland, Seeing Islans as others saw it, for a 
discussion of authorship. He thinks both versions are literary creations that do not transcribe the actual 
debate, but do reflect discussions taking place between Christians and Muslims. 
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strong they could not assume a position of intellectual dominance. While Nestorian 
scholars translated Greek texts into Arabic for the Caliph it did not follow that they could 
mount a challenge to Islamic convictions with ease. 77 The Caliph had the true revelation 
and Timothy was under pressure to give an account for Christian beliefs that seemed not to 
concur with that revealed truth. The Caliph scrutinises Timothy's understanding of the 
Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Bible. The section on Christology is mainly concerned 
with Christ's relationship with God. 
2.3.1. The Relationship between the Divine and Human in Christ 
Al-Mahdi thinks that Christians believe in a biological connection between God and Jesus 
via Mary. "How can someone like you, knowledgeable and wise, say that the most high 
God took a wife and had a son? " 78 Evidently al-Mahdi reads the Qur'an in this way, since 
no Christian would ever have claimed that Mary was married to God. 79 Timothy simply 
denies the allegation and avoids using sonship terminology altogether, in favour of "the 
Word of God", who "appeared in the flesh for the salvation of the world. " 80 
Al-Mahdi insists on discussing Christ's sonship, knowing that Christians believe in 
it. Timothy makes a distinction between Christ's eternal sonship and his temporal one. 
"We believe that the Messiah was born of the Father as his Word and that he was 
born of the Virgin Mary as a man; and that his birth from the Father is eternal 
beforeti8me, and that his birth from Mary took place in time without a human 
father. " 
77 For the translation work of Nestorian scholars see A. S. Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity. 252f. 
78 Dialogue between the Caliph AI-Mahdi and the Nestorian Patriarch Timothy I. In 11. Putnam, Op cit. 
appendix, 7. 
7 The Qur'an does not make this allegation, but al-Mahdi probably understood süra 4: 171 to imply that 
Jesus, the son of Mary, had been transformed by Christians into Jesus, the son of God, via Mary, in strictly 
physical terms. 
80 Putnam, appendix, 7. 
81 Ibid. 
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However, al-Mahdi spots a difficulty with the two births. If the Messiah has two points of 
origin, does not this mean two separate Christs? "So there are two Messiahs, one temporal 
and the other eternal; the eternal is a god coming from God and the temporal is a man from 
Mary. " 82 Timothy concedes two separate points of origin for the divine and human natures 
of Christ, but argues that after the Incarnation there is complete unity between the divine 
and human in him. "There are not two Messiahs or two Sons but one Messiah and one Son 
who has two natures, divine and human, because he is the Word of God who took a human 
body and became a man. " (ittakhadha jasadan bashari)yan ova sära insänan). 83 This 
sounds as though the Word found a ready-made body from Mary, but the use of the verb 
sära introduces another dimension to the discussion. The Word once was not human, but 
by uniting in time with the human nature taken from Mary, the Word became human. 
Al-Mahdi does not accept that two types of nature can be united without losing 
their distinctiveness. Timothy appeals to the way a human being is a combination of mind 
and body; Christ is a combination of the divine and human, but no less a unity than any 
human with a mind and body. 84 Here is the same argument found in The Anonymous 
Apology, but Timothy goes beyond the earlier work in his vocabulary. A new technical 
term for Incarnation appears, which becomes standard in subsequent Christian writing in 
Arabic. "The Word of God had, as a result of his Incarnation (bi tajassudi-hi), two distinct 
natures, one divine and the other human. " 85 Tajassud is the verbal noun of lajassada, "to 
become embodied". In the Qur'an, the noun jasad is found, meaning "body", but the idea 
82 Ibid., 9. 
8; Ibid., 10. Timothy argues in the tradition of Antiochene Chrisiology that stressed the union of two natures 
in Christ. Theodore of Mopsuestia (c. 350-428) gave a similar answer to those who thought that two natures 
in Christ meant two sons. "The fact that we speak of two natures does not mean that we are forced to speak 
of two Lords or two sons. " Sermons on the Catechism, 8: 14. Text in H. Bettenson, The Later Christian 
Fathers. London, 1970,167. 
84 Putnam, appendix, 10. The use of the duality of the human person as body and mind as a support for two 
natures united in Christ was a feature of Antiochene Christology. Theodoret of Cyrus (c. 393-466), who had 
attempted to defend Nestorius before agreeing to his anathematization in 451 at the Council of Cbalcedon, 
provides an example of this argument. "In the case of one man we divide the natures, speaking of a mortal 
body and an immortal soul, but the two, we say, are one man. It is even more reasonable to acknowledge the 
distinction of the natures of God, who assumed, and man who was assumed. " Refutation of the Twelve 
Chapters or Anathemas of Cyril, 3. Text in Bettenson, The Later Christian Fathers. 271. 
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of becoming embodied is absent. Whether tajassud was first used in this dialogue is not 
certain, but it is the first surviving record of its use in Christian writing in Arabic. 
Christians were being forced to develop theological terms in the language of their Muslim 
rulers, which meant coining new expressions in Arabic not found in the stock of Islamic 
discourse. 
2.3.2. The death of Christ 
This dialogue contains the first recorded debate on the crucifixion between Muslims and 
Christians. John of Damascus and the writer of The Anonymous Apology did not enter into 
discussion of the Qur'änic denial of the death of Jesus by crucifixion. Here al-Mahdi raises 
the issue of the death of the divine nature if the Christian story is true. If Christ really did 
die on the cross, then it must follow logically that the divine nature died there also. But if 
Christians believe God is eternal how can they hold that the eternal Word was put to death? 
Al-Mahd-1 asks; "Is it possible that God died, supposing that he [Christ] is [God]? " 
Timothy replies; "In so far as he was God, Christ did not die; but in so far as he was 
human, in his human nature he died. " 86 Timothy gives the same answer that John of' 
Damascus recommended; the divine nature cannot die otherwise the eternal One would 
cease to exist. Though both Timothy the Nestorian and John the Chalccdonian were united 
on this point, it raised a profound problem for both types of Christology. The union of 
divine and human in Christ seemed to operate up to the death of Christ and no further. 
When Christ died there must have been a separation of the divine and human natures. The 
divine was spared death, but the human had to submit to it. Therefore the supposed union 
of two natures lacks cogency for Muslims. 
85 Putnam, appendix, 10. 
86 Ibid., 44. 
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Al-Mahdi does not press this inconsistency but simply quotes süra 4: 157; "They 
did not crucify him. " 87 The Qur'an denies the crucifixion of Christ so no further 
discussion is necessary. Now Timothy quotes from süra 19: 33, where Jesus says; "Peace 
be on me, the day I was born, the day I die, and the day I am raised alive", and interprets 
this to mean "that Jesus died and was brought to life. " 88 Al-Mahdi does not accept the 
chronology placed on the text by Timothy; "Jesus is not yet dead but he is going to die. " 
This is early testimony to the stories contained in the Iladith, that Jesus will return at the 
end of the age to preach Islam and then die for the first time. 89 
Timothy continues to answer al-Mahdi by refusing to accept that Jesus can ascend 
to heaven without dying. "If Jesus is not dead he would not have ascended to heaven. But 
it is affirmed by you that the ascension of Jesus to heaven and his resurrection took place a 
long time ago, as your book testifies. " 90 Timothy sees a basic contradiction between the 
plain meaning of süra 19: 33 and al-Mahdi's interpretation of it. How can the future dying 
of Jesus be possibly reconciled with Jesus' own statement of his death preceding his 
ascension? As far as Timothy is concerned, Al-Mahdi has reversed the order of the dying 
and raising of Jesus in such a way as to render meaningless the text of the Qur'än. Timothy 
does not argue that the Qur'an contradicts itself, but rather that al-Mahd-i's reading of the 
Qur'an is faulty. 91 
Al-Mahdi produces another argument to deny the death of Christ on the cross. 
"Jesus was honoured by God who did not deliver him into the hands of the Jews so that 
87 Ibid., 45. 
881bid. This use of sera 19: 33 reappears in subsequent Christian apologetic for the historicity of the death of 
Christ up to modern times. For example, Bill Campbell asked a Tunisian taxi driver who had denied that 
Christ died; "What about the verse where God is speaking and says - Oh Jesus, I will cause you to die and 
raise you to myself - doesn't that say that Jesus died before he rose again? " The taxi driver replied that the 
two statements don't have to be in chronological order. See W. Campbell, The Qur'dn and the Bible in the 
Light of Ilistory and Science. Marseille, 1986,161. 
89 See $ahih Muslim 1: 72,287-293. 
90 Putnam, appendix, 46. 
91 This approach to dialogue has-been revived in the modern era. See especially Kenneth Cragg's Christian 
readings of the Qur'an in chapter eight. 
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they could kill him. " 92 This is an early example of the standard Muslim assertion that God 
would not allow a prophet to suffer such an ignominious death. Timothy's reply quotes the 
gospel of John 10: 17f; "The Father loves me because I lay down my life of my own free 
will" and makes the comment that the Jews crucified Jesus not because he was weak, but 
because he decided to die of his own will. 93 Presumably this rescues God from blame for 
allowing the Messiah to die, but Timothy does not make the point. The debate on the 
crucifixion therefore ends on different conceptions of what God allowed to happen to 
Christ. For al-Mahdi, God does not allow his prophets to be defeated, but for Timothy, 
God allows Christ to die by his own choice. 94 
2.3.3. Evaluation 
This dialogue graphically displays the concerns Muslims have with Christian faith in 
Christ. Firstly, Muslims suspect that there is a biological link between Jesus and God in the 
thinking of Christians, which undermines the character of God. Secondly, the idea that 
Christ has two natures seems to the Muslim mind to be a logical impossibility since it 
would result in two separate beings rather than one. Thirdly, the Christian claim that Christ 
died on the cross proves the logical absurdity of the two natures concept, because it ought 
rationally to follow that both natures died there and not just the human. Finally, the 
supposed death of Christ by crucifixion must undermine both the dignity of Christ's status 
as a prophet and the power of God to protect him. 
Timothy's method is to avoid giving offence at all costs in the way that he answers 
the Caliph's questions. Thus he never criticises the Qur'an as such but only the Caliph's 
92 Putnam, 48. 
93 ibid. 
94 B. D. Kateregga uses the argument in, Islam and Christianity. Grand Rapids, 1981,140. "According to the 
true belief of Islam, it would seem most inappropriate for the Messiah to die through a shameful crucifixion. 
God, who is just, would not permit the righteous Messiah to suffer in that manner. " 
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interpretation of particular Qur'änic texts. Indeed his purpose in referring to these texts is 
to find a credible Islamic basis for the fact of the crucifixion. His general approach to 
answering questions about Christian doctrine is to make a reasoned case based on the 
coherence of the beliefs themselves. The four objections raised by the Caliph are dealt with 
in this fashion. 
Timothy answers the first objection by denying that Christians hold to a physical 
connection between Christ and God. The other three objections are dealt with by accepting 
the apparent problem while offering a different perspective on it. The second objection is 
met by explaining that the two natures in Christ have two points of origin but an ultimate 
unity. The divine is from eternity, the human is from within time, but after the union of the 
eternal and the temporal there is a unity of being. As far as the third objection is concerned, 
Timothy's concession that only the human nature died on the cross seems to confirm al- 
Mahdi's point that the unity of the two natures is actually broken by the death of Christ. 
The fourth objection is countered by an appeal to the Qur'änic text that seems to say that 
Christ's death comes before his being raised. However, he does not offer a defence of the 
appropriateness of the crucifixion of a prophet. 
2.4. Towards Ninth Century Dialogue on Christology 
From John's cryptic advice to Christians in their conversation with Muslims to the detailed 
debate between Timothy and al-Mahdi is a journey short in time but long in theological 
development. John wrote in Greek for Christians. The Anonymous Apology was an Arabic 
document for Christians with a Muslim readership in mind. Timothy's dialogue would have 
been conducted in Arabic, and the Arabic text would have been produced for Muslims as 
well as for Christians. 
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The Anonymous Apology presents a Christology based on the Bible with some 
Christological language taken from the Nicene creed and the Chalcedonian definition. 
However, the treatise does not give a Muslim response to the Christology put forward. 
Timothy, on the contrary, was required to answer questions about Christological ideas that 
were unacceptable to Muslims, so he was forced by the circumstances of the interview to 
mount a defence of Christology as best he could. Timothy's style of argument was to show 
the intelligibility of the two natures Christology when understood properly. If his Muslim 
questioner could be helped to see the inner consistency of the language used then the 
dialogue would be worthwhile. 
Timothy's apologetic method of giving reasoned answers to difficult questions was 
further developed by the three ninth century apologists, Abü Qurra, Abü Rä'ita and 
'Ammär al-Basri, whose work will be examined in chapters three to six. Whether any of 
them were familiar with Timothy's dialogue with al-Mahd is uncertain, but they all 
followed the same method of finding principles on which to base their arguments for the 
validity of their Christology with which Muslims might agree. However, these early ninth 
century writers show a depth of engagement in dialogue between Christians and Muslims 
that went much further than the three examples from the eighth century that have been 
reviewed here. 
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Part One. Ninth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Three 
The Christology of Theodore Abü Qurra in Dialogue with Muslims 
3.1 Theodore Abü Qurra 
Abü Qurra (c. 755- c. 829) was the leading Middle Eastern Chalcedonian theologian in the 
generation after John of Damascus, but little is known about his life, apart from a few 
details given in two Syriac Chronicles, the Chronicle of Michael The Syrian, and the 
Anonymous Chronicle of 1234. The former mentions that Theodore was Bishop of Harrän 
in Syria before being deposed by the Patriarch Theodoret of Antioch, and that he travelled 
to Egypt and Armenia around 813-4 to promote Chalcedonian orthodoxy. 95 Patriarch 
Theodoret was in office between 785 and 799 and therefore Theodore probably was 
Bishop of Harrän sometime during those years. 6 The latter chronicle says that Abü Qurra 
was involved in a debate with the Caliph al-Ma'mün (813-833) in the year 829.91 S. H. 
Griffith adds together these biographical items to give a career spanning forty years, 
assuming he was thirty years of age in 785.98 
Among his writings arc a number of apologetic treatises for Jews, Muslims and 
Christians concerning Christology. For Christians, he defended the Chalcedonian 
definition against those who did not accept it. 99 For Jews, he attempted to show that Jesus 
was superior to Moses in his ability to perform miracles in his own name so proving that 
93 See J. -B. Chabot, Michel le Syrien. vol. 3, Paris, 32-34. 
96 See I. Dick, "Un continuateur arabe de saint Jean Damascene: Theodore Abuqurra, evique melkite dc 
Barran", POC. (12,1962,209-23 and 319-32; 13,1963,114-29), and S. II. Griffith, "Reflections on the 
Biography of Theodore Abü Qurrah", PO. (18,1993,143-170) See also the accessible summary of his 
biography in BDEC. Oxford, 1999. 
97 See J. -B. Chabot, Anonymi Auctoris Chronicun: adA. C. 1234 Pertinens. CSCO. (109,1937) 22f. 98 See S. 11. Griffith's "Reflections", 149. 
99 See his "Confession of the Orthodox Faith" ed. I. Dick in "Deux Ecrits In&dits de Theodore Abuqurra", Le 
Museon. (72,1959,53-67) 
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he was divine. 100 For Muslims, AbU Qurra produced at least three treatises on Christology. 
These are concerned with the problem of attributing Incarnation to God, 101 the nature of 
the Sonship of Christ, 
102 
and the necessity of the suffering of Christ for the forgiveness of 
sin. 
103 The existence of treatises in Arabic addressed to such a variety of audiences shows 
how the language of Islam had, by the turn of the ninth century, become the common 
means of discourse in the Middle East. His treatise comparing Moses and Jesus assumes 
that Jewish readers understand Arabic. His Confession of the Orthodox Faith is essentially 
a catechetical piece to educate fellow Melkite Christians in the errors of alternative 
Christologies and the rightness of the definition of Chalcedon. This is written in complex 
theological language designed for serious students of theology, perhaps indicating that the 
traditional Church languages of Greek and Syriac were giving way to Arabic. 
Abü Qurra emphasizes aspects of Christology relevant to the audience. For 
example, in his writing for Jews he explicitly engages with Jewish convictions about 
Moses who he compares with Christ. In the Treatise on the Holy Law of Moses he 
addresses Jews directly in the fashion "you say Jew", and goes on to argue that what Jews 
revere about Moses can hardly be compared with the reality of the Messiah and his 
accomplishments. Moses was able to perform miracles by God's power but not by his own 
ability, whereas the Messiah was able to perform miracles in his own name and to 
"empower others to do similar work in his name. " 104 The treatise engages with exposition 
of the Old Testament, arguing that Moses and other prophets looked forward to the coming 
loo See his "Treatise on the Holy Law of Moses and the Prophets who predicted the Messiah", ed. C. Bacha 
in Un Traite des Oeuvres Arabes de Theodore Abou-Kurra. Paris, 1905. 
'01 "A reply to the one who refuses to attribute the incarnation to God", ed. C. Bacha in Les Oeuvres Arabes 
de Theodore Aboucora Eveque d'tlarran. Beyrouth, 1904,180-186. 
102 "God has a Son who is his equal in Nature and exists forever with him", in Bacha, 1904,91-104. 
103 "There is no forgiveness of sin without the suffering of the Messiah on behalf of humanity", in Bacha, 
1904,83-91. 
1°4 "Maymar fit tahgiq nämüs müsä al-muqaddas wa-l-anb yä' aladhina tanabä u' alä al-masiti", in Bacha, 
1905,9. 
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of the Christ of the New Testament. 105 His Confession of the Orthodox Faith is quite 
different in content. Here there is no discussion of Scripture but a detailed defence of 
Chalcedonian Christology over against alternative views. This treatise is addressed to 
fellow Chalcedonians to help them have confidence in the rightness of their faith in Christ. 
Neither Jews nor Muslims are in his sights in this presentation. When he writes for 
Muslims there is no discussion of alternative Christologies but only a defence of his own. 
Two of his treatises for Muslims relate to the impossibility for Muslims of the divine 
nature uniting with the human nature in Christ, and are written as answers to questions 
Muslims ask in a "we say to you" format. The treatise on the suffering of Christ is an 
exposition of why Christians believe in the death of Christ for sin, but even here Muslims 
are addressed as "you". 
Abü Qurra then wrote for widely different audiences, tailoring his argument for the 
group in mind. His presentation for Jews is a very detailed study of the Old Testament, not 
of immediate interest to Muslims. His debate with alternative Christian presentations of 
Christology was only of interest to Christians. Answering questions Muslims ask 
Christians was firstly an aid to fellow Christians in their encounter with Muslims, and 
secondly a means of making Christian faith more understandable to Muslims. Abü Qurra 
seems to have been successful in reaching a Muslim audience, given that among others 'Isä 
ibn Sabih al-Murdär (d. 840) wrote a refutation of his writing entitled Kitäb 'ala Abi Quna 
a1-nacräni (Against Abü Qurra the Christian), which is unfortunately no longer extant. 106 
Abü Qurra's treatise on the Incarnation is one of the first known Christian attempts 
to deal with the possibility of Incarnation on Islamic terms of reference. His appeal to the 
image of God seated on his throne as a way of showing, as he sees it, that the immanence 
of God as a shared premise between Christians and Muslims marks a new departure for 
los Abü Qurra writes in the tradition of Justin Martyr (d. c. 165), whose Dialogue with Tiypho the Jew 
likewise argues for the superiority of Christ over Moses. 
106 See The Fihrist of al-Nadim, vol 1. ed. and trans. B. Dodge. New York, 1970,394. 
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Christian presentation of Christ for Muslims. His treatise on the sonship of Christ is also 
innovative in its appeal to the anthropomorphic language of the Qur'an as a way of 
showing that the language of God as Father and Christ as Son can be understood in an 
analogous fashion. If God hears without physical cars then he can be Christ's Father 
without any physical connection. The third treatise on the atonement seeks to ground 
forgiveness in the concept of justice, which he argues must not be overruled by God's 
mercy. The death of Christ provides the balance between mercy and justice by joining the 
two together in a way that would not otherwise be possible. While not discussing the 
Qur'änic denial of Christ's death on the cross, he does put forward a new argument for the 
purpose of the cross that relates to Muslim concepts of forgiveness. 
In order to discover to what extent Abü Qurra developed his Christology as a result 
of dialogue with Muslims, his Confession of the Orthodox Faith written for a Christian 
audience may be compared with the three apologetic pieces for Muslims. The comparison 
shows that while not developing new Christological concepts in dialogue, Abü Qurra did 
provide arguments for Christological beliefs that were based on principles derived from 
Islamic teaching. 
3.2. Confession of the Orthodox Faith 
This confession is written as a statement of faith with the formula "I believe" along with 
refutations of several unorthodox views, suiting a catechetical purpose. There are no 
references to Jewish or Muslim views, and debate is only with Christians. The purpose of 
the treatise seems to be a comprehensive summary of Orthodox belief for fellow 
Chalcedonian Christians, probably designed for the theological training of clergy. The 
opening section deals briefly with the Trinity before the much longer Christological main 
body of the text, which offers a critique of five faulty Christologics, those of Nestorius, 
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Eutyches, Dioscorus, Severus, and the Maronites, which all fail to depict adequately the 
union of divine and human natures in Christ. The Christological section of the confession 
opens with a statement of Orthodox Christology. The eternal Son, begotten (al-mawlz d) 
from the Father before time, who is God from God, came down from heaven in the last 
days for our salvation. He became incarnate (tajassada) through the Holy Spirit and the 
Virgin Mary. He became human (ta'annasa) in such a way that he formed for his 
hypostasis a living body with a rational and intelligent mind. He became a perfect man 
(sara insänan kämilan) like one of us, except without sin. He remained perfect God 
(illähan tamman) as he is eternally, since his becoming human (ta'annus) did not entail 
any change. For he still is the eternal Son after becoming human (ta annus). He has two 
natures (tabi'atain) and one hypostasis; the divine nature which the Father and the Spirit 
have, and the human nature that became his at his Incarnation (tajassud), which each one 
of us has. 107 
Abü Qurra here expounds the definition of the council of Chalcedon that Christ had 
two natures and one hypostasis. He then goes on to defend this description of Christ 
against the alternative views of Nestorius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, Severus, and the 
Maronites. a) Nestorius was guilty of saying that the one born of Mary had a different 
hypostasis from the one eternally begotten of the Father, so that he could not confess that 
Mary is the mother of God. b) Eutyches, Dioscorus and Severus were wrong to state that 
Christ had only a divine nature but not a human one. This would be to introduce change, 
suffering and death into the divine nature. c) The Maronites claimed that the human nature 
of Christ did not have a human will or human action. But this strips the human nature of 
Christ of its real character. 108 Abü Qurra closes the debate with a description of the union 
of the two natures. 
107 Abü Qurra, "Imäna at-uribüduksiya", ed. I Dick, in "Dcux tcrits In6dits dc Theodore Abuqurra", 56f. 
108 Ibid., 57f. 
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"The divinity abides in the Incarnate Word (171 tajassudi al-kalimati), not subject to 
any limitation, suffering or death, which belong to the human nature ... Both divine 
and human natures belong to the divine Word, so the Word of God Incarnate (al- 
kalimatu-llähi al-muta'annasi) is limited by the human nature. " 109 
Therefore, a Chalcedonian view of the union of divine and human natures means that the 
limitations of the human nature affect Christ without undermining the integrity of the 
divine within him. 
Abü Qurra uses the terms tajassud and ta'annus for the Incarnation interchangeably, 
even though tajassud implies becoming embodied, while ta'annus means becoming 
human. Tajassud was used in the Arabic translation of Timothy's debate in the last decade 
of the eighth century, when Abü Qurra was in Harrän. Despite disagreement between the 
Chalccdonians and Nestorians, they share a common vocabulary in Arabic, which shows 
how much interchange there was between the rival Christian communities in Mesopotamia. 
However, the fact that Abü Qurra's confession is composed in Arabic rather than the 
Syriac traditional to the churches of Harrän may mean that Chalcedonians were ahead of 
Nestorians in the use of Arabic for preaching and teaching. The early search for new 
expressions in Arabic for Christian ideas came perhaps from them rather than Nestorians. 
110This suggestion may be supported by the second term for the Incarnation ta'annus, 
which is not found in the Qur'än, though the related term insdn (human being) is common. 
The verb ta'annasa (he became human), the state of being ta'annus (his having become 
human), and the descriptive muta'annas, appear in the confession. Abü Qurra uses these 
terms more frequently than tajassud. This may be because becoming human is more 
suggestive of the union of the divine with a fully independent human nature than the mere 
embodiment of the divine. There was no dispute between Nestorians and Chalcedonians on 
the full humanity of Christ. Both held to a union of two distinct natures, so there is no 
109 Ibid., 59. 
1 10 This is despite the fact that Nestorians were given greater access to the 'Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad than 
Chalcedonian Christians. See J. Joseph, The Nestorian and their Muslin Neighbors. Princeton, 1961,27. 
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surprise that both Timothy and Abü Qurra use the phrase sära insänan (he became a man). 
Christ was a particular human being, not simply a body in which the divine nature dwelt. 
Here Nestorians and Chalcedonians could line up against the one nature miaphysites who 
held that the eternal Word took flesh and always acted as the thinking and willing centre of 
Christ. 111 
The confession could have been written even if Islam had not come to Harrän in 
northern Mesopotamia. Even though it is an Arabic tract, it does not address Muslims, nor 
does it allude to Islamic concerns with Christology. In the three treatises for Muslims on 
Christ, however, the content shifts from confession of faith to apologetic, from argument 
with other Christians to argument with Muslims, from defence of the Chalcedonian 
definition to defence of the possibility that the divine became human. But in shifting the 
focus in these ways, Abd Qurra is dealing with issues that simply were not part of 
traditional Christological discourse among theologians in the Middle East. The Islamic 
understanding of Christ was now forcing theologians to mount a much more elaborate 
defence of Christology than had been attempted before. This is a response to The Muslim 
view that if God is transcendent then the embodiment of the divine is impossible, and if 
Christ suffered then he cannot be divine. 
3.3. A Reply to the one who refuses to attribute the Incarnation to God 
This apology attempts to answer a question raised by Muslims about the Incarnation. 
"You ask us how the divine Son could take a body and experience suffering. We answer 
that God is not effaced or cancelled out by appearing to his creation. " 112 Abü Qurra 
Nestorians spoke Arabic but wrote in Syriac before the 'Abbasids set up their capital in Baghdad. See P. K. 
Ilitti, History of the Arabs. (tenth edition) London, 1970,84. 
11t See chapter four for an exposition of one nature Christology 
112 Abn Qurra, "Maymar fi-l-radd 'alä man yankaru li-lläh al-tajassud", in C. Bacha, Les Oeuvres Arabes de 
Theodore Aboucarra Evegue d'llarran. 180-186,180. 
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proceeds to develop his answer by quoting several Old Testament texts to the effect that 
God can be simultaneously seated on his throne and in touch with the whole world. Thus 
God can be in one location and in all places at the same time. He then applies this duality 
to the embodiment of the divine nature in Christ. "The eternal Son is in every place ... He 
is not at all limited or restricted, apart from being in the body in which he experienced pain 
and suffering. " 113 
The body of the eternal Son is akin to God's throne as a location of divinity such 
that it does not in any way reduce the capacity of God to be God when united with the 
human body. The choice of the throne analogy from the Bible may have been inspired by 
Muslim discussion of texts in the Qur'an that referred to God sitting on a throne. 114 
Although he makes no appeal to the Qur'än in his exposition of four Biblical texts 
containing the image of God's throne, he appears to be inviting his Muslim reader to notice 
that both the Bible and the Qur'an speak of God limiting himself to one particular place 
while at the same time being everywhere. If the Muslim grants that the unlimited God can 
limit himself to a throne then the Christian claim that the eternal Son lost nothing of his 
divine status by taking a human body may not seem so contradictory after all. Seppo 
Rissanen suggests that the throne texts of the Qur'an were a major point of debate among 
Muslims in the late eighth and early ninth centuries. 115 To be sure, there was discussion 
about the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'an between the Mu'tazila, who denied that God 
had attributes, and the Traditionists who held that he did. Al-Ash'ari (d. 935-6) reported 
that "all the Mu'tazila agree that God is one with nothing resembling him. He is the 
hearing and seeing one without being matter, spirit, body, shape, flesh and blood, person, 
"3 Ibid., 182. 
114 There are eighteen references to God's throne in the Qur'än. See süras 7: 52,9: 130,10: 3,13: 2,17: 44, 
20: 4,21: 22,23: 88 and 117,25: 60,27: 26,32: 3,39: 75,40: 15,43: 82,57: 4,81: 20,85: 15. 
115 See S. Rissanen, Theological Encounters of Oriental Christians with Islam during Early Abbasid Rule. 
Abo, 1993,120-123. 
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substance or accident ... He is not limited by space or affected by time. 
" 116 The fact that 
the contemporary miaphysite Abü Rä'ita discusses the session of God on his throne by 
directly quoting from the Qur'an provides support for a debate between Muslims in which 
Christians were engaged. 117 
Abü Qurra has a Muslim respond to the use of the throne texts to allow God to limit 
himself to a human body while still ruling the universe by denying the validity of the 
comparison. "It is undeniable that God sits on the throne but he does not take up residence 
in the body ... The throne is pure but the human body is not suitable for God. 
" 118 Abü 
Qurra suggests that far from being unsuitable, the human body is the crown of God's 
creative work and perfectly free from corruption. "God does not abhor residence in the 
finest aspect of his creation ... God does indeed abhor impurity in humanity, but the body 
taken from Mary was not touched by sin. " 119 lie quotes The Letter to the Hebrews 4: 15 to 
support the purity of the human nature of Christ, and backs this up by several quotations 
from Isaiah on the righteous character of the Messiah. The upshot of these Biblical 
references is that "the body was not taken from the virgin Mary before the Holy Spirit 
cleansed it from all trace of sin. The eternal Son took from Mary a body which was pure, 
clean, immaculate, and beautiful in order that the divine could reside there. " 120 Abü Qurra 
is able to avoid the idea that human nature is unsuitable for union with the divine. If the 
power of God could fashion a pure human nature from Mary then the Muslim objection to 
the divine entering the human is groundless. In fact the divine nature enabled Christ to 
remain unpolluted throughout his life. 
"After taking up residence, the divine nature became the source for the human nature 
of all of the glory of divinity, righteousness, wisdom and power. However the 
116 Abü-l-I lasan 'Ali al-Ash'ari, Kitäb Magälät al-Islänii}zn wa Ikhtiläf al-Musallin. ed. II. Ritter, 
Wiesbaden, 1963,155. 
117 For Abü Rä'ila's contribution see chapter four. 
118 Abu Qurra, "Maymar fi-l-radd", 183. 
I'9 Ibid. 
120 Ibid., 184. 
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Eternal Son restricted the glory of his divinity and did not reveal it in his body when 
he lived among people. He let human activity appear in his divinity; eating, drinking, 
sleeping, and the like. " 121 
As a result Abü Qurra feels confident that he can lean on his Muslim questioner to 
acknowledge the suitability of this human body as a residence for the divine nature. "It 
would be astonishing for anyone to deny the residence of God (hulül allah) in the human 
body which we have shown is the most perfectly suited aspect of his creation. " 122 If the 
Muslim still wants to protest that the divine cannot associate with his creation then how 
can he accept that God was present in a thorn-bush from which he spoke to Moses or in the 
pillar of cloud that guided Israel? Then again Moses consulted God in the tabernacle. Just 
as God sat between the cherubs on the Ark of the Covenant so he was sustaining the world 
at the same time. "Therefore the eternal Son was in heaven and on earth and in every place 
necessary to communicate with people in this human body which he took from the 
immaculate Mary. " 123 
3.3.1. Evaluation 
This is one of the first known attempts to argue for the possibility of the Incarnation with 
Muslims who denied it. The eighth century writing already surveyed tended to expound 
what Christians believed about the Incarnation without using Islamic categories of thought 
to defend it. In this apology Abü Qurra tries to clear the ground for the concept of 
Incarnation by arguing that human nature is not unsuitable for God to dwell in if it is 
properly prepared by him. To back this up he refers to God's session on a throne as a 
helpful parallel to the Incarnation. Abü Qurra may have known of contemporary Muslim 
discussion on the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'än, and here makes his own contribution 




to the discussion. Assuming that the throne cannot sully God's character, or limit him to 
time and space, a position shared by all Muslims, he argues that the union of divine and 
human natures in Christ similarly does not sully God's character or limit him to time and 
space. This is the kind of argument that would have been taken seriously by Muslim 
intellectuals of his day, though a thoroughgoing belief in the transcendence of God on their 
part would have provoked the reply that `indwelling' is beyond the bounds of acceptable 
interaction between God and creation. 
He may also be alluding to the purity of Christ mentioned in süra 19: 19 at the 
announcement of the gift of a pure child to Mary. If this is so, Abü Qurra is appealing to 
Qur'änic texts that support Christian ideas, in order to demonstrate that the Incarnation can 
be supported by Muslims on the basis of Islamic premises. By appealing to two notions 
familiar to Muslims, God's session on a throne, and the perfection of Christ's character, he 
argues that Muslims can believe in the Incarnation on terms acceptable to them. This is an 
apologetics of persuasion, which appeals to concepts held by the dialogue partner. 
Ultimately the apology seeks to head off the anathema of `associating' human nature with 
God by showing that God may in fact associate with his world in a fashion that does not 
undermine his dignity. Nevertheless, Muslims would have argued that pure transcendence 
acts as a brake on such a speculative notion as Incarnation, even if the human material 
taken by God is specially prepared and purified. What Abü Qurra succeeds in doing here is 
to present Incarnation in a way that takes seriously Muslim reservations, so that the idea of 
Incarnation may not simply be dismissed as fantastic nonsense. 
3.4. God has a Son who is his equal in nature and who exists forever with him 
In this apology Abü Qurra deals with the alleged problem of God giving birth to a son, an 
accusation implied by several Qur'änic texts though none is explicitly quoted in the 
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apology. The Muslim challenge comes in the following form; "How can God give birth in 
the light of the fact that a man only has offspring after intercourse with a woman? Surely it 
is not right to speak this way about God? " 124 Abü Qurra calls this a futile question. The 
Muslim might as well ask how God exists in the light of the fact that humans only exist by 
eating and drinking. Surely it cannot be right to speak of God in that way? The same goes 
for God seeing or hearing. Does such language imply that God has eyes and cars like 
people do? 125 He has a question for the Muslim; "If you accept that God can be called the 
one who hears and the wise, and these titles do not demean him, why can't you accept that 
he can be called the Father in the same way? 126 After an exhaustive study of Old and New 
Testament texts Abü Qurra declares that the Son is not part of the created order at all, nor 
has he a beginning in time. God cannot be accused of `taking a son to himself', since the 
Son lives forever with the Father and is equal in nature to him. 127 Muslim discussion of 
the anthropomorphisms in the Qur'än reappears in this treatise. The Mu'tazila denied that 
God had attributes of seeing or hearing even though he is called the all seeing and all 
hearing repeatedly in the Qur'an. The Traditionists held that he did see and hear although 
humans cannot know how he did so. 12" Abü Qurra joins the debate by ignoring the 
division among Muslims over the seeing and hearing of God, and by emphasising that both 
camps accept that the language of hearing and seeing is applicable to God without 
compromising his character. This is a similar approach to the discussion of the throne of 
God in the earlier treatise. 
The treatise goes on to explore whether attributes such as wisdom are separate from 
God's nature. Just as the book of Proverbs personifies `wisdom' which yet remains fully an 
attribute of God, so the New Testament speaks of the Son of God in personally distinct 
124 Abü Qurra, "Maymar yaýgiqu an li-iläh ibnan huwa 'adilu-hu fi-1 jawhar wa lam yazill ma 'a-hu", in 
Bacha, Les Oeuvres Arabes, 91-104,94. 
125 Ibid., 95. 
126 Ibid., 96f. 
127 Ibid., 97f. 
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terms yet he remains fully divine. 129 This section of the treatise is focused on the nature of 
the Trinity, especially Old Testament support for the activity of God's Word and Wisdom. 
At the outset of the lengthy exposition of Scripture Abü Qurra gives a brief statement of 
his Christology; "The Holy Church testifies that the Messiah is perfect God and perfect 
man. He has two natures, one divine and the other human. " 130 This is a much simpler 
statement than that given in his Confession of the Orthodox Faith, and illustrates the two 
different contexts of his writing. The Confession is a detailed defence of Chalcedonian 
Christology over against rival views within the Christian world of the Middle East. This 
apology on the nature of Christ's sonship is concerned to defend the possibility of sonship 
for God as an eternal rather than temporal reality. Only Muslims and Jews would have 
needed to hear such an argument. Here Muslims are the audience. Conversely, Muslims 
did not need to hear detailed discussion of rival Christological positions among Christians. 
For them the issue was the suitability of the terminology of sonship, rather than the 
mechanics of the union between divine and human natures. 
3.4.1. Evaluation 
Abü Qurra appeals to anthropomorphic language of God hearing and seeing. As with the 
discussion of God's session on a throne, he appeals to debate among Muslims themselves 
over the way to interpret human concepts applied to God. If there are Muslims who 
understand such language in a metaphorical sense, then they ought to be able to interpret 
Christian talk of God in a similar fashion. The upshot is that Fatherhood can then be 
128 See al-Ash'arº, Magälät, op cit. 
129 Abü Qurra, "Maymar yal*igiqu an li-11äh ibnan", 98. This use of wisdom is first found in the apologetics of 
the Patristic era. See Irenaeus, Against Heresies. 4: 22: 1, where the Word is the Son and Wisdom is the Spirit 
of God. "God always has, at his side his Word and Wisdom, the Son and the Spirit. Through than and in 
them he created all things of his own free will. " See also Tertullian, Against Praxeas. 6. "Wisdom speaks - 
the Lord created me as the beginning of his ways, for his works (Prov 8: 22) that is, he created and begat his 
own consciousness. " Texts in 11. Bettenson, The Early Christian Fathers. London, 1969,76f. and 119. 
"o Abu Qurra, "Maymar yahgiqu an li-llah ibnan", 99. 
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interpreted in a metaphorical sense. This is an important position for Abü Qurra to adopt 
since it allows Muslims to think about Fatherhood and Sonship along the same lines as 
hearing and seeing. However, the Muslim denial of fatherhood for God prevents any 
proper discussion of the sonship of Christ, and Abü Qurra realises that the prior question of 
the nature of God himself needs to be answered before any purely Christological 
discussion can proceed with Muslims. 131 
Discussion of God's wisdom extends the range of debate about the attributes of 
God. John of Damascus appealed to the attribute of God's word to argue that while God's 
speech cannot be distinct from him yet it subsists independently. 132Abü Qurra makes the 
same point about God's wisdom. In the Bible, God's wisdom seems to have personal, 
almost human characteristics, yet is an aspect of God's nature. On this basis God's son has 
individual human characteristics but still is fully identified with God's nature. Faced with 
a Muslim audience that questioned the possibility of divine attributes having a distinct 
existence, Abü Qurra attempts to show that such a possibility is not inconsistent with 
God's character. As far as Christ is concerned, the double attribution of natures, divine and 
human, is only a logical extension of the idea of wisdom acting `alongside' God, yet being 
essentially God at work. If Muslims can accept the personification of God's wisdom, then 
it should not be too difficult for them to appreciate the union of divine nature with human 
nature in Christ. The weakness in this argument lies in the assumption that Muslims will 
accept the personification of wisdom. While the appeal to the hearing and seeing of God is 
based on Qur'änic concepts, here the appeal to wisdom is not. Whether Muslims would 
have been impressed with exposition of the Bible is doubtful without a Qur'änic base to 
131 This is the burden of Kenneth Cragg's apologetic in the twentieth century. See chapter eight. 
132 See John's argument in 2.1.1. 
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the discussion. In this desire to communicate Scripture to Muslims, Abü Qurra shares in 
the approach of the Anonymous Apology from his own Chalcedonian community. 133 
3.5. There is no forgiveness for sin without the suffering of the Messiah on behalf of 
humanity 
In this treatise Abü Qurra questions the Islamic belief that God's forgiveness can be 
obtained directly without the help of an intermediary. 134 He argues that it is a mistake to 
think that God's mercy is greater than his justice. God's law must not be rendered futile by 
its requirements being overruled by kindness on his part. Therefore, in order to balance 
justice with mercy God sent his eternal Son to fulfil the just requirements of his law on 
behalf of those who had failed to keep them. 135 Underlying this argument is the Qur'änic 
denial that one human being can atone for the sin of another. 136 Abü Qurra's method is to 
expound the Biblical idea that the Messiah would die for the sins of others, without directly 
engaging with the way the Qur'än deals with human sin. The treatise is basically a 
presentation of the Biblical notion of the need for perfect purity before God, which only 
Christ fulfils, by the purity of his human nature at his conception. 137 Thus Christ achieves 
salvation for others on the strength of his suffering the punishment due to them for their 
sin. In this way the justice of God is co-ordinated with his mercy. 
Quite soon into the treatise comes a detailed description of the coming of the Son 
into the world in language reminiscent of Abra Qurra's Confession of the Orthodox faith. 
133 See the emphasis placed on exposition of Scripture in the Anonymous Apology on Christianity in 2.2.2. In 
the nineteenth century, Karl Pfander relied on Biblical support for Christ's purity of character mentioned in 
süra 19: 19. But, unlike Abü Qurra, lie began his exposition with Islamic concepts. See chapter seven, 7.1. 
134 AbÜ Qurra, "Maymar ft anna-hu la yaghtru li-ahad khat yati-hi illä bi-awjä al-Masib allat1 ballat bi-hi fi 
sha'n al-näs", in C. Bacha, Les Oeuvres Arabes, 83-91. 
135 Ibid., 83f. 
136 See Süra 6: 70, "Each person comes to death with that which he has earned. Ile has no patron or 
intercessor alongside God. Even if a complete ransom were offered it would be unacceptable. " Intercession 
for sin is also denied in seiras 7: 53,30: 13,32: 4,39: 43f, 40: 18, and 74: 48. 
137 Abu Qurra, op cit., 86-91. 
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"The eternal Son, begotten of God before time, of the nature of God and equal to 
him, came down from heaven out of his compassion for the descendants of Adam, 
and indwelt (balla) the womb of Mary the immaculate Virgin by the Holy Spirit. He 
took (ittakhadha) a body (jasadan), making it like himself with a mind and bein 
(nafs). He became human (ta'annasa) by the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. " 38 
Abü Qurra introduces a phrase not found in his Confession of the Orthodox Faith; "He 
took a body" (ittakhadhajasadan). The verb ittakhadha is found in the Qur'an in several 
texts denying that God took to himself a son. 139 Perhaps Abü Qurra is aware of the 
difficult connotations of this verb, and seeks to set the idea in a better context. If it is the 
Eternal Son who takes a human body, then it should be clear to his Muslim reader that 
Christians do not claim that God took a son. Rather, the already existing Son took human 
nature. The expression `he took a body' could be taken to imply that the Eternal Son found 
a ready-formed human body to enter. That Abii Qurra does not intend this sense is clear 
from the explicatory phrase which follows; `making the body like himself'. The Eternal 
Son therefore fashions the human body until it becomes fit for his indwelling. The union 
with the body taken from Mary only occurs at the end of this creative process. 
The apology continues by explaining that according to the Old and New 
Testaments forgiveness can only come through the death of the Messiah. His suffering for 
sin had been predicted "by all the prophets. " 140 A substantial exposition of Scripture ends 
with this challenge to Muslim readers; "You have heard from the books of God that there 
is no forgiveness without the cross of the Messiah. There is no fulfilment of the 
requirement of the law except through the shedding of his blood on behalf of the living and 
the dead. " 141 
1 311 8Sf. 
139 See Süra 2: 116, "They say God took a son" (wa gälü ittakhadha allähu waladan). Four other texts are 
similar; süras 10: 68,18: 4,19: 88, and 21: 26. Süra 72: 3 links the taking of a son with the taking of a wife, 
offering a biological understanding of ittakhadha. 
140 Abü Qurra, "Maymar fi anna-hu", 87. 
141 Ibid., 89. 
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Abü Qurra does not attempt to address the apparent denial of the cross in the 
Qur'an. He simply assumes that Christ was crucified as described in the New Testament. 
Any other means for receiving the forgiveness of God apart from the cross of Christ is 
illusory. "We in the Christian community receive forgiveness when we accept the 
sufferings of the Son for our sins. But non-Christians who do not accept the sufferings of 
the Messiah for their sins will die in their sins. " 142 
3.5.1. Evaluation 
Abü Qurra's approach to the atonement of Christ differs from that of the Patriarch 
Timothy, who sought to argue for the death of Christ on the basis of the teaching of the 
Qur'än. 143 Abü Qurra nowhere appeals explicitly to the Qur'än in this treatise. Rather he 
bases his appeal on the Biblical insistence on sacrifice for sin as the means of forgiveness, 
with the self-giving of Christ as the pinnacle of this process. His final words strike a 
strident note. Christians understand forgiveness correctly, and more to the point, actually 
embrace God's forgiveness. However, this is not the case with others, who can have no 
assurance of God's forgiveness if they fail to believe in the death of Christ. Such a 
dismissive attitude to Muslim notions of forgiveness would no doubt alienate his supposed 
audience, which shows Abü Qurra to be a polemicist here rather than an apologist. 
He seems unconcerned with any Muslim accusation that the Bible is corrupt, which 
is at variance with al-Mahdi's questioning of Timothy on this point, and John of 
Damascus' awareness of the problem. 144 Perhaps he believed that some Muslims might be 
persuaded by an interpretation of the Bible that could be aligned with Islamic thought. Abü 
142 Ibid., 90. 
143 See Timothy's argument that Christ predicted his death according to sllra 19: 33 in 2.3.2. 
1« John cautioned his fellow Christians about appealing to prophetic predictions of Christ in dialogue with 
Muslims since they did not accept the prophecies as genuine. See 2.1.1. Al-Mahds questioned Timothy at 
length about inconsistencies in the Biblical text. See IL Putnam, L'Eglise sous Timothee I, appendix. 
62 
Qurra's aim is to show the necessity of the sacrificial death of Christ by spelling out the 
conditions laid down in the Bible. So the truth of Christ's sacrificial death for sin is based 
on the premise that God must judge sin rather than overlook it. Thus all are judged guilty 
and none can be forgiven without some kind of external means. In this way Christ provides 
the way for God to forgive without forsaking justice. Whether Muslims would be 
impressed with such an argument is doubtful given the denials of the crucifixion of Christ 
and human ransom for sin in the Qur'än. His unwillingness to tackle these Qur'änic 
beliefs, even in an indirect manner, means that his argument for the death of Christ as an 
atonement for sin would most probably fail to convince a Muslim. 
3.6. Conclusion 
Abtº Qurra's Christology in dialogue with Muslims is largely a defence of the Nicene- 
Chalcedonian tradition. His summary creed at the conclusion to his treatise on sonship 
speaks of Christ as "perfect God and perfect man. " 145 The language of the detailed 
description of the Incarnation in the treatise on the forgiveness of sins reflects the Creed of 
Contantinople; "The eternal Son begotten of God before time ... came 
down from heaven 
and became human by the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary. " 146 He translates the orthodox 
creeds into Arabic, finding terminology to suit the purpose. Thus, for example, the descent 
of the Son is hulül; a term found in the Qur'an in other contexts, but now pressed into 
service for the indwelling of God in human nature. The terms for the Incarnation tajassud 
and ta'annus appear to be neologisms. The roots arc Qur'änic but the verbal forms are not. 
Abü Qurra may not have developed these new Arabic expressions himself, but he was one 
145 As in the definition of the Council of Chalcedon, "perfect in Godhead ... perfect 
in manhood", in J. 
Stevenson, Creeds, Councils and Controversies. 337. 
146 Compare with the Creed of Constantinople; "The only-begotten Son of God, begotten from the Father 
before all ages ... came down from heaven and became incarnate from the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary", in Creeds, Councils and Controversies, 335. 
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of the first Christians to use them. He upholds the faith of Chalcedon in a way that would 
interpret the truth of that Christology for Muslims. One example of a new interpretive 
departure is his use of the phrase `took a body', which is hardly a translation of credal 
vocabulary into Arabic. Abü Qurra uses the verb ittakhadha (took), a term found in the 
Qur'an in the context of Islamic Christology. The Qur'an denies that God took a son, but 
Abü Qurra affirms that the Son took a body. As a result the Muslim reader would be more 
able to understand the kind of `taking' Christians believed in. 
Abü Qurra weaves expositions of Scripture and tradition into answers to questions 
Muslims ask Christians on Christology. His treatment of the atonement of Christ is less a 
set of answers to questions and more a careful presentation of the Biblical notion of 
sacrifice for sin. There is an Islamic conviction underlying the whole treatise; that the 
Merciful and Compassionate forgives wrongdoers. Abra Qurra seeks to argue that God 
must be just as well as merciful, and that the balance between justice and mercy lies in the 
self-offering of the perfect eternal Son. The death of the Son is therefore a better solution 
to the problem of wrongdoing than the simple exercise of mercy. 
The two treatises on Incarnation and sonship are constructed on a dialogical 
framework of "you ask, and we reply". He shows inventiveness in his answers in four 
different ways. Firstly, he uses the idea of God's session on a throne to raise the issue of 
God's relationship to his creation in a way that Muslims could relate to from their own 
interpretation of this Qur'änic conception. Did God literally sit on a throne? Even if the 
answer is affirmative, the conclusion ought to be that God's apparent limitedness does not 
cancel out his ubiquity. If Muslims are prepared to grant this truth, then God can be 
Incarnate in Christ while still ruling the universe. Secondly, the appeal to the purity of 
Christ enables another idea familiar to Muslims to be put to use in defence of the 
Incarnation. God's character is not undermined by relationship with a pure form of human 
nature. Only union with sinful human nature would demean the creator. 
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Thirdly, the reference to God's seeing and hearing helps Abil Qurra to suggest to 
his Muslim reader the possibility of metaphorical language in the Qur'an. If Muslims can 
think of the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'an in that sense then the metaphorical use of 
Fatherhood for God should not be ruled out of court by Muslims. Indeed, Christians want 
to say that the Son never came into being in time, but rather has always been Son to the 
Father. Surely this Father - Son relationship is quite different from what Muslims allege 
Christians hold, the taking of a son by God in a physical sense. Fourthly, AbU Qurra 
attempts to develop the idea of God's wisdom as a personification of God as a parallel to 
the Father- Son idea. If God's wisdom is inseparable from his nature then this is a model 
for understanding the inseparability of the divine nature in Father and Son. 
These four apologetic moves are Abü Qurra's recorded contribution to dialogue on 
Christology. As a Chalcedonian bishop, it is not surprising that he defended Chalcedonian 
Christology. While he was ready to give detailed criticism of faulty Christologies in his 
writing for Christians, in his apologies for Muslims he expounded Chalccdonian 
Christology without arguing against alternative Christian views. The burden of his 
apologetic Christology for Muslims was not so much exposition and defence of received 
tradition, but more a defence of Christology mounted on Islamic principles. Thus in the 
three apologies for Muslims, there is no discussion of varieties of Christological positions 
held by Christians. Muslims were not asking questions about differences between Christian 
views, so what was essential debate in his Confession of the Orthodox Faith, is irrelevant 
to his apologies for Muslim. He was trying to find openings in Muslim thought for the 
presentation of Christ as he saw him. His contemporary Abü Rä'ita, with whom he debated 
concerning Christology, took this method to a more sophisticated level in his apologetic 
writing for Muslims. Chapter four will expound and analyse his contribution. 
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Part One. Ninth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Four 
The Christology of Habib ibn Khidma Abn Rä'ita in Dialogue with Muslims 
4.1. Habt ibn Khidma Abü Rä'ita 
Habib ibn Khidma Abiz Rä'ita was a Jacobite theologian associated with Takrit to the north 
west of Baghdad. He was a contemporary of Abü Qurra, with whom he claims to have 
debated face to face. 147 He was named in The Chronicle ofMichael the Syrian as a 
participant in a synod held in the year 828, so probably was active beyond the third decade 
of the ninth century. 148 The Jacobites were named after Jacob Baradaeus who became a 
rallying point for those who opposed the two natures definition of Chalcedon. The 
Emperor Justinian I had condemned one nature Christology as heresy in 536, but Empress 
Theodora encouraged the survival of the one nature Christology under the enthusiastic 
leadership of Jacob who "travelled widely ordaining monophysite clergy. " 149 The one 
basic difference between Chalcedonians and Jacobites was over the understanding of the 
Incarnation. The former held to "one hypostasis in two natures; unity on the level of the 
hypostasis; difference on the level of the physis. " 150 Jacobites held to the unity of 
hypostasis and physis; the one physis was equivalent to the hypostasis of the Incarnate 
Word. 151 
147 Abü RA'ila opens his Reply to the Melkfites on the union (of the divine and human in Christ) with a 
reference to a debate between himself and Abü Qurra that he wishes to follow up in writing. See "Al-radd 
'ala al-malkiya fl-l-ittiläd", in Die Schriften des Jacobiten Lia bib Ibn Ilidma Abü Rd'i/a ed. G. Graf. CSCO. 
(130, Louvain, 1951,65-72). 
148 See J-B. Chabot, Chronique de Michelle Syrien: Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche. (4 volumes, Paris, 
1899-1910), vol 3,50. 
149 A. S. Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity. London, 1968,182. 
'50 A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. Vol 2: 2, London, 1995,507. 
151 Ibid., 504. The Jacobites were inheritors of the `Word-flesh' Christology of Alexandria, represented 
especially by Athanasius (c. 296-373), who held that the human nature taken from Mary was like clothing that 
the Word put on in such a way that it did not alter the character of the Word. "As Aaron remained the same 
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Abü Rä'ita did not come from a Greek speaking Christian community like Abü 
Qurra. Sidney Griffith has pointed out that the Jacobite Mesopotamian community used 
Syriac and he believes that this was Abu Rä'ita's native language. 152 However, it is 
significant that like Abü Qurra, Abn Rä'ita wrote in the language of the Muslim rulers. No 
longer were the received ecclesiastical languages sufficient for theological work. Indeed 
Arabic was a necessity not just for communication with Muslims but also between 
Melkites and Jacobites, since it was in Arabic that Abü Rä'ita argued with Abü Qurra in 
his Reply to the Melkfites on the union (of divine and human in Christ). 153 This dialogue 
with Abü Qurra is concerned with problems raised by the differences between Jacobites 
and Melkites over the precise nature of the Incarnation. Abü Rä'ita wrote a longer Reply to 
the Melkites in the form of a letter. 154 These two documents give insight into the Arabic 
used by a Jacobite to express Christological concepts in an intra-Christian context. 
Abü Rä'ita also wrote about Christology for a Muslim audience. His Christological 
views are briefly outlined in A Demonstration of the Christian Religion and the Holy 
Trinity, which surveys what Christians believe about a wide range of issues. '" A much 
more detailed account of Christology is given in his Letter on the Incarnation, which is 
written in the form of answers to forty-four questions posed by Muslims on the 
and did not change by assuming the high priest's dress ... so the Lord did not become another by taking the flesh, but remained the same and was clothed in it. " [Atbanasius, "Against Arius" 2: 8, text in 11. Bettenson, 
The Early Christian Fathers, 281 ]. The Word then is the thinking, feeling, and willing centre of Christ. 
Athanasius does not seem to make room for a genuine human mind in Christ after the union of Word and 
flesh. The Alexandrian tendency to eliminate a human mind in Christ was turned by Apollinarius (310-c. 390) 
into a full blown `one nature' Christology. "We confess that the Word of God has not descended upon a holy 
man ... but that the Word himself has become flesh without having assumed a human mind. 
" [Apollinarius, 
"Letter to the Bishops at Diocaesarea" 2, text in J. Stevenson, Creeds, Councils, and Controversies, 96]. The 
logical conclusion of the Word-flesh union was that the Word is the life of the body and that "the body as 
such cannot be accorded the character and title of a physis. " [A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. vol 
1, London, 1975,328]. 
152 See S. H. Griffith, "Ilabib ibn IIidmah Abü Rä'ita, a Christian mutakallin: of the First Abbasid Century", 
DC. (64,1980,161-201), 165. 
153 Abü RA'ita, "Al-radd 'alä al-malkiya fi-l-ittiliad", in Graf, 65-72. 
154 AN RA'ita, "Radd 'ala al-malkiya", in Graf, 105-130. 
155 AbO RA'ila, "Ithbät din al-nasraniya wa ithbät al-thälüth al-mugaddas", in Grat 131-159. 
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Incarnation. 156 The extant Christological writing of Abü Rä'ita is fuller than that of Abü 
Qurra, and the very extensive set of replies to Muslim questions in his Letter on the 
Incarnation has no parallel in the available work of Abi! Qurra. The method of comparing 
Abü Rä'ita's writing for Christian and Muslim readers will be followed here, as it was in 
the previous chapter, to find out to what extent Abü Rä'ita developed his Christology in 
dialogue with Muslims. Therefore the two works addressed to Melkites will be studied 
before turning to his writing for Muslims. 
4.2. Reply to the Melkites on the Union (of divine and human natures in Christ) 
At the outset of this reply, Abü Rä'ita refers to a meeting between himself and Abü Qurra 
in which differences about the correct way to describe the Incarnate state of the Messiah 
were discussed, and declares that he intends to state why Jacobites cannot subscribe to 
Melkite Christology. 157 Since only one member of the Trinity becomes flesh, that is the 
eternal Word, it must follow that the eternal Word is the source of thought, will and action 
after the union between the Word and the flesh. Melkites are therefore mistaken when they 
claim that there remain two natures after the union, which would imply that there were two 
sources of thought, will and action in Christ. If there were two natures they would split 
Christ into two actors, sometimes functioning on the basis of the divine nature and 
sometimes on the basis of the human nature. 
He summarizes his view of the Incarnation in the following way, 
"It was the will of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit that one of them became 
Incarnate (tajassada) that is to say became human (ta'annasa). The eternal 
Son, the everlasting Word of God the Father became Incarnate of the 
immaculate Virgin Mary. His Incarnation was without change in his substance 
(jawhar) and without any alteration to his state. He was a unity of the divine 
'56 Abü Rä'ila, "Al-risäla 1-1-ittihäd", in Graf, 27-64. 
157 Abü Rä'ila, "A1-radd'alä al-malkiya G-1-ittihid", 65. 
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Word and the physical body, a rational personality (nafs); one person (shakhs); 
one substance (jawhar); consisting of divinity and humanity. " 58 
Abü Rä'ita believes that the substance (jaivhar) of the Second person of the Trinity cannot 
be divided by the addition of a human nature. To defend this conviction he appeals to the 
unity of mind and body in human beings. We do not claim that humans have two natures, 
but we say that the human mind controls the activity of the body. Likewise we must surely 
affirm that the divine substance controls the activity of the human body of the Messiah. 
"Just as a human being is a unity composed of mind and body so the Messiah is one 
substance (ja)vhar) and one hypostasis (qunüm). " 159 He asks Abü Qurra how Melkites can 
claim that Christ is a unity when he has two distinct natures? Does not the Chalcedonian 
duality of natures rob the eternal Word of his dignity if he has to make way for thoughts, 
decisions or actions that arise from his so-called human nature? This debate with Abü 
Qurra is underlined by a second piece of writing by Abü Rä'ita addressed to an unnamed 
Melkite correspondent that is considerably longer than his reply to Abü Qurra. 
4.3. Reply to the Melkites 
He begins by rehearsing the decision of the Council of Ephesus (in 431) to anathematize 
the teaching of Nestorius that Christ had two natures (jawharain) and two hypostases 
(qunümain). He believes that the Melkitcs' more moderate view must come under the same 
condemnation, since they too hold to two natures (jawharain) albeit in one hypostasis 
(qunüm). 160 Abli Rä'ita does not regard the Council of Chalcedon of 451 as authoritative, 
and this accords with the normal Jacobite rejection of Chaleedon as a betrayal of the 
Council of Ephesus. The basic error of Chalcedon was to allow talk of a second nature 
158 Ibid., 70. 
's9 Ibid. 
160 Abü RA'iia, "Radd 'alä al-malkiya", 107. 
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alongside the divine nature in Christ, since if Christ had another nature in addition to his 
divine nature then the divine nature must be enlarged by the human. This would result in a 
new definition of the Trinity. In the Trinity, the three hypostases are within one divine 
substance, so to grant the eternal Word a human nature alongside his divine substance 
would entail adding human nature to the Trinity as a fourth hypostasis. 
"The hypostases (agänim) are the substance (jawhar) itself, and the substance 
is the same as the hypotases from the aspect of the `one' and the `three. ' If the 
hypostases are not the same as the substance then the human nature becomes 
a fourth member of the Godhead. " 161 
According to Abü Rä'ita, the Melkites have undermined the Trinity by their definition of 
the Incarnation. They define the Trinity as `one nature in three hypostases', but their use of 
`nature' to describe the Incarnation conflicts with the meaning given to `nature' in their 
definition of the Trinity. Jacobites do not accept such a change of use for `nature', because 
Christ can only have the divine nature that is inherent in the Trinity, and not another type 
of nature that is inherent in humanity. 
It appears that Abü Rä'ita was more likely to have difficulty in dialogue with 
Muslims than Abü Qurra, since his miaphysite view made no room for genuine human 
thought and action in Christ. To Muslims who encountered his Christology, Christ must 
have appeared to be a divine visitor like an angel rather than a human being. The Muslim 
insistence on the humanity of Christ posed a serious obstacle for Jacobites in a way it did 
not for Melkites. To his writing for Muslims we now turn. 
4.4. Demonstration of Christianity and the Holy Trinity 
This treatise is written as a series of responses to Muslim questions on a range of Christian 
convictions. 162 There are two questions about the Incarnation: why should God need to do 
161 Ibid., 116. 
162 Abu Ra'ita, "Ithbat din a1-nasraniya", in Graf, 131-159. 
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it, and why can God not save humanity without doing it. In answer to the first question, 
Abü Ra'ita appeals for intellectual humility, since the Incarnation is too difficult for our 
small minds to grasp. As for the second question, he concedes the Islamic conviction that 
God is powerful enough to save whoever he wills. His Muslim brother knows that there is 
common ground between them in the fact that God sent messengers to bring humanity to 
obey God. However, the Muslim wants to know how Abü Rä'ita can speak about God 
becoming human. "Messengers and preachers sent by God are not equivalent to what you 
(Christians) mean by the Incarnation (tajassud) of God, or by his becoming human 
(ta'annus). " 163 Abü Rä'ita concedes the distinction. The coming of God himself to save 
humanity can only be described as an act of sheer mercy. 
The Muslim then wonders how God can come without undergoing change in his 
nature. How can God "experience pain and death when he always lives and can never die". 
164 Abü Rä'ita makes a distinction between human and divine attributes in the one divine 
substance of Christ. "There was a union of the divine personality with a human one, 
without change to either of the two ... They became one substance (jativhar). 
" 165 However, 
the one substance retains distinctive functions deriving from the original divinity or 
humanity. "He is truly divine and truly human; he retains these two attributes (, sifatain). In 
his divinity he always lives and does not die or even feel pain; but in his humanity he does 
die and feel pain. " 166 Abü Rä'ita seems to be making room for human experience in 
Christ. Despite not having a human mind, Christ has human feelings. Perhaps Abü Rä'ita 
believes that Christ can feel pain without a mind, and that `rationality' can exist in a 
`mindless' human flesh. This interpretation seems to be borne out by his description of the 
way the human mind and body operate "as a combination of two substances (jawharain); a 
personality which is rational and spiritual, along with a body which senses, perceives, feels 
163 Ibid., 149. 
164 Ibid., 150. 
165 Ibid. 
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pain and dies. " 167 The body receives sensations from without, but does not have a mind 
to act on them. The Word is the only source of action. 
4.4.1. Evaluation 
The two questions on the Incarnation are indicative of Muslim anxiety that Christians 
impose unnecessary restrictions on God by their insistence that the divine united with the 
human. God's freedom to act must be limited by a human body and the whole idea of 
Incarnation is beside the point in terms of human salvation, since God saves whoever he 
wills without any external constraint. There is no doubt that these were real questions for 
Christians to answer in the ninth century. In this treatise only the second question is dealt 
with, but Abü Rä'ita answers the first question at some length in his Letter on the 
Incarnation, which will be studied in the following section. 
In answering the question about the purpose of the Incarnation Abü Rä'ita appeals 
to the conviction common to Muslims and Christians that God sent messengers to save 
humans from going astray. However, the Muslim questioner is aware that Christians see 
Christ as more than a mouthpiece for divine truth. The key difference between Muslims 
and Christians lies in the Christian belief that Christ alone among the messengers is divine 
as well as human. Thus the Muslim turns to the impossibility of the divine being affected 
by human pain and death. While this treatise need not be a transcript of an actual debate 
between Abü Rä'ita and a Muslim, there is little reason to doubt that such questions were 
being asked of Christians by Muslims in the early ninth century. 
Abü Rä'ita deals with the challenge by denying that the divine in Christ was 
affected by human suffering and death. This is essentially the same answer given by Abü 
Qurra to the question whether the death of Christ nullified his divine character, but in 
166 Ibid., 151. 
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different terminology. For Abü Qurra the human nature suffered, but this did not affect 
Christ's divine nature. 16' Abü Qurra wrote of two natures in Christ, while Abü RA'ita 
described two attributes in Christ's one nature. Both the Melkite and the Jacobite affirmed 
a duality in Christ, which enabled them to separate the experience of suffering and death 
from the divine character in Christ, and so both Melkite and Jacobite agreed that God did 
not experience either suffering or death as a result of the Incarnation. Nevertheless, from 
the point of view of Muslim readers, this separation of the divine from the human in order 
to achieve immunity from weakness and death must have seemed decidedly illogical and 
cumbersome. To Muslims, the logic of Islam was so much more obvious in that God's 
transcendence is at all times inviolable, and the simplicity of Islam commended the 
complete segregation of the divine and human. This was certainly the reaction of the 
Muslim philosopher Abü 'Isä al-Warräq in his detailed critique of Christian theology later 
in the ninth century. 169 This summary defence of the Incarnation is given a much fuller 
treatment in his Letter on the Incarnation addressed to a Muslim audience, in which Abü 
Rä'ita attempts to show that the Incarnation is not as illogical as Muslims may think. 
4.5. Letter on the Incarnation 
This letter, which contains forty-four questions and answers on the Incarnation, takes up 
almost thirty pages in Graf's edition of Abü Rä'ita's writings. 170 Here, AbFa 11511a not 
only gives a reasoned account of Christian convictions, but also challenges his questioner 
by a form of cross-examination, asking the Muslim reader whether the Qur'an actually 
supports Christian beliefs about Christ. This apologetic method is similar to Timothy's 
167 Ibid. 
168 See the discussion of Abü RA'ila and Abü Qurra on the death of Christ by Rissanen, Theological 
Encounter of Oriental Christians with Islam during early Abbasid Rule. Abo, 1993,188f. Rissanen makes 
the point that both apologists held that only The humanity of Christ died and that his divinity was not affected 
by his death. 
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challenge to al-Mahdi over the interpretation of sz7ra 19: 33,171 but not to Abü Qurra, who 
never directly quotes from Islamic Scripture. Although these forty-four questions would 
not actually have been asked by Muslims in the order presented, they do represent the kind 
of debate that was taking place in the early ninth century. Timothy's debate in the late 
eighth century shows that this style of dialogue was already established as a pattern for 
Christian-Muslim engagement. The intricacy of the argument in the early ninth century 
shows that the level of debate had become more sophisticated. This can be seen in the fact 
that Abü Ra'ita and 'Ammar al-Basri both produced exceedingly detailed answers to 
multiple questions on the Incarnation. 172 Abu Rä'ita's Letter on the Incarnation and 
'Ammar's Book of Questions and Answers represent the best of the apologetic writing on 
Christology in the early centuries of Islamic rule in the Middle East. 
The forty-four questions cover the following topics; questions 1-6, the relationship 
between the Incarnate one and the Trinity; questions 7-12, the relationship between God 
and the humanity of the Incarnate one; questionsl3-18, the necessity for God to become 
Incarnate; questions 19-21, the supposed death of God by crucifixion; questions 22-24, the 
human body of the Incarnate one as a possible addition to the attributes of God; questions 
25-29; the problem of change in God posed by the Incarnation; questions 30-3 1, the 
difficulty of God becoming embodied; questions 32-34, the exact nature of the Sonship of 
the Messiah; questions 35-40, the restriction on God implied by the Father/Son analogy; 
question 41, the seeming contradiction between belief about the Messiah and his own 
words in the gospels; and questions 42-44, the problem of the will of God and the death of 
the Messiah. 
169 See chapter six for a review of his writing on Christianity. 
170 Abü Rä'ita, "Al-risäla ü I-tajassud", in Graf 25-64. 
171 See 2.3.2. 
172 for'Ammar's contribution see chapter five. 
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4.5.1. Questions 1-6. The relationship between the Incarnate one and the Trinity 
1. Is the Incarnate one divine or human? The Incarnate one (al-mutajassid) is God 
become human (muta'annis). 
2. How can the Incarnate one be one of the three hypostases (agänim) and not all three at 
the same time? He is the Son, the eternal Word of God, not all three hypostases 
(agänim). 
3. Does the Incarnate one act on the basis of the Incarnation? The Incarnate state is the 
means whereby the Incarnate one acts. 
4. Who controls the actions of the body of the Incarnate one? The Word of God controls 
the actions of the body of the Incarnate one. 
5. Does the body never act independently? The Word took a body (al-kalimatu akhadhat 
li-hü jasadan) in such a way that the body never acted independently of the Word. 
6. Did the Word become Incarnate independently of the other members of the Trinity? In 




Much of this language is similar to the three pieces of writing by Abü Rä'ita already 
reviewed, but there is a new expression akhadhat which recalls Abü Qurra's ittakhadha. 
These two forms of the same root have a similar meaning, `to take', suggesting that Abü 
Rä'ita like AND Qurra found the concept congenial in dialogue with Muslims. Like Abü 
Qurra, he only uses the notion of the Word `taking' a human body in dialogue with 
Muslims and not in his writing addressed to Christians. There he writes of the Word 
173 Abü Rä'ita, "Al-risäla [7-I-tajassud", 27-29. 
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becoming Incarnate rather than taking a human body. Christians did not need to speak of 
the Word `taking' a body when discussing Christology among themselves. The need to 
speak this way seems to have arisen in dialogue with Muslims most likely because 
Muslims used the term when insisting that God did not take a son in debate with 
Christians. 
Abü Rä'ita appeals to Muslim discussion of God's attributes in answer to question 6, 
After replying that the three members of the Trinity work together in creating and willing, 
but that only the Word appeared in flesh he asks the Muslim, 
"Don't you define God as knowing, willing and performing? If so, then does 
God know what his will is or how he will perform it? If you say that he does, 
then he knows that the resurrection will take place and it is his will which he 
performs ... You may then say that 
God's knowledge is not exactly identical to 
his will or his performance because he knows what he does not will, evil deeds; 
and he also performs what he does not will, allowing evildoers to enter 
paradise ... This 
is exactly what we claim about the Incarnation; one of the 
hypostases became Incarnate without the other two yet all three are one 
nature. " 1 74 
Abü Rä'ita joins in current Islamic debate over how the actions of God relate to his 
knowledge and will to support the Incarnation of only one of the members of the Trinity. 
The apparent lack of co-ordination in the action of the Trinity is comparable to the 
apparent discord between the knowledge of God and the performance of his will. Both 
Christians and Muslims have to deal with a similar difficulty in describing what God does. 
Both attempt to reconcile seeming contradictions in God's actions. This is a clever move 
by Abü Rä'ita showing that logical consistency is not as easy for Muslim belief in the unity 
of God as might be claimed. A united God appears to be divided against himself over the 
administration of mercy to humans who don't deserve reprieve. Christians could mount a 
defence of the rationality of the Incarnation by pointing out the irrationality of Islamic 
description of God's work. Neither side in the debate then was immune from the charge of 
inconsistency. But this worked to the advantage of Christians in the early ninth century 
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who were facing the accusation that the Incarnation was in principle an inconsistent idea, 
since Muslims could hardly claim that they were entirely consistent in their exposition of 
divine activity. 
4.5.2. Questions 7-12. The relationship between God and the humanity of the incarnate 
one 
7. If the Incarnate one became Incarnate by leaving his original state for the water of the 
womb have you not made the latter essential to the Incarnate one? The body is not part 
of the nature of the Word any more than heated material is part of the nature of fire, or 
a human body part of the human personality. 
8. Do you claim that God dwelt in the body? God dwelt in the Incarnate state. 
9. Is this indwelling not a limitation on God? It is not the sender (mursio, but the sent one 
who indwells the body. 
10. If something dwells in something else is it not enclosed in it? Just as light is not 
enclosed in the sun nor the personality in the human body neither is the Word enclosed 
in the body 
11. How could the Word become Incarnate without limitation? When the sun's rays light 
up the ground the sun is not limited to that spot, so the body is not a limiting factor for 
the Word. 
12. Is there a difference between the body of the Incarnate one and other bodies? They arc 
similar in that they are part of creation, but different in that there is a union of the Word 
and the body. 175 
174 Ibid., 29. 
175 Ibid., 30-35. 
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4.5.2.1. Evaluation 
Abü Rä'ita uses the analogy of the human mind and body in the context of dialogue with 
Muslims as he did in dialogue with Melkites, but in different ways. For Melkites the 
analogy shows that the Word did not unite with a human mind. For Muslims the analogy 
demonstrates that the sender of the Word remains untouched by the identity of the Word 
with the human body. These two different uses of the mind/body distinction show the 
versatility of Abü Rä'ita as an apologist, able to relate a miaphysite conviction in quite 
separate ways to Christian and Muslim contexts. Muslim difficulty with the Incarnation 
lies in the restriction placed upon God by his indwelling a human body. Abü Rä'ita's 
argument that the sender of the Word is unrestricted by the indwelling of the Word in a 
human body is an attempt to meet this problem by demonstrating that divinity can touch 
humanity without being absorbed by it in such a way as to lose transcendence. Of course 
this distinction between the sender and the sent may not have carried weight with Muslims, 
since for them the latter had to be human and not divine. Nevertheless, here is a Christian 
attempt to give Islamic ideas a Christian meaning in order to convey the Incarnation in 
terms that a Muslim could understand. 
4.5.3. Questions 13-18. The necessity for God to become Incarnate 
13. Why should God become human? God became human to release humans from 
punishment for disobeying him, and to return them to their original condition. 
14. Why did God create Adam and his descendents? He had created Adam in the first place 
out of his goodness and kindness. 
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15. Was God not good and kind until he created? It is his character to be always good and 
kind, but he wanted to display his goodness after Adam fell into sin. 
16. Could God not redeem humanity without becoming human? God can do what he 
wants. However, simply forgiving Adam's descendants for sin was not enough. If any 
fault remained in the human personality God could not demonstrate his complete 
goodness, and therefore, to fully renew his creation he had to become human to show 
his goodness. 
17. Is not death evidence against your view of salvation? There are two kinds of death; 
natural death and death caused by sin. The body dies a natural death and the personality 
dies a death caused by sin. Faith in God delivers us from both types of death. 
18. Would not the sending of angels or pure humans be more suitable for the salvation of 
humanity than God becoming human? God did send human messengers such as Noah, 
Abraham and Moses, but few followed them, so he could not save humans by sending 
more angelic or human messengers. God decided that the only solution was the 
Incarnation. 176 
4.5.3.1. Evaluation 
The two reasons given for the Incarnation, to release humans from punishment for 
disobeying him and to return them to their original condition of goodness, are grounded in 
the Christian tradition that had its origins in the teaching of the New Testament. Abü 
Rä'ita appeals to the prophetic messengers known to Muslims to back up his case that 
salvation needed more than human proclaimers. The fact that few people responded to the 
preaching of Abraham or Moses shows that only divine indwelling in a human body would 
have a significant impact. Secondly, even if there had been a widespread response to the 
176 ibid., 35-38. 
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messengers, humans would have continued to act in both good and evil ways. Only a 
perfectly good life would remove the problem of evil, and therefore, the divine had to 
become Incarnate. However, the explanation of this tradition for a Muslim audience might 
not have made its mark. Why God `had to' become human in order to restore wayward 
humanity is not really clear. Might the Muslim not conclude that according to the two basic 
reasons for the Incarnation it was the choice of God to become human? If so, there was no 
external compulsion on God so to act, no necessity for him to become Incarnate. Indeed 
this is a difficulty for Abü Rä'ita that he scarcely perceives. Making the Incarnation 
essential to God's administration of the world because of human failure is to introduce 
fundamental weakness into the plan of God for creation. Perhaps the Islamic instinct for 
the freedom of God would have served the argument better. 
4.5.4. Questions 19-21. The supposed death of God by crucifixion 
19. If God died how could he still rule the world? The death of Christ did not undermine 
God's rule over his creation, since only his body died, but his divinity did not. 
20. Why do you separate his divinity from his body, nullifying the unity between them? He 
died a human death but it did not touch his divine state. The union of the Word with the 
flesh was unaffected by the flesh being put to death. 
21. How is being put to death a demonstration of God's goodness? The death of Christ is 
the ultimate demonstration of the goodness of God because it shows the length to 
which he was prepared to go to save humans. 177 
177 Ibid., 39-42. 
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4.5.4.1. Evaluation 
Here Abü Ra'ita gives an explanation for the Incarnation that depends on choice rather 
than necessity. The death of Christ shows how much God cares for humans. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the eternal Word is unaffected by the death of his human body produces the 
protest that this sunders the union between divine and human in Christ. The protest of al- 
Mahdi is heard here too, showing how Muslims in the ninth century were insisting on the 
same difficulty. 178 Timothy's answer to al-Mahdi reappears in the writing of Abü Rä'ita 
and Abü Qurra, who were united in arguing that only the human body of Christ died, and 
that divinity could not die on the cross. While these three apologists differed over the 
correct language to describe the relationship between the divine and human in Christ, there 
is little to choose between them over their description of the death of Christ. At first sight 
this is strange. Should not the miaphysite Abü Rä'ita have more difficulty explaining the 
death of Christ than the diophysites Timothy and Abü Qurra? If the miaphysite insists that 
Christ is the eternal Word at all times and in all experiences, and that he does not have two 
minds, then how can the eternal Word escape the experience of suffering and death? It 
turns out that he did not in fact experience death. Only his human body died. However, this 
is a decidedly weak argument completely denying the reality of human suffering in Christ. 
Surely, the diophysite claim that the human mind suffered and died is a distinct 
improvement, even though it does not solve the problem of a radical split in the character 
of Christ at the point of death. A Muslim would no doubt conclude that Christians could 
not possibly affirm unity between the divine and human in Christ while arguing that only 
the human experienced death. Neither diophysites nor miaphysites had a solution to this 
dilemma. 
178 For al-Mahdi's accusation that the union was broken at the death of only the human and not the divine 
nature of Christ see 2.3.2. 
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4.5.5. Questions 22-24. The human body of the Incarnate one as a possible addition to the 
attributes of God 
22. Is it possible for an attribute of God to add to his nature? No, it is not. 
23. Is not the body of the Incarnate one an addition? Yes, but not in number. Before he 
became Incarnate The Word was a unity, and after his Incarnation he was still a unity. 
24. How can the body not be an addition to the Word when there was a time when he did 
not have a body? The body does not add to the Word who remained a unity after the 
Incarnation. This is similar to how we understand a human being. We do not talk about 
the body being an addition to the human spirit. 179 
4.5.5.1. Evaluation 
Muslim anxiety centred on associating with God that which was not appropriate, so the 
charge levelled against Christians was that the human body was being `associated' with the 
divine in an inappropriate way. Abi! Rä'ita uses the human mind/body relationship to deny 
the charge. Certainly his one nature Christology comes to his aid here, since by not giving 
a human mind to Christ he is able to argue that the human body is not a threat to the divine 
mind that controls it. In effect, the human body cannot add anything of importance to the 
Word, since it is only a vessel for the divine personality. But it is precisely here that the 
true humanity of Christ is at stake, for a mindless human body is simply an empty shell for 
the Word to fill. Thus in gaining immunity for Christ's divinity he has sacrificed his 
humanity. It was theoretically possible for miaphysitc Christians to protect God from 
associating with potentially wayward human nature, but the Christ that emerges is 
practically divorced from being human in any normative sense. 
179 Abü RA'ita, "Al-risäla !? 1-tajassud", 43f. 
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4.5.6. Questions 25-29. The problem of change in God posed by the incarnation 
25. How can you deny that something which has been lit up and has light increased in it 
has changed from its original state? Surely light does not change the body itself or add 
anything to its original condition. 
26. Is the Word limited by anything? The Word is not limited by anything but rather 
everything is limited by the Word. 
27. Is the Word in everything? Certainly. He is supreme over everything. 
28. Did all of the Word become Incarnate or only a part of the Word? God is supreme over 
all his attributes, so all of the Word became Incarnate. 
29. Does this not mean that the body is in everything and that nothing remains in the Word 
which is not Incarnate? Abü Rä'ita asks the Muslim about God sitting on his throne. 
Abü Rä'ita: Do you not say that God is in heaven and on his throne? Show us whether 
all of God is in heaven and on the throne or only part of him. The Muslim: We do not 
describe God in part here or in part there. He is in heaven and on the throne and 
everywhere. Abü Rä'ita: Then heaven is in everything so that nothing remains in 
heaven that is not God. The Muslim: Our expression "God is in heaven and on the 
throne" means that he is Lord of heaven and Lord of the throne. Abü Rä'ita: You 
believe that God appears in heaven and on the throne but he is not in them. The 
Muslim: God is in them, he doesn't just appear in them. Abü Rä'ita: Then God is 
limited by his creation. The Muslim: God is in them by appearing on them. Abü RA'ita: 
You agree with us that God can be in an aspect of his creation without being swallowed 
up by it. 180 
180 Ibid., 45f. 
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4.5.6.1. Evaluation 
The paradox of the Incarnation is now addressed in all its sharpness. Christians claim that 
the eternal Word was limited to a particular human body, while at the same time they 
believe that The eternal Word was still fulfilling divine control over the creation. The 
Muslim concludes that Incarnation cancels out divine rule. Abü Rä'ita makes an appeal to 
Muslim discussion of the throne texts in the Qur'än in his answer to question 29, and 
concludes that the Muslim agrees that God can be in an aspect of his creation without 
being swallowed up by it. This discussion about the throne of God by Abü Ra'ita and Abü 
Qurra shows how important the analogy was in dialogue with Muslims in the early ninth 
century. 181 While Muslims could point to the Christian dilemma of limiting God to a 
human body, Christians could point to the Islamic paradox of God being limited to a 
throne. The use of Muslim debate about God's session on his throne enabled Abü Rä'ita to 
turn from defence to interrogation. Discussion between Muslims about whether sitting on 
the throne limited God in any way allowed Christians the opportunity to argue that if 
Muslims can believe that God is not limited by sitting on the throne then Christians are 
right to believe that the eternal Word of God is not limited by indwelling a human body. 
Finding interpretive keys in Islamic thought was vital to Christian apologetics in a period 
when Christians were on the defensive and struggling to stem the flow of nominal 
Christians turning to Islam. This appeal to the throne texts may have been helpful in the 
struggle to defend the integrity of the Incarnation in the face of a simpler Islamic 
understanding of the activity of God. 
181 For Abü Qurra's appeal to the analogy see 3.3. 
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4.5.7. Questions 30-31. The difficulty of God becoming embodied 
30. How can God have a human body that is not appropriate to his nature? The human 
nature of the Incarnate Word was not human in the ordinary sense. The Word took 
flesh from the woman and became united with that flesh. 
31. How does that which does not have a body become Incarnate? We do not know how 
the process took place. Just as nobody knows how God creates, or how the human 
spirit indwells flesh, so nobody can know how the Word united with human flesh. 182 
4.5.7.1. Evaluation 
Abü Rä'ita declines to say how the eternal Word united with the flesh taken from Mary. 
Abü Qurra wrote of the eternal Word purifying the flesh from Mary before uniting with it, 
but Abü Rä'ila does not follow him. Nevertheless, the thrust of Abü Rä'ita's response is 
similar. If Muslims find human nature demeaning for God to associate with, then the 
problem of unsuitability may be solved if the human nature arising from Mary is uniquely 
suited to divine indwelling. Yet the Muslim reaction to such uniqueness must surely have 
been to ask how Christ was at all like the rest of humanity. Abü Rä'ita was disadvantaged 
by his one nature Christology from giving a satisfactory answer. 
4.5.8. Questions 32-34. The exact nature of the sonship of the Messiah 
32. Where does Christ get his sonship from? The sonship of the Messiah has to do with his 
birth outside of time, he is not son in a physical sense. 
192 Abü Ra'ita, "AI-risäla 1? -1-tajassud", 47f. 
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33. Mary gave birth to him in time, so how can you claim that God did not take a son [lam 
yatakhudh ibnan]? We do not describe the Messiah as the Son of God in the Incarnate 
condition in which he was born of Mary. Rather, Son of God describes the condition in 
which he was begotten of the Father before time and without beginning. 
34. Was the son born twice, from the Father and then from Mary? Yes, there were in fact 
two births of the Messiah, one from the Father and the other from Mary. 183 
4.5.8.1. Evaluation 
The Qur'änic denial that "God took to himself a son" is dealt with here. There is a sense in 
which Christians can agree with the Qur'an that God did not `take' a son because sonship 
belonged to Christ from eternity. There never was a time when the Father was without the 
Son, so the Father did not exist alone before `taking' a son. The Qur'änic assertion that 
"God does not beget" can then be understood in the same way. The begetting from eternity 
need not be censured by the Qur'änic text if the nature of begetting is not physical. What 
the Qur'an disapproves of is birth in the natural sense, but Christians confess generation in 
a non-physical sense. Abü Rä'ita shares a common understanding of these Qur'änic texts 
with Timothy and Abü Qurra, showing how Christians across the three main confessional 
divides borrowed apologetic arguments from each other when dealing with the Islamic 
context. 184 This kind of argument is ground clearing work, but it is interesting to observe 
that in this treatise the discussion of the denial of sonship comes so late on in the 
presentation. Abü Rä'ita has consistently spoken of the eternal Word rather than the eternal 
Son up to this point, out of deference to Islamic scruples over the notion of Sonship. This 
is akin to the method of John of Damascus and Timothy, who preferred to talk of the Word 
becoming Incarnate, but not of Abü Qurra, who wrote of the Son taking flesh in 
183 Ibid., 48. 
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conversation with Muslims. There is a clear advantage in Abü Rä'ita's careful avoidance 
of a title that would be readily misunderstood by Muslims. 
4.5.9. Questions 35-40. The restriction on God implied by the Father/Son analogy 
35. Don't you believe that the Father existed before the Son? The fact that the Son is 
begotten of the Father does not mean that the Father is prior to the Son in time. Neither 
of them have a beginning. 
36. Does this not contradict what is known in creation? This appears to contradict the 
normal process of reproduction in the created order, but remember that God need not 
be tied to the way of creation when he does things. 
37. Why tic God to your description of his activity since he only has to say "be" and it is 
(kün fa yaki7n)? We affirm that God is not tied to human action. 
38. Surely you must believe that God does not do things the way people do? We affinn 
that God is not restricted to the way people do things. The birth of the Son is from 
eternity, in contrast to temporal human birth. 
39. Can a father have a son without procreating? God does not need to do anything the way 
that creatures do. 
40. If you distinguish God's actions from the actions of the created order then why talk 
about "father" and "son" when such language means that the father precedes the son? 
The Father and Son are equal, neither precedes or follows the other. 185 
lm For Timothy's interpretation of sonship and begetting see 2.3.1. For Abü Qurra's treatment see 3.4. 
185 Abu Ra'ita, "A1-risala r-1-tajassud", 49f. 
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4.5.9.1. Evaluation 
God's power to say "be and it is", found in siiras 2: 111 and 3: 42 of the Qur'an, is 
understood by Abra Rä'ita to teach that God is not constrained by anything outside himself. 
If this is so, then the begetting of the eternal Son need not be dependent on the normal 
order of human procreation. While it is true that human fathers precede their sons in time, 
this does not apply to the begetting of the Son by the Father. The Muslim protests that the 
analogy is therefore useless, but Abü Rä'ita argues that the analogy is not nullified by its 
transfer from human to divine spheres. However, this different evaluation of the father/son 
analogy remains an unbridgeable gulf between Christians and Muslims no matter how Abü 
Rä'ita seeks to defend its validity. As far as the Muslim is concerned it would be better for 
Christians to drop the analogy altogether. Yet Christians could hardly give up on language 
embedded in the Apostolic and Patristic descriptions of Christ without losing touch with 
their roots. 
4.5.10. Question 41. The seeming contradiction between Christian belief about the 
Messiah and the Messiah's own words in the gospels 
41. How can you say that the Messiah is God and Lord when he said to his disciples that 
his father was his God [John 20: 17], that his father was greater than he was [John 14: 28], 
that he didn't know the hour [Mark 13: 32], that he could not give places to people in his 
kingdom [Matthew 20: 21,23], and when he appealed to his father in the face of death 
[Matthew 27: 47]? All these sayings demonstrate Jesus' human nature. But it is also 
necessary to take into account quotations that show his divine nature. He said that he 
thought the same as his Father [John 14: 9], that he was in his Father and his Father was in 
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him [John 10: 38], that he and his Father were of one nature [John 10: 30], that he was Lord 
of the Sabbath [Matthew 12: 8], Lord of the disciples [John 13: 13], and that he existed 
before Abraham [John 8: 58]. 
[Abü Rä'ita then engages in a detailed exposition of the verses quoted by the Muslim] 
i) John 20: 17. "I am returning to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God. " It 
is as if he said to his disciples -I am returning to the condition I had before I became 
Incarnate among you. 
ii) John 14: 28. "The Father is greater than I. " He did not mean greater in nature (jawhar) 
because their natures are equal, nor greater in importance because they are equal in glory 
and honour. Rather the Father is greater in cause, but this cannot imply greater in nature. 
iii) Mark 13: 32. "No-one knows about that day or hour not even the angels in heaven; nor 
the Son, but only the Father. " This is the reality of his Incarnate state in which he shares 
the limitations of the humanity of his disciples. 
iv) Matthew 20: 23. "To sit at my right or left is not for me to grant. " The Messiah was not 
willing to make a special case for only two out of his twelve disciples. 
v) Matthew 27: 46. "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me. " This proves that in his 
Incarnate state he was exactly like all other humans who experienced the fear of death. 186 
4.5.10.1 Evaluation 
This discussion of the teaching of Christ recorded in the Gospels occupies almost nine 
pages in Graf 's edition. Abü Rä'ita placed considerable emphasis on interpretation of the 
New Testament because he was forced to do so by his Muslim questioner. It is interesting 
to observe the way that both Muslim and Christian seek to support their views of Christ 
from the Scriptures of the debating partner. Here the Muslim claims to have found 
89 
evidence in the Christian Scriptures for an Islamic view of Christ. This may not be a 
transcription of an actual debate between Abü Rä'ita and a Muslim, but just such a 
discussion of the gospels probably took place in the early ninth century. There would be 
little point Christians arguing against a subordinationist reading of Christ's relationship to 
God unless Muslims had tried to find evidence for it in the gospels. 
The four texts mentioned by the Muslim seem to show the subordination of Christ 
to God. AbU Rä'ita is at pains to point out that each of them can be interpreted from the 
perspective of the equality of the Son with the Father. Thus if the Incarnation of the Word 
is the controlling notion in the Gospel of John, then the two Johannine texts can be placed 
within that framework. "Going to his Father" is another way of saying that he is going 
back to a status of equality given up as a result of his submission to the limitations of the 
human body. Similarly, his lack of knowledge about the future is a feature of his taking on 
human characteristics during the time of his Incarnation, but this ignorance is a temporary 
phenomenon. Likewise the two Matthean texts demonstrate that the Son voluntarily gave 
up decision making about the future once Incarnate, and that he was liable to suffering in 
the way that all other humans are after taking a human body. 
Abü Rä'ita appeals to the Qur'an for support in interpreting Mark 13: 32, where 
Christ denied knowing the hour of his coming. 
"You say that in your book God says to Moses - Give a soft reply to Pharaoh: 
perhaps he will remember and be afraid. In another place in your book - Perhaps 
your Lord will make an alliance between you and those who attack you. And - Did 
you say to people, take me and my mother as gods apart from God? Doesn't God 
attribute doubt or concealment to the human condition? So the Messiah's lack of 
knowledge of the hour of his coming is the result of his Incarnate condition. " 187 
These texts all suggest that humans make the will of God difficult to bring about because 
of waywardness or even hostility. Abü Rä'ita does not interpret the texts individually, but 
simply draws his conclusion that lack of knowledge is part of what it means to be human. 
186 Ibid., 51-59. 
187 Ibid., 56f. The three texts from the Qur'an are saras 20: 46,60: 7 and 5: 116. 
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However, this ignorance of Christ can hardly be attributed to a human mind that he did not 
possess. For Abü Rä'ita the eternal Word is the sole intellect in the union of divine and 
human, so must be charged with a defective memory over future divine plans. 
4.5.11. Questions 42-44. The problem of the will of God and the death of the Messiah 
42. Was Christ's death by crucifixion done with his consent? If so, there was no sin 
committed by those who crucified him. If not, then does not the divine become repulsive? 
There are two sides to his death. On one side, he did not consent to what the Jews wanted 
to do to him, but on the other side, he consented to death for the salvation of humanity. 
43. How could he suffer willingly when he did not consent to what they did? He did not 
want the Jews to put him to death in the way that they wanted. This seems to be a 
contradiction. We ask you, "does God consent to the death of one who testifies to faith in 
him or not? If you say that he does, we say that that there is no sin in the unbelief which 
puts faithful witnesses to death. If you say that he is opposed to their death, we say that 
God becomes despicable by allowing such injustice to happen. 
44. How can you argue that God rewards liars? Your book testifies against you when it 
says "they slander God with their lies" 188 If this means that humans lied about God how 
could they do this when God does not reward them. If it is said "God is exalted far above 
what people do to slander him", then you agree with what we say about Christ. His divine 
nature is not touched by the crucifixion. The Jews did not crucify his divine nature. They 
tried to slander God, but he is exalted far above their slander. 189 
188 Ibid., 62. See süras 4: 53,5: 102,10: 61,70 and 16: 117 
189 Ibid., 60-63. 
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4.5.11.1. Evaluation 
The Muslim is concerned finally with the contradiction between God's will being achieved 
and the Christian insistence on the death of Christ. Abü Rä'ita accepts the apparent 
contradiction is a difficulty for the Muslim, so his way of resolving the problem is to 
appeal to the voluntary nature of Christ's death. If Christ gave up his life to save others 
then the will of God was not frustrated by those who put him to death. It may appear that 
humans defeated Christ by putting him to death, and that they defeated God's will in this 
way. However, God's will was achieved by the death of Christ. The Jews claimed to have 
defeated Christ, and in a sense they did defeat the human body of Christ. But they were 
unable to destroy the divine nature of Christ. So the Jews made false claims about the 
results of the crucifixion. Abü Rä'ita again uses his awareness of Muslim thought to 
answer Muslim questions about Christianity. Just as it is incorrect in Islam to believe that 
God rewards those opposed to him, so Christians should not be thought by Muslims to hold 
that those who put Christ to death are congratulated by God for performing his will. 
Though he does not refer to the denial of the crucifixion in the Qur'an, AbU Rä'ita seems 
to suggest that this denial applies to the killing of the divine Word rather than the human 
body. While this interpretation has appealed to a few Muslims it has not succeeded in 
becoming widely accepted. 190 
4.6. Conclusion 
Abü Rä'ita's Letter on the Incarnation is a more thorough treatment of Christology in 
dialogue with Muslims than any so far surveyed, and is an almost exhaustive scrutiny of 
Christian claims about Christ from what appears to be a skeptical Muslim point of view. 
190 See 1.2.3. 
92 
While the Demonstration of Christianity dealt with only one Muslim concern, whether the 
Incarnation changes God's nature, the Letter on the Incarnation opens up eleven areas of 
Muslim unease about Christology. When these questions are compared with those posed 
by Melkites in the treatises addressed to them by Abü Rä'ita, it becomes apparent how the 
Islamic context radically changed the way Christology had to be discussed. 
Abü Ra'ita handled two issues in his debates with Melkites. Firstly, he denied that 
Christ needed to have a human mind in order to be fully Incarnate. The danger lying 
behind this Melkite claim was the potential to split Christ's actions into two groups, some 
divine and others human. Only if Christ had a divine mind could such a split be avoided. 
Secondly, the Melkites were in danger of adding a fourth member to the Trinity by 
insisting on a human mind in Christ alongside a divine one. Neither of these questions 
arises in his writing for Muslims. 
The eleven debating points in the Letter on the Incarnation are based on problems 
that a Muslim has with divine interaction with the world. A concern to maintain the 
transcendence of God underlies the Muslim questioning. Thus the first set of questions 
establishes whether Christ is divine or human, not a point of contention among Christians. 
The second group of questions asks why the Trinity did not become Incarnate, only a 
problem for a Muslim unitarian view of God. These questions were not raised in intra- 
Christian debate on Christology, and they demonstrate the radical shift in Christological 
discourse brought about by Islamic encounter with Christian theology. The same can be 
said for the other types of question raised. Anxiety about limitations placed on God by 
indwelling a human body, or about God's rule of the world being disrupted if Christ 
suffered death, or about adding a human attribute to God's nature, is symptomatic of a fear 
of reducing the greatness of God felt by Muslims but not by Christians. Other questions 
relate to the goodness of God. Can God's forgiveness be tied to the Incarnation without 
restricting his goodness? The death of Christ on the cross can hardly speak of a God who 
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protects the innocent. For Christians, but not for Muslims, the Incarnation and atonement 
were the very demonstration of the love of God for human beings. 
Muslims who could have read the New Testament would have found evidence of a 
human Christ who seemed quite different from the Eternal Word who was Second person 
of the Trinity. Christians were now forced to defend the way their understanding of Christ 
had developed from Scriptural beginnings. Abü Ra'ita interprets texts which seem to 
support a human Christ as evidence of the Incarnate condition of the eternal Word. Christ 
is ignorant of the future because he has given up divine knowledge in his Incarnate state in 
order to share in the life of his disciples, and he is afraid of death just like all humans since 
his Incarnation resulted in his experience of human frailty. But here is the heart of the 
problem for Abü Rä'ita's Christology. He accused Melkites of splitting Christ into two by 
insisting on a union of divine and human minds, holding that unity in Christ can only be 
maintained if the divine mind alone is active. However, he seems to allow the divine mind 
to become like a human mind in order to make sense of apparent human weakness in the 
gospel accounts of Christ. In other words, Christ in practice does think the way humans do, 
and thus the gap between one nature and two nature Christologics virtually disappears. 
Abra Rä'ila speaks of two attributes ($ifalain) in one divine substance (jativhar), 191 enabling 
him to allow room in Christ for human feelings and perceptions, even if he only decides 
and acts from his divine nature. However, knowledge and ignorance can hardly be 
attributed merely to receptive perception, but must be the functions of a thinking, deciding 
and acting mind. Muslim insistence on the humanity of Christ placed one nature 
Christology under intense pressure to acknowledge the reality of human mental processes 
in Christ, and thus to come closer to the Chalcedonian definition of Christ's two natures. 
A comparison of his writing for Melkites with his apologetics for Muslims reveals 
two linguistic developments for the Islamic context. Firstly, he explains the duality of 
191 Abu Ra'ita, "Al-risala li-l-tajassud", Si. 
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human and divine in Christ by using the idea of attributes. Christ has two attributes, divine 
and human. Muslims speak of the attributes of God such as knowing and willing, and 
Christians speak of Christ having attributes. Abü Rä'ita does not use this language in 
dialogue with Melkites, for whom he writes of one divine nature in a human body. For 
Muslims he explains this intra-Christian discussion by referring to the language Muslims 
were familiar with in explaining the nature of God. Thus if Muslims think about God as 
having more than one attribute, they may be able to understand how Christians think of 
Christ as having a human body and a divine mind. He can apply the concept of attributes to 
Christ because he holds that Christ is essentially divine, and so the eternal Word carries the 
attribute of divinity from his eternal state into his Incarnate state and adds another attribute 
as a result of taking human flesh. How the human attribute coheres with the divine is left as 
a mystery. 
Secondly, he uses the verb akhadha, with its Qur'änic allusions, to describe the 
process of Incarnation in the Muslim context but not the Melkite one. Like Abü Qurra, he 
writes of the eternal Word `taking' flesh from Mary. While Muslims may fear that 
Christians hold that God took to himself a son, in reality it was the Word who took flesh 
from Mary, so the eternal Word is the actor, not the product. The eternal Word is not the 
passive recipient of divine activity, but the one who does all the creative work himself. 
This is an attempt to reclaim the denial of the Qur'än that God took a son by turning the 
negative statement into a positive one with a different subject of the verb, which should 
have indicated to Muslims that Christians could agree with the denial. 
Several of the appeals to Islamic convictions to support his Christology are 
noteworthy. Firstly, the eternal character of the Word is supported by the Qur'änic dictum 
that God only has to say - "be and it is". Muslims should not tie God to typical 
reproductive processes. If God can create by speech, then the Father can beget his Son 
without recourse to typical reproductive processes. Secondly, he shares with Abü Qurra 
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references to God's session on his throne in support of God's ability to be in part of his 
creation while ruling over all of it. In the same way God is Incarnate in Christ while 
upholding the universe. Thirdly, as for the death of Christ compromising the power of God 
over evil, Muslims have their own difficulties in this area. Humans slander God's name but 
he is not ultimately damaged by it, because human evil does not touch him. So the death of 
Christ does not undermine God's power since only the human body dies. The cross does 
not damage God. These appeals to Islamic convictions are more penetrating in the writing 
of Abü Rä'ita than that of Abü Qurra. The use of Islamic beliefs enabled him to show that 
Christian belief about the Incarnation is not entirely incompatible with Islamic belief, even 
if he was probably unable to show any necessary connection between the Incarnation and 
Islamic thought. 
Finally, though his Christology in dialogue with Muslims is a faithful defence of 
the miaphysite tradition for which Abü Rä'ita stood, he develops a very thorough 
apologetic for the possibility of Incarnation that had not been part of the traditional intra- 
Christian Christological debates that had run for centuries. While Abü Qurra fields a few 
questions raised by Muslims about the divine becoming human, Abü Rä'ita attempts an 
encyclopaedic survey of all the issues Muslims raise on the topic. His answers show a 
patient seriousness with questions that Christians take for granted, and provide a model for 
Christians in any age in their dialogue with Muslims. 
Abü Rä'ita was not alone in developing an extensive apologetic on Christology in 
the early ninth century. The following chapter will examine a similar type of writing by 
'Ammar al-Basri, a Nestorian theologian who was probably a younger contemporary of 
Abü Rä'ita and Abü Qurra. 
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Part One. Ninth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Five 
The Christology of 'Ammär al-Basri in Dialogue with Muslims 
5.1. 'Ammär a1-Bas! 
'Ammar al-Basri came from the Nestorian church, named after Nestorius who had been 
anathematized at the Council of Ephesus in 431 for refusing to confess that Mary was 
mother of God. This movement thrived outside the Roman Empire after the expulsion of 
Nestorians by Emperor Zeno beteen 474 and 491.192 The details of'Ammär's life are not 
known, but he was a contemporary of the Muslim scholar Abü 1-Hudhayl al-'Alläf (d. c. 
840) who wrote a "refutation of'Ammär the Christian in his reply to the Christians" 
according to the Fihrist of Ibn al-Nadim. 193 "Ammär was therefore engaged in apologetic 
writing for Muslims in the early ninth century. The fact that he wrote in Arabic signals a 
development in Nestorian apologetic writing from the late eighth century when Timothy's 
debate with the Caliph al-Mahdi held in 781-2 was first written in Syriac and then 
192 See A. S. Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity, 252. Nestorian Christology grew out of the Word- 
human nature Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia [c. 350-4281, who held that the Word assumed not 
only a body but also a human mind. Since sin arises in the mind it was essential for the Word to unite with a 
complete human nature in order to abolish sin in humanity as a whole. Thus Christ is both fully divine and 
fully human. "He who assumed is by nature the same as David and Abraham, whose son he is. " [Theodore of 
Mopsuestia, "Eighth Catechetical Homily, 1", in 11. Bettenson, The Later Christian Fathers, 167. ] Nestorius 
applied the two natures Cbristology of Theodore to a dispute over the correct way to speak of Mary's 
relationship to Jesus. As Bishop of Constantinople, Nestorius had to mediate between some who called Mary 
the mother of God and others who insisted that she was only mother of Christ's human nature. Nestorius 
suggested "that she should be called mother of Christ, a term which represented both God and man, as it is 
used in the gospels. " [Nestorius, "Letter to John of Antioch", in A. Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition. 
vol 1, London, 1975,451. ] However, his refusal to allow Mary to be called mother of God led to his exile in 
436 after the decision of the Council of Ephesus in 431 that Mary should be given the title "Mother of God". 
Followers of Nestorius later refused to accept the definition of Chalcedon in 451, which held to one 
hypostasis in two natures, preferring to think of the two natures as two hypostases. See A. Grillmcier, Christ 
in Christian Tradition. vol 2: 4, London, 1996,504. 
193 See B. Dodge, The Fihrist of al-Nadim, a Tenth Century Survey of Muslin: Culture. vol 1, New York, 388. 
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translated into Arabic. 194 The Nestorian community was using the language of the ruling 
power by the beginning of the ninth century. 
The two extant works by 'Ammar are apologetic treatises. His Book of the Proof 
covers the key areas of controversy between Christians and Muslims with most attention 
paid to explaining the Trinity and the Incarnation. 
195 'Ammär's Book of Questions and 
Answers deals with the Christian understanding of Revelation, the Four Gospels, the 
Trinity and the Incarnation. 196 This latter work is dedicated to the Caliph, most likely al- 
Ma'mün, who ruled from 813 to 833.197 
5.2. The Book of the Proof 
The Book of the Proof deals with the Christian beliefs that were controversial for 
Christians living among Muslims, the authenticity of the Bible, the Trinity, the Incarnation, 
the death of Christ, the sacraments, and the afterlife. 'Ammar writes in a dialogical style 
offering a defense of Christianity in the light of Muslim interrogation. However, the 
addressees are Christians rather than Muslims since Christians are "we" and Muslims 
"they" throughout the book. "The author quite obviously considers the pamphlet to be a 
compendium of ready reference for Christians who are involved in religious controversy 
with Muslims on a day to day basis. " 
198 
194 See the discussion in chapter two, 2.1.3. 
195 'Ammar al-Basri, "Kitäb al-Burbän", ed. M. Ifayek, in Amnidr al-Bavri: Apologie et Controverses. 
Beirut, 1977,19-90. 
196 'Amm5r al-Basri, "Kitäb al-masä'il wa-l-ajwiba", in M. IIayck, op. cit., 91-266. 
197 See M. Ilayek, "'Ammar al-Bast-1. La Premiere Somme de Theologie ChrCtienne en Langue Arabe, ou 
Deux Apologies du Christianisme", Islamochristiana. (2,1976,69-113), 73. 
198 S. li. Griffith, "'Ammar al-Basri's Kitäb al-Burhän: Christian Kaläm in the First Abbasid Century", Le 
Museon. (96,1983,145-181), 155. 
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5.2.1. Handling Texts from the Qur'an that deny the incarnation 
The proof concerning the Incarnation begins with an interpretation of two Qur'änic texts 
that appear to deny the possibility of the divine uniting with the human in the way that 
Christians believe. These are süra 72: 3, "Our Lord is highly exalted, he did not take a 
female companion nor did he take a son", and süra 112: 3, "God does not beget nor was he 
begotten". On the basis of 72: 3 Muslims think that Christians believe that God "took up 
residence in Mary's womb thus restricting his essence (dhät) within her. " 199 Christians 
should reply that this is to confuse eternal and temporal categories. The sonship of Christ is 
eternal not temporal so there is no real difficulty with the language of begetting if it is 
understood in an eternal context. After all, Muslims do not interpret names given to God 
such as `knowing' and `wise' according to the way humans are knowing or wise. Rather 
they understand human knowledge and wisdom in the light of divine knowledge and 
wisdom. "The names adhere to God in their true sense, and are given to us from him on a 
temporary basis, so that they belong to him eternally. " 200 Thus Christian names such as 
`Father' and `Son' should be interpreted as adhering to God eternally. 
The second text from the Qur'an, sura 112: 3, safeguards God from imperfection 
according to Muslim thought. The Christian can argue that in the created order only the 
simplest aspects of creation fail to beget, and that human begetting reflects most closely 
the begetting of the eternal Son by the eternal Father. Muslims accept that God is described 
in human terms such as `merciful' and `angry', which imply that he feels pain. However, 
Muslims do not ascribe imperfection to God as a result, because they believe that he is free 
from the weakness associated with such feelings. Likewise Christians should argue, "why 
199 'Ammar a1-Basri, "Kitäb al-Burbän", 56. 
200 Ibid., 59. 
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don't you Muslims accept that fatherhood and sonship can be imputed to God without any 
implication of imperfection. " 201 
5.2.1.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar's treatment of süra 72: 3 is significantly different from the way his fellow 
Nestorian, Timothy, replied to al-Mahdi's quotation of the same text. Whereas Timothy 
simply denied the accusation that God had taken a wife and had a son, 'Ammar refers to a 
current Muslim view of the text that understands the denial to be about the restriction of 
God's essence (dhät) in a human being. This difference marks a development in Islamic 
interpretation of the Qur'an, from al-Mahdi's assumption that the text denies God 
begetting as such, to the belief that the text opposes a restriction on God implied by the 
begetting of a son. 202 The early ninth century was therefore a period during which 
Muslims were interpreting the Qur'an in more philosophical ways, and engaging Christians 
in a philosophical debate. 'Ammar rises to the occasion with his references to Muslim 
interpretation of two of the attributes of God, knowledge and wisdom. If Muslims can 
distinguish between human and divine knowledge and wisdom, then they ought to be able 
to distinguish between human and divine begetting. The former is bound by limitations but 
the latter is not. The fact that 'Ammär's appeal to Muslim interpretation of God's attributes 
is found in Abü Qurra's treatise God has a Son shows the level of interaction between 
Christian theologians from different Christian communities in search of arguments to 
defend commonly held beliefs. 203 
201 Ibid., 62. 
202 For al-Mahdi's argument see chapter 2.3.1. 
203 See 3.4. for Abü Qurra's argument that God's attributes of hearing and wisdom do not imply that human 
bearing and wisdom are the same, and therefore it follows that divine begetting is not the same as human 
begetting. 
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The second text is interpreted by Muslims to protect the perfection of God, which 
would be undermined by a relationship between Christ and God described in filial and 
paternal terms. 'Ammar appeals to the kind of divine attributes that could imply weakness 
and imperfection in him, such as `mercy' and `anger'. If Muslims are able to understand 
these attributes as being free from weakness then it follows that Christians should be 
allowed to do the same with the terms `Father' and `Son'. A similar argument is also found 
in Abü Qurra's treatise God has a Son, confirming the point already made about the 
sharing of apologetic approaches among Christian theologians from different communities. 
204 Debate among Muslims about the attributes of God provided fertile ground for 
Christian apologists in the early ninth century. While the Mü tazila and the Traditionists 
were engaged in a struggle to determine the nature of the attributes, Christians were able to 
join in the discussion to their advantage. For if God could be described in terms of activity 
normally associated with humans then there was scope for distinctively Christian terms to 
be as valid as those found in the Qur'än. The weakness of this approach lay in the fact that 
the Qur'än appeared to rule out the very attributes that Christians wished to apply to God, 
namely begetting and fatherhood. However, this was not to rule out Christians making use 
of the difficulties Muslims had with the interpretation of divine attributes, since they were 
entering into territory familiar to Muslim intellectuals as equals rather than inferiors. 
5.2.2. Four Reasons for the Incarnation 
Turning to reasons why God should appear in human form, 'Ammär first of all argues that 
the appearance of God in the flesh is the best form of revelation, since it was not really 
adequate for God to send prophets to declare his message. It was God's ultimate plan to 
reveal himself to humanity in the Messiah, so that none would be in any doubt about the 
204 See 3.4. where Abü Qurra argues that the title `Father' should be acceptable to Muslims since 
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character of God. "He appeared to human beings in human flesh (fl bashar min-hum) and 
spoke to them about himself revealing his authority and power to them. " 205 Secondly, God 
condescends to the human need to see the divine nature expressed in the fact that people 
make images of the divine in their search for him. Then, thirdly, if God will judge 
humanity is it not proper for those being judged to see their accuser? Since God cannot 
appear to us directly he "veiled himself with human nature" (jawhar al-insän). 206 
Fourthly, by being in a human body (171jasad min-hum) God has given humanity the 
opportunity to rule creation not only in time but also in eternity. 207 'Ammar concludes this 
section with a brief discussion of the union of divine and human in Christ. Even though 
Christians have different ways of describing the union, they are united in confessing that 
God became Incarnate. "They agree that the Creator appeared in a body like theirs ... but 
they disagree over how to describe the body; some say it is one hypostasis (qunüm) and 
others that it is two hypostases (qunümain). " 208 
5.2.2.1. Evaluation 
These four arguments seek to validate the Incarnation as profitable for humans. Firstly, 
human ability to see God himself in Christ in terms of authoritative speech and powerful 
deeds would remove any doubt that God was truly active in the world. In other words, 
sending human messengers was never going to be ideal to secure faith and obedience from 
humans, even though God had used that form of revelation over a long period of time. This 
argument is a direct challenge to Islamic notions of revelation, which arc bound by the 
transcendence of God in the giving of revelation as speech, safeguarding the character of 
anthropomorphic titles attributed to God such as seeing or hearing do not demean him. 
205 'AmmAr a1-Basri, "Kitäb al-Burhän", 62. 
206 Aid., 69. 
207 Ibid., 72. 
208 Ibid., 79. 
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God from contamination or limitation in his relationship with humanity. That 'Ammar 
makes this case so boldly suggests that he believes Christian ideas of revelation are simply 
more valuable than Islamic ones, and that the opportunity for catching sight of the divine in 
a man is by definition the kind of revelation that nobody would refuse. This confident 
assertion of the superiority of the revelation of God in Christ is unique to 'Ammar among 
the apologists of the eighth and ninth centuries, and shows how he was willing to compare 
Christian and Muslim thought to the disadvantage of the latter. This method applies to his 
second and third reasons for the Incarnation. God understands human need to visualize the 
divine despite the insistence of the Qur'än that humans had gone astray precisely by 
making images of divine beings. God also thinks it appropriate for humans to get some 
idea of the appearance of the judge they all one day will meet, even though he has to hide 
his face from view, despite the fact that Muslims regard God as unseen to the human eye. 
'Ammar seemed to think that such arguments would find a ready audience among 
Muslims, but this was unlikely in reality. Transcendence is breached in each of these 
arguments in terms simply unacceptable to Muslims, so that it must have been difficult for 
them to take these propositions seriously. 
5.2.3. Dealing with the Muslim denial of Christ's death on the cross 
Muslims accuse Christians both of introducing weakness to God and of humiliating Christ 
by holding that Christ was put to death at the hands of his enemies. The first accusation is 
made in terms of sl ra 19: 90, "The sky is ready to burst, the earth split and the mountains 
fall down, " which is interpreted by Muslims to imply that Christians slander God in 
holding to the crucifixion of Christ. 209 'Ammär suggests that Christians counter this 
supposed slander by arguing that the death of God's messengers is not necessarily a sign of 
209 ibid. 
103 
weakness on God's part. For example, John the Baptist suffered a terrible death but 
Muslims do not impute weakness to God for allowing it to happen. The basic problem with 
the cross is the type of death it signifies. Muslims seemed to find it impossible to 
incorporate the defeat of a messenger of God into their understanding of prophethood. This 
was one of the points made by al-Mahdi to Timothy in his criticism of the crucifixion, and 
now, a generation later, 'Ammar is aware of the force of this position for Muslims. 
210 So 
any appeal to the death of a prophet, which suggested defeat of God's purposes, would 
most likely have failed to convince. Still, 'Ammar thinks that this Islamic premise ought to 
be challenged by the story of John's killing as recorded in the gospels. John the Baptist's 
death is mentioned in the Qur'an, but there is no information about the manner of his 
passing. 211 Whether the testimony of the Christian Scriptures would have had much 
persuasive power is doubtful. 
212 
The second accusation that the story of the crucifixion demeans Christ himself can 
be dealt with by pointing to the subsequent honouring of Christ by God as a result of 
Christ's resurrection and ascension. Then Christians can argue that the victory of Christ 
over the power of death had incalculable consequences for humans, since by conquering 
death and rising to life Christ opened the way for humanity to overcome death and rise to 
eternal life. 213 
210 Al-Mahds believed that "Jesus was honoured by God who did not deliver him into the hands of the Jews 
so that they could kill him. " See 2.3.2. 
2`t See süra 19: 15, "Peace on him (Yahyä) the day he was born, the day he dies, and the day he is raised 
alive'. 
212 Nevertheless, the twentieth century Qur'an commentatorYüsuf'Ali accepts the historicity of the New 
Testament account of John's death as an explanation of süra 19: 15, even though he does not in consequence 
accept the historicity of the gospel story of Christ's crucifixion. 
213 'Ammar, Op. cit., 80f. 
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5.2.3.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar does not quote the denial of the crucifixion in süra 4: 157, "They did not kill him, 
they did not crucify him. " Why open the advice to Christians on answering Muslim 
questions about Christ with two outright denials of his status as begotten of God and Son 
of God, and not end with the rejection of the cross? The fact that none of the Christian 
apologists surveyed here from the eighth and ninth centuries mentions the content of süra 
4: 157 provides a clue to the answer. Christians felt unable to counter the Qur'änic 
opposition to the cross in a direct way, but were compelled by the strength of Muslim 
sentiment to talk about the cross indirectly. Timothy came closest to a direct counter 
argument by suggesting that the mention of the death of Christ in süra 19: 33 supported the 
gospel version of Christ's death and resurrection, but he refrained from saying that süra 
4: 157 was wrong. 214 Muslim rule meant that there were limits to the kind of argument 
Christians could employ in debate with Muslims. 
'Ammar's approach is to tackle the subsidiary issues of the demeaning of the 
characters of God and Christ felt by Muslims to be implied in the crucifixion. Here was 
more congenial territory for apologetic argument, since 'Ammar could develop the paradox 
of humiliation leading to exaltation, which was the original Apostolic interpretation of the 
death of Christ in the New Testament. The Islamic anxiety about protecting God's 
messengers from shameful defeat could become the foundation for the greater truth that 
defeat by human enemies turned out ultimately to be the occasion for God's victory. 
Therefore, Christ is honoured precisely because he undergoes death to raise up fellow 
humans to life, and in the process he accepts dishonour to bring honour to many. This 
approach is unique to 'Ammar among Christian apologists of the eighth and ninth 
centuries, and certainly provides a way of dealing with the honour and shame theme 
214 See 2.3.2. for Timothy's use ofsüra 19: 33. 
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central to Islamic perception of God's messengers. 215 Still, the question remains how 
Muslims would have received this argument. The basic stumbling block of the denial of 
the cross would probably have prevented them from accepting a paradox that included the 
crucifixion. 
5.3. The Book of Questions and Answers 
In this work 'Ammar deals with questions raised by Muslims about the existence of God 
and his creation, the four gospels, the Trinity and the Incarnation. The final fourth section 
answers fifty-one questions about the Incarnation but occupies a third of the work. 
216 The 
format is similar to the forty-four questions answered by Abü Rä'ita in his Letter on the 
Incarnation, but is a much more substantial piece of writing. Both Abü Rä'ita and 'Ammar 
al-Basri were from Syriac speaking Christian communities, which had a history of 
theological writing in a question and answer style. According to S. H. Griffith, "The 
practice of composing books of questions was a conventional manner of scholarly 
composition in Nestorian academic circles. " 217 While Abü Ra'ita and 'Ammär composed 
questions and answers on the Incarnation, they did not adopt an identical answering 
approach. Firstly, Abü Rä'ita explicitly refers to the Qur'än on occasion but 'Ammar never 
does. Secondly, 'Ammär's answers are often independent of Abü Rä'ita's, even though the 
questions are similar. Thirdly, 'Ammar's style is less direct than Abü Rä'ita's. The latter 
addressed his questioner as `you', but 'Ammär refers to the Muslim questioner in the third 
person as `he', which may indicate that, like the Book of the Proof, the Book of Questions 
and Antivers was primarily designed to assist Christians in defence of their faith. Therefore 
215 For a twentieth century Christian attempt to deal with the shame of the crucifixion see The Life of Christ 
in chapter ten. 
216 'Ammär a1-Barry "Kitäb al-ma sä'il wa-l-ajwiba: al-magala al-räbi'a', in IIayek, Apologie et 
Conlroverses, 178-265. 
217 S. 11. Griffith, "'Ammar al-Basri s Kitäb al-Burhän: Christian Kaläm in the First Abbasid Century", 152. 
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the questions raised by the anonymous Muslim are organized to suit an orderly exposition 
and do not represent actual debate, but rather typify the kind of issues that Muslim 
intellectuals raise when in discussion with Christian theologians. 
The fifty-one questions are grouped according to the following themes: questions 
1-10, the union between the divine and human in Christ; questions 11-14, the embodiment 
of God; questions 15-20, the way God is affected by the Incarnation of the Word; questions 
21-26, the choice of Mary's son: why not another human being or angel; questions 27-31, 
how the work of Christ affects others; questions 32-35, the purpose of Christ's suffering; 
questions 36-42, the historicity of the crucifixion and resurrection; questions 43-46, the 
relationship between Christ and the Trinity; and questions 47-5 1, the salvation Christ 
brings. 
5.3.1. Questions 1-10. The union between the divine and human in Christ 
1. [Question one has been lost but part of the answer is extant] 'Ammar begins with a 
definition of the union of the divine and human in Christ which asserts that "the eternal 
Word and the temporal created human being became one Messiah ... who is the union of 
two natures (jawharain). " 
218 
2. Is Christ eternal or temporal? Before the union one can speak about the eternal Word but 
not about Christ. "The Messiah can only be named after the eternal nature (al-jawhar al- 
azali) became Incarnate (yatajassad) by uniting with created human nature. " 219 
3. Are the two natures (jawharain) united? Yes, They are united in Christ. "The two 
natures (tabd'ain) or the two hypostases (qunümain) are united. " 220 
21$ 'Ammär a1-Basri, "Kiläb al-masä'il wa-l-ajwiba", 179. 
219lbid., 180. 
220 Ibid., 181. 
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4. In what way is Christ a unity of two natures? He is a unity of divine and human 
hypostases (qunümain lähütiyan wa näsütiyan). 221 
5. Does the human nature not affect the divine? No, just as coal receives heat from fire but 
does not impart blackness to it, so the human nature does not affect the divine. 
6. Was the human nature in the virgin's womb before the uniting of the divine with a 
human body? The virgin conceived Christ as a union of two natures. 
7. Who was the Son of God, the one who existed before the Incarnation or the one 
conceived in the virgin's womb? "The Incarnate Christ is the Son of God, equally in his 
eternal nature (bi jawhari-hi al-azat) as in his temporal nature (bi-jawhari-hi al-zamani)". 
222 
8. Did only one or both natures eat and drink and suffer? From his human nature Christ ate, 
drank and suffered, not from his divine nature. 
9. Do you not hold that Christ has two births, one from eternity and the other in time? "We 
don't say that Christ had two births but that he was begotten (mawvlüd) from the Father 
outside of time, and born (tiviläd) of his mother in time". 223 
10. How is the nature that is created in time called Son of God? The eternal Son decided 
that human nature (jawhar al-ins) should share in his sonship. "He became Incarnate, 
uniting with human nature as a garment for his divine nature (libäsan li-lähüti-hi). " 224 
5.3.1.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar shares with Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita the root tajassud to describe the 
Incarnation. Along with Abü Rä'ita he uses the idea of the human nature as a garment for 
the divine nature. Once in this opening section he refers to the humanity of Christ as a 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid., 187. 
223 Ibid., 192. 
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temple (haykal), but 'Ammär generally prefers the image of clothing to a temple. This use 
of garment imagery leaves the impression of a human nature in Christ that is passive, a 
conclusion understandable for the miaphysite Abü Rä'ita but less helpful for the diophysite 
'Ammär. The image gives little room for a human mind in Christ, a concept central to the 
two nature Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia. 225 In terms of its usefulness in an 
Islamic context the garment analogy would probably have suggested to Muslims that the 
Christian Christ was a divine being clothed in a human body, rather than a union between 
divine and human natures. 
The Nestorian belief in the union of two hypostases (qunümain) does seem to pose 
problems in the light of the fact that the three hypostases (agänim) of the Trinity are also 
described by the same root (qunüm). Answers to questions 3 and 4 refer to Christ as a 
union of divine and human hypostases (qunümain). However, the answer to question 46 
speaks of Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three eternal hypostases (agänim). It is not 
surprising that Abü Rä'ita complained that if the Nestorian terminology is followed then 
the human nature of Christ looks like a fourth hypostasis in the Godhead. 226 This 
inconsistent use of terminology shows the weakness of the Nestorian notion of two 
hypostases in Christ, which function alongside the two natures. Chalccdonians as well as 
miaphysites were justified in criticizing Nestorian over-elaboration in the description of the 
union. Muslims would have found grounds for their allegation that Christians were 
irrational in their belief in the Incarnation since the language they used lacked consistency. 
'Ammär's answer to the Muslim anxiety about contamination of the divine after 
union with human nature is similar to that of Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita. If the eternal Son 
always has the initiative after his union with human nature then it is possible to defend the 
integrity of the divine. Despite his insistence on a union of divine and human natures, 
2241bid., 193. 
225 See the opening footnote of this chapter for Theodore of Mopsuestia. 
226 See 4.3. 
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'Ammar does not hold that they function in a united way. Weakness, pain and death touch 
only the human nature, while the divine is exempt from any blemish caused by such 
experiences. As a result the Muslim questioner need not fear that the integrity of the divine 
is undermined by the Incarnation. All three ninth century apologists agree on this point. No 
matter which way they define the union of divine and human in Christ, they each assert the 
immunity of the divine from contamination in any form. This, of course, was the key 
problem for Muslims in the Incarnation of the divine, so it is hardly surprising that there is 
a shared apologetic argument to deal with the apparent loss of transcendence in an 
embodied divinity. 
5.3.2. Questions 11-14. The embodiment of God? 
11. How is it possible for the divine nature to clothe itself with human nature without 
becoming limited by it? In the same way that the sun gives light to part of the earth without 
in any way being limited to that space. "He took human nature as a temple to dwell in" but 
he is not limited to that place. 227 
12. [the question is missing] We do not speak of God's body. "God the Word became 
human (allah al-kalima ta'annasa). " 228 This is not to be understood in the same way as we 
think of a child becoming a man in a natural process of change. Rather, the becoming 
human is like a man becoming dressed or taking up arms, or putting on a turban. 
"He did not become (sara) a turban or weapons, or armour. Likewise we say that God 
the Word became embodied (tajassada); became human (ta'annasa). In other words, 
he brought into being (al! datha) a body (jasadan) and clothed himself with it (labisa- 
hi). He created (khalaqa) a human being (insanan) and put it on (tadana'a-hu). " 229 
227 "KilAb al-masä'il", 194. 
228 Ibid., 196. 
229 Ibid., 196f. 
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Christ is a union of God the Word with this human nature created by him. 
13. Why did he want to have a human nature? To unite humanity with himself. 
14. Why do you speak of God's temple but not his body? It is not the temple of God but 
rather the temple of the eternal Word. The Father and the Spirit did not become incarnate, 
so it is not appropriate to speak of God's body. 
5.3.2.1. Evaluation 
The answer to question 11 uses the analogy of the sun lighting up the earth without being 
confined to it in the same way as Abü Rä'ita does, which perhaps enables the Muslim to 
grasp that God may interact with his creation without becoming restricted by the 
connection. 230 'Ammär's answer to question 12 does not refer to the eternal Word 
"taking" human nature as Abü Qurra and Abü Ra'ita do. Instead, he says that the Word 
brought into being (alzdatha) a body, or created (khalaqa) a human being. Whereas Abü 
Qurra and Abü Rä'ita may have been sensitive to Islamic convictions that only God 
creates, and therefore emphasized that the Word fashioned a pure body out of that which 
already had been created, 'Ammar applies to the Eternal Word full creative powers from 
nothing. 231 While Christ created (khalaqa) a real bird from a clay model in süra 5: 110 of 
the Qur'an, he did not make the bird from nothing. So, although 'Ammar uses the term 
khalaqa for the action, the meaning goes beyond that found in the Qur'an when applied to 
Christ's creative work, and suggests a power that belongs to God alone. This was an 
unnecessary complication for a Muslim audience, and shows the wisdom of his two ninth 
century colleagues in using the notion of `taking' what already was there. 
'Ammar shares with Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita the conviction that the human 
nature of the Messiah was different from that of other humans. In this way all three 
230 See 4.5.4. 
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apologists distanced God from mingling with human sin. However, this very safeguarding 
of God from contamination may have left Muslims with the impression that Christians did 
not think that Christ was a normal human being. This reaction would probably have been 
reinforced by the use of clothing and temple imagery by 'Ammar. 
'Ammar takes the opportunity in the answer to question 12 to show that only 
Nestorian Christology satisfies Islamic suspicion that the Incarnation implies the 
embodiment of God. He criticises miaphysites for failing to distinguish the divine and 
human in Christ by speaking of "one nature and one hypostasis" (jawharan wähidan wa 
qunüman wähidan). This can only result in the body of the Messiah being the body of God. 
He also believes that the Chalcedonian insistence that Mary is the mother of God also 
entails the embodiment of God. The name `God' in the Chalcedonian statement applies not 
only to the Messiah but also to the Father and the Spirit. Therefore the followers of 
Chalcedon are guilty of speaking of the body of God or saying that Mary gave birth to 
God. He appeals to Scripture for support, because Matthew and Luke speak of the birth of 
the Messiah not the birth of God. Therefore only the Nestorian position safeguards God 
from embodiment. The argument that Miaphysites and Chalcedonians are bound to hold 
that God is embodied appears to give the Nestorian an advantage in dialogue with 
Muslims. For it is 'Ammär who can most easily say that only the Word of God is 
embodied. Abü Ra'ila may hold that the sent one not the Sender indwells the body, but if 
Christ is only a divine hypostasis in a human body then divinity has to be directly linked to 
human flesh. 232 Abü Qurra is bound to lead Muslims into confusion by adhering to the 
formula "Mary is the Mother of God". 233 The advantage of the Nestorian view was that a 
Muslim would be less likely to think that there was a direct association between God and 
human nature. 
231 See 3.5. for Abü Qurra's and 4.5.1. for Abi Ra'ila's contributions. 
232 See 4.5.2. 
233 See 3.2. 
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5.3.3. Questions 15-20. The way God is affected by the Incarnation of the Word 
15. The question is not complete, but begins by asking how the divine nature could unite 
with human nature while at the same time being united with the other two members of the 
Trinity] Just as the rays of the sun give heat without being separated from the sun, so the 
Son could unite with human nature without being separated from the Father and the Spirit. 
16. Why did the Father and Spirit not become human rather than the Son? Since human 
nature is not eternal, it would not be appropriate for the Father to enter the temporal in the 
same way as the Son has done. Likewise the Spirit cannot become embodied and remain 
the eternal Spirit. 
17. How can you prove that the Son became Incarnate? The prophecy in Isaiah 7: 14 about 
a virgin giving birth to Emmanuel shows both that the Messiah had the same human nature 
as Mary and that he had the divine eternal nature. The four gospels show the same unity in 
the Messiah of the human and divine nature. Matthew 1: 1 declares that Jesus Christ had a 
human lineage, but in 8: 18-34 Christ cast out demons by divine power. 
18. Did the union between divine and human not result in a new kind of human being? 
When the Word of God took human nature as "a body, a temple and a dwelling place" 
(jasadan tiva-haykalan Iva-mahallan) he gave to it his authority but not his eternity or his 
spiritual nature. 234 
19. How can the divine nature be unaffected by this union? We do not know how the 
divine united with the human. This is analogous to creation. We do not know how God 
creates. 
20. Why did the Incarnation happen if God does not perform futile actions? The 
condescension of God towards his creation is demonstrated exactly in the enfleshment of 
234 "Kitab al-masä'il", 213. 
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the Word and not otherwise, for by the Incarnation God grants sonship to all humans by 
means of one particular human (al-shakhsa al-wähida al-insiyya). 235 
5.3.3.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar uses two traditional arguments in this section. Firstly, the Trinity is explained by 
the analogy of the sun, its rays and the heat it produces, 236 and secondly, the divinity of 
Christ is established from the prophets and the gospels of Christian Scripture. 237 This is 
the first of many appeals to Biblical evidence for the Incarnation by' Ammar, which shows 
that, despite Muslim doubt about the trustworthiness of Christian Scripture, Christians 
found it hard ignore the source of their theology in defending the Incarnation. 238 A third 
argument, shared with Abts Rä'ita, relies on Muslim agnosticism concerning the way God 
acts. 239 
"If we Christians ask Muslims how God creates, they say that they do not know 
how ... Likewise there 
is no reply to any question about how the divine became 
human (tajassada illah) or how the human body united with the incarnate one (al- 
mutajassid) in the state of sonship (al-bunuunva). " 24° 
If Christians may be interrogated on the logical inconsistency of the divine becoming 
human, then by implication Muslims ought to be willing to be questioned about the way 
God works. Christians may have difficulty explaining the union of the divine and the 
human in Christ, but then Muslims are not able to explain the manner of God's creative 
work. There is an equality of ignorance between Muslims and Christians in understanding 
the processes of God's actions. Certainly, this is a useful apologetic stance, which takes the 
discussion back to first principles. Human knowledge of God is based on revelation, with 
235 Ibid., 215. 
236 See the AnonymousApologv for a similar application of this analogy in 2.2.1. 
237 See also the extensive series of Biblical texts quoted in the Anonymous Apology supporting the divinity of 
Christ in 2.2.2. 
238 See Abü Qurra's use of Biblical evidence in 3.4. Abü RA'ila was least dependent on Scripture quotation 
among the three ninth century apologists. 
239 See 4.5.7. for Abi! Rä'ila's version of the argument 
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the result that what humans know is dependent on what he has made clear to them. Both 
Christians and Muslims have knowledge of the results, but not the method, of God's 
actions. 
5.3.4. Questions 21-26. The choice of Mary's son: why not another human or an angel? 
21. Why did the Creator not become incarnate in everybody? He chose one person through 
whom the rest would be honored. 
22. Why did he not choose an angel rather than a human being? Angelic appearance would 
not touch humanity except from the outside. 
23. How did he choose the particular human being to unite with? He chose him on the 
basis of "his righteousness and his purity" (birri-hi wa iaharati-hi). 241 
24. If he was pure before entering the womb how can it be just for other humans to be 
deprived of a similar purity? Some individuals have indeed been made pure before birth 
such as Jeremiah according to Jeremiah 1: 4, "before I took you from the womb I purified 
you". But the majority of humans only gain purity from the Incarnation. 
25. How can you prove that he is better than any other? If God had found another more 
righteous he would have chosen him. 
26. Was it possible for him to lose his purity after becoming human? It was possible, but 
he did not lose his purity. 
240 «Kitäb al-masä'iI', 214f. 
241 Ibid., 218. 
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5.3.4.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar's answer to question 26 involves a discussion of what is meant by sinlessness. If it 
means being prevented from sinning by God's decree then that does not apply to Christ, 
because he had to obey God's will like any other human being. There was no special 
protection for Christ from the temptations to rebel and go astray. This use of the continued 
testing of the obedience of Christ to affirm his true humanity sets 'Ammar apart from Abü 
Qurra and Abü Rä'ita. While all three insist on the purity of Christ at the point of union 
between divine and human natures, only 'Ammar stresses the importance of the lifelong 
process of maintaining that purity. 'Ammar's Christ is one who had to prove his worth 
before God. This Nestorian definition of the human nature of Christ as that which the rest 
of humanity shares is without doubt closer to a Muslim perception of him. Though Abü 
Qurra held to a fully human nature in Christ, he did not allow for the human mind in Christ 
to entertain the possibility of sinning, but maintained that the divine mind was in control. 
242 According to süra 5: 116f of the Qur'an, Christ was interrogated by God over whether 
he had asked his followers to worship himself and his mother apart from God, showing that 
the Qur'änic Christ was judged capable of sinning. The purity of Christ in the Qur'än was 
not beyond scrutiny, and although he denied the allegation vigorously, the questioning 
shows that Christ had to maintain the purity given to him at his conception. As a result, a 
Muslim reader of all three apologists may have been more able to identify 'Ammar's 
Christ as truly human rather than the Christ of Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita who seems not to 
have faced the testing of his purity. 
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5.3.5. Questions 27-31. How the work of Christ affects others 
27. How does the merit of Christ relate humans to God? Imagine a king who wants to do 
the best for his people by identifying with them as fully as possible, and so has a son who 
is born among them. The son still inherits the kingdom of his father with all the authority 
that goes with it, but the son is one of the people. Since he stems from his father and from 
the people, the latter are caught up in the inheritance of the kingdom. "In the same way the 
incarnate one by taking a human body relates humanity to his divine inheritance by taking 
humanity into that which belongs to God. " 243 
28. Could the Creator take back the gifts of authority and power conferred on the Incarnate 
one? No, because after the union of divine and human there can be no separation. 
29. How can you claim that there can be no separation between the two natures when only 
the human nature experiences pain and death? The unity of the divine and human means 
that divine power and authority is truly united with human weakness. There is no 
"separation or distance between them. " 244 
30. Was the outcome of the union not already decided before it took place? Just as a son 
who inherits from his father needs to prove his faithfulness to his father throughout his life, 
so the human nature has to prove by action that it is worthy of the union with the eternal. 
Scripture supports this idea of testing. Only after the resurrection is Christ given all 
authority in heaven and on earth, according to Matthew 28: 18. 
31. Does this text not say that he was only given divine authority at that point and not 
before? In Matthew 11: 27, Jesus claims that his Father has given everything to him as 
proof that he possessed divine power and authority before the resurrection. However, the 
full exercise of that authority had to wait for the outcome of his obedience to death. 
242 See 3.5. 
243 «Kitab al-masä'il", 222. 
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5.3.5.1. Evaluation 
The parable of the king having a son raised among his people is an innovative 
interpretation of the Incarnation, which illustrates 'Ammar's fourth reason for the 
Incarnation in the Book of the Proof 245 Humans are enobled by the condescension of the 
Son who is one of them in order to lift them up to share in God's kingdom. This is a 
worthy attempt to disclose the value of the Incarnation to the rest of humanity by stressing 
the fact that the presence of the son guarantees life with God. Given that Muslims were not 
free to depend on another for salvation, the offer of help from the son would possibly be 
both a sign to them of the distance between Christians and Muslims, and an attractive 
aspect of the Christian story. 
'Ammar's answer to question 29 turns on the way that divine attributes function in 
Christ. Some divine attributes, such as eternity, are not communicated to the human nature 
of Christ, whereas other divine attributes, such as power and authority, are shared with the 
human nature. At death the eternal nature of Christ is unaffected, but the power and 
authority of Christ are reduced to impotence. In some sense the divine attributes shared by 
the human nature are affected by a temporary defeat before being restored at the 
resurrection. This is a more satisfying solution to the problem of the death of Christ 
impacting the divine nature adversely than the one given by Abü Rä'ita, who held that, 
though the death of Christ did not at all affect his attribute of divinity, there was no 
separation between the attributes of divinity and humanity. 'Ammar manages to show why 
there was no separation between the two natures in the death of Christ. 
'Ammar drives home the point that an untested Christ is without value either to 
God or humanity. Whereas Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita leave the impression that the divine 
nature in Christ was never seriously disturbed by testing, 'Ammar holds to a genuine 
244 Ibid., 224. 
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dialectic between the two natures in Christ. The human nature could have ruined Christ if 
he had allowed it to lead him astray. The greatness of Christ lay in his ability to submit to 
God's will in all circumstances, and this is what qualifies him to transfer merit to those 
who fail to submit to God. While the potential for true union between the divine and 
human was there from conception, actual union of will and action had to happen under 
extreme conditions in the life of Christ. 
5.3.6. Questions 32-35. The purpose of Christ's suffering 
32. Why did he have to suffer even to death if he possessed divine glory and authority? 
Like a prizefighter who has to use up all his strength to defeat an opponent, Christ was 
willing to submit himself even to death to defeat death on behalf of others. Like a doctor 
who wants to demonstrate his ability to heal by swallowing some poison before 
administering medicine to a patient, "Christ chose to rescue humanity from wrongdoing 
and from slavery to Satan by submitting to death in order to raise to life those subject to 
death. " 246 
33. Did not Moses and David and other prophets experience the resurrection without Christ 
offering himself for them? Moses told Israel what their Lord expected of them. Christ 
announced to Israel that he had come to save them from the results of their failure to fulfil 
what Moses brought to them. 
34. Could he not have preached the resurrection without having to die and be raised 
himself? Yes, but people would not believe in the resurrection without visible proof. So he 
died and rose again to "place firmly in their hearts the promise of their resurrection. " 247 
245 See above, 5.2.2. 
246 "Kitäb al-masä'il", 229f. 
247 Ibid., 233. 
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35. But then wouldn't it be better to be raised up without having to be put to death by his 
enemies? "If he died on his bed as others do and then rose up alive it would leave grave 
doubt in people's hearts. " 248 But if he consents to death at the hands of his enemies and 
then is raised up, he can vanquish any doubt in his ability to overcome death. 
5.3.6.1. Evaluation 
While Abü Rä'ita also argues that the death of Christ shows the lengths to which God goes 
to rescue sinful humanity, 'Ammär's analogies are original and compelling. The 
prizefighter exhausts himself in victory just like the divine power in Christ which gives 
way to abject weakness, and the doctor poisons himself in the pursuit of a drug which 
might heal others, just like Christ who willingly drinks the cup of death to bring life to 
others. These illustrations go to the heart of the Christian sense of the love of God shown 
in the self-giving of Christ, and give a true exposition of the value of the Incarnation in 
terms that a Muslim would understand. If the end result of the Incarnation is the defeat of 
weakness, sin and death, then the Incarnation goes beyond a doctrine that might seem to be 
denigrating to God's honour, to a belief that provides assurance of success for humans in 
their struggles. Such illustrations would probably have had a more immediate impact on 
Muslims than Abü Rä'ita's more formal argument. 249 
'Ammar's concentration on the resurrection is strikingly different from the 
apologetics of Abü RA'ita and Abü Qurra. 'Ammar alone argues that Christ's resurrection 
enables others to rise from the dead. The Muslim query about whether Moses and David 
experienced the resurrection is probably based on the notion of resurrection found in the 
Qur'an, where believers are granted resurrection to bliss. 'Ammar's answer focuses not so 
much on the possibility of resurrection for believers, but on the assurance that Christ's 
2481bid., 234. 
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resurrection gives to those who believe. Muslims believed in the possibility of resurrection 
but that only God knew who actually would be raised. 'Ammär's confidence in the 
promise of resurrection is a notable apologetic position, because the possibility of personal 
resurrection to life is now strengthened by the firm promise of Christ that those who 
believe will be raised to life. Here again the value of the Incarnation is made clear, that the 
self-giving of Christ releases humans from the grip of death into life. Muslims would no 
doubt have understood why Christians held to the Incarnation, even though they may not 
have thought the idea to be true to their comprehension of God's transcendence. 
5.3.7. Questions 36-42. The historicity of the crucifixion and resurrection 
36. How could it be possible for Christ to let his enemies put him to death like a criminal? 
By allowing them to crucify him, he demonstrated, to all those who witnessed his death, 
the grace that would flow from that death. 
37. Then why did he not come down from the cross alive instead of being buried in the 
ground? Isn't that what those who crucified him suggested when they said, "save yourself 
and come down from your cross and we will believe in you? " 250 Just as the Children of 
Israel tested God in the wilderness and were punished for it, so those who crucified Christ 
were putting God to the test and deserved not to be placated but punished. In any case there 
had to be no doubting whatsoever about the fact of his death. 
38. How is it that a crowd witnessed his crucifixion but only twelve of his followers met 
him raised alive? Just as God does not reveal himself to unbelievers, so Christ only 
appeared to those who had faith in him. If he appeared to the same people who had 
crucified him, they would quite likely say that it was the work of Satan to deceive them. 
The only alternative to appearing to a small number of believers would have been to 
249 For Abü RA'ila's argument see 4.5.4. 
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appear to the whole of humanity, nation by nation, but this was clearly impossible. Christ 
chose to reveal his divine glory through those who witnessed his resurrection. 
39. If Christ sent those who witnessed his resurrection to the nations to perform miracles in 
his name, why was it not sufficient for the apostles only to witness his death? In that case 
doubt might rise up in the minds of the apostles, but since the enemies of Christ saw that 
he really died, then the apostles could be assured that he both truly died and truly rose from 
death. 
40. If Christ decided to die to save others from divine punishment, then why should the 
Jews who killed him not receive a reward for putting him to death? The Jews did not have 
the same intention as Christ; he wanted to save others, but they wanted to destroy him. The 
only possibility of salvation for them would follow repentance for their crime. 
41. Did not the Messiah ask God to forgive the Jews who had put him on the cross when he 
said, "Father forgive them for they don't know what they are doing? " If the Jews were 
offered forgiveness by Christ how can they be punished? When Jesus sought forgiveness 
for people, he sought it for those who did not know what they were doing, but the Jews 
who wanted Christ killed certainly knew what they were doing. 
42. If they saw his miracles and understood his teaching, why did the Jews kill him? The 
Children of Israel had defied the prophets of God before so there was no reason why they 
could not rebel against Christ in a similar way. 
5.3.7.1. Evaluation 
'Ammär's section on the crucifixion is much more detailed than Abu Rä'ita's, and is 
focused on the intentions of Christ rather than how the crucifixion could be God's will, 
250 "wtäb al-masä'il", 236. 
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which preoccupied Abü Rä'ita. 251 'Ammar sees Christ as the willing subject of the cross, 
who decides to give himself for the salvation of others. Thus the Jews who sought to kill 
Christ were in one sense defying God, but in another sense were only doing what was 
always possible for the people of God to do. In this way 'Ammar deals with the Qur'änic 
denial of the cross. The Jews were quite capable of that kind of thing, and God allowed 
them to achieve it because Christ willingly submitted to it. However, 'Ammar allows the 
Muslim to uphold the denial of the death of Christ on the cross by finding possible support 
for it from the gospels. So the Muslim questioner quotes from Matthew 27: 42, where the 
crowd challenge Christ to come down from the cross. The significance of the quotation for 
a Muslim would lie in the possible match between the assumption in the suggestion and the 
teaching of süra 4: 157 in the Qur'än. For if Christ had come down from the cross alive, 
then the Qur'anic statement "they did not kill him" would be upheld. By allowing a 
detailed comparison between süra 4: 157 and Matthew 27: 42, 'Ammar enables a Muslim to 
engage in comparative exegesis of texts, in the hope that the latter may come to a new 
interpretation of the death of Christ. 
'Ammar deals directly with Muslim doubt about the value of the testimony to the 
crucifixion and resurrection in the gospels, which neither Abü Rä'ita nor Abü Qurra do. 
This may be explained by the apologetic approach of 'Ammar, who makes more use of 
New Testament sources than his two contemporaries. His rather elaborate four points 
defending the paucity of witnesses to the resurrection can be seen as an attempt to offer a 
thorough defense of the few witnesses to the event. Muslims were all too aware that the 
evidence for the death of Christ hung on the truth telling of a few people who were keen to 
promote the story. 252 His argument that even the enemies of Christ witnessed his death is 
251 See 4.5.4. for Abu Rä'ita's presentation. 
252 See the remarks of al-Räzi in 1.2.3. that the only way to combat the Christian story was to question the 
veracity of the witnesses. 
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designed to head off this complaint. Nevertheless, debate about what actually happened to 
Christ at the end of his life still could come to grief over interpretation of texts. 
5.3.8. Questions 43-46. The relationship between Christ and the Trinity 
43. How could Jesus command his disciples to baptize people in the name of the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit? Isn't this text "evidence of the corruption" (tahrij) of the message of 
Jesus by Christians? 253 Christ also said that he had descended from heaven and that he 
existed before Abraham, so he claimed a relationship of equality with his Father. 
44. Why does he speak of the Spirit rather than simply the Father and the Son? While there 
is a place for a dual relationship between Father and Son that is not the whole reality of the 
Trinity. 
45. How could Christ send the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, to the apostles when the Spirit is 
the Creator, the Father and the Son included? When Christ said he would send the Holy 
Spirit, the Paraclete, to his disciples, he meant that the miracles they would perform in his 
name could only be done in the power of the Spirit and that "the three eternal hypostases 
(al-agänim) were equal in authority and in nature. " 254 
46. What is the meaning of the statement that Christ sits at God's right side interceding for 
others? Does God have a right side to sit at? Why should the Messiah intercede for others? 
First of all, the `right side' shows that he has the authority of God. Secondly, his power to 
intercede is based on the fact that only Christ among humans is perfectly righteous. In fact 
his sacrificial death intercedes for sinners by "annulling the sin of Adam in the descendents 
of Adam through his righteousness and purity. " 255 
253 "Kitäb al-masä'iI', 249. 
254 Ibid., 252. 
255 Ibid., 255. 
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5.3.8.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar's discussion of the Trinity in the gospels is significantly different from Abü 
Ra'ita's debate on the relationship between the eternal Word and the other members of the 
Trinity, since the latter is concerned with the way the second person of the Trinity 
functions in relation to the other two, whereas'Ammär deals with the meaning of 
Trinitarian language in the New Testament. 256 'Ammar allows the gospel accounts to be 
scrutinized by the Muslim who wonders how much the Trinity features in them, which 
gives him the opportunity to show that the Trinity was to Christ's teaching. The Trinity, 
therefore, is not an axiom of theological reflection unrelated to the teaching of Christ 
himself, but is expressly taught by him. 
In posing question 43, the Muslim asks whether Jesus has been reported accurately 
when he refers to the Trinity in Matthew 28: 19, and whether the text is not basically 
corrupt. This is a fascinating insight into the kind of research Muslims were doing in the 
early ninth century into Christian scripture. Certainly there would be no call for Christians 
to go looking for New Testament texts that gave evidence of corruption of a supposed 
original reading. While the Qur'än usually accuses Jews of corrupting their scriptures, here 
is testimony to the charge of corruption being made of Christian texts too. Presumably the 
discovery of the content of the gospels by Muslims lent urgency to the need to extend the 
corruption charge to these Christian scriptures as well. 'Ammär does not deal directly with 
the accusation of corruption against the authenticity of the sayings of Christ in the New 
Testament. He had already answered fourteen questions on the accuracy of the gospels in 
the Book of Questions and Anwvers before the filly-one on the Incarnation. 257 His basic 
conviction on the authenticity of the saying of Jesus which includes the Trinity is that it is 
consistent with many other sayings that presuppose the Trinity even if they do not 
256 ForAbü Ra'ita's presentation see 4.5.1. 
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explicitly endorse it in so many words. Therefore the text is not corrupt when read 
alongside corroborating texts from the fourth gospel in particular. Of course a Muslim 
could simply reply that these other texts confirm the charge of corruption. 
5.3.9. Questions 47-5 1. The salvation Christ brings 
47. If Christ brought forgiveness for the sin of others how is it that sin has been so 
widespread since the time of Christ? In reality Christ cancelled the effects of the sin of 
Adam on the rest of humanity. Death became the universal experience of humanity as a 
result of Adam's sin, but Christ's righteous character undid the effects of death for all 
others. He made void the power of death and made possible the gift of eternal life for 
others. 
48. If Adam was created to die before he sinned and he and his descendents were raised 
from death before Christ's coming, why did they need Christ's righteousness? God 
intended to grant life without end to the first man, but Adam's sin deprived his descendents 
of life without end, so Christ became the means by which people of any generation might 
attain life without end. 
49. If this is so then why have people kept on dying since Christ's coming? The 
experience of death is not removed, but the reality of eternal life is given within the 
experience of death. 
50. Even if all this may be granted, does it not simply show that Christ was only a servant 
among servants, as "he is called in your books? " 258 It is true that the prophet Isaiah refers 
to the servant of God carrying the sin of the people; but this way of speaking is not used by 
Christ, who calls himself `bread', `a door', `the way', `light', `life' and `resurrection'. 
However, the Messiah uses the title `servant' not of himself, but of people enslaved to sin. 
257 "Kitäb al-masa'il", pages 127-146. 
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When Isaiah the prophet spoke of the servant of God carrying the sin of others, he was 
looking forward to Christ taking away sin from those enslaved to it. This is what Christ 
himself said he had come to do, when he told the apostles to eat bread and drink wine in 
memory of his death. 
51. If you claim that there is no eating and drinking and other pleasures in the life to come 
is this life not preferable to such a future life? There is no pleasure in food and drink when 
hunger and thirst cannot be satisfied. The bodies in the new life will not be subject to the 
same desires as in this life. 
5.3.9.1. Evaluation 
'Ammar and Abü Ra'ita both answer questions concerning the way Christ removes sin 
inherited from Adam. 'Ammar focuses on the opportunity for eternal life opened up by 
Christ for Adam's descendents, whereas Abü Rä'ita emphasizes the necessity for God to 
show his goodness in the Incarnation as a result of Adam's fall involving his descendents 
in evil. 259 This difference is in line with 'Ammar's special interest in the resurrection in 
his answers to questions 32 to 35. 'Ammar answers a question about the possible use of the 
title `servant of God' for Christ, which fits a Muslim perception of him. 'Ammar concedes 
that Christ is given the title by others but does not use it himself. He argues that Muslim 
preference for such language should not disguise the fact that Christ calls himself names 
that imply a much more exalted status. In other words Muslim language to describe Christ 
is valid in a limited sense, but must be supplemented by the testimony of the gospels. 
258 "Kitab al-masa'ii" 259f. 
259 For Abü Ra'ila's argument see 4.5.3. 
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5.4. Conclusion 
'Ammar shares with Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita similar vocabulary to describe the 
Incarnation, by using tajassada and ta'anassa for the manner in which the eternal Word 
becomes human. Like Abü Rä'ita he understands the eternal Word to have fashioned a 
human nature for himself from the human issue from Mary. However, the human nature 
created by the eternal Word can be compared to a temple in which God dwells, or a turban 
that adorns the divine head, or even weapons that he takes up. These metaphors inherited 
from Nestorian tradition suggest that the human nature of Christ was somehow external to 
his divine consciousness, and that the thinking, feeling and willing of Christ was solely the 
divine nature at work at the heart of the human clothing, but they are at variance with 
'Ammar's insistence on the testing of Christ's obedience to the will of God. Unlike Abü 
Qurra and Abü Rä'ita, 'Ammar argues that the purity of Christ is not guaranteed by the 
creation of a sinless human nature before the union of the divine and human natures. 
Rather, the sinless Incarnate one had to prove his obedience to the divine will right to the 
end of his earthly life, since only at the end could he be pronounced pure of any kind of 
wrongdoing. There is a paradox in a truly human experience of testing and the use of the 
metaphors of temple, turban and arms that hardly allows for any real human experience for 
Christ. If the human nature was merely an inanimate shell for the eternal Word then why 
would the latter need to be tested for submission? 
In the end, the theme of testing is more significant in the Christology of 'Ammar 
than the clothing or temple metaphors, for he painstakingly argues for the unfolding 
obedience of Christ as if disobedience was a real possibility. Indeed it is this struggle to 
obey the will of God that gives 'Ammär's Christ a real human nature, despite the 
metaphors that imply the opposite. 'Ammär then wishes to make room for a human Christ 
within a set of metaphors that arc inadequate for the task. He sees the human mind 
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interacting with the divine mind in Christ, which leaves the metaphors far behind. The . 
apologetic value of the testing of Christ would have been considerable, since the fact that 
Christ is tested by God would have enabled Muslims to recognize a human Christ in 
'Ammär's presentation more readily than in any of the others from the eighth and ninth 
centuries. Even his fellow Nestorian Timothy I did not argue for the continued testing of 
Christ in his debate with al-Mahdi. One of the serious difficulties with the Incarnation for 
Muslims lay in the notion that the eternal Word was the thinking, feeling and willing centre 
of Christ, because such a notion robbed him of humanity. Since 'Ammar allowed for a 
dynamic interchange between divinity and humanity in the life experiences of Christ, his 
presentation was an advance on the apologetic alternatives on offer in the early ninth 
century. 
'Ammär's three analogies for the purpose of the Incarnation in the Book of 
Questions and Answers are excellent means of communication with Muslims. The parable 
of the king having his son born among his people who then brings the people into his 
father's inheritance shows the loving identification of God with humans that the 
incarnation seeks to uphold. The prizefighter who exhausts himself in defeating his 
opponent, and the doctor who takes poison before giving it to his patient, show the lengths 
to which God is prepared to go to rescue humans from death, the key idea behind the death 
of Christ. These stories expound the importance of the Incarnation and the atonement in 
imaginative ways that would probably have made a favorable impression on Muslims. 
Other analogies that 'Ammär uses may not have hit their target. The second and third of 
his four reasons for the Incarnation in the Book of the Proof were more likely to offend 
Muslims by challenging their belief in the strict transcendence of God. The idea that since 
humans tend to make images of divine beings God condescended to their level through the 
Incarnation, and the picture of God making himself visible to those he would judge out of 
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compassion for them, would probably be understood by Muslims to make God a promoter 
of idolatry. 
'Ammär's presentation of the death of Christ is original and compelling in three 
respects. Firstly, in the Book of the Proof he argues that the humiliation of Christ so 
unacceptable to Muslims can be mitigated by the honour he is given by God as a result of 
his defeat of death. Therefore the shame of his crucifixion is outweighed by the glory he is 
able to grant to other humans whose death is transcended as a result of the cross. Muslims 
may have been able to perceive that someone who lays down his life in a shameful fashion 
could give honour to others in the process, and so be praised for seeking the greater glory 
of others. Secondly, his distinction between divine attributes related to Christ's human 
nature and others that are separate helps to hold together the divine and human natures of 
Christ at his death. If eternity is not imparted to the humanity of Christ then it is not lost at 
death as Muslims may think must be the case. On the other hand, if God's power and 
authority are imparted to his humanity then these are lost at the point of death. There is a 
temporary loss of these divine attributes between the time of death and the resurrection of 
Christ in God's power and authority. This is a distinction unique to 'Ammar, which goes a 
long way to answering the question also asked in the writing of Timothy, Abü Qurra and 
Abü Rä'ita, how it is that the divine nature can die, without losing control of the created 
world. Whereas the other three apologists simply deny that the divine dies and that only the 
human experiences death, 'Ammar shows that some aspects of divinity can cease to be part 
of Christ at death. However, the fundamental characteristic of God's nature, his eternity, is 
unaffected by death. This dialectical Christology is much more flexible in an Islamic 
context than the more rigid separation of divine and human found in the apologetics of 
Timothy, Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita. 
Thirdly, his emphasis on the resurrection of Christ as a guarantee that death can be 
overcome for others is unique among eighth and ninth century apologists. The weakness of 
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any theoretical offer of life beyond death lies in the lack of assurance that it will actually 
happen, but this is not the case for those who believe that Christ went through death into a 
new life. Here is the evidence that others can follow him after death into life. Such an 
indirect challenge to Muslims to see if they have similar evidence for their resurrection is 
met with the idea that Christ was raised without going through death, but 'Ammar points 
out that humans need to be assured that death will not overcome them. It is altogether more 
reassuring for the rest of humanity if Christ did die before being raised to life. The Muslim 
response would probably rely on the will of God finally determining the destiny of human 
beings beyond this life, but here 'Ammar has shown that in the resurrection of Christ there 
is a promise that humans can rely on. 
These distinctive arguments show both that 'Ammar was searching for creative 
ways to defend the two natures Christology inherited from his Nestorian tradition and that 
he was prepared to develop new ways of forming Christology in the context of dialogue 
with Muslims. The new developments are seen in the emphasis placed on the testing of the 
human nature of Christ, and in the distinctions between types of divine attributes that 
impacted Christ's human nature. Even if Muslims appreciated the rounded human portrait 
of Christ offered here, they probably were not convinced by the equation of divine 
attributes of power and authority at work in Christ with the actual presence of God in him. 
Nevertheless, 'Ammar's presentation of Christ for Muslims is the most comprehensive in 
his epoch, offering a more detailed treatment than Abü Rä'ita of the issues facing 
Christians in their understanding of Christ in a Muslim context. 
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Part One. Ninth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Six 
The Christologies of Abn Qurra, Abü Rä'ita and 'Ammär al-Bag! and 
Muslim Response 
Two questions arising from the apologetics of Abü Qurra, Abü Rä'ita, and 'Ammar al- 
Basri will be explored in this chapter. Firstly, what developments in Christology can be 
observed as a result of engagement with the Islamic context? Secondly, what impact did 
these presentations of Christology have on Muslims? In answer to the first question, S. H. 
Griffith has suggested that Islam forced Christian theologians in the Middle East to make 
an intelligible case for their beliefs. 
260 He sums up Abü Rä'ita's Christological 
apologetics as an attempt to support "the reasonableness or the non-contradictory nature" 
of the Incarnation. 261 This is an apt judgment of Abra Rä'ita in particular among the three 
apologists, but it is a verdict that can also be applied to Abü Qurra and 'Ammar to a large 
extent. An examination of the arguments employed by the three men to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of the Incarnation will show to what extent this conclusion is true. If S. H. 
Griffith is right, then the development in the writing of Christology is to be seen especially 
in the justification of the notion of Incarnation as worthy of God given the prevailing 
conception of his nature. 
The second question can be answered by studying the writing of Muslims on 
Christianity. Despite the fact that the refutations of Abra Qurra by 'Isa ibn Sabih al-Murdär 
[d. 840], and of 'Ammar by Abts 1-Hudhayl [d. c. 840] arc no longer extant, it is possible to 
discover the views of other Muslims about the Incarnation. 262 The criticisms by several 
260 S. Ii. Griffith, "Ilabrb ibn Ilidmah Abü RA'ilah, a Christian mulakallim of the First Abbasid Century", 
OC. (64,1980,161-201), 161. 
261 Ibid., 192. 
262 These refutations by leading Mu'tazilite scholars are mentioned in B. Dodge, The Fihrist of al-Nadine, a 
Tenth Century Survey of Muslim Culture. vol. 1,388 & 394. 
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ninth and tenth century Muslim authors of Christological affirmations made by Christians 
provide an indication of the impact of Christian apologetics in the period. These writers 
are al-Qäsim ibn Ibrähim al-Hasani al-Rassi [d. 860], 'Ali ibn Rabban al-Tabari [d. 855], 
Abü'Isä al-Warräq [d. 861], al-Näshi' al-Akbar [d. 904], and Muhammad ibn al-Tayyib 
al-Bägilläni [d. 1014]. 
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6.1. The Christology of Abü Qurra 
6.1.1. Developments in the language of Christology 
Abü Qurra's Christological summaries show similarities and differences between his 
Christology in dialogue with other Christians and his Christology in dialogue with 
Muslims. The Christological summary in his Confession of the Orthodox Faith written in 
the context of dialogue with other Christians may be compared with the one in his Treatise 
on the Atonement written in the context of dialogue with Muslims. 
264 Two similarities are 
striking in the Muslim context. Firstly, Christ is called `the eternal Son' in dialogue with 
Muslims as much as in debate with Christians. Use of the term `son' would surely have 
been understood by a Muslim as a direct denial of the Qur'änic assertion that God had no 
son, but Abü Qurra did not resort to calling Christ by the more Qur'änic title `word'. 
Secondly, Christ is `begotten of God before time' in both summaries, but the term 
`begotten' would probably be understood by Muslims as a challenge to the Qur'änic denial 
that God begets. It appears then that Abü Qurra did not attempt to redesign the language of 
his Christology at these points in order to accommodate Qur'anic conceptions of Christ. 
263 There are two other Muslim commentators on Christology who are not expounded here. Abt? 'Ali al- 
Jubba'i (850-914) gives a brief summary of the three main Christologies without offering a critique. The 
tenth century writer 'Abd al-Jabbär gives a fuller account of Christology, but seems to be dependent on Abü 
Isa al-Warräq for his information and provides no fresh evaluation of his own. 
264 See 3.2. & 5. 
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Three differences seem to be intentional changes for a Muslim context. Firstly, he drops 
the concept of `hypostasis' when writing with Muslims in mind. In the Confession, he says 
that the eternal Son `formed for his hypostasis a living body', whereas in the Treatise on 
the Atonement he writes that the eternal Son `took a body, making it like himself'. For 
Muslims he spells out the mechanics of the Incarnation in a way that he could take for 
granted in the Christian context. For Christians he writes of the eternal Son forming a body 
to accommodate both human and divine natures, but for Muslims he describes the entry of 
the eternal Son into Mary's womb to extract a human body from her in order to shape it 
into his own likeness. Abü Qurra then appears to be interpreting inherited theological 
language in the Muslim context so that technical terms do not impede understanding. 
Secondly, Abi! Qurra does not describe two natures in Christ when writing for 
Muslims, so setting aside the key element that defined the Christology of his own 
community in favour of terms that would communicate clearly to Muslims what all 
Christians believed about the Incarnation. Thirdly, in his search for language more 
understandable to Muslims, Abü Qurra appears to have used the expression "took" in the 
light of the Qur'änic denial that God took to himself a son. Here he asserts that it is the Son 
who took to himself a human body. The idea of the eternal Son "taking" a human body was 
not a traditional way of describing the incarnation in Christian theology. At the beginning 
of his Treatise on the Incarnation Abü Qurra has the Muslim use the verb in his very first 
question, "How can the Son who is divine want to take a body in which he will suffer? " 
265 
He represents the Muslim using the language of `taking a body' rather than the usual 
Christian language of `becoming human'. Abü Qurra probably believed that such a shift in 
language facilitated dialogue with Muslims. Whether Muslims actually used this manner of 
speaking is debatable, but putting such a question on the lips of his fictitious Muslim 
enabled Abü Qurra to communicate the Incarnation in a way that Muslims might find more 
265 Abü Qurra, "Treatise on the Incarnation", in Bacha, 180. 
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acceptable. These three changes in language are modest and leave most of the traditional 
Chalcedonian terminology in place. Abü Qurra's aim seems to have been to modify that 
tradition where he could without losing its essential elements when addressing a Muslim 
context. More important for him were arguments supporting that tradition based on Islamic 
patterns of thought. 
6.1.2. Arguments for the Incarnation 
Abra Qurra used three arguments to demonstrate the reasonableness of the Incarnation. The 
first of these is based on the Qur'änic picture of God seated on his throne which allows 
Abü Qurra to show that there are situations where it is appropriate for the divine to interact 
with the created world. Z66Discussion among Muslim scholars in the early Abbasid period 
about the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'än provided Abü Qurra with an opportunity to 
engage in an Islamic debate as a Christian. If the Mu'tazila thought that nothing could be 
learned from the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'än about the nature of God, and if other 
Muslim interpreters held that it is not possible for us to know how God sits on a throne and 
is present elsewhere at the same time, then Abü Qurra offers a third interpretation which 
could be more satisfying. 267 If the Incarnation is true then it becomes a key to interpret 
God's relationship with the created world, because God restricted himself to a human body 
while at the same time leaving himself free to be elsewhere ruling the world. According to 
Abü Qurra, this Christian reading of God's session on a throne is ultimately more 
satisfactory than any interpretation offered by Muslims because it allows us to say that this 
is how God works in his world. There is a solution to the apparent paradox of God limiting 
266 His Treatise on the Incarnation is a sustained defense of the reasonableness of the incarnation based on 
the implications of God's session on his throne. 
267 For a good summary of Islamic debate on Qur'änic anthropomorphisms in the early ninth century see the 
introduction to B. Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur'an in the Theology of Al- 
Qäsim ibn Ibrahim. Leiden, 1996,1-18. 
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himself to a particular place, and it is to believe that God is at one and the same time 
limited and unlimited. But only the Incarnation gives this solution. Only the fact that the 
divine becomes limited to the human body without becoming trapped there allows this 
third way of reading the throne texts. By engaging with Muslim forms of argumentation he 
forced intellectual Muslims to take him seriously as an equal, and offered an apologetic 
that worked as long as Muslims themselves debated the interpretation of 
anthropomorphisms. 
The second argument defending the Incarnation is that the body indwelt by the 
divine nature was perfectly adapted for the purpose so that no imperfection could cross 
over from the human to the divine. Abü Qurra has the Muslim raise the issue of impurity. 
"It is undeniable that God sits on the throne but he does not take up residence in the body. 
The throne is pure but the human body is not suitable for God. " 268 Here is the heart of the 
problem for Muslims. The purity of God must be preserved at all costs, but incarnation 
automatically destroys purity. The logic of transcendence must be maintained in the face of 
Christian denial. Abü Qurra seeks to defend divine enfleshment by taking "impurity" out 
of the discussion. He alludes to the Qur'änic belief in the purity of Christ expressed in süra 
19: 19 as a basis for his argument that in the case of Christ there is no suspicion of impurity 
in his nature. His own interpretation of that purity is that the Holy Spirit cleansed the 
human body taken from Mary before the eternal Son united himself with it, and so God 
himself guaranteed the purity of the human body by his own action. This is a very 
significant argument in the light of süra 19: 19, because it offers to Muslims a way of 
seeing human flesh as fitting for God's indwelling. If Gabriel announced to Mary that she 
was to bear a `pure boy' then it follows that Christ was conceived without any defect. But 
then this purity is a perfect ground for the union of divine and human natures. Muslims 
cannot claim that indwelling this pure human body taints God's pure character. Therefore 
268 Abu Qurra, `Treatise on the Incarnation", 183. 
136 
the Incarnation is not an unreasonable idea when it implies a union of divine and human 
natures. The appeal to purity could possibly have provoked Muslims to rethink their 
distaste for such a union, and despite their probable rejection of the Incarnation as 
undermining transcendence, they may have become aware of one reason why Christians 
believed in the Incarnation. 
Thirdly, in his Treatise on Sonship Abü Qurra deploys another argument based on 
the anthropomorphisms of the Qur'an. The treatise sets out to deal with the Muslim 
suspicion that Incarnation implies physical begetting on God's part. The opening question 
of the Muslim is, "how can God give birth in the light of the fact that a man only has 
offspring after intercourse with a woman? " 269 Abü Qurra's answer is a counter-question, 
"if you accept that God can be called the One who hears and the Wise, why can't you 
accept that he can be called the Father? " 270 Ile appeals to the Mu'tazilite interpretation of 
the divine attributes in this question, since if they are correct in supposing that God does 
not actually have ears with which to hear, then Christians are correct in holding that God 
does not actually have a child in the normal way. Christians are not guilty of attributing 
physical fatherhood to God. They speak of fatherhood and sonship in a non-physical sense 
because the relationship of father and son exists outside time and space. Therefore God 
cannot have given birth to a son in the sense that human fathers do, since the Son lives 
forever with the Father. The logic of the Incarnation is dependent on the definition of God 
as Father of the Son from all eternity. Muslim acceptance of the validity of this argument 
would depend on a fresh reading of the Qur'änic texts that denied that God begot a son, but 
this was probably unlikely given the outright rejection of the language of sonship in the 
Qur' än. 
269 Abu Qurra, "Treatise on Sonship", 94. See 2.3.1. for a similar question posed by al-Mahdi to Timothy. 
270 Abu Qurra, "Treatise on Sonship", 95. 
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These three defensive arguments support Griffiths' view that Christian apologists in 
the early 'Abbasid period were concerned to uphold the non-contradictory nature of the 
Incarnation. Abü Qurra used debate among Muslims as a resource for Christian apologetics 
in order to draw attention to conceptual difficulties encountered by Muslims in their 
understanding of God's action in the world. A purely transcendent interpretation of the 
anthropomorphisms of the Qur'an leads to the emptying of such expressions of their 
meaning. On the other hand, a willingness to accept that God acts in the world without a 
willingness to understand how he acts leads to an inability to make sense of God's 
character. However, Christian belief in the Incarnation provides us with a way to bring the 
transcendence of God into ordinary human life without sacrificing God's otherness, and it 
also shows how God works in his world without becoming restricted to it. Abü Qurra's 
three arguments are still useful for Christians who want to uphold the Incarnation in a 
Muslim context. 
6.2. The Christology of Abü RA'ita 
6.2.1. Developments in the language of Christology 
The Christological summary in Aba Rä'ita's dialogue with Abü Qurra may be compared 
with the one in his Treatise on Christianity written with an Islamic context in mind. 271 
Both summaries present the eternal Word as uniting with human flesh from Mary, with the 
result that there was one nature consisting of divine and human characteristics. Abra Rä'iia 
presents a Miaphysite Christology in both contexts. The divine and human aspects of 
Christ are not two natures because the human aspect cannot be equal to the divine without 
infringing the character of God. The divine hypostasis takes on human characteristics after 
271 See 4.2. & 4. 
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the union with human personality. This divine hypostasis is equivalent to the divine nature, 
so Melkites like Abü Qurra are wrong to speak of nature and hypostasis as distinct. 
Within the substantial agreement between the two summaries arc four differences 
that show an adjustment to an Islamic audience. Firstly, Abra RA'ita drops the expression 
`the eternal Son' in the Muslim context, for unlike Abü Qurra, he seems to be more 
sensitive to Islamic rejection of sonship for Christ. Therefore, he uses the phrase `the 
eternal Word' because he probably believes that it is less open to misunderstanding by 
Muslims. Secondly, there is no mention of God as `Father' in the summary for Muslims, 
which further reduces the risk of misunderstanding by Muslims. Thirdly, he uses the verb 
`take' in the apology for Muslims but not in the dialogue with Mclkites, to refer to a divine 
`taking' of a human body. Like Abu Qurra, Abu Rä'ita appears to be offering a reflection 
on the Qur'änic teaching that God did not take to himself a son by suggesting that it was 
not God who took a son, but the eternal Word of God who took a human body. This 
sharing of the same linguistic innovation by Abu RA'ita and Abu Qurra may be traceable to 
an earlier apologist whose work is not available today. Alternatively, one of them may 
have been the source of the innovation, but it would be difficult to know the direction of 
borrowing, given the facts that they debated with each other and that their writing cannot 
be dated with enough precision to judge who borrowed from whom. Fourthly, he uses the 
Islamic term sift to describe the divine and human aspects of Christ. Muslims used , sift 
for the attributes of God such as hearing, seeing, knowing and willing, but Abu Rä'ita 
applies the idea to Christ. This enables him to argue that in Christ there is one divine nature 
which has two attributes, just as in God there is one nature with several attributes. This is 
Jacobite one-nature Christology being interpreted in a way that Muslims might be able to 
understand through the use of the language of attributes. For if Muslims were able to hold 
that God was one even with many attributes, then Christians could point out that they 
believe that the divine nature in Christ is one even when it has human characteristics. This 
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is a significant innovation by Abü Rä'ita which arises out of his Miaphysite tradition but is 
not determined by it. Rather the new context of engagement with Islamic language 
provides him with the linguistic resources to develop a novel description of the union of 
divine and human characteristics in Christ that would perhaps make sense of the union to 
Muslims. 
These four linguistic innovations show that Abü Rä'ita was alert to the need for 
sensitivity to Islamic discourse in a more thorough fashion than Abü Qurra. They also 
challenge S. H. Griffith's claim that Abü Rä'ita had both Melkites and Muslims in view in 
his apologetic writing so that "we should not assume that his quarrel with these two 
groups, especially as it was conducted in Arabic, was aimed in two different directions. " 
272 This opinion is surprising in the light of his earlier statement that "the Arabic language 
became the catalyst for new thought models in Christian theology, especially in as much as 
Arabic was and is inextricably intertwined with an Islamic religious consciousness. " 273 It 
would be more accurate to say that Abü Rä'ita wrote for two different audiences. In his 
argument with Melkites he used concepts translated into Arabic from Syriac, but in his 
apologetic work addressed to Muslims he removed some traditional Christological 
terminology that might be misunderstood and adopted some Islamic concepts that might 
make Christology more understandable. 
6.2.2. Arguments for the Incarnation 
In his Letter on the Incarnation Abü Ra'ila presents five arguments which attempt to show 
the reasonableness of the Incarnation to Muslims. Two of them are shared with Abü Qurra. 
The first of these shared arguments is the defence of Christ's sonship as being outside time, 
and the second is the defence of the human body as suitable for union with the divine 
272 See S. II. Griffith, "Ilabib ibn Ilidmah Abü Rä'ija", 168. 
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nature by means of interpretation of the session of God on his throne. 
274 The need to place 
the concept of `sonship' outside time was obviously felt by all Christians in dialogue with 
Muslims, since the Nestorian Timothy I, the Melkite Abü Qurra, and the Jacobite, Abü 
Rä'ita used the argument. These three Christian communities had a common understanding 
of the Father/Son analogy which gave them a theological unity in the face of the Islamic 
denial of `son' as a true descriptive category for Christ. If the sonship of Christ was not 
from eternity then Muslims were right to reject it as demeaning to God's character. On the 
other hand, if Muslims could see that Christ's sonship is a non-physical notion, then they 
would have no grounds for rejecting the idea as unworthy of God. 
The second argument shared with Abü Qurra is the use of the session of God on his 
throne to point out to Muslims that God can be in the world without ceasing to be 
transcendent over it. If Muslims reject any suggestion that God is confined to the throne 
then Christians can claim that the divine nature indwells the human body of Christ but is 
not confined to it. Whereas Abü Qurra alluded to contemporary debate among Muslims, 
Abü Rä'ita engages directly in debate with Islamic interpretation of the throne texts of the 
Qur'an. "God is in heaven and on the throne" must mean that he is Lord of heaven and 
Lord of the throne, and that God is in heaven and the throne and does not just appear in 
them. 275 His much more direct challenge to Muslim interpretation of the Qur'än would no 
doubt have evoked a more immediate response than Abü Qurra's less direct argument, 
though the conclusion of the argument would probably have been unacceptable to Muslims 
whichever way it was presented. 
There are three new arguments put forward by Abü Rä'ita. The first of these 
appeals to Muslim understanding of the attributes of God to support the Incarnation of the 
second person of the Trinity. If Muslims define God as knowing, willing and performing, 
273 Ibid., 165. 
274 Abü Rä'ila, "Letter on the Incarnation", questions 32-34 and 26-29. 
275 Ibid., question 29. 
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they have to admit that these attributes do not always function together. If God allows 
evildoers to enter paradise then he knows and performs what he does not will, the entry of 
evil people into paradise. Yet Muslims claim that these apparently contradictory attributes 
do not affect the unity of God. On the same basis, Christians claim that when "one of the 
three hypostases became Incarnate without the other two" all three remained united. 
Diversity in attributes does not destroy unity in nature. 276 The second novel argument in 
support of the incarnation makes use of the relationship between the human mind and body 
to explain the way the divine and human attributes work together in Christ. Abü Rä'ita has 
the Muslim ask whether the water of the womb is essential to the divine nature as a result 
of the Incarnation. The reply is negative since the physical body is no more essential to the 
divine nature of Christ than a human body is essential to a human personality. 277 If a 
Muslim grants that there is a kind of duality in human beings as a result of the union of 
non-material mind with material body then he might be prepared to entertain the possibility 
that non-material divine nature has united with material human nature. It is not nonsense 
for Christians to believe that divine and human characteristics have united in Christ. 
The third innovative argument concerns the relationship between Christ and other 
messengers of God. The Muslim wonders why it is not more fitting for God to send a pure 
human to save humanity than to become human himself. Abü Rä'ita concedes that God did 
send human messengers such as Noah, Abraham and Moses but few listened to them. God 
could not save humanity merely by sending more of the same, so he decided to solve the 
problem through the Incarnation. There were two advantages to this decision; when people 
saw the divine nature in human flesh they were more able to respond to God's will, and in 
addition, God was able to show his goodness in a way that would not have been possible 
merely through messengers. 278 Here Abü Rä'ila appeals to the Qur'änic sequence of 
276 Ibid., question 6. 
277 Ibid., question 7. 
278 Ibid., questions 13-18, especially the answer to 18. 
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prophetic messengers familiar to Muslims, but takes Christ out of the list into a separate 
category. This argument that Christ is superior to all other messengers flies in the face of 
the presentation of Christ in the Qur'an where he is presented as one among several 
messengers who stand together as equals in God's sight. Abü Rä'ita directly challenges the 
clear teaching of the Qur'än, a method he usually avoids. Acceptance of the initial premise 
that Christ was superior to other messengers because of his divinity would depend on a 
leap of faith by a Muslim that seems highly unlikely. Elsewhere, Abü Rä'ita tended to 
begin his arguments for the Incarnation with premises acceptable to Muslims before 
attempting to reach Christian conclusions. As a result this argument is not as useful in 
dialogue with Muslims as the four others surveyed. 
Abü Rä'ita does not develop a fresh Christology in dialogue with Muslims. His 
apologetic strategy does nevertheless force him to argue for the reasonableness of his view 
of Christ in the light of Islamic convictions. Unlike Abü Qurra, he is explicit about the 
nature of Muslim thought, even to the point of relying on the teaching of the Qur'an to 
support his own argument. The presupposition seems to be that, properly understood, a 
Christian view of Christ is not incompatible with Islamic conceptions of him. 
6.3. The Christology of'Ammär Al-Ba ri 
6.3.1. A defence of Nestorian Christology 
'Ammär's known Christological writing is addressed to Muslims, and if he wrote for a 
Christian context only, his writing is not available. It is then not possible to compare his 
Christology for Muslims with a Christology for Christians. However, a comparison can be 
made between the apologetics of'Ammar, Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita. 'Ammar's 
description of the Incarnation differs from Abü Qurra's and Abü Rä'ita's in his insistence 
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on talking of a unity of two natures in two hypostases. He acknowledges this difference in 
his shorter apologetic work, The Book of the Proof. 279 In the answers to fifty-one questions 
he also affirms this two natures, two hypostases view. He finds it necessary in dialogue 
with Muslims to show why this view is more accurate than those of the Melkites and the 
Miaphysites. According to 'Ammar this view safeguards God from becoming embodied. 
Miaphysites have to concede that God is embodied because they claim that there is only a 
divine nature in the Messiah. Melkites are subject to the same difficulty, since God must be 
embodied if Mary is God's mother. 280 Clearly 'Ammar believes that a Nestorian 
Christology is less susceptible to Muslim objections than rival ones. 'Ammar then, in 
dialoguing with Muslims, is conducting another debate with Christian rivals, using the 
Islamic context to show that Nestorian Christology is truer than other types of Christology. 
It is almost as if the Nestorian is grateful to Islam for providing a platform for re-instating 
the anathematized Nestorian teaching to its rightful place as the truth. 281 
6.3.2. Arguments for the Incarnation 
'Ammar uses three arguments found in other apologetic writing. Firstly, he shares with 
Timothy I, Abü Qurra, and Abü Rä'ita the argument that the begetting of the Son by the 
Father was outside time and therefore unlike human procreation. 'Ammar's version of the 
argument is different because he appeals to Islamic interpretation of the attributes of God 
to support a non-physical understanding of the Father/Son relationship. Since Muslims do 
not interpret the knowledge and wisdom of God according to human knowledge and 
wisdom, the fatherhood of God should not be interpreted according to the way humans 
understand fatherhood. If God's attributes are eternal and non-physical then the sonship of 
279 'Ammar al-Basri, `The Book of the Proof'. 62. 
280 'Ammar al-Bag!, "The Book of Questions and Answers", question 12. 
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Christ must also be eternal and non-physical. 282 This way of putting the argument is more 
sophisticated than his contemporaries' versions that simply state that Christians do not 
understand the sonship of Christ as bound by time, and therefore has greater usefulness in 
dialogue with Muslims. 
Secondly, in common with his contemporary apologists he holds that the human 
characteristics of Christ do not adversely affect the divine nature, since the suffering of 
Christ was endured only by his human nature. If this is difficult to imagine then he 
suggests the analogy of coal that is heated by fire but does not impart blackness to it. 283 
This analogy is particular to 'Ammar's presentation of the argument, again showing his 
desire to support the Christian case with ideas that might appeal to Muslims as reasonable. 
Thirdly, he shares with Abü RA'ita the related argument that the divine nature is not limited 
by the humanity of Christ, but adds an analogy to help the Muslim to see the sense of the 
argument. The divine nature relates to the human nature in the same way that the sun lights 
up the earth without being limited to it. 284 
'Ammar has several arguments not found in other Christian apologetic writing in 
the period. They are of two kinds; arguments that are based on Islamic premises, and 
arguments that show the value of the Incarnation once the idea is granted as possible. He 
has two innovative arguments based on Islamic premises. Firstly, in order to deal with the 
denial that God begets in süra 112: 3, he refers to the divine attributes of mercy and anger 
which imply that God suffers. If Muslims hold that, in fact, God does not suffer despite the 
apparent meaning of `anger' and `mercy', then Christians are justified in believing that the 
Father can have a Son without `begetting' imputing imperfection to God in any way. 285 
Secondly, 'Ammar appeals to the manner of God's creative work to present the process of 
281 See P. K. Iiitti, Ilistoryof the Arabs. (tenth edition), London, 1970,354f, for the rivalry between 
Nestorians and other Christians to be accepted as `true' representatives of Christianity to their Islamic rulers. 282 "The Berk of The Proof', 59. 
283 "The Book of Questions and Answers", questions 5 and 8. 
284 Ibid., question 11. 
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Incarnation. If Muslims do not know how God created the world then it is not a weakness 
for Christians to be ignorant about the way the divine nature united with the human nature 
in Christ. 'Ammar's reminder that agnosticism about the actions of God is a necessary 
position for both Muslims and Christians has a continuing validity, though there will 
always be a contention between Muslims and Christians concerning divine actions deemed 
admissible by one side or the other. 286 
'Ammar is especially interested in showing Muslims the value of the Incarnation 
for faith in God, despite the fact that Islam seems to reject the idea. He has six arguments 
commending the Incarnation as inherently true that do not depend on premises held by 
Muslims. Four of them come from The Book of the Proof. The first of these states that 
since human messengers cannot show God's character, only God Incarnate can enable 
people to see him. Christ did exactly this when he revealed to the people of his day his 
divine authority. 287 This appeal to the historical Jesus of the Gospels is unusual in ninth 
century apologetics, which are typically focused on the developed Christology of the 
Christian communities of the Middle East. Secondly, God chose to become visible to 
people as an act of mercy, in recognition of the fact that people make images of the divine 
in their search for him. This is sheer condescension by God who knows that the weakness 
of humans needs to be taken into consideration in the process of revelation and salvation. 
288 Here 'Ammär probably has made too strong a connection between God's choice to 
become visible in Christ and the supposed need of humans to sec God, because Christians 
normally affirm the former but not the latter. Moreover, in the context of dialogue with 
Muslims this argument is flawed, since it seems to suggest that the desire to visualize God 
is acceptable to him, an idea which the Qur'än flatly opposes. 
293 "The Book of the Proof', 62. 
286 See the debate on such admissibility between Kenneth Cragg and Ismä'i1 al"FarDq in chapter eight. 
287 The Book of the Proof', 65. 
288 "The Book of the Proof', 67. 
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The third argument is related to the second in that 'Ammar again uses the notion of 
the desired visibility of God for human beings. This time the visibility comes at the Day of 
Judgment when humanity will appear before the divine judge, but since God cannot be 
seen directly on that day, he has chosen Christ as an appropriate means of being seen. 289 
However, the idea that the human Christ is God's veil in the judgment room is less than 
appropriate to the argument, because it follows that God is not seen as such, but only the 
veil of Christ's human nature. A Muslim would rightly infer that since veils hide rather 
than reveal, 'Ammar is actually arguing for the hiddenness rather than the revelation of the 
divine nature. The fourth argument has to do with the outcome of judgment for those being 
saved. If God gave humans authority over the rest of the created world, then he will surely 
give them similar authority in the eternal world. This is guaranteed by the Incarnation of 
the divine nature in the human. 290 The idea of believers ruling with Christ in the afterlife is 
found in the New Testament but not as a result of the Incarnation as such. 291 'Ammar 
seems to be arguing that human beings can only rule as a result of the fact that the human 
Christ showed his divine authority, and that without the Incarnation there would be no rule 
for believers in the next life. However, the argument lacks coherence in the form in which 
'Ammar expresses it, and would therefore be hardly likely to commend the Incarnation to a 
Muslim. 
Two further arguments for the value of the Incarnation come from The Book of 
Questions and Answers. Firstly, the Incarnation is supported by the purity of Christ from 
the beginning to the end of his life. While Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita both appealed to the 
purification of the human body taken from Mary before the union with the divine nature, 
only'Ammär argues that the maintenance of that purity is significant for the Incarnation to 
be verified. At least one other human being is said to have been pure at the point of 
289 Ibid., 69. 
290 Ibid., 72. 
291 See for example Ephesians 2: 6 and Revelation 20: 6,21: 5. 
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conception, according to 'Ammar, so it is not enough for Christ to be pure at the outset of 
his life. He quotes Jeremiah 1: 4 as evidence that God purified the prophet Jeremiah in the 
womb, and goes on to argue that Christ could have lost his purity during his life, but, 
unlike the rest of humanity, he kept himself pure. 
292 The implication of this testing of 
Christ throughout his life is that the human nature in Christ has a role to play alongside the 
work of the divine nature. The divine nature does not need to be tested for it is always 
perfect, but the human nature does need to be tested to prove its continuing suitability as an 
abode for the divine nature. Here 'Ammar parts company from the emphases of Abü Qurra 
and Abü Rä'ita, for whom the fact that the eternal Word fashioned a body from the flesh 
derived from Mary ensures the continuing purity of that human nature. This is not adequate 
according to 'Ammar, since the human nature taken from Mary may be susceptible to 
failure after the union with the divine. He believes that the human nature in Christ was 
active in responding to the will of God, which contrasts with Abü Rä'ila's assumption that 
only the eternal Word responds to God's will. 'Ammar's Christ has human struggles that 
Abü Ra'ita's seems to know nothing of. This conviction arises from the fact that Christ can 
only save other humans if he has gone through the same experiences as they have. The 
continuing relevance of this argument can be seen in the way Karl Pfander in the 
nineteenth century and Kenneth Cragg in the twentieth century appealed to the obedience 
of Christ as essential to his value for humanity. 293 
The second innovative argument in The Book of Questions and Answers follows on 
from the establishment of Christ's complete obedience to the will of the Father. The 
culmination of that obedience involved death on the cross to release humans from the 
judgment of God and to grant them eternal life. The value of Christ's death and 
resurrection lies in the gift of resurrection life to humanity. 'Ammar's analogies of a 
prizefighter using up all his strength to defeat an opponent, and of a doctor swallowing 
292 "The Book of Questions and Answers", questions 23-26. 
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poison before administering harmful medicine are interesting attempts to commend the 
idea to Muslims. It was not enough for Christ to promise the resurrected life to others 
without offering proof that it could happen, so he willingly submitted to death and 
resurrection to "place firmly in their hearts the promise of their resurrection". 294 This is an 
argument for the Incarnation that looks to the end rather than the beginning of the action, 
thus Incarnation is not defined merely by the commencement of a union between the divine 
and human natures as Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita seem to argue. Without the willing 
submission of Christ to death there is no guarantee that death can be overcome, and 
without the resurrection of Christ there can be no certainty that humans will have a life 
beyond this one. 'Ammar's argument is based on the teaching of several New Testament 
texts, 295 and has often been repeated in modern apologetics for Muslims. 296 
6.4. Muslim Responses to Christian views of Christ in the ninth and tenth centuries 
6.4.1. The truth about Christ comes from the Qur'än 
The first type of response was to appeal to the Qur'an as the measure by which to judge 
Christian beliefs. This was the approach of al-Qäsim ibn Ibr-ahim al-Hasani al-Rassi [d. 
860] who wrote a Reply to the Christians possibly in the period from 815 to 826 during 
which he debated with Christians in Egypt. If this is the case his reply is the earliest 
surviving Muslim writing against Christian beliefs. 297 Al-Qäsim documents the three main 
Christian presentations of the Incarnation by Melkites, Jacobites and Ncstorians before 
concluding that all of them depart from the teaching of "the prophets and apostles of God". 
293 See chapter seven for Pfander and chapter eight for Cragg. 
294 "rhe Book of Questions and Answers", questions 30-34. 
295 See for instance John 11: 25f; Acts 2: 31 f, and I Corinthians 15: 21-23. 
296 See the use made of the voluntary death of Christ by Pfander in chapter seven, Cragg in chapter eight, and 
Kling in chapter nine. 
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298 He does not actually specify at what points Christian teaching on the Incarnation 
diverges from that of the Qur'än, but he may have taken for granted that his Muslim 
audience did not need much assistance with such a critique. His intention seems to have 
been to provide Muslim readers with an accurate reference work of Christian thought, as 
can be seen in his description of the Incarnation. Melkites believe that the Messiah had 
two natures, divine and human, in one hypostasis; Jacobites hold that the divine nature and 
the human nature are one, "just as the human spirit and body are one; " and Nestorians 
claim that the Messiah had two natures and two hypostases. 
299 These arc good summaries 
of the three main Christian positions, even noting the distinctive mind/body analogy used 
only by Jacobites. 
Alongside the presentation of separate Christologies, al-Qasim notes that all three 
Christian communities hold a common view of the purpose of the Incarnation. "The reason 
for the descent of the divine Son from heaven was because of the sin of Adam, which 
included all of his descendents. He delivered them from the power of Satan by offering 
himself on the cross. " 300 But this is a mistaken notion since the crucifixion did not take 
place as Christians believe. They may have a tradition in their scriptures that the Jews put 
Christ to death, but the Jews themselves did not claim to have crucified him. "The 
Christians gave their interpretation from their own opinions. " 301 Only here does al-Qäsim 
refer to Qur'änic teaching to refute Christian belief, but his underlying assumption is that 
Christians have developed their beliefs about Christ as a result of poor scriptural 
foundations. They are wrong about the facts of Christ's death and their concepts of 
Incarnation are a product of their imagination. 
297 See D. Thomas, "The Bible in Early Muslim Anti-Christian Polemic", ICMR (7,1996,29-38) 
298 Al-Qäsim, "Radd 'alä al-nasAra", cd. I de Matteo, "Confutazione contro I Christiani dello Zaydati al- 
Qäsini b. Ibrähim", RSO. (9,1921-2,301-64) 319. 
299 Ibid., 316f. 
300 Ibid., 317. 
301 Ibid., 319. 
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6.4.2. Christian scriptures do not support the incarnation 
A second type of critique made by 'Ali ibn Rabban al-Tabarl [d. 855] and al-Näshi al- 
Akbar [d. 904] was to separate developed Christology from that found in the Bible in order 
to show that Christian thought had forsaken its roots. 'Ali al-Tabari claimed to have been a 
Christian for seventy years in his Reply to the Christians, which must have been written 
sometime around the middle of the ninth century. 302 The fact that he had been a Christian 
most of his life is seen in his familiarity with the Bible on which he bases his criticism of 
Christology. He has two particular points to make; the Bible presents a human rather than a 
divine Christ, and the father-son terminology found in the Gospels has been radically 
changed by developed Christological formulations into something it was not intended to 
mean. In support of his first point al-Tabari quotes from the Messianic prophecies of the 
Old Testament, such as Psalm 8, where the Messiah is clearly expected to be a human 
being without any hint that he might be divine. 303 
His second point is that Christological writing has taken father-son language in the 
New Testament out of context. In the Gospels the term `father' is used as a metaphor in the 
same way that clan leaders and aged people are called father by those who arc not their 
children. Similarly, the term `son' is figurative like the sons of leaders who are not their 
actual children. However, Christian tradition has corrupted this understanding of the 
father-son analogy, "because Christians hold the literal truth of these names. " 304 They 
want to hold that the Father is a parent while being beyond the process of creation, and 
they claim that the Son is born before time. But these are self-contradictory positions that 
do not arise from the Gospel accounts from which the terminology is taken. Worse still, 
302 'Ali al-Tabari, "Radd 'alä al-nasärä", ed. I-A. Khalifs and W. Kutsch, AfS/. (36,1959,113-48) 119. 
303 Ibid., 146. 
304 Ibid., 147. 
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developed Christology has made the Son equal to the Father in a way that is both a false 
interpretation of the Gospels and logically incoherent. 
"To say on the one hand that the Son is like his Father in his eternity, and on the 
other that he is not like his Father because he is born, is to deprive the words [father 
and son] of any meaning ... If the Father and Son are equal 
in power and eternity 
then what authority remains for the Father over the Son? " 305 
Al-Tabari is able to make great play over the removal of the father-son analogy from 
typical figurative use by Christian doctrinal formulations. How could Christians have gone 
from a metaphor for the lordship of God over the submitted Christ as found in the Gospels 
to a divine paternity of a divine offspring occurring beyond space and time? Sadly for al- 
Tabari, Christians have ended up being unable to separate the divine from the human in 
their thinking. The only solution for them is to go back to the human Christ in their 
scriptures. 
Al-Näshi' al-Akbar also contrasted the Christologics of the ninth century with the 
portrait of Christ in the Gospels in order to show how Christians had forsaken their roots. 
He blames Christians for superimposing Greek philosophical categories on the language of 
the Gospels. 
"Whoever looks at the evidence of the Gospel will come across the saying of the 
Messiah -'Consecrate the people in the name of the Father and the Son and the 
Holy Spirit'. There is no evidence here as to whether the Messiah is eternal or 
contingent, or whether he has one essence or not. These Greek philosophical 
expressions which have been adopted by Christians would not occur to those who 
examine the Gospel where Jesus ['Isa] says -'I am going to my Father and your 
Father, my Lord and your Lord', and makes himself the same as them. " 306 
In other words Christians are guilty of reading into the father-son analogy ideas that simply 
don't belong to the original image in the Gospels. A straightforward interpretation of these 
sayings of Jesus leads to the conclusion that he referred to God as his father and himself as 
God's son in deferential terms. The father is Lord, so the son is submitted to his father. The 
305 Ibid., 148. 
306 A1-Näshi' al-Akbar, Kitäb al-Awsät J-1-Magalät. ed. J. van Ess, Beirut, 1971,82. 
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son turns out to be on the same level as those to whom he is speaking, rather than on the 
same level as God. Subsequently, Christians have re-interpreted the sonship as equality of 
status with the father via the alien concept of eternal sonship imported from Greek thought. 
Al-Näshi' quotes Melkite and Jacobite Christological formulas to illustrate the distance 
between them and the Gospels. Melkites believe that the Messiah has two natures, eternal 
and temporal, in one hypostasis, whereas the Jacobites hold that the Son joined with the 
human and became one nature, "God the Word who is Jesus". 307 When compared with the 
figurative language of Jesus in the Gospels such formulae seem to bear no relation to the 
true intent of Jesus to be submitted to his Lord and to lead others in that submission. The 
simplicity of the Gospel accounts has been abandoned by Christians who have elaborated 
Jesus into a divine being through complex ideas borrowed from the wrong sources. 308 
6.4.3. Arguments for the Incarnation are incoherent 
A third type of response was to deny the validity of the apologetics put forward by 
Christians to defend the Incarnation as reasonable. Abü 'Isä al-Warräq (d. 861] and Abra 
Bakr Muhammad ibn al-Tayyib al-Bagilläni [d. 1014] argued that the analogies used by 
Christians to explain the Incarnation were inadequate for the task because the notion of the 
union of the divine with the human was basically incoherent. Abü Isä stands out among the 
Muslim authors of his time for his thoroughness in handling Christian material. In his 
Reply to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity he surveys in great detail the Christologics of 
the Melkites, Jacobites and Nestorians, pointing out inconsistencies in their use of 
language to show that Christians were incapable of making sense of their beliefs about 
Christ. His main criticism of the language used by Christians has to do with terminology 
307 ibid., 80. 
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for the humanity of Christ. He observes that Nestorians and most Jacobites claim that the 
eternal Son united with "one contingent human being", but that Melkites hold that the 
eternal Son united with "the universal human nature" shared by all humans "in order to 
save everyone. " The Melkfites believe that if the Son "had united with one human being 
then he could only have intended to save this individual and not everyone. " 
309 However, 
he notes that despite this observation, Nestorians, Jacobites and Melkites are not consistent 
in the way they describe the humanity of Christ. "They all tend to apply the explanations 
loosely, interpreting the human nature as a human being and vice versa. " 310 This lack of 
precision in the use of language is confirmed by the terminology for the Incarnation found 
in these Christologies. "Sometimes they say the Word became human ta'annasa and some 
of them say the Word became embodied tajassada. 99 
311 
Abü Isa lists seven metaphorical explanations given by Christians of the union of 
the divine Word with the human body; firstly, the Word united with the human body in the 
sense of mixing and mingling with it; secondly, the Word took the body as a temple; 
thirdly, the Word took the body as a garment; fourthly, the Word dwelt in the body; fifthly 
the Word appeared in the body without indwelling it; sixthly, the Word appeared in the 
body like a seal in clay, without being transferred to the clay itself; sevcnthly, the Word 
appeared in the body as a face appears in a mirror without being part of it. 
312 Of these 
seven analogies only the idea of indwelling is used by Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ila. 'Ammär 
has indwelling as well as the temple and garment analogies. As far as Abü ' Isä is 
concerned the amount of disagreement between Christians tells against the coherence of 
the idea of union between divine and human natures. Such internal inconsistency does not 
308 See similar Muslim argumentation answered in the apologetics of Abu RA'ila and 'Ammar, as well as the 
basic agreement of John Hick with such arguments in chapter nine, though with no awareness of these 
authors. 
309 Abra 'Isä al-Warräq, "Radd 'alA al-thaläth liräq min al-nasärä", ed. D. Thomas, Anti-Chrislian Polemic in 
Early Islam. Cambridge, 1992,69f. 
310 Ibid., 70. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Ibid., 71f. 
154 
encourage Muslims to take Christology as a source of true information about Christ. Abü 
'Isa seems to list the variety of Christian perspectives in order to show how much more 
rational is the teaching of Islam. If Christian faith in Christ corresponds with a Muslim 
view then Christianity has little to teach that is not confirmed by Islam. Where Christian 
teaching about Christ differs From Islamic teaching it is likely to be faulty. 
Abü Bakr al-Bägilläni provides a critique of two more analogies used by Christians 
to explain the Incarnation. The first of these appeals to the session of God on his throne. 
"There are those who say that the Word indwells the human nature without being confined 
to it, just as the Creator descends on his throne without being confined to it. This is 
irrational, because the Creator is not on his throne in the sense that he indwells it.,, 313 Al- 
Bägilläni points out that any use of God's contact with his throne as an analogy for the 
contact of the Word with the human body is illegitimate because Christians claim an 
indwelling of the Word. The parallel is simply not there in the session on the throne, for 
God cannot be thought by any stretch of the imagination to be within his throne in the way 
that the Word is supposed to be in the human body. Both Abü Qurra and Abu Rä'ita had 
appealed to the session of God on his throne as a helpful analogy for the Incarnation, but 
al-Bägilläni demonstrates the gap between the Christian affirmation of divine embodiment 
and the Islamic conviction that God transcends that which he has created. 
The mind-body analogy is also criticized for failing to provide what Christians 
really argue for. "The idea that the mind is the essence of the person and yet is not affected 
by the body is futile. 99 314 When applied by Christians to the Incarnation the analogy does 
not work since they want to maintain that the Word was basically unaffected by the body. 
The mind-body analogy was used by Abü Rä'ita because he believed that in fact the 
human body did not influence the human mind, but this understanding of human 
psychology lacked cogency for Muslims like al-Bagillani. 
313 al-Bägilläni, Kitäb al-Tamhid. ed. R. J. McCarthy, Beirut, 1957,88. 
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Both of these analogies are inadequate for the task to which Christians put them 
because they attempt to support the union of the divine with the human, a notion which is 
completely impossible. Al-Bägilläni dismisses these apologetic moves as incapable of 
achieving what Christians desire because the basic belief in the Incarnation is irrational in 
the first place. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The developments in Christology are mainly seen in the presentation of arguments to 
commend the rationality and value of the Incarnation as understood within the traditions of 
the three authors, Abü Qurra the Melkite, Abü Rä'ita the Jacobite, and 'Ammar the 
Nestorian. Abü Qurra and Abü Rä'ita shared a common concern to argue for the 
Incarnation on Islamic grounds, even to the extent of using the same Islamic conceptions 
as premises of their arguments. They both appealed to the session of God on his throne, 
familiar to Muslims from the Qur'än, as a way of defending the reasonableness of divine 
union with a human body. 'Ammar was more inclined to present arguments that showed 
the value of the Incarnation as a means of the revelation of God, but he did also develop 
some distinctive arguments based on Islamic ideas. There were some developments in the 
language of Christology, especially in the writing of Abü Rä'ita, who used the concept of 
attributes to describe the divinity and humanity of Christ when addressing a Muslim 
audience. However, Abü Qurra and 'Ammar were less inclined to adopt Islamic 
terminology, preferring to explain the meaning of their Christological traditions in ways 
that might be intelligible to Muslims. 
The response by Muslim authors illustrates the way such arguments were received 
Ultimately the Christian case for the Incarnation is perceived to be a poor building on any 
31 4 Ibid., 90. 
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Islamic foundations suggested. Nothing in Islam allows for the union of the divine with a 
human body, and the use of divine anthropomorphisms in Islam to make room for 
Incarnation is not admissible. However, the fact that al-Bägilläni took the trouble to refute 
such arguments in the second half of the tenth century shows that Muslim intellectuals felt 
the force of the Christian case made over a century before. This may suggest that 
arguments based on Islamic premises can have a continuing usefulness to Christian 
apologists. Muslim reading of the Gospels to deny the divinity of Christ put Abü Rä'ita 
and 'Ammar on the defensive, but they were convinced that the divinity of Christ was 
clearly portrayed there. Perhaps these ninth century discussions of the Gospels have less 
relevance in modem times in the light of critical Gospel scholarship, but the issues 
surrounding scriptural roots for developed Christology raised by 'Ammar's presentation of 
a tested Christ have a continuing importance. 
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Part Two 
Twentieth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
The second part of this study analyses four presentations of Christ for Muslims from the 
second half of the twentieth century. Chapter seven opens Part Two with a brief review of 
the decline of innovative writing on Christ after the ninth century, and gives two examples 
of renewed attempts to engage in dialogue on Christ from the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Chapter eight expounds and evaluates the novel contribution of 
Kenneth Cragg over five decades beginning in the 1950's. His use of Islamic ideas to 
present the Incarnation is the most innovative since the ninth century, and his Christian 
interpretations of the Qur'än challenge traditional Muslim scholarship to make room for a 
new approach to the Christ of the Qur'an. Chapter nine reviews dialogues with Muslim 
scholars held by two leading European theologians Hans Kling and John Hick. Kling 
challenges Muslims to accept the historical facts of the gospels that appear to be ignored or 
denied by the Qur'an, such as the facts that Jesus forgave sin in God's place and that he 
died by crucifixion. Hick, on the other hand, thinks that only the crucifixion stands 
between gospel and Qur'an, and that belief in the cross is not essential for a relationship 
with God. Kung's abrasive polemic represents a less imaginative approach to dialogue than 
Cragg, while Hick's desire to smooth over tensions between the scriptures of Christians 
and Muslims represents a less realistic approach to dialogue than Cragg's attempt to give 
Christian meanings to Islamic ideas. Chapter ten analyses the Christology of a life of 
Christ which incorporates material from the four gospels into one story, using a 
considerable number of Qur'änic expressions to rework the language of the gospels in 
terms that might appeal to Muslims. For instance, Christ rarely calls God `father' and 
himself `son'in this account, so that Muslim readers may be enabled to see an essentially 
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Christian view of Christ from a fresh perspective that might not seem totally foreign to an 
Islamic perception of him. This life of Christ offers imaginative suggestions for future 
Christian -Muslim dialogue on Christ. These four modem attempts to present Christ for 
Muslims show commendable effort on the part of Christians to communicate in the context 
of Islamic convictions about Christ, and provide different models for dialogue in the 
twenty-first century. 
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Part Two. Twentieth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Seven 
New Beginnings in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries 
7.1. Between the Ninth and Nineteenth Centuries 
The steady growth of Islam in the Middle East did not bring about the demise of dialogue 
between Christians and Muslims. The arrival of Mongol domination after 1259 led to the 
systematic oppression of Middle Eastern Christians, which became particularly intense 
under Timür Lang from 1394 to1405 when Christians in the Mesopotamian region who did 
not convert to Islam were hunted down. 
315 Between the creative period of the late eighth 
and early ninth centuries and the suppression of the post Abbasid era, Christian dialogue 
on Christology with Muslims hardly developed in novel directions. A notable exception, 
however, is the contribution from the twelfth century made by Paul of Antioch, Melkite 
Bishop of Sidon, who quoted extensively from the Qur'än in support of the Gospel 
accounts of Christ in his Letter to the Muslims. For instance, he was able to accept the 
Qur'anic denial of the death of Christ on the cross by arguing that the Qur'än meant that 
the divinity of Christ was untouched when his human nature died. 316 However, the letter 
does not match the earlier apologetic writing of the ninth century for arguments 
commending the Incarnation. 
During the Medieval period, the European Christian encounter with Islam 
was coloured by the sense of threat posed by possible Muslim invasion. Those who 
attempted to understand Islam did not engage in the kind of apologetic used by Middle 
Eastern Christians, but sought to directly criticise Islam in the light of Christian truth. 
315 Sec A. S. Atiya, A History of Eastern Christianity, 276. 
316 Paul of Antioch, Letter to the Muslims. cd. P. Khoury, Beirut, 1964,73. 
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Ramon Lull (1232-1316), who visited North Africa on a number of occasions to debate 
and preach, produced a treatise three years before his death for Christian merchants doing 
business in the Muslim world. He advised his readers that Muhammad had misunderstood 
what Christians believed about the Trinity, the Incarnation, the crucifixion, and the 
resurrection. Other aspects of his teaching corresponded to Christian truth; God is creator, 
Christ is the Spirit and Word of God, Christ is born of the Virgin Mary, he is exalted and 
alive in heaven, and he is the worthiest man of all time. While acknowledging that 
Muhammad was not wholly in error, the notion that he had misunderstood Christian 
teaching was to become standard in subsequent Western writing on Islam until the modern 
era. 317 Ricoldo of Montecroce (c. 1243-1320) worked in the Baghdad area with Tartars. 
His polemic against the authenticity of the Qur'än, entitled Confutatio Alcorani, represents 
a still more critical approach to Muslims. The Qur'an repeats the teaching of Arius who 
regarded Christ as the noblest of God's creatures but not as divine. He suggests that 
Christians defend the Incarnation by arguing that no limit ought to be placed on God by 
human reason, so the Incarnation is possible for the Almighty. 318 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) made the greatest effort in the West to read the 
Qur'an sympathetically. He wrote De Pace Fidei in 1453 in the aftermath of the fall of 
Constantinople to Muhammad II, confident that despite differences between Christians and 
Muslims the truth would win out in the end. His Cribratio Alkorani was written at the 
request of Pope Pius II probably in 1461. While not aimed at a Muslim audience, it does 
attempt to show that the Qur'an contains a Christian view of Jesus. In the tradition of John 
of Damascus whom he had studied, he argues that the title `Word' given to Jesus in the 
Qur'an must imply his divine nature. "Since Ile is the Word of God sent from Heaven, 
317 See D. Urvoy, "Ramon Lull et L'Islam", Islamochristiana (7,1981,127-146) 135. Lull grew up among 
Spanish Muslims and was familiar with the work of several Muslim writers including ihn Iiazm, al-Ghazäli, 
The Brethren of Purity, and ibn Masarra from the tenth century and ibn Sabin from the thirteenth century. 
lie may also have been aware of the two twelfth and thirteenth century Andalusian Muslim writers, ibn 
Rushd and ibn al-'Arabi. 
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then assuredly He is of the same nature as God who sends (him). For since the Divine 
Word is the Word of God, we cannot say that it is something other than the most simple 
God. " 319 He is innovative in dealing with the supposed denial of the crucifixion. While the 
Qur'än denies that the Jews killed Christ it leaves open the possibility that Pilate had him 
put to death. 
"It is not denied that the Jews could be perpetrators of the killing of Christ, even 
though they did not (really) kill him. Therefore, in the whole of the Koran there is 
no denial that Christ was crucified; rather Pilate, not the Jews, could have carried 
out this crucifixion in the way stated by the gospel.,, 
320 
Nicholas seems to have been the first to suggest this way of reading süra 4: 157. However, 
he did not engage in debate with Muslims to test out his approach. 
The arrival of Jesuits in Northwest India in the sixteenth century provided a new 
opportunity for engagement with Islam. They were able to hold discussions with the 
Mughal Emperor Akbar on a variety of topics including the Incarnation and crucifixion of 
Christ. They appealed to the Qur'änic title `word from God' for support for the divinity of 
Christ and to the intimation in the Qur'än that Christ died for support for the death of 
Christ as recorded in the Gospels. 
321 However, it was not until the nineteenth century that 
European Christian mission was able to produce apologetic work that addressed Muslims 
in terms of their own scholarly tradition. By then, developments in the study of Islam by 
European scholars had become available for apologetic use. The fruit of this knowledge 
can be seen in the writing of Karl Pfander (1803-1868), whose training in Islamic studies 
in Switzerland enabled him to engage in debate with Muslims by quoting Muslim scholars 
to support Christian interpretation of the Qur'an. 
322 
318 See J. W. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology vol 2: 1. London, 1955,118-122. 
X19 Nicholas of Cusa, "Cribratio Alkorani. 1: 12: 59", in J. I lopkins, Nicholas of Cusa .c De Pace Lidei and 
Cribratio Alkorani. Minneapolis, 1994,5. 
320 Ibid., 2: 14: 129, in Hopkins, 103. 
321 See J. S. lloyland and S. N. Banarjee, trans. Commentary of Father Monserrate S. J. on his Journey to the 
Court ofAkbar. London, 1922,59f. and 180. See also P. Jackson, "Jesuits at Akbar's court", Salaam. (16, 
1995,100-113) 
322 See A. A. Powell, Muslims & Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India. London, 1993,135f. 
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7.2. Karl Pfander's The Balance of Truth 
Karl G. Pfander, a Pietistic Lutheran from Germany, joined the Basel Mission to work 
among Muslims on the northern border of Persia. 
323 His presentation of Christianity 
entitled The Balance of Truth was published in Armenian in 1831, Persian in 1835, and 
Urdu in 1843, after he moved to India in 1841. Pfander wrote the work to fill a gap in 
literature for the Muslim audience he encountered in preaching around Shusha in the 
Caucasus and on trips within Persia. He subsequently rewrote the work in the late 1840's 
utilising fresh studies on Islam by European scholars as well as Islamic writing available in 
situ. 324 Few of his missionary contemporaries had read the Qur'än or Islamic writing. 
Henry Martyn was one who had, but he had dedicated his energy to Scripture translation 
before his death in 1812 at the age of 31.325 Pfander was attempting to communicate the 
Christian faith in terms a Muslim might understand, rather than simply repeat the 
theological terminology he had learned in Europe. 
The Balance of Truth first addresses the authenticity of the Old and New 
Testaments since Pfander had discovered that this was the most important point of 
contention in discussions with Muslims. If he could persuade his reader of the 
trustworthiness of Christian scripture then the Trinity and the Incarnation which he goes on 
to expound, would be firmly grounded. Pfander declined to debate these doctrines in 
isolation from their origin in revelation. His was not a philosophical approach that sought 
to show the reasonableness of the Trinity or the Incarnation on a priori grounds, since as a 
Pietistic Lutheran he was inherently suspicious of natural theology. His presentation of 
Christian claims about Jesus follows a detailed argument showing that the Torah and the 
323 See the survey of Pfander's life and work by J. S. Moon, "From Carey to Zwemer. Karl Pfandur", BC/1S, 
(1,1967,46-57). 
324 Pfander mentioned that he had used material provided by the British Islamist William Muir, who was in 
India at the time, along with books by Gustav Weil on the early history of Islam, and the Lladth collection of 
Majlisi published in Teheran in 1831. See Powell, 147f. 
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Injil had not been corrupted by Jews or Christians. Pfander's Protestant background shows 
through in his opening emphasis on the Apostolic conviction that Christ died to save 
sinners. To support this he ranges widely over the New Testament teaching on the 
Atonement. 
7.2.1. The sinlessness of Christ 
The introductory section shows an important aspect of Pfander's method. The Old 
Testament prediction of Jesus' birth from the Virgin Mary is backed up by süras 21: 91 and 
66: 12. Later he pays close attention to these Qur'änic statements using references from 
commentaries on the Qur'än in order to demonstrate that the Qur'an teaches the sinlessness 
of Christ. 
"The Qur'än accuses the other prophets of sin but does not once accuse Jesus of 
sin; rather it testifies that he is innocent. Süra Mary'am 19 says on the lips of the 
angel who announced him to his mother -'I am your Lord's messenger to 
announce to you a pure boy'. Baidäwi said this means purity from sin or growth to 
goodness or progress towards goodness from year to year. Bukhäri and Muslim 
said that the following Hadlth agrees with this verse; `Satan has pierced the side of 
every newborn son of Adam with his finger except'Isä son of Mary. " 326 
Pfander's appeal to the Qur'än commentator al-Baidäwi (d. c. 1290) and the Iladilh 
collectors al-Bukhäri (810-870) and Muslim (d. 875) marks a new stage in Christian 
apologetic writing for Muslims. He presents evidence from Islamic sources to back up 
Christian claims about Jesus. This approach to apologetics is an intensification of the 
eighth and ninth century use of the Qur'an to support Christian belief, since it allows the 
apologist to back up a Christian reading of the Qur'an with Islamic scholarship. In this 
context, the confirmation of the sinlessness of Christ by the renowned commentator al- 
Baidäwi establishes the credibility of Pfander as a serious debater who seeks appropriate 
325 See J. Sargent, Life and Letters of the Rev. Henry Marlyn. London, Seeley and Co. (New Edition) 1862. 
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evidence for his points. The quotation of a sound tradition from the collections of al- 
Bukhäri and Muslim shows that Pfander was aware of the importance of the Ifadith in the 
interpretation of the Qur'an in the Islamic Persia and India of his time. In fact, the tradition 
is even more valuable than the commentary, since Christ is picked out as uniquely free 
from the taint of evil among humans, giving the apologist the opportunity to challenge the 
common assumption that all the prophets were sinless. 
"There are many sayings of Muhammad showing that he asked for forgiveness and 
repented of sin. Among them are these sayings, `I ask God's forgiveness and I 
repent seventy times a day' and `Repent to your Lord for I tell you that I repent to 327 God the Almighty and Sublime a hundred times a day'. 99327 
Muslims would not be able to take refuge in the theory that such sayings are 
unsound since they appear in al-Bukhäri and Muslim. Pfander softens any accusation of 
Christian bias by sticking rigidly to impeccable Islamic sources to reinforce his central 
claim of the unique status of the Messiah among God's prophets. The new knowledge 
gained from Islamic literature provided apologists with the opportunity to move beyond the 
stereotyping of Muhammad long familiar to European thought. Now Christ could be 
rescued from an inferior status to Muhammad by reference to the sayings of the Prophet. If 
Muhammad himself claimed to have needed forgiveness and yet taught that Jesus was 
without fault then the Christian case is made by the Prophet of Islam. 
Having achieved his aim of isolating Jesus as the only sinless prophet according to 
the Iiadith, Pfander enters into a lengthy explanation of the Biblical view that sin needs 
atonement, and that such atonement can only be made by a pure sacri fice according to the 
Torah. Only Jesus Christ is capable of acting as that perfect sacrifice and this is foretold in 
the Torah itself. As for the gospels, they are supported by the Qur'än in their portrait of 
Jesus' ministry. "He performed amazing miracles, he healed the sick, cast out demons, 
326 K G. Pfander, M: n al-Ilagq. Rikon, 179f. This is a reprint of the Arabic translation published in Beirut 
in 1877. W. S. Tisdall edited an English version in 1912 with revisions to the original text of Pfander. 
327 Ibid., 180. 
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gave sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, cleansing to the leper, and made the cripple 
walk. Read süra 3: 42. " 328 
Pfander cannot claim similar Qur'änic testimony for the death and resurrection of 
Jesus. This silence of Islamic testimony considerably weakens his case for the importance 
of Jesus as a pure sacrifice. However, his exposition does emphasise the self-giving of 
Jesus and the fact that the Jews handed him over to the Roman governor. 
"Jesus once told his disciples that he would bear suffering not out of compulsion 
but willingly out of love for people that he might give them eternal life. The 
Messiah allowed the Jews to seize him, to mock him, to hit him and hand him over 
to the Roman judge, Pilate the governor of Judea, to whip him and crucify him. " 329 
Pfander possibly hopes to show first of all, that Jesus voluntarily went to his death on 
behalf of others. If that is granted then the injustice of the death of God's prophet is 
mitigated. Secondly, he points out that the Jews, while wanting to kill Jesus, handed him 
over to the non-Jewish governor of their country. Pfandcr may have hoped that this 
explanation would fit in with the Qur'änic assertion that `they certainly did not kill him', 
interpreting `they' as the Jews. However, Pfander does not spell out how he reconciles the 
gospel accounts of the death of Jesus with the seeming denial of death by crucifixion in the 
Qur'än. It is here that his method breaks down. Why quote the Qur'än when the text 
favours a Christian interpretation, but fail to indicate when the Qur'än appears to contradict 
it? Surely his reader would be frustrated with Pfander's unwillingness to discuss the 
Qur'än's opposition to Jesus' death by crucifixion in süra 4: 157. 
328 ibid., 213. 
329 ibid., 214. 
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7.2.2. Christ's divinity 
Pfander then deals with the divinity of Christ, recognising Muslim difficulty with the 
concept of sonship. 
"The name given to the Messiah, (in John 3: 16 and 4: 9), `Son of God', has been a 
stumbling stone on the path of many Muslims because they believe that this name 
goes beyond the acceptable limits imposed by the Qur'an, since the Qur'an denies 
that God took a partner or a son. But the gospels call the Messiah `Son of God' ibn 
Allah not ivalad Allah, the difference between ibn and walad is clear because the 
word ibn is often used metaphorically whereas the word walad is only used 
literally. -)' 330 
Pfander shows awareness of the impasse caused by the emphatic opposition of the Qur'än 
to `son' language by his decision to move swiftly to a much longer exposition of the 
Messiah as `Word of God'. By drawing on Messianic prophecy from the Old Testament 
and the use of the title in the Johannine writing of the New Testament he concludes that "it 
is obvious to the informed Muslim that the Qur'än agrees with the Torah and the In, fil in 
calling the Messiah `Word of God'. " 
331 According to John, the Word existed with God 
before space and time and then became human. Ile was fully human yet free from sin. The 
meaning of the title is expressed in the way the Son relates to his Father. "As a human 
being he prayed to God his Father and fasted. But he showed his divine nature when he 
called God his Father in the sense that he was connected to him as a son is connected to his 
father and that he was sent from God as a son is sent from his father. " 332 The title `Word' 
gives the meaning to the title `Son' by showing that the relationship between God and 
Christ is an identity of thought and intention and speech. 
Pfander anticipates a negative response from his reader who is concerned about the 
confusion between divinity and humanity in the Incarnation. "If the question is asked - 
`How is it possible to unite the divine and human natures? ' We reply - `f low is it possible 
330 Ibid., 219. 331 Ibid., 222. 
332 Ibid., 223. 
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to unite in a human being spirit and body? '" 333 Pfander is clear that the union of the two 
natures is not to be understood as "the changing of one nature into another or a mixing or 
mingling of them. " 334 How the union may be described positively is governed by our 
inability to comprehend the way in which God works. We have a limited intellectual 
capacity and depend ultimately on the fact that God has revealed the union of divine and 
human natures in Scripture. Thus we must believe in the fact of Incarnation even though 
we cannot fully understand the manner of union between divine and human nature. 
The value of the union of divine and human in the Messiah is the certainty this 
brings to his redeeming power. "This union of divinity and humanity in the Messiah 
accomplishes the goal of the eternal God to lavish on people his abundant grace, saving 
them from destruction, sin, and slavery to Satan. " 333 Here Pfander returns to the theme of 
Christ's sacrificial death on behalf of others, which is central to his Christology. At this 
point he tackles the Muslim objection that human sin can be forgiven without the work of 
Christ. 
"Some have objected to this asking -'Is it not possible for God to save people from 
the punishment of hell by the exercise of his unlimited authority, and to show his 
mercy to those who he wants to be merciful to, without the way of salvation set out 
in the Injii? Is it not God who says to anything he wishes -'Be! and it is'? " 
336 
Pfander catches the mood of his Muslim reader very well in these two questions. While the 
Christian claims the Incarnation to be possible, surely the greater possibility is for God to 
deal directly with humans. A Muslim might respond that when it comes to weighing 
different possibilities it is necessary to allow the greatest measure of freedom in portraying 
God's actions, since the Qur'an shows that God can bring things into being by a mere word 
of command. The elaborate story of the Incarnation and atonement is therefore a less than 
credible account of his work. Pfander's understanding of Muslims is clear, but his reaction 
333 Ibid., 224. 
334 ibid. 
335 Ibid., 225. 
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to these questions is to insist on the validity of the Biblical demand for pure sacrifice for 
sin, and to insist that God chose Jesus to be the ultimate sacrifice. This story has ultimate 
value for us because by means of God's choice to display his nature in Christ he showed 
his love for people by "taking away their suffering. " 337 Christianity offers a way for 
sinners to find acceptance with God that does not make light of their wrongdoing. Only the 
atonement made by Christ adequately combines God's justice and his mercy. What then of 
the frequent Qur'anic testimony to the mercy and compassion of God? Pfander declines to 
compare New Testament thought with that of the Qur'an at this point. His method is 
certainly consistent in that he only quotes the Qur'än to back up Christian teaching and not 
when Christian positions seem to be challenged. 
By now the reader of the Balance of Truth could well raise the logical problem of 
the supposed death of God. Pfander is alive to this difficulty, and leans on the distinction 
between the two natures in Christ to deny that God died on the cross. "God does not die, 
indeed it is not possible for God to die, but the Word of God, when he became human, was 
able to taste death on account of his human nature. " 
338 This traditional answer does not 
receive scrutiny from Muslim conviction. For instance, Pfandcr does not raise and answer 
the questions - in what way is the Word of God connected to the human Jesus? And why 
do Christians insist on the union of divine and human natures if the union fails at such a 
crucial juncture? 
336 Ibid., 226. 337 Ibid. 
339 Ibid., 230. 
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7.2.3. Evaluation 
Pfander's Christology is inherited from his Lutheran background. The definition of the 
Council of Chalcedon governs the language that he uses to describe the union of the divine 
and human natures in Christ. The essential Christian message is the salvation of the human 
race from the consequences of sin by the union of the eternal Word with human nature. 
The Incarnation was essential to the rescue operation, but the sacrificial death of Christ 
was central to the rescue itself. Only a pure sacrifice sufficed to cleanse humans from guilt. 
Without the death of the sinless Christ there can be no assurance of pardon for anyone, but 
since he has laid down his life for others they can receive the benefits of his sinless 
character. Luther's emphasis on the exchange of Christ's righteousness for our 
unrighteousness is at the heart of Pfander's presentation. 
339 
Pfander seeks not to develop a new Christology but to present a received view in a 
way that Muslims might accept. He tries to back up the perfect obedience of Christ from 
Islamic sources to get his reader focused on the key idea of Christ's character. Similarly, 
he appeals to those sources to deny to any other messenger of God the same perfection. 
Muhammad taught that only Jesus among the prophets was untouched by Satan, so 
Muslims must hold that Christ is unique in his obedience to God. If Islamic sources testify 
to the truth of the Christian message at this point then the rest of the Christian case ought to 
follow. The sacrificial death of Christ should make sense to Muslims once they understand 
the need for sacrifice to remove the guilt of sin. The love of God should be clear to them 
once they see that he has gone to such lengths to forgive them. 
339 The idea of the exchange of Christ's perfect obedience for our disobedience was characteristic of Luther's 
reformed theology. See, for example, his sermon on "Two Kinds of Righteousness" from 1519, in which he 
expounds his new reading of the New Testament. "Through faith in Christ his righteousness becomes our 
righteousness and all that he has becomes ours; rather he himself becomes ours ... This 
is the righteousness 
given in place of the original righteousness lost in Adam. 
" Luther's Works, 31. ed. 11. J. Grimm, 
Philadelphia, 1957,298f. 
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Reaction to Pfander's apologetics can be seen in a public debate held in Agra in 
1854 between Pfander and Rahmatulläh al-Kairänawi, who saw himself as a defender of 
Islam, and who challenged Pfander to deal with the status of the Bible, the Trinity, the 
Prophethood of Muhammad, and the status of the Qur'än. Sao The status of Christ would 
most likely have been considered under the heading of the Trinity, but in fact the debate 
did not proceed beyond the first topic. By using the insights of Christian Biblical 
scholarship, Rahmatullah had Pfander bogged down in the details of Scriptural exegesis 
which tended to support the contention that the Gospels were riddled with contradictions 
that could not be made to cohere. 341 The order of issues for debate corresponds to the 
order of topics in The Balance of Truth, demonstrating that Christology was not a primary 
subject for discussion. 
The debate introduced a new dimension to dialogue between Christians and 
Muslims. Pfander had not read Strauss's The Life of Jesus before the debate and had been 
largely unaware of critical European gospel scholarship that had been engaged in the task 
of separating the Christ of history from the Christ of the faith of the Church. It would now 
be difficult for Christian missionaries to avoid the work of Christian scholars in the way 
that Pfander had, because Muslims could produce literature liberally quoting the findings 
of such scholarship. The future path of dialogue on Christology was now established, but 
Pfander did not himself embark on it. 342 
Sao See Powell, op cit., 221-5; and C. Schirrmacher, `°The Agra Debates of 1854'; B/FMUS (13,1994,74.84). 
341 Ibid., 248-255. Rahmatullah had consulted 77re Life of Christ by the radical German scholar I). P. Strauss, 
which had been published in an English edition in 1846. Rahmatulläh went on to write a widely disseminated 
critique of the Bible entitled Lhär a1-Ilagq, which was first published in Arabic in 1867. 
342 See how Kenneth Cragg attempts to hold together a critical reading of the gospels with the developed 
traditions of the Church in chapter eight, and how Hans Küng and John Hick use gospel scholarship to 
fashion their different portraits of the historical Jesus in chapter nine. 
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7.3. Ibrähim Lügä's Christianity in Islam 
Pfander's method of using Islamic sources to defend Christian belief was taken much 
further by an Egyptian Coptic priest, Ibrähim Lügä, in the following century. His 
Christianity in Islam, first published in 1938, was into its third printing in 1967 when it 
was banned by the Egyptian authorities. 343 Lügä's treatment of Christ takes in the whole 
of the Qur'änic portrait, paying particular attention to the way well known commentators 
understood the Christ of the Qur'än, with the aim of demonstrating that Christian teaching 
is not incompatible with that of the Qur'än. His adoption of Pfander's apologetic method 
shows that not only Western missionaries were inclined to try to read the Qur'an in a 
Christian way. The difference between the two men lies in their approach to Islamic 
sensitivities. Whereas Pfander was prepared to show that Muhammad lacked sinlessness, 
Lügä avoids any direct criticism of the Prophet. The title of his work reveals his goal 
because Christianity in Islam is an apt description of what he is attempting to achieve. 
Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the trustworthiness of the Old and New Testaments, and 
Chapter 3 with the Trinity. In the fourth chapter he turns to the Messiah. This is basically 
the same format as Pfander's Balance of Truth since Lügä also recogniscs the importance 
of establishing the authenticity of the sources of Christian faith in the face of Muslim 
allegation of the corruption of the Bible. 
7.3.1. The Titles of Christ in the Qur'an 
The section of the study devoted to Christology opens with the surprising claim that what 
Christians believe about Christ is also testified to by the Qur'än. "The Messiah is truly God 
343 See 0. Leirvik, Images of Jesus Christ in Islam, Uppsala, 1999,175. 
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and truly human: this is the authentic Christian teaching about the person of the Messiah 
and it is also what the Qur'än teaches about him. " 344 So it is clear from the outset that 
Lüga is attempting to show that the Qur'an teaches the divinity of Christ, and that Muslims 
have failed to grasp this key point. This might seem an impossible task after so many 
centuries of Qur'an interpretation, but Lügä is ready for the challenge. He begins his 
analysis of the Qur'an with the title `Word from God' found in süras 3: 45 and 4: 17 1, 
quoting comments on these süras by al-RAzi, al-Baidäwi, and the two Jaläls noting that 
they understand `word from God' to be God's speech. aas Lüqä questions this interpretation 
in the light of the Qur'änic expression "by a word from him whose name is" in süra 3: 45, 
arguing that "this word is not speech, but a person, " 346 and must share God's eternal 
character. "It is clear from the expression `cast into Mary' that this word existed before 
being cast into Mary. Thus the Messiah exists eternally because he is here identified with 
the word of God. " 347 Lügä boldly contradicts the long tradition of Qur'änic hermeneutics 
by analysing the contextual relationships of `word', `Mary' and `whose name is', 
concluding that `word' can only apply to the child to be born of Mary. "The Messiah is the 
Word of God who entered into the Virgin Mary, sharing her human nature and yet at the 
same time possesses the nature of almighty God. " 348 
Lügä next examines the title `spirit from him' also found in süra 4: 171. lie quotes 
al-Räzi s four possible interpretations of this phrase along with the comments of at.. 
Baidäwi and the two Jaläls. Al-Räzi mentions the following possible interpretations of 
`spirit from him'; from the breath of Jibril, meaning from the grace of God; creative life 
force from God; mercy from God to mankind; and a spirit from the spirits, meaning a 
prophet from among the prophets. Al-Bai4awlt understands that the Messiah is called 
344 I. Lügä, A1-Afasibiyya fi I-Islam, Rikon, no date, 119. This is a reprint of the original 1938 edition. 
345 The two Jaläls were Jaläl al-Din al-Mahalli (d. 1459), who began writing the commentary and JAM al-Din 
al-Suyüti (d. 1505), who finished it. 
346 I. Lügä, op cit., 124. 
347 Ibid., 125. 
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`spirit' because he would give life to the dead and to human hearts. The two Jaläls think 
the Messiah is given the spirit from the Almighty as a gift, and not as Christians allege to 
become Son of God and God. Luga believes the best interpretations focus on the breath of 
God in the Messiah, but holds that the context demands more than just breath. All the 
commentators overlook the fact that only Jesus is named `spirit from him'. What can this 
unique title mean except that God has endowed Jesus with his own spirit, which is much 
more significant than breathing life into a human so that he draws breath. God puts his 
spirit into Mary, not to invigorate her with his breath, but to bring about a new human 
being, and since only Jesus among humans possesses God's spirit, only he possesses God's 
character. 
Lügä summarises his presentation of the word and spirit of God in Christ in a 
version of John of Damascus' argument that God ought not to be mutilated by the removal 
of his word and spirit from his essential nature. 349 
"If God possesses spirit and word from eternity we ask - arc these two qualities of 
the essence (dhät) of God or not? If not, then alongside God there arc two 
independent attributes and God is not one ... The spirit and the word together are of 
the essence (dhätý of God, both of them attributes (, cit) of God, without addition 
or separation. " 3s 
In other words God has attributed to Christ his own character, and there is no sense in 
which human beings have attributed `word' and `spirit' to Christ in a way that would leave 
them open to the charge of shirk. The Qur'än therefore testifies that Christ shares the 
nature of God. According to Lügä's contextual interpretation we cannot conceive of the 
Messiah being from the Spirit of God without him having God's nature. "So he is true God 
from true God, eternally existing and not created. " 351 Therefore the Qur'an teaches by the 
348 Ibid. 
349 For John's argument see 2.1.1. 
350 Ibid., 127f. 
3511. Lügä, op cit. 
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very titles given to Christ that he is equal in nature to God, and any other reading of these 
titles does less than justice to their meaning. 
Lügä examines the title `Messiah' in süra 3: 24, where "the angels said, Mary, God 
has blessed you with his word called the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary", but is not 
impressed by most of the explanations given for this title by the commentators. They are 
summed up without attribution to particular commentators as, "applying to descent and 
legitimacy or being like a smooth coin with nothing engraved on it, or great in kindness, or 
anointed with oil and with blessing. " 
352 He believes al-Rail gives a better interpretation 
when he says that the Messiah was given that name because he was kept from sin and 
wrongdoing, and because Jibril's wing touched him at the time of his birth to keep him 
from Satan. LGgä notes that al-Räzi's view corresponds with the Ilad7th recorded by al- 
Bukhdri, that Satan pierced the side of every son of Adam with his finger at the moment of 
birth, except Jesus, son of Mary. When Satan tried to pierce him, he pierced his garment. 
Lügä concludes that Islam holds, not only to the sinlessness of Jesus, but also to the 
culpability of all other humans. "Islam teaches that all human beings have erred and 
become corrupt. It teaches that the Messiah alone is sinless and that he alone was protected 
from the influence of Satan, raising the Messiah above the level of humanity, and therefore 
teaches his glorious divinity. " 353 The latter claim seems to go beyond the evidence, but 
Lügä is not shy about making the case. 
7.3.2. The life and death of Christ in the Qur'än 
Lügä turns from the titles given to Jesus to the details of his life and ministry found in the 
Qur'an. Of particular interest is his treatment of the miracle of birds fashioned from clay 
352 Ibid., 132. 
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which is found in süras 3: 48 and 5: 115. He might have been expected to pass over the 
story in silence since it has no support in the canonical gospels. Rather, he gives the 
impression of accepting the historical validity of the account and that he is prepared to 
receive testimony about Jesus from sources outwith the New Testament. Sara 3: 48 
describes Jesus as creating birds from clay, and Lügä points out that the verb khalaga, to 
create, is only used of the action of God elsewhere in the Qur'an. "The power to create is 
credited to God alone. The Qur'an accords to the Messiah this same power, testifying 
clearly to his divinity. " 354 Lügä does not engage with any of the commentators on the 
interpretation of this miracle, which is strange given his method of interacting with al- 
Baiciäwi, the Jaläls and al-RM. The latter plays down the significance of khalaqa with 
reference to Jesus' own power, arguing that it is God who created the birds from clay using 
Jesus as his means of creation, and that it is wrong to think that God transferred an attribute 
belonging to himself to Jesus. 355 
He moves on to the description of Jesus in süra 3: 40, as "highly honoured in this 
world and in the hereafter"quoting four commentators on the significance of wajihan, 
`highly honoured'. Al-Räzi, the two Jaläls, al-Baidäwi and al-Zamakhshari all agree that 
"highly honoured in the hereafter" means that Jesus is given the power of intercession. 356 
Lügä then refers to süra 39: 4, "Say, to God belongs all intercession, to him all authority 
over heaven and earth" and does not hesitate to draw the parallel between the powers of 
Jesus and the Almighty. "Islam makes it clear that intercession does not belong to 
humankind, and that intercession is one of the attributes of God. The ascription of 
intercession to the Messiah is a clear indication that Islam holds to his divinity. " 357 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid., 140. 
sss See al-Räzi's interpretation in 1.1.1. 
356 Al-Zamakhshari's commentarywas written before the others. lie died in 1143. Al-RBz1 died in 1210, al- 
Baidäwi around 1290, Jaläl al-Dºn al-Ma1 alli died in 1459, and Jaläl al-Din al-SuyütT died in 1505. 
357 I. Lüga op cit., 141. 
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The apparent denial of the crucifixion of Jesus in süra 4: 157 is dealt with by means 
of paying attention to the account in the canonical gospels. 
"We do not see in this verse what others see, namely, a denial of the death of Jesus 
by crucifixion. What the verse says is that the Jews are lying when they say we 
killed the Messiah. This is because the Jews did not kill him by crucifying him. 
They did not in fact have the authority to do it in the days of the Messiah. The one 
who did it was the Roman governor since the Romans controlled the land of the 
Jews. " 358 
Lügä believes that the Qur'än does not oppose the historicity of Jesus' death by 
crucifixion, however, he does not seriously reckon with the unanimous understanding of 
the commentators that the verse does deny the crucifixion. Lügä sees his task as that of 
giving basic information to Muslims so that they can adjust the traditional interpretation of 
the text to allow for the death of Jesus. 
7.3.3. Evaluation 
Lügä's method is to read the Qur'än in order to align it with Christian convictions, but his 
reading strains Qur'änic exegesis beyond limits acceptable to Muslims. Lügä would 
probably argue that though Muslims have a traditional hermeneutic of the Qur'An, this 
should not preclude novel readings of texts being offered for discussion. This was the 
method of Christian readers of the Old Testament such as the Apostle Paul. Jews may yet 
object to Paul's habit of finding Jesus in the Old Testament where such exegesis cuts 
across the original context in an unwarranted fashion. Lügä is carrying out the same 
procedure with the Qur'an. While Paul convinced only a small number of Jews of the 
Messianic status of Jesus, most Christians would not condemn him for his Old Testament 
hermeneutic. Thus Lügä's interpretation of the Qur'än, while unacceptable for Muslims, 
358 Ibid., 143. 
177 
may still be supported by some Christians who think that the Qur'an can be used as a 
source for Christian truth. 
His extensive use of well known commentators on the Qur'an marks a fresh 
development in dialogue that goes beyond Pfander's limited use of them, and shows the 
importance for Christians of paying close attention to Islamic thought. In many respects 
Lügä's work represents the fruit of a new attitude among Christians to the careful study of 
Islam which would become the basis for dialogue in the second half of the twentieth 
century. For example, Kenneth Cragg, an important European contributor to dialogue with 
Muslims, has continued the method of listening to Islamic scholarship while offering a 
Christian reading of the Qur'an. 359 
Lügä, like Pfander, makes no reference to modern Christian scholarship. His 
Christology is relatively undeveloped, and can be summed up as upholding the teaching of 
the Nicene creed. There is no hint of the post-Nicene distinctions between miaphysite and 
diophysite understandings of the Incarnation. Indeed, Lüga is not really concerned with the 
issues surrounding the union of the divine and human in Christ, since he is focused on 
finding support for the divinity of Christ from the Qur'än. In other words, the Christology 
of Lügä neither reflects the complete traditions of the Coptic community in Egypt, nor the 
search for the historical Jesus within the Christ of the Church's faith going on in Europe. 
His avoidance of the Incarnation and the problems surrounding the son of God concept in 
the Qur'an means that the most important difficulties for Muslims in Christology are not 
dealt with. 
359 See Cragg's Christian reading of the Qur'än in the following chapter. 
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7.4. Muslim reactions to Christology in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries 
Two Indian and two Egyptian writers have been chosen as representative of a variety of 
responses to Christian views of Jesus. The two Indian writers from the nineteenth century 
were both replying to Pfander, one very negatively and the other much more positively. 
The first Egyptian writer finds the New Testament portrait of Jesus contradictory, while the 
second finds much to admire in that portrait. The first Indian Muslim response came from 
Rahmatulläh al-Kairanäwi who debated publicly with Pfander and published pamphlets 
and a book refuting his arguments. The second Indian, Sayyid Alimad Khan, took a 
positive view of the Christian gospels, but argued that they support neither a divine Jesus 
nor a Christ crucified for the sin of humanity. Muhammad 'Abdüh, the first of the two 
Egyptian writers, was one of the leading Muslim thinkers of the late nineteenth century. 
His criticisms of the Jesus of the Christian gospels have had a significant impact on 
subsequent Muslim thought. The second Egyptian, Muhammad Kämil Husain, is much 
more sympathetic to the portrait of Jesus in the gospels. His openness to Coptic Christians 
results in an appreciation of their faith in Jesus, but a Muslim cannot look to Jesus as more 
than an exemplar. 
Rahmatulläh al-Kairanäwi (1818-1891) published an attack on the authenticity of 
the Bible entitled A Miraculous Cure, as miraculous as the Cures of 'Isü - The Burnisher 
of the Corruption using Christian commentaries. His understanding of the Jesus of the four 
gospels is determined by the extent to which the real Jesus can be seen in them. The only 
parts of the four gospels that could be considered genuine arc the direct words of Jesus, so 
he finds too much interpretation by the four writers. Jesus was supposed to have spoken 
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Hebrew but the only documents available are translations into Greek. He concludes that the 
witness of the gospels is thoroughly unreliable. 36° 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) was influenced by the controversy between 
Pfander and Rahmatulläh, and like the latter, Abmad Khan attempted to respond to the 
missionary impact in Islamic India by meeting Christians on their own ground. Unlike 
Rahmatulläh, he accepted the genuineness of much of the Bible, so that instead of 
perverting the Injel the four gospels actually preserve it. In a three volume work, The 
Mahomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible, published between 1862 and 1865, Abmad 
Khan argued that there is nothing incompatible between the four Gospels and the Qur'an 
when read properly. In other words Christians have not corrupted the text of the Gospels, 
but have only misinterpreted the meaning of the text. Textual discrepancies found in the 
Gospels by Christian scholars are really insignificant. Ahmad Khan relied on similar 
Christian sources to those used by Rahmatulläh for his information on the Bible. The most 
quoted text is T. H. Home's Introduction, a widely used textbook in the early nineteenth 
century, which presented a conservative view of Scripture. Ahmad Khan also knew about 
radical critics such as J. W. Colenso, D. F. Strauss and F. C. Baur, but he did not follow 
their sceptical approach to Scripture. "There remain a few passages, that without any 
doubt, have not yet been brought back into correspondence with the original texts. I think 
in this matter there is no doubt between us and the Christians. " 361 
Christians, like Pfander, are right to argue that the Gospels are largely authentic, 
but this authenticity is on a par with the lladilh rather than the Qur'an. The four gospels do 
not so much give us the words of Jesus as reports of what he said, albeit by his companions 
who were trustworthy men. Jesus' companions would have no good reason to falsify the 
message that they should worship God, but this means that an Incarnational interpretation 
36° See the study of The Burnisher of the Corruption in C. W. Troll, Sa}3'id Alimad Khan. New Delhi, 1978, 
80-83; and Troll's essay "Sayyid Ahmad khan on Matthew 5: 17-20", Islamodiristiana. (3,1977,99-105). 
361 A. Khan, The Mahomedan Commentary on the Holy Bible. 1: 150, in Troll, 81. 
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of the four gospels is actually incompatible with the original documents. According to 
Ahmad Khan, the Ebionites in the early church preserved the Hebrew version of Matthew, 
which is more purely unitarian than the Greek version. Unfortunately the majority of 
Christians came to understand Jesus in a trinitarian sense. The true picture of Jesus in the 
gospels does accord with that of the Qur'än, where Christ was sent by God to teach 
spiritual holiness. "It was necessary that a person should be born who would teach the 
people spiritual holiness and spiritual light. This could be done effectively only by the one 
who was born of the spirit only and not through any external cause. " 362 
Muhammad'Abdüh (1849-1905), represents a Middle Eastern response to 
Christianity in the nineteenth century. 'Abdüh was both a lecturer at al-Azhär in Cairo and 
the leading reformer in the Arab world of his day. His openness to European thought meant 
that like Sayyid Abmad Khan, he was able to appreciate the presuppositions of 
Christendom. He also shared with Ahmad Khan a desire to integrate Enlightenment 
rationalism into Islam. Another area of agreement between the two thinkers was their 
willingness to accept that the Bible contained the authentic Torah and Infil. Thus the life 
and teaching of Jesus can be retrieved to a large extent from the four gospels. In his 
commentary on the Qur'än transcribed in twelve volumes by his disciple Rashid Ridä, he 
held that the disciples of Jesus recorded "what they understood of all that he taught them, 
his commands, his wisdom, and his proclamation; and these gospels are true in our 
opinion. " 363 'Abduh believed that Jesus spoke of God as his father metaphorically. 364 
Muhammad Kämil Husain (d. 1979), was a medical practitioner in Cairo who 
published widely on religious subjects, and became well known for his 1954 novel on the 
events of Good Friday in Jerusalem, entitled City of Wrong, which led to an Egyptian State 
Prize for Literature in 1957. This dramatic account of the desire of the Jewish leaders to 
362 Ibid., 3: 23, in Troll, 98. 
363 NL 'Abdüh, "Tafsir al-Manär", 2: 159f in R. Caspar and J. M. Gaudcul, "Textes dc la Tradition 
Musulmane concernant le Tabrifdes Eccritures", Isla, uochristiana. (6,1980,61-104), 93. 
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have Jesus crucified relied heavily on the evidence found in the four gospels. His novel is 
structured around the people who witnessed the events of Good Friday. The Romans are 
central to the plot as exercising authority at the time. The Jews want rid of Jesus, but they 
do not have the power to execute him. "The day was a Friday. On that day the Jewish 
people conspired together to require from the Romans the crucifixion of Christ, so that 
they might destroy his message -a decision to crucify the human conscience and 
extinguish its light. " 
365 There follows a series of portraits - Pilate and his wife, a 
blacksmith, a merchant, the lawyer who issued the death sentence on Jesus, Lazarus, 
Caiaphas, Mary Magdalene, the disciples who ran away, a Roman officer and finally a 
soldier. Husain stops short of portraying the crucifixion itself. Husain was asked by his 
English translator, Kenneth Cragg, what his attitude was to the crucifixion of Jesus 
recounted in the gospels, and he replied that the Qur'änic text concerning the crucifixion is 
difficult to interpret with assurance. "The text is taken to mean that the Jews thought they 
killed Christ, but God raised him unto him in a way we can leave unexplained among the 
several mysteries which we have taken for granted on faith alone. " 
366 Husain decided to 
live with the paradox of faith cancelling history. He was happy to quarry the gospels for 
information for his novel without affirming that any of it actually happened in reality. Faith 
arises from what has been revealed in the Qur'dn, and Husain composed his novel within 
the confines of that revelation. Where story transgresses faith, then Husain is silent. If 
pressed on the historicity of the events of Good Friday, Husain adopted an ambiguous 
stance. 
He returned to the historicity of the crucifixion in a later work on the philosophy of 
religion, The Hallowed Valley. Here he expounds why Islam denies the death of Jesus on 
the cross. The real issue is not so much whether Jesus died by crucifixion, as what 
364 Ibid., 3: 345, in Caspar and Gaudeul, 95. 
365 M. K. Husain, City of Wrong. Amsterdam, 1959,3. 
366 Ibid., note on page 222. 
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Christians claim happened on the cross. Indeed the conflict between Muslims and 
Christians concerning the death of Christ runs much deeper than many imagine. 
"The real issue that divides lies in the fact that Christians believe in atonement and 
redemption, whereby men may be delivered from their sins and be declared pure 
and clean ... Muslims, 
for their part, do not enthuse about redemption. Nor do they 
believe in atonement for transgressions by dint of what befalls another who is not 
the transgressor. With us, no burden bearer can bear any other's burden. " 367 
The real contention is therefore not about history but faith. The denial of the death of 
Christ on the cross is not so much a denial of history as a denial of Jesus as an object of 
faith. Although Husain is sympathetic to the story of Christ in the gospels, the death of 
Christ and the focus Christians place on its effects do not impress him as true. Kenneth 
Cragg, who translated Husain's writing, has attempted to respond to these concerns, and 
the next chapter will examine his apologetic work. 
7.5. Conclusion 
Pfander and Lügä show how Christians could take Islamic convictions into their 
Christological writing at least in a partial way. The main attraction for them in referring to 
Qur'än commentary or the Hadith literature lay in the seeming support found there for 
certain Christian interpretations of Christ's person and work. Thus both Pfander and Lügä 
made great play over the sinless character of Christ argued for by Qur'än commentators 
and sound Prophetic sayings. The negative role of Islamic tradition was not so helpful to 
them. For example, neither of them engaged with the unanimous denial of the crucifixion 
by the Qur'än commentators, nor the idea that Christ would break crosses on his return at 
the end of time found in the ffadith. As a result, Muslim readers would most likely 
conclude that Islamic writing was only being used as a repository of arguments to back 
Christian claims and not as a source of objective truth. 
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The Muslim writers surveyed show a mixed attitude to Christian scripture and 
tradition from the generous attitude of Ahmad Khän to the hostile approach of 
Rahmatulläh. However, the findings of gospel scholarship enabled both of them to separate 
the developed faith of the church from the teaching and practice of Jesus of Nazareth, and 
argue for a Christ that appeared to be much closer to the Qur'Anic portrait than most 
Christians cared to acknowledge. Neither Pfander nor Lügä were ready for this reaction, 
since post-enlightenment gospel scholarship did not contribute to their understanding of 
Christology. They were essentially locked into a pre-enlightenment framework of scripture 
interpretation and were incapable of interacting with newer approaches to Christ. 
During the second half of the twentieth century this deficit was made up by 
Christians who realised that dialogue with Muslims about Christ simply had to be 
conducted on the basis of sound interpretation of the gospels. The following chapter 
analyses the contribution of Kenneth Cragg, whose portrait of Christ is based on his 
understanding of the historical Jesus rather than the Christ of the Church's faith. 
367 M K. Husain, The Hallowed Valley. Cairo, 1977,75C 
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Part Two. Twentieth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Eight 
The Christology of Kenneth Cragg in Dialogue with Muslims 
8.1. Getting back to the Historical Jesus 
The Christological writing of Kenneth Cragg [b. 1913] for an Islamic context spans much 
of the second half of the Twentieth century. 
368 His approach to Christology is quite 
different from any of the apologists reviewed so far, since he bases his understanding of 
Christ on the records found in the synoptic gospels, rather than on the theology of the 
fourth gospel, or the New Testament epistles, or the creeds of the church. Cragg accepts 
the distinction, made by New Testament criticism in the modern era, between historical 
facts about Jesus of Nazareth and beliefs about him developed by the church. For Cragg it 
is essential to present to Muslims what Jesus taught and did, carefully distinguishing the 
self-understanding of Christ from the beliefs in Christ held by the church. 
In order to present the historical Jesus to Muslims it is also necessary for Christians 
to begin with what Muslims already know about him from the Qur'an. This is the only 
sound method of apologetics, because a Christology that does not take account of Islamic 
convictions about Christ will not be properly understood, let alone accepted, by Muslims. 
Cragg's way of using the Qur'an is new in Christian apologetics. Eighth and Ninth century 
apologists appealed to Qur'änic texts to support the possibility of the union of divinity and 
humanity in Christ as developed in the theology of the churches. Pfander's quotations from 
the Qur'än supported New Testament belief in the sinlcssncss of Christ, since Pfander held 
the Apostolic teaching about Jesus to be central to Christology. LGyä's use of the Qur'än 
185 
was not to support the Jesus of history but to back up the divinity of Christ presented in the 
Johannine writings of the New Testament and in the Nicene creed of the Patristic era. 
Cragg seeks to get back behind developed Christology to the kind of person the historical 
Jesus claimed to be. 
8.2. The Call of the Minaret 
Cragg's earliest attempt at communicating a Christian view of Jesus to Muslims was made 
in his first book The Call of the Minaret, written in 1956 while he was teaching at Hartford 
Seminary in Connecticut, USA. He had served as a curate in the Church of England before 
moving to Beirut in 1939 to teach philosophy in the American University there. The book 
reflects his situation as an educator of Western postgraduate scholars of Islam and is 
addressed to Christians who seek to relate to Muslims in the Islamic world. In the light of 
his own exposure to the Islamic world he encourages Western Christians to identify as 
much as possible with Muslims in their thinking and communicating. In terms of 
Christology this means that Christian talk about Jesus must be done "in terms that Muslims 
» 369 can understand. 
The ideal approach is to enable Muslims to relate to Christ in the same way that the 
first disciples did. They came to convictions about him after a period of time rather than all 
at once, and Muslims may need to be allowed some considerable time to appreciate who 
Jesus claimed to be. This process of understanding must begin with the Qur'änic account 
of Jesus which provides a Muslim with some basic knowledge that can be enlarged from 
the accounts in the New Testament gospels. The rather slight data concerning the historical 
Jesus in the Qur'an can then be supplemented "by all those aspects of Jesus which remain 
36$ Cragg's first major treatment of Christology was in his 1956 The Call of The Afinarct, but it was not until 
his Jesus and the Muslin: of 1985 that he produced a book entirely dedicated to the subject. 369 K. Cragg, The Call of the Minaret. New York, 1956,287. 
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unknown to Islam. " 370 A Muslim may then reach the same kind of view of Jesus that the 
first disciples came to on their travels with him. 
But there are two obstacles arising from the Islamic conception of God that might 
prevent a Muslim from reaching the conviction of the early Christians that Jesus was an 
Incarnate saviour. The first obstacle is that God reveals through the speech of prophets and 
the books they brought but not in the men themselves. The Christian conception of Jesus is 
that he reveals God not only in his speech but also in himself. How then can a Muslim step 
around this rock on the path to understanding Christ? The solution lies in the Christian 
reminding the Muslim that the nature of God is personal for Muslims as well as Christians. 
On this basis it must be possible for a Muslim to see that speech implies self-revelation. 
Just as humans reveal themselves when they speak, so God must be showing his character 
when he speaks. A Christian ought to lay the groundwork for a Christian presentation of 
Jesus by making the argument, "if God is personal, knowledge of Him must be a personal 
revelation. He can never be only propositional. " 
371 
The second obstacle is that since God is sovereign his will is always accomplished 
despite any appearances to the contrary, which seems to make the Christian idea that God 
has come in Jesus "an unworthy thing. " 372 The Christian needs to address this conception 
of sovereignty by asking the Muslim whether a God who never comes to deal with his 
wayward subjects directly is really in control. This coming of God in Jesus may be very 
difficult for a Muslim trained to think of God as utterly transcendent to accept, so 
Christians must find a way of showing that transcendent divine power and majesty is 
enhanced by Christ. 
"When we present Christ, we ask Muslims to believe not less but more, in the 
undefeated sovereignty of God ... [We] invite men to seek and find in Christ the 
370 Ibid., 288. 
371 Ibid., 290. 
372 Ibid., 291. 
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demonstration that God is God alone, and that all contrary powers are gloriously 
vanquished and subdued. " 373 
This conclusion can only be made after leading the Muslim to the outcome of the death of 
Jesus. But this means that the presentation of the life and teaching of Jesus from the 
gospels seems to depend on the way his disciples came to believe that Christ's death 
overcame forces hostile to God's rule. Cragg does not really demonstrate how a Christian 
should take a Muslim on the journey through the ministry of Jesus. After working out how 
to get the Muslim around the two obstacles on the path he goes on immediately to discuss a 
third obstacle, the denial of the crucifixion in the Qur'an. This is curious when he has 
announced his intention to lead the Muslim the way the disciples went. The Muslim has to 
consider the implications of the death of Jesus before he follows the life of Jesus in the 
gospels, whereas Jesus' disciples were only faced with the realisation that Jesus had 
arrived on the scene to suffer and die after having lived with him for many months. 
According to Cragg there ought to be no real difference between Jesus' disciples' 
and a modem Muslim's appreciation of Jesus if he intended to go to the cross right from 
the outset of his ministry. Jesus had come to die and anyone who approaches the gospels 
today cannot fail to see this, although it took his disciples time to accept the truth. As far as 
Jesus was concerned he was aware of 
"the inevitability of suffering and His surrender to the necessity... From beginning 
to end, he resisted the temptation - in the wilderness, on the road, in the garden, 
even on the cross itself ... to avoid the climax, to abandon Jerusalem, `to come 
down from the Cross'. " 374 
The Cross is the main motive for Jesus' life and ministry, so this third obstacle for a 
Muslim is not only to be found towards the end of the journey but very much also at the 
commencement. However, it may be more of a barrier than the first two obstacles since the 
Qur'an seems to deny the historicity of the crucifixion. This rejection of the cross has 
373 Ibid., 292. 
374 Ibid., 296. 
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"made havoc of the manifest continuity between what Jesus taught and what Jesus 
suffered. " 375 Cragg thinks that the denial of the death of Christ by crucifixion arose from a 
desire to protect Christ from defeat at the hands of his enemies, based on the 
presupposition that prophets succeed in their mission. This fear of a failed prophet has 
distorted the portrait of Jesus in the Qur'An. "In conforming Christ to its own conception of 
the successful Prophet, Islam has robbed Him of Himself, transformed Him into an 
unrecognisable Jesus. " 
376 In the face of such Islamic determination to have a successful 
Jesus, what should the Christian do? It is better not to argue, but rather to witness to the 
impact of the cross. "We must show what the preaching of the Cross has meant in our own 
lives and proclaim the discovery of power and peace which has been made by multitudes 
through the faith that Christ died for them. " 377 However some explanation of this faith 
ought also to be given. Jesus forgave those who crucified him and because he forgave, 
forgiveness becomes possible for others. Only by bearing sin does he bear away sin. His 
death is an act of obedience to his Father's will as well as a demonstration of the love of 
God for sinful people. Finally, His death shows that suffering is essential to the nature of 
God. 
8.2.1. Evaluation 
Cragg expounds the significance of Jesus from an Evangelical Protestant perspective that 
emphasises the effect of his death for others. The teaching of Jesus held to be central by 
Liberal Protestants is hardly touched on here. Cragg has more in common with Pfander 
378 than liberal gospel scholars who deny that Jesus intended to die for others. His failure to 
375 Ibid. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid., 297. 
378 Cragg does not report and discuss the kind of gospel scholarship common in Germany that rigorously 
distinguished between the thinking and leaching of Jesus and the ideas and words credited to him by the early 
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acknowledge such scholarship opens his writing to the same criticism that Pfander had 
faced a century previously, that the picture of Christ is not one that is truly representative 
of Christian opinion. Cragg might have argued that many distinguished gospel scholars 
held that Jesus did intend to go to the cross on behalf of others, but he seems unwilling to 
get drawn into Christian scholarly debate. 
379 
However, this lack of attention to internal discussion among Christians is a serious 
problem for a presentation of Jesus for Muslims. In the nineteenth Century, Pfander could 
be excused for ignoring new interpretations of the gospels as products of the faith of the 
church rather than the actual teaching or activity of Jesus himself, but Cragg had been 
exposed to this well established tradition of scholarship in his training for Church of 
England ministry. The measure of the problem can be observed in a round table discussion 
organised by the World Council of Churches in 1976, in which Ismä'il al-Faraq used his 
extensive knowledge of Christian gospel scholarship to challenge the historicity of the life 
and teaching of Jesus found in the synoptic gospels. 
380 
church. For example, The Theology of the New Testament, by the leading German scholar Rudolph 
Bullmann, had come out in an English edition in 1951. Bullmann believed that Jesus had been crucified but 
that his intention to die as a ransom for others was not historically accurate. Only alter his death did the 
church develop the crucifixion into an intentional act of atonement. "Can there be any doubt that the 
predictions of the passion are all vaticinia ex eventu? " (R. Bultmann, The Theology of the New Testament. 
vol 1, London, 1951,29. ) From Bultmann's perspective Cragg expounds the faith of the early church but not 
the thinking of Jesus. 
379 British and American gospel scholars tended at mid-century to be less radical than their German 
counterparts. For example, leading British synoptic gospels expert, Vincent Taylor, complained of "excessive 
scepticism from the continent" (V, Taylor, The Life and Ministry of Jesus. London, 1954,26. ) l le held that 
Jesus predicted his death by crucifixion as a ransom for the sins of Israel. 
380 The debate over al-Farugi s paper "On the Nature of Islamic Da'wah" was published in 1RM (65,1976, 
391-409). Al-Farügi was the leading Muslim spokesperson and Cragg the foremost Christian debater among 
the invited participants. Al-Far-ugt had published Christian Ethics in 1967 and showed a fine awareness of 
current Christian scholarship. During the discussion of a presentation entitled "The Concept and Practice of 
Christian Mission" by Arne Rudvin, a Lutheran Bishop from Pakistan, who had insisted that Christian 
mission to Muslims was an inevitable consequence of Jesus' commission to his disciples to make disciples 
among all nations, al-Farügi pointed out that Jesus himself gave no such order as the best Christian scholars 
had shown, but that the early church had put the command on Jesus' lips to attempt to give dominical 
authority for a mission to non-Jews. Therefore Jesus could not be quoted as supporting mission outside the 
Jewish community. (Ibid., 385). In this al-Farügi was correct, since even the moderate German scholar J. 
Jeremias held that Jesus only commissioned his disciples to go to fellow Jews with the message of the 
kingdom. (J. Jeremias, New Testament Theology. vol 1, London, 1971,303.10. ) 
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8.3. Dialogue with Ismä i1 al-Farügi 
From 1959 to 1967 Cragg had been involved in teaching at an Anglican college in 
Canterbury, England, and then had been appointed Assistant Bishop of Jerusalem, living in 
Cairo from 1970 to 1973. At the time of the dialogue he was Reader in Religious Studies at 
the University of Sussex, a post he retired from in 1978. It was not surprising that Cragg 
should be invited by the World Council of Churches Department on Dialogue with other 
Faiths and Ideologies to represent them in a debate on mission at Chambcsy, Switzerland 
in 1976. Cragg had established himself as the leading Christian exponent of dialogue with 
Muslims, not only through the widely read The Call of the Minaret, but also in his 1959 
work, Sandals at the Mosque. The very titles of these books suggested an cirenic attitude 
on his part to Islamic convictions. Cragg was summoning fellow Christians to a serious 
listening exercise, and was the obvious choice for the leadership of the kind of high profile 
event that the WCC dialogue section had in mind. Ismä'il al-Farügi was also an obvious 
leader of the Muslim delegation at the talks. Ile had taught religious studies in several 
North American Universities, and had established a reputation as a Muslim student of 
Christianity. 
Cragg followed his The Call of the Minaret method in the conversation at 
Chambesy, by attempting to get the Muslim group to reassess their concept of God to make 
room for the Incarnation. Cragg took the lead in continually pressing the Muslims to 
answer his points. Al-Farfiq was the main respondent, so that eventually the table talk 
became a dialogue between the two men with the rest of the group reduced to being silent 
listeners. Cragg's opening question concerned the teaching of the Qur'An about the 
relationship between the Creator and his creation. Cragg wondered whether the Qur'An did 
not actually presuppose God's involvement with humanity. Here he was dealing with the 
first obstacle to a Christian presentation of Jesus outlined in the The Call cf the Minaret 
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concerning the transcendent character of God. According to the transcript of the informal 
table talk, Cragg was unable to elicit a positive answer from al-Farügi. 
Cragg pressed al-Farügi to accept that God has compromised his omnipotence in 
entrusting the created world to human management. Al-Fariiq replied that the creator of a 
computer is not compromised by the power of the machine he has created. Cragg retorted, 
"Man is not a computer... He is a volitional being, and what is required of him is a 
volitional Islam ... God 
is involved in wrong that jahiliyyah does to him. " 381 Al-Farügi 
denied the involvement of God in the wrongdoing of humans. 
"I would deny accountability or responsibility on the part of God for my misdeeds 
... God 
has given me freedom and moral responsibility ... Now if it is my will, 
despite all this, to disobey Him, then I am responsible and I live to bear the burden, 
not God. " , 382 
Cragg tried another route. The issue is really the degree of God's involvement with 
humanity. Islam acknowledges that God cares about people, but he shows it through 
speech alone. Surely compassion must be more than issuing commands. So Cragg asked, 
"Is there the possibility of a relationship more tragic, more compassionate? It is possible 
you can be found forbidding things to God in the interest of what you trust is Isis dignity. " 
383 Al-Farügi responded by arguing that he is forbidding man not forbidding God. 
However, Cragg protested, "You are forbidding God the sovereign freedom of manifesting 
His transcendence in whatever way He chooses - which may be to condescend to man's 
condition in terms of incarnation. " 
384 Al-Farügi had the last word, and it was a Qur'änic 
one. "There is this revealed text in the Qur'an which says - There is nothing like unto him 
[42: 11]. It is we who must beware of what is appropriate when talking about God and 
about transcendence. " 
385 
381 IRAQ Op cit., 407. 
382 Ibid., 407f. 





Cragg concentrates in this debate on the logic of Incarnation since the character of God is 
at stake when presenting a Christian view of Jesus. The details of the life of Jesus arc 
insufficient to establish his divinity, so the life of Jesus can only demonstrate Incarnation if 
the idea is first argued for. Cragg does not really think that the historical Jesus can 
establish his own Incarnate identity. Perhaps the idea of the Messianic Secret in the 
synoptic gospels is in the back of Cragg's mind. In Mark's gospel in particular Jesus 
appears to want his Messianic status to be kept in the dark, but he is constantly foiled by 
excited recipients of his healing ministry who cannot but tell of what he has done for them. 
But why cannot Jesus establish his own case? Why does Cragg insist on a priori argument 
about what God can and cannot do? Even if Cragg wins his argument about the possibility 
of Incarnation, he still has to establish that Jesus is actually the Incarnate one, which can 
only be done by examining the gospel accounts themselves. 
Here Cragg shows that he is in the great tradition of Christian apologetics in an 
Islamic context. If he can persuade Muslims to rethink their view of God, then the 
Incarnation can become acceptable to them. In following this methodology he does not 
acknowledge any debt to the ninth Century writers surveyed in this thesis, but his argument 
is similar to the discussion of the throne texts by Abü Qurra and Abu Rä'iia. 386 Cragg's 
own evaluation of the debate points out the strategic importance he placed on the doctrine 
of God in discussion with Muslims concerning Christ. In a lecture delivered at the 
Pontifical Institute of Arabic Studies at Rome in December 1976, Cragg commented on the 
Chambesy encounter with al-Farügi, 
"The parties are united in holding that to speak of God as transcendent means 
including and excluding certain things ... both arc agreed that God is most great. 
3U See 3.3. and 4.5.6. 
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The problem between them is that He is differently greater. The obligation for 
dialogue, then, is just a longer patience and a surer realism. " 387 
Patience and realism were to be tested by the advent of the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 
heightened atmosphere of Islamic vigour in the early 1980's. Cragg wistfully reflected on 
this new situation in 1983. Dialogue has to do with moving "from bigotry and towards 
finality". However Christians and Muslims have different sources of truth which they 
believe to be final. "The New Testament will be truth for Christians, the Qur'an truth for 
Muslims, irrespective - in the mutual situation - of the truth of either for the other. " 
388 He 
recognises that some argue that dialogue is not likely to get beyond these two "mutually 
complementary and mutually contradictory Truths". He resists this conclusion because it 
leads to "supine tolerance", which presumably means a reduction of the concept of truth to 
varieties of belief that are more or less of equal value. If dialogue is about truth rather than 
belief, or about truth rather than truths, then it will take courage in the face "of national 
passion, of hemispheric tension and of spiritual alienation. " 
389 
Cragg reflected again on the Chambcsy encounter in a 1995 paper about al"Farügi. 
Recounting the 1976 discussion, Cragg commented that his partner had "ignored the whole 
careful consideration as to the congenially divine". 
390 lie drew three conclusions from the 
"ignoring" of his arguments. Firstly, Christians should not be put off by such "bland 
dismissiveness" from the Muslim side, but should continue to set forth the logic of the 
intentional involvement of God in His creation. Secondly, they should not listen to non- 
Muslims who complain when Christians "read things Christian into things Islamic". 
Thirdly, non-Muslims should not tell Muslims what Islam "ought to be in regret that it is 
not". 391 There must be no shrinking back from "authentic" dialogue, which presses from 
387 K Cragg, "Legacies and Hopes in Muslim/Christian Theology", Islamochristiana. (3,1977,1.10), 9. 
388 K Cragg, The Pen and the Faith. London, 1983,113. 
389 Ibid. 
390 K. Cragg, "Ismä'zl al-FarUgi in the Field of Dialogue", in Christian-Muslim Encounters. eds. Y. Y. 
Haddad & W. Z. Haddad, Gainesville, 1995,406. 
391 Ibid. 
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the Christian side the question of how far the compassion of God has to go to meet the 
predicament of man. 
But dialogue must not concede to Muslims what Christians ought not to concede. It 
is one thing for secularists to hold that Christianity and Islam are merely types of belief 
that are not to be regarded as true in any ultimate sense. It is quite wrong for committed 
Christians to follow the same reasoning. Cragg criticised Hans Küng for stepping beyond 
the bounds of authentic dialogue by conceding truth to the Qur'an that it does not contain. 
The German theologian stated in a speech he had made in Iran in 1985 that the Qur'an was 
"an effective word of the all-forgiving and merciful God for believing Muslims". 
392 Cragg 
protests that Küng has misread the Qur'an as being effectively a word of divine 
forgiveness when it is not. 
"The Qur'än plainly disavows the principle concerning forgiveness which 
Christians believe is enshrined in the love that bears away and only so doing bears 
it away - the love and the principle being together present, respectively and divinely 
in the cross of Jesus. That cross, however, the Qur'än strongly denies ... Further the 
Qur'än repeatedly excludes the redemptive principle by its reiteration that no 
burden-bearer bears any burden but his own. If that is as it would seem to be then is 
truth for here consonant with truth of as to the cross? Perhaps the question cannot 
+ý 393 be answered. 
Despite the "perhaps" it is clear that Cragg does not think that a Christian ought to confess 
that divine forgiveness is effective on Qur'änic terms, since divine forgiveness can only be 
effective through the cross. Cragg's doubt about the effectiveness of divine forgiveness in 
Islam colours all of his writing. However, Küng believes that salvation is available to 
Muslims as Muslims, and that divine forgiveness does not need to be restricted to the cross 
as Christians have tended to think. 
39a Richard Jones' summary of Cragg's view of Islam as 
a way of salvation is apt. 
392 II. Kling, in The Christian Century, Chicago, 9 October, 1985. Cited by Cragg in To Meet and to Greet. 
London, 1992,42. 
393 Ibid. 
394 See chapter nine for King's Christology. 
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"Cragg takes a doubtful view of Islam as a way of salvation. Convinced that God is 
rightly understood only in Trinitarian terms, Cragg has to conclude that doctrinal 
elements in Islam tend to block Muslims from full saving knowledge of God. 
Convinced that humanity requires more than a mere reminder of its vocation Cragg 
remains constrained to proffer to Muslims additional dimensions of salvation not 
contemplated in the usual pattern of their response to God. 99 
395 
8.4. Jesus and the Muslim 
Cragg wrote Jesus and the Muslim in 1985 to meet an unfulfilled need "to have the New 
Testament seriously read and studied in the Islamic world. "'% He notes that Muslims have 
yet to master the technical skills required for such a task and he is concerned that the 
"temperamental" skills needed are not in abundant evidence. Before embarking on a 
presentation of the life of Jesus, he casts a glance at the methods of his predecessors. lie 
will not follow the tradition of reading Christian meanings into the Qur'an that contradict 
the teaching of the Qur'an as a whole. He cites, as an example, the reading of sui-as 3: 45 
and 4: 17 1, where Jesus is given the title "a word from him", in the light of the Prologue to 
John's gospel. This superimposition of the Johannine "Word" on the meaning of the 
Qur'än is illegitimate. "It would be against the insistent themes of the Qur'an to read this 
New Testament dimension into the Kalimah of the Surahs about Jesus. " 397 
A better way is to enable the Muslim reader to discover the historical Jesus, but this 
raises the problem of the veracity of the gospels. Has the Muslim reader not heard of 
doubts among Christian scholars concerning the historical value of Matthew, Mark and 
Luke? Do these gospel writers not express their own convictions, or the convictions of 
groups they represent? So how much of the historical Jesus can be recovered by gospel 
archaeology? Cragg adopts a moderately critical stance in terms of gospel scholarship. On 
395 R J. Jones, "Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Kenneth Cragg on Islam as a Way of Salvation", 1BA11?. (16, 
1992,105-109), 109. 
396 K. Cragg, Jesus and the Muslin?. London, 1985, preface xiv. 
397 ]bid., 32. 
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"the one hand there is no place here for infallibility, " but on the other hand he 
acknowledges that "church situations fold back into the telling of the history of Jesus. " 398 
The middle way is to accept that all history is composed of what happened as well as the 
meaning of what happened. In other words the perspective of the gospel writers cannot be 
separated from the events they report. This should occasion no alarm, for all history is 
written from a particular point of view. 
8.4.1. The Historical Jesus 
Cragg takes the Muslim into the encounter with the historical Jesus by way of the kingdom 
that Jesus proclaimed, which is only apparently about an objective reality belonging to 
God. The heart of Jesus' message about the kingdom is a message about himself. "Jesus' 
message of the kingdom is not about something external to himself of which he merely 
tells. It is something he announces as operative through him. " 399 Cragg recognises that this 
concept of "truth-through-personality" is very difficult for a Muslim to accept. "This New 
Testament awareness of truth in Jesus and not simply from him, of the word that he is 
rather than the words that he brings" is radically different from the concept of prophcthood 
in Islam, "with its strong sense of wahy, or revelation-inspiration, as a language bestowal. " 
400 
The kingdom is demonstrated in Jesus' actions, which Cragg confines to acts of 
healing and compassion. The nature miracles seem to cause him difficulty. He expresses 
puzzlement at the decision of Jesus to condemn the fig tree [Mark 11: 12-14; 20f0. This is 
no doubt due to Cragg's definition of Kingdom actions as, "the occasions of healing and 
398 Ibid., 85f. 
399 Ibid., 129. 
400 Ibid., 129f. 
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compassion... All have to do with genuine suffering, emergency and need. " 401 It is evident 
in such actions that Jesus reveals how he is at the centre of the kingdom, but acts of power 
for their own sake would not accomplish such a goal. Kingdom actions "are quite unlike 
the stories which occur in apocryphal writing about purely fortuitous `miracles' such as the 
making of clay birds that flew. " 402 He does not discuss the possible reaction that the 
dismissal of this miracle attested by the Qur'an might have on a Muslim reader. This is 
very disturbing, given his insistence on taking the Qur'änic account of Jesus seriously. In 
general, if the nature miracles in the gospels are not historical, then can the historical 
accuracy of the other miracles be trusted? Might they not also be products of enthusiastic 
faith? 
Cragg is more concerned to get to the heart of Jesus' ministry, than to engage in a 
defence of the historicity of the miracle stories of the gospels. The heart of Jesus' life and 
work is `suffering'. Echoing the thinking of The Call of the Minaret, he sees the verse "the 
Son of Man must suffer" [Mark 8: 31] as the secret to all that motivated Jesus, whose 
determination to face the hostility of religious vested interests is the outward expression of 
this inner commitment. 
"Messiah may not abnegate or adjust his message to evade its hostile reception. On 
the contrary, in the Gospels, Jesus deliberately and strongly seeks out Jerusalem, 
the citadel and shrine of the forces and prejudices which disown him" 403 
We know how Jesus intended to face suffering from the way he spoke about the future in 
language borrowed from Isaiah 53. In his early work Cragg simply took it for granted that 
gospel scholarship could be relied on to support this view. So he wrote in Sandals at the 
Mosque, "Somehow the fact of suffering as integral to Messiahship had to be worked into 
the scheme of things, for minds to which the two concepts were unthinkable together. " 404 
401 Ibid., 141. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Ibid., 151. 
404 K. Cragg, Sandals at the Mosque, 93. 
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By 1985 Cragg is aware that Jesus' predictions of his suffering are ascribed to the 
evangelists by many New Testament scholars, but argues that the gospel writers were not 
as creative as such scholars suppose. 
"Words and haunting imagery from Isaiah 53 can be detected in the language of 
Jesus in anticipating the Cross ... It is of course, possible to attribute the alignment 
of the Gospel narrative and prophetic precedent to the evangelists, as somehow, the 
precedents determined the story. But could they, as it were, be self-fulfilling 
without a living self - the self of Jesus - to fulfil them? ... The role of the evangelists 
was responsive, not original. 4os 
The last sentence is a big claim. If Cragg does not rely on infallibility, and admits 
that the recounting of Jesus is done by the early church, then it is but a small step to accept 
that the evangelists represented the attitude and concerns of the church of their time. Cragg 
does in fact acknowledge scholarly distinctions between parables as Jesus may have 
delivered them and the versions of the evangelists. 
"The parable in Luke 16: 1-12 has `footnotes' from verses 8 to 12, on the part of the 
evangelist ... Readers have need of care to discern, if they can, the ways in which 
the present text has been formulated from its springs in Jesus via the oral reporting 
and the editing within church situations. " 406 
This leaves the question open whether it is not Mark who structures his gospel around the 
three pronouncements of Jesus about his death. The dividing line between response and 
originality is then much less clear. 407 The comment by Christopher Lamb on Cragg's 
handling of New Testament scholarship is disturbingly accurate; "Some have thought that 
his attitude to Biblical criticism seems to be to ignore its alleged results while defending its 
legitimacy of method. " 408 Cragg responded to this criticism in his 1995 The Lively 
Credentials of God. To side with the reductionist critic is to end up with the impossible 
405 K Cragg, Jesus and the Muslim. 156. 
406 Ibid., 87f. 
407 It is now a common assumption in mainstream British scholarship that Jesus' reference to Isaiah 53 is the 
work of the early church. See for instance, M. Hooker, The Gospel of Mark. London, 1991,248-251; and W. 
R. Telford, Mark. Sheffield, 1995,134. Cragg could have appealed to an earlier generation of scholars who 
supported his view. See, for example, the staunch defence of Jesus' intention to die as a ransom for the 
people in terms taken from Isaiah 53 made by J. Jeremias, New Testament Theology. vol 1, London, 1971, 
288-299. 
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notion that the church invented Jesus. It takes more faith to be a sceptic than a 
conservative. 
"The case is strong for the view that the Gospels represent an event faith, a faith- 
event, a literature that deserves to be trusted if perceptively received as such. We 
have always to ask what kind of `event' must Jesus and his `Christhood' have been 
to have had this reporting ... To discount the documents as sclf-enerating, self- 
deluded, or self-opinionated would be the ultimate credulity. " 409 
8.4.2. Jesus in the Qur'än 
Cragg is not averse to being original in his interpretation of the Qur'5n when he links süra 
5: 113 to the last supper. In süra 5: 113 Jesus prays, "Lord, send a table from heaven to us 
that will be a celebratory feast for us, for all of us from first to last, a sign from you". 
Cragg picks out the table, the festival for the disciples, and the sign, as fitting into "the 
occasion of `this last supper' in Jerusalem ... There is nothing unfitting 
in the Qur'änic 
Jesus presiding at this mä'idah of communion with his disciples and of solace to their 
hearts. " 410 But this begs the question of the content of the last supper. There is no 
indication in süra 5: 113, that Jesus intends the festival to celebrate his impending death. 
Indeed the only death that comes into view is that awaiting the unbelievers when God 
agrees to send the table. "God said: I will certainly send a table to you but whoever among 
you fails to believe afterwards, I will certainly punish more severely than any other 
member of the human race. " The Qur'änic context of the table is that of a miraculous sign 
that authenticates the sending of Jesus in the eyes of his disciples, but this type of 
authentication, as seen in the sign of the birdibirds made from clay, is not congenial to 
408 C. A. Lamb, The Call to Retrieval: Kenneth Cragg's Christian Vocation to Islam. London, 1997,70. 
409 K. Cragg, The Lively Credentials of God. London, 1995,171 f. 
"0 K. Cragg, Jesus and the Muslim. 158. Cragg had first put forward this interpretation in an article 
published in The Muslim World in 1959 under the psuedonym 
'Abd al-Tafähum. Cragg was editor of the 
journal during his tenure at Hartford Seminary. See'Abd al-Tafähum, `"The Qur'8n and the Holy 
Communion", MW. (49,1959,239-248). 
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Cragg. It is, nevertheless, what the Qur'än appears to be presenting, so the claim that the 
Qur'än speaks of "the body and blood of the Lord" is open to the objection that Cragg 
makes about Johannine superimposition on the Qur'änic "a word from him". Both readings 
do not take the overall message of the Qur'än seriously in interpreting specific texts. 
A similar issue of marrying the Qur'än with the gospels arises in Cragg's 
interpretation of süra 3: 55, "0 Jesus, I am causing you to die and I will exalt you to 
myself'. This pronouncement of the death of Jesus, is linked by Cragg with Mark 10: 33, 
"the Son of Man must suffer". Cragg argues on the basis of this connection, that the Qur'an 
can be read to support Jesus' "will for" crucifixion. 
411 However, only non-Muslims have 
interpreted mutawaf-ka as "cause to die". Muslim interpretation has favoured "cause to 
sleep" or "cause to wait until the right time for death by natural causes, not at the hands of 
men". 412 Cragg does not enter into dialogue with such Muslim interpretation in order to 
justify his own Christian reading of the Qur'än, but in a book addressed to Muslims this 
omission is less than helpful to his case. 
Cragg is critical of Christians who have tried to interpret süra 4: 157-9 as 
supporting the crucifixion of Jesus. He does not think much of the argument that while the 
Qur'än states that the Jews "certainly did not kill Jesus", the passage leaves room for the 
Romans to carry the blame. "If the context of 4: 157-9 intended to substitute `the Romans' 
it would surely have to say `it was not they, the Jews, who killed him; it was the Romans' 
... 
We cannot escape the negation of the crucifixion by confusion as to the agent. " 
413 For all 
Cragg's attempts to link the Qur'än and the death of Christ, he finally admits that the 
Qur'änic teaching about the death of Jesus by crucifixion is that it was prevented by God. 
"' Jesus and the Muslim, 167,169. 
412 See 1.2.3. Cragg's translation of mutawaf-ka has not been accepted by any Muslim to date. Yfisuf 'Ali 
translates "0 Jesus, I will take thee to myself and raise thee to myself'. A. U. M. Zahniser points out that 
only Christian interpreters have read the verb tawa 
in süras 3: 55 and 5: 117 as 'causing to die'. 'The 
meaning of 3: 55 could be as adequately served by assuming that God completed Jesus' earthly mission 
without actual death as it would be assuming that 
be caused him to die. " [A. ILM. Zahniser, "The Forms of 
Tawqj)ä in the Qur'än: A Contribution to Christian-Muslim Dialogue", A ff. (79,1989,14-24), 23.1 
413 Jesus and the Muslim, 170. 
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The Jews wanted him killed, Jesus was willing to go through with it, but God was against 
it happening. This is the great disappointment of the message of the Qur'än and subsequent 
Islamic tradition. "Christianity lives by the confession of Jesus, veritably crucified and 
risen; Islam lives in the conviction that Jesus did not really die but was mysteriously 
received up into heaven. " 414 
With such a yawning chasm between the Christian and the Muslim what is to be 
done? Cragg suggests an answer that differs from that given in The Call of the Minaret, 
where he thought that the best approach was not to argue, but to witness. Now there is 
room for argument. When Muslims object to the necessity of the cross as the only means 
of finding God's forgiveness, they do so "out of their confidence in divine competence, that 
his forgiveness of us is effortless and majestic. " als Cragg suggests that this confidence is 
misplaced because it overlooks that forgiveness can only be effective in relationships. In 
other words there has to be a cost for God to forgive. 
"[Muslim] confidence in divine mercy is sound. But on reflection it surely melts 
away. It is clear that the redemptive action in Christ is truly the pattern of God's 
competence. Mercy, like justice and all eise in God of which human experience is 
cognisant, is relational. " 
Cragg knows what the Muslim reaction is likely to be; that it is quite wrong to insist that 
God must pay a price in order to forgive, and that it is rather the other way round. Cragg 
then uses the argument of not limiting God by granting him freedom, which may actually 
impose restrictions on him; in this case to limit the demonstration of his will and power to 
defeat evil utterly and completely. "Those who question the necessity of the Cross on the 
ground that forgiveness is effortless with God may be forbidding Him the will and power 
the Cross can measure. " 417 More seriously, the refusal of Muslims to embrace the cross as 
God's act is a fundamental denial of the truths they hold dear. "Adamantly to exclude the 
414 Ibid., 176. 
`5 Ibid., 180. 
416 Ibid. 
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Cross of Jesus from the wisdom of God is not truly to believe Alldhu Akbar. It is, rather, to 
withhold from His greatness what may well be its greatest measure and sign. 418 This kind 
of language is certainly not likely to sustain a quiet conversation in the courtyard of the 
mosque. Al-Farügi's warning to Cragg about his language being suitable to the majesty of 
God ought to be heeded by Cragg here, since the very idea that Muslims should be denying 
God's greatness by denying an event that God has repudiated is monstrous. Perhaps the 
counsel to avoid argument and simply witness, given in The Call of the Minaret, would 
maintain the conversation more effectively. 
8.4.3. The Incarnation 
Cragg begins his treatment of the Incarnation by studying the language of Sonship in the 
gospels. He suggests that Christians adopt non-physical terminology such as "filiality" to 
avoid misunderstanding, but although he is concerned that filiality is "a sadly abstract term 
for that warm communion with God we have traced in Jesus' ministry", he cannot think of 
a more appropriate term. 
419 In The Call of Jhe Minaret he outlined two problems that 
Muslims have with the Incarnation, but now he raises five questions Muslims ask about the 
Incarnation. Firstly, Does Christian faith not `compromise God'? Does the Christian not 
`violate divine transcendence'? The Christian may reply that the Muslim is actually the one 
who compromises God by denying the Incarnation. Such a denial "might indicate a Creator 
no longer vitally concerned with man. " 
ago 
Secondly, "Should we not minimise God from the sort of human criteria that are in 
mind here? " Divine sovereignty must mean freedom from constraint from the human side, 
assumes the Muslim. The Christian should call this view of sovereignty "moral 
417 Ibid. 418 Ibid., 181. 
419 Ibid., 197. 
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unaccountability on the part of God", and ought to press the Muslim to admit "we do no 
justice to that unutterable transcendence if we plead it to negate what is given in 
revelation. " 421 Thirdly, "Have we not put God under necessity? " Christians seem to imply 
some external constraint on God and so deny his sovereignty. But these constraints that 
seem to be external to God are actually internal to him. "The constraints of justice and love 
are within His own nature. His being characterised by them is His entire freedom. " Indeed 
the Christian ought to turn the tables on the Muslim by arguing that it is the Muslim who 
puts constraints on God by insisting that, "He must be understood as arbitrary and despotic, 
or that He must be denied the liberty for the kind of loving initiative which Christians 
identify in Christ. " 422 
Fourthly, this understanding of Christ as God Incarnate is tantamount to the 
greatest sin of all, associating with God what should not be associated with Him. Are 
Christians not deifying Christ? The answer is not too difficult, because the "Qur'an is in 
fact rejecting adoptionism which Christians also repudiate. " This is evident from süra 
17: 111, "Say, Praise to God, who took not up a son" repeated in süras 19: 35,92 and 25: 2. 
The verb `take up' is used in süra 2: 54 of the Jews who "took to themselves" a calf as a 
deity. Thus Christians can simply point out that Incarnation is about coming down 
(tanäzül) not taking up (ittikhddh). "Deification in ittikhüdh is all human and chronically 
misguided, in tanazicl the initiative is all God's and blessedly compassionate. " There is 
therefore no association, of what does not belong to God, in the Incarnation. Muslims can 
perhaps understand the Incarnation on the model of the Qur'än itself. Muslims came to 
believe in the uncreatedness of the Qur'än as Christians came to believe in the 
uncreatedness of Christ. Just as Muslims cannot fully explain the connection between the 
earthly Qur'än in their hands and the heavenly Qur'än that is believed to have descended, 
420 Ibid., 19ac 421 Ibid., 199f. 
422 Ibid., 200. 
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so Christians should not be judged for not being able to fully explain the connection 
between the historical Jesus and the pre-existent Christ. 423 
Fifthly, is Divine Unity not "at risk in this faith about Jesus as the Incarnate 
Word? " The Christian can turn to the Johannine expression `the only begotten' in John 
1: 18 to find an answer. The Incarnation of God in Christ was not partial but complete. 
Since all of God is Incarnate there can be no division in God as a result of Incarnation. 
Seen this way the Incarnation upholds the unity of God. 
"The definitive, heavenly commissioned, incarnation of the pattern, in a once-for- 
all disclosure of its nature and its cost, could not be other than as singular as God is. 
It is seldom realised how close in this way is the Christian doctrine of `the Word 
made flesh' to the Islamic passion for the divine unity. 99 424 
Cragg's five answers to Muslim questions do not use an analogy developed in two 
other pieces of writing; that Muhammad is a clue to the Incarnation. In a 1974 essay he put 
forward the suggestion that the prophethood of Muhammad must entail an association 
between God and humanity. "It is surely clear from the Qur'än that Muhammad's 
prophethood, far from being a cypher or a vacuity of mind and person, is a profound 
association of personal involvement and divine authorization. " 425 This daring application 
of association language to Mubammad's relationship with God flies in the face of Islamic 
sentiment, but Cragg draws back from pressing the metaphor. Instead he widens 
association to include all divine-human relationships. 
"Every instance of human charisma in divine employ, every coinciding of historical 
event with heavenly intent, contains in its own measure, this mystery of the eternal 
and temporal at rendezvous. To believe in the incarnation is not to cxclusify that 
mystery. For it is relatively present in creation and without it this could not be the 
sort of world in which the incarnation could happen. " 426 
423 Ibid., 203-5. 
424 Aid, 206. 
425 K. Cragg, "Islam and Incarnation", in Truth and Dialogue. cd. J. Ilick, London, 1974,134. 
426 Ibid. 
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In his Muhammad and the Christian of 1984, Cragg again leans on prophecy as a means of 
understanding Jesus. Prophecy is a pointer to what Incarnation signifies. Muhammad is 
actually a kind of John the Baptist, preparing the way for Jesus. Just as John was the last of 
the prophets and was superseded by the Messiah, so Muhammad, the final prophet 
according to Islam, must make way for the one who is more than a prophet. 
"Jesus, according to the Gospels used the words, Yea, I say unto you and more than 
a prophet, [Mt 11: 9] in respect of the forerunner, John the Baptist, the Yahya of the 
Qur'an ... One prophet more than another, 
in range, in honour, or in impact - this is 
a view with which Islam is familiar enough. Indeed Muhammad's finality clinches 
it. Yet something more than prophethood itself - how can this be? It is this more 
upon which the whole New Testament proceeds - the more of Messianic action to 
redeem - the more of God's loving engagement with the sequel to rejected 
education of the world, the more of a divine expression of the Word, hitherto only 
spoken, but now in flesh and personality, in suffering and salvation. " 
427 
Thus the Incarnation can be seen in part in the prophets that God sent but only fully in 
Christ himself. 
8.5. An evaluation of Cragg's Christology 
Cragg attempts to build his Christology on the historical records contained in the synoptic 
gospels. This marks him out from ninth century apologists as a twentieth century European 
Christian who is unwilling to base Christology on church tradition. Ile never appeals to 
credal formulations in his dialogical work in the way that ninth century writers did. 
Whereas ninth century Christology took Johannine Incarnational language as the basis for 
dialogue with Muslims, Cragg begins with Jesus the preacher of the kingdom, and the doer 
of compassionate deeds for those in need. Cragg is representative of a movement 
awayfrom doing Christology from `above' to `below', away from the Incarnation of the 
427 K. Cragg, Muhammad and the Christian. London, 1984,1260 
206 
eternal Son, to the human Jesus who is recognised as being in a unique relationship with 
God. 428 
While aware of radical criticism of the gospels Cragg is not inclined to shift from 
his early conviction that, from the beginning of his ministry, Jesus set his face to Jerusalem 
to die for recalcitrant humanity. There can be no guarantee of Divine forgiveness without 
the obedient self-offering of Christ, therefore, the redemption gained by Jesus is not a 
theory imposed on the Galilean carpenter by the early church but an outworking of his own 
decision. What the disciples came to see in him was not a product of their imagination but 
recognition of his divine character. 
429 It is this realisation that Muslims need to arrive at 
too, so Cragg applies his energy to bring about a Muslim awakening to the `real' Jesus, 
obscured by the Qur'an and centuries of tradition. 
Cragg's attempt to read new Christian meanings into the text of the Qur'an to 
encourage Muslims to see Christ in a fresh way repeats previously established Christian 
readings as well as giving a completely new one. For example, Cragg agrees with Patriarch 
Timothy's opinion that the Qur'än teaches that Christ died before being raised to heaven, 
when he translates süra 3: 55 as "0 Jesus, I am causing you to die and I will exalt you to 
myself'. 430 The novel reading is finding the Eucharist in süra 5: 113. The legitimacy of 
Christian readings is ultimately decided by whether they make sense to Muslims as 
possible interpretations. There has been little enthusiasm among Muslims for the Christian 
428 For this shift see, for example, the nineteenth century English theologian k C. Moberly who argued in an 
influential set of essays by Anglican theologians that the creeds "must wholly rest upon the history of our 
Lord Jesus Christ". (R C. Moberly, LuxMundi, 1890,243). Twentieth century theology largely accepted 
Moberly's dictum, so that at the end of the century a leading German systematic theologian, Wollhart 
Pannenberg, begins his chapter on "The Deity of Christ" with a detailed study of the historical Jesus. For 
Pannenberg it is essential that "we first begin to see the uniqueness of Jesus as a man". (W. Pannenberg, 
Systematic Theology. vol 2, Edinburgh, 1994,326). 
"229 This places Cragg at the very conservative end of the scholarly spectrum. Even 1 coward Marshall, who has 
written extensively on the historical Jesus from a conservative position, is unable to affirm that Jesus 
intended to die for others from the outset of his ministry. According to Marshall, "Jesus must have reckoned 
with the possibility of his own violent death ... The path of 
faithfulness to God carried the risk of persecution 
and even death as part of the divinely ordained way for the righteous in an evil world. " (I. IL Marshall, I 
Believe in the Historical Jesus. London, 1977,231). Note the accidental nature of the cross in Marshall's 
account in contrast to Cragg's idea that Jesus intended to die from the beginning of his ministry. 
430 For Timothy's argument see 2.3.2. 
207 
reading of süra 3: 55 so it seems highly unlikely that Cragg's discovery of the Last Supper 
in sara 5: 113 will fare any better. Nevertheless, Cragg believes that the able Christian 
communicator must look for interpretative keys in the language of Muslims, but is not 
ultimately concerned to remain within the meaning framework of that language. The goal 
is rather to persuade Muslims to move into a new conceptual arena. 
Cragg shares with Pfander an Evangelical theology of forgiveness only through the 
cross. It is significant how much space is occupied by this idea in their writing. Cragg, like 
Pfander, believes that Islam is an inadequate way of salvation, that Muslims can only find 
peace with God through faith in the dying saviour, and that the love generated by that 
salvation compels him to proclaim Christ to the Muslim world. The whole point of the life 
and ministry of Jesus is his self-giving sacrificial death to release humans from guilt before 
God. In other words, the Incarnation is dependent on the act of redemption. Lüyä, on the 
other hand, has more in common with ninth century writers who sec the Incarnation as 
primarily a means of revelation. We see what God is like in the life of Christ. Certainly, 
Cragg appeals to the Incarnation as an act of condescension on God's part. Jesus reveals a 
God who suffers human weakness. He embodies God's kingdom as a rule of love. 
However, Cragg gives scant attention to the union of divinity and humanity in 
Christ with which ninth century apologists were preoccupied. When he does deal with this 
central issue he makes a comparison between Muslim belief in the eternity of the Qur'An 
and Christian faith in the eternity of the Incarnate Word. Here Cragg makes a rare appeal 
to an analogy from Islamic tradition, which puts him in touch with John of Damascus' 
argument about the eternity of God's speech. 
431 Cragg believes in the union of divine and 
human natures, but the centre of his Christology is the love of God expressed in the self- 
giving of Jesus. He prefers to talk of `God's loving engagement with the world' or `a 
Divine expression of the Word in personality' rather than a union of two natures. This form 
431 For John of Damascus' argument sec 2.1.2. 
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of language might be understood in an Islamic sense as showing Jesus to be particularly 
open to the compassion of God and to his speech, but not as God become human. The 
following chapter will explore this possibility more fully in the work of Hans Küng and 
John Hick. Cragg does not want to be read in this way even though his writing continually 
depends on poetic ambiguity, since, for him, all of God is found in the Incarnate Christ. 
In the final analysis, the Christology in Jesus and the Muslim is not essentially 
different from that found in The Call of the Minaret thirty years earlier. There is in Christ a 
revelation of God in person that is and will be unique. Muslims need to come into an 
awareness of that unique personal revelation because Islam has obscured the true nature of 
the historical Jesus and has limited the freedom of God to restrict himself to the human 
dimensions Jesus of Nazareth. The utter self-giving of God in love for humans can only 
fully be seen in the suffering of the Incarnate Christ on behalf of others. That is why 
revelation by prophetic pronouncement is always secondary to revelation by Incarnation, 
since speech may tell of love but cannot perform it. However, in the context of Muslim 
response to this Christology, Cragg has neither made much room for scholarly issues 
concerning the facts of the life of Jesus nor for the challenge laid down by al-Farügi 
concerning the freedom of God to limit himself. 
209 
Part Two. Twentieth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Nine 
The Christologies of John Hick and Hans Küng in Dialogue with Muslims 
Kenneth Cragg's engagement with Islam arose from early exposure to the Muslim world of 
the Middle East, enabling him to develop a thorough understanding of the Islamic 
challenge to Christology. However, among European theologians his experience is rare. 
John Hick and Hans Küng are more typical of the recent interaction of Western theology 
and Islam. Both men were established theological writers before attempting to 
communicate with Muslims, and their Christological views were already developed for a 
Western context. The fact that they turned their attention to a global context for theology 
demonstrates a shift in the self-understanding of some Western Christian leaders away 
from simply doing theology in the traditionally Christian world of Europe and North 
America, to thinking about the Christian faith in non-Christian contexts. 
In Hick's case the presence of Muslims in the United Kingdom urged him to 
rethink a theology worked out in training for the Presbyterian ministry in England and 
subsequent lecturing in theological faculties of North American and British universities. 
For Küng, a career as a theological lecturer in the University of Tübingen in Germany 
intersected with Islam through visits to the Muslim world in which he attempted to build 
bridges between Christianity and Islam. Both men were also concerned to relate Christian 
thought to other major religious traditions and attempted to dialogue with Iiindus and 
Buddhists as well as with Muslims. Neither is an expert in Islamic thought, having no first 
hand knowledge of Arabic to read original Islamic texts, and the published dialogues they 
led were conducted in English with Muslim scholars familiar to Western university 
teaching. Hick and Küng are representative of a new reality in Christian thought, which is 
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likely to be increasingly relevant in the Twenty-first century, as Christian theologians will 
continue to feel the need to address an Islamic context when articulating Christology. 
9.1. John Hick [b. 1922] 
John Hick has come relatively late to communicating a view of Jesus to Muslims. Having 
taught the Philosophy of Religion in the USA since the 1950's it was not until he occupied 
the H. G. Wood chair of Theology at Birmingham University in 1967 that he began to 
dialogue with Muslims. His new awareness of other faiths was to bring about a 
`Copernican revolution' in his thinking about Christ, which was a shift from 
Christocentrism to Theocentrism. An exposition of this shift comes at the beginning of a 
series of papers given at a trialogue of Christians, Muslims and Jews in September 1981, 
convened and chaired by Hick himself. 
432 
9.1.1. From Christocentrism to Tbeocentrism 
According to his own testimony at the trialogue, Hick at one time held that the Incarnation, 
Trinity and atonement were divinely revealed truths, but that he gradually came to accept 
that these concepts were better understood as products of human thinking. While he once 
thought that these doctrines were "straightforward reports of fact" he now concluded that 
they were "of the nature of theories. +t 433 This shift of perception involved the realisation 
that "theological formulations are always both fallible and culture-relative. " 434 In his own 
theological pilgrimage there were two major causes for this paradigm shift, firstly, the 
432 See J. Hick, "A Recent Development within Christian Monotheism", in Christians, Muslims and i s. 
eds. D. Kerr and D. Cohn-Sherbok, Birmingham, 
1982,1-19. 
433 Ibid, 1. 
434 Ibid., 2. 
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results of scholarly research in the gospels, and secondly, the realisation that a religiously 
plural world required a new approach to doctrinal truth. 
In dealing with the first cause of the Copernican revolution, Hick became 
increasingly impressed with the work of gospel scholars who separated the historical Jesus 
from the Christ of the early church's faith. According to such scholars, the Jesus of history 
did not teach the Church's doctrines of Incarnation, atonement and Trinity. As an 
illustration of gospel scholarship he analyses Jesus' model prayer, pointing out that few 
scholars question the authenticity of this prayer as Jesus' own. The prayer suggests that a 
direct unmediated relationship with God is possible, and does not suggest the more 
developed theology of the Apostolic period. 
"The prayer includes no reference to the great theological themes ... of divine 
incarnation in the person of Jesus Christ or of atonement for the sins of mankind by 
his death on the cross or of God as a Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. It is 
indeed an extraordinary and thought-provoking fact that these traditional doctrines 
play no part at all in Jesus' own summary of his message to mankind. Jesus 
thought of God in purely monotheistic and unitarian terms. " 435 
The implications of gospel scholarship for Christian theology are obvious to Ilick. Jesus 
must be seen as a man exceptionally conscious of God's presence, but not as God become 
human. Some theologians had already reached this conclusion but had nevertheless held 
that Jesus had a unique relationship to God. 
The second cause of the Copernican revolution was the dawning admission that 
Jesus was not unique in his capacity to relate truth about God. Hick came to sec that other 
great religious figures, including Muhammad, were just as `God conscious' as Jesus was. 
"If we see in the life of Christ a supreme instance of that fusion of divine grace and 
creaturely freedom that occurs in all authentic human response and obedience to 
God, then ... there 
is now no difficulty, in principle, in acknowledging that the 
paradox of grace was also exemplified in the prophet Muhammad, and indeed in all 
other true servants of God. " 436 
ass Ibid, 6. 
436 Ibid., 14. 
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It follows firstly, that Islam is just as valuable as Christianity as a model for true spiritual 
experience, and secondly, that it is no longer right for Christians to regard religions such as 
Islam as "preliminary or defective, or inferior. " 437 Rather they must sec other religions in 
terms of complementarity rather than superiority. As a result, Christians and Muslims "can 
each see, in the best elements of the other tradition, convincing evidence that it too 
embodies an authentic awareness of and response to God, Allah -to whom be praise. " 438 
Hick then asks whether Muslims could accept divine Incarnation "in the sense of 
interactions of divine grace or inspiration with free human response, not only in the life of 
Jesus but in the lives of all true Messengers of God? " 439 
Of the five Muslims involved in the trialogue only Hasan Askari related to 
Christology in his paper, but he did not refer to Hick's views. Askari, a leading Indian 
Muslim scholar teaching in Birmingham at the time, understands the Qur'änic picture 
of Jesus to be about his servanthood. The polemic of the Qur'an against the language 
of sonship is not really about Jesus being "actually begotten. " °40 In a much more profound 
sense the Qur'an attacks sonship as a "metaphorical mode of stating the God-Man 
relationship. " The Qur'an offers a "no risk" concept of servanthood in exchange for the 
"ambiguous" idea of sonship, which ensures that God is never brought "to the level of 
creation" or "creation to the level of God. " 441 Askari was not commenting directly on 
Hick's paper but on Christology in general, and it would be intriguing to sec what he made 
of Hick's presentation. The difference between this conference and the Cra g al-Farüyi 
meeting was the absence of published interaction between the participants. They read 
papers but did not talk to each other in the published proceedings. 
asp ibid. 
438 Ibid., 19. 
°39 Ibid. 
440 II. Askari, "The Qur'anic Conception of Risala", in Christians, Muslims and Jews, 131. 
441 Ibid. 
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Hick's equation of Jesus and Muhammad as men of "grace" is a striking 
development for Christology, since it entails a re-reading of the New Testament portrait of 
Christ on which the whole tradition of the church has been based. By separating out the 
human Jesus from any of the New Testament ascription of divinity to him, it is in principle 
possible to align him with other religious leaders such as Muhammad. Nevertheless, the 
admission that not only Muhammad but also "other true servants of God" exemplify God's 
grace in an equivalent way is hardly likely to commend his view to Muslims. Cragg's 
comparison of the prophethood of Jesus and Mul; ºammad is much more in tune with 
Muslim thought, because prophethood suggests being sent to declare God's word, and 
Muslims believe that Jesus was faithful to that calling. However, Hick's emphasis on the 
experience of God shown in the lives of Jesus and Muhammad along with all other 
servants of God does not relate so accurately to Islamic categories of receiving God's 
word. Muslims make a distinction between those who do right as true servants of God and 
those who have received God's instructions about how to do right. Therefore God's 
"grace" may be given in very large measure to many humans, but God's "word" is given 
only to a select number who are known by name in the Qur'än. 
Hick's Christology is the end product of a gradual acceptance of the normative 
value of the historical Jesus, so that what can be shown to be plausible historically is true. 
At one time he held the Incarnation, the atonement and the Trinity to be true, but no longer 
does because it is not clear that the historical Jesus believed in them. Certainly Ilick is in 
tune with mainstream gospel scholarship in his assessment of the historical Jesus in a way 
that Cragg is not. 442 In other words, Hick has adopted the logical conclusion of gospel 
scholarship that Christology as we know it is basically a product of faith in Jesus rather 
442 hick accepts the common conviction among scholars that Jesus did not apply the idea of ransom to his 
own death, but that it was read into his death by the early church. As far as the Incarnation is concerned, J. 1). 
G. Dunn represents a majority of New Testament scholars in his view that the Incarnation is a late 
development in the faith of the early church found partially in Paul's letters, but fully only in the letters 
attributed to Paul such as Colossians, and in the Johannine writings. See J. D. 0. Dunn, Chrlstology in the 
214 
than a faithful following of the actual teaching of Jesus. The latter yields results not too far 
removed from the teaching of Muhammad and other remarkable religious characters. He 
challenges fellow Christians, who continue to hold to the truth of the Incarnation and 
atonement on the basis that God revealed them to be true to the Apostles and the Councils 
of the Church, to step back in time to the actual teaching of Jesus on which a new common 
understanding of Christ can be arrived at by people of various faiths. 
9.1.2. Muzammil Siddiqi responds to Hick's Christology 
In 1985, Hick organised another trialogue in California, after moving to Claremont 
Graduate School of Theology. Hick's paper was essentially a re-run of the one given in 
Birmingham in 1981, but this time his presentation on the Incarnation was given a 
reply by a Muslim, Muzammil H Siddiqi, Imam and Director of the Islamic Society of 
Orange County in California, and Professor of Islamic Studies at California State 
University. 443 Siddiqi has two problems with Hick's enthusiasm for pluralism. Firstly, 
Hick does not make room for revelation, and secondly, Hick thinks different belief systems 
are equally valid. Siddiqi deals with the first problem by asking Hick, "Arc all religions 
human responses to God or did God also take any initiative in revealing Himself sclf- 
disclosing, speaking, commanding the human beings? 9+ aaa He attempts an answer on 
Hick's behalf. "Hick, probably, would say that either God never took such initiative, or, for 
the good cause of peace and pluralism, let us not emphasise this. " aas It is disappointing 
that Hick did not actually publish a reply in the collection of papers, but the fact that forty- 
five Jews, Christians and Muslims took part shows the limitations of genuine dialogue in 
Making London, 1980. This reading of the gospels includes the assumption that Jesus could not have 
believed in the Trinity as proclaimed by him in Matthew 28: 19. 
443 See M. IL Siddiqi, "A Muslim Response to John flick: Trinity and Incarnation in the light of Religious 
Pluralism", in Three Faiths-One God., A Jewish, Christian, Muslim Encounter. Ws. J. I lick and IL S. Melier, 
London, 1989,211-213. 
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such a huge gathering. Perhaps Hick would reply that revelation can never be separated 
from the God-consciousness of humans, and must be understood from within human 
experience. It is not surprising to find Siddiqi complaining that Hick's position is 
unsatisfactory, since it has been an article of faith virtually unchallenged from within Islam 
that Muhammad's conscious mind was totally separate from the wording of the Qur'an. For 
Muslims the religious experience of Muhammad is secondary to his receiving the word of 
God, but Hick plays down the distinction between them. 
Siddiqi approaches the second problem of the equivalent value Hick finds in the 
major religious traditions, by noting that Hick has only one criterion for "value" and that is 
the effectiveness of different types of religious experience in bringing about salvation. Ile 
asks Hick, "How can or does one know that none of them is a more efficacious context of 
salvation than the other? " 
446 He asks too, "What is salvation? " Neither of these questions 
is answered by Siddiqi. If Hick had responded he may well have argued that a variety of 
religious traditions have produced saints who equally show the marks of God's grace. Both 
Islam and Christianity have given the world people of outstanding spiritual and moral 
character, therefore both traditions are equally valid as a means of full human 
development, which, according to Hick, is the essence of salvation. 
Siddiqi does approve of Hick's Christology, but does not spell out exactly what he 
admires. "I like John Hick's discussion on Christology. John knows quite well that his 
book The Myth of God Incarnate is very well received by Muslims. The Christology 
proposed by John Hick can serve as a good subject for dialogue between Muslims and 
Christians. " 447 The Myth of God Incarnate was a collection of essays published in 1977 by 
John Hick and six British theologians and subsequently translated into Arabic. The essays 
put forward the view that the Incarnation as understood in the Apostolic and Patristic 
444 ibid., 211. 
445 Ibid. 
446 ibid., 212. 
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periods should not need to govern modem Christology. Use of the word "myth" in the title 
led some to understand that the "truth" was not to be found in theology, but only in history. 
One Muslim reviewer welcomed the book as "a rational, godsent lightening ... to explode 
an agelong blunder in Christian thought. " 448 Siddiqi does not explain his approval of 
Hick's position, but he probably has in mind Hick's perception of Jesus as being only 
human and not divine. Hick's Jesus can largely be recognised by Muslims, but differences 
may still remain, especially about the historicity of the crucifixion. 
9.1.3. The myth of Jesus' crucifixion? 
In his Metaphor of God Incarnate of 1993, Hick rccogniscs only one instance of direct 
disagreement between the Qur'an and the gospels, the Qur'änic denial of the crucifixion. 
Hick accepts the historicity of the crucifixion, which he includes in a very brief list of facts 
known about Jesus. 
"Scholars have listed such generally agreed points as that Jesus was a Galilean 
Jew, son of a woman called Mary; that he was baptized by John the Baptist; that he 
preached and healed and exorcised; that he called disciples and spoke of there 
being twelve; that he largely confined his activity to Israel; that he was crucified 
outside Jerusalem by the Roman authorities; and that after his death his followers 
continued an identifiable movement. " 449 
None of these facts would cause any difficulties for Muslims except the crucifixion. Later 
in the book Hick raises the issue of this refusal on the part of Muslims, but sloes not believe 
that "facts" are after all decisive in delivering well developed spiritual and moral human 
beings. 
"I suggest that differences of historical judgment, although having their own 
proper importance, do not prevent the different traditions from being cffcctivc, and 
447 Ibid., 213. 
448 Sec A. S. Sharafuddin, About the Myth of God Incarnate - An Impartial Survey of il. i Main Topics. 
Jeddah, 1978,1. 
419 J liick, The Metaphor of God Incarnate, London, 1993,18. 
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so far as we can tell, more or less equally effective, contexts of salvation. 
Evidently, then, it is not necessary for salvation that we should have correct 
450 historical information. $9450 
In other words, the crucifixion is not a myth in the sense that the atonement is. Though 
Jesus did not die for others to save them from the results of their sin, he certainly did die on 
a cross. But even this truth can be set aside in dialogue with Muslims, if it helps Christians 
and Muslims to work together to promote "salvation". Hick seems to believe that Muslims 
and Christians will continue to see salvation differently, but that in reality there arc no 
fundamental differences in the final product of these two traditions. His task is to help 
Christians especially to come to accept this. 
9.1.4. An evaluation of Hick's Christology 
It is hardly surprising that Hick should be criticised by more traditional Christians for his 
severe reductionism. In a response to such criticism in his 1995 Rainbow of Faiths, f lick 
defends his scepticism about much of the material in the gospels. The book is written in the 
form of dialogues between Hick and a philosopher Phil and a theologian Grace. Grace 
challenges Hick's assumption that Jesus did not imply his divinity according to the 
gospels, even if he did not teach it explicitly. Did Jesus not assume divine authority in 
abrogating the Jewish Law and in forgiving sins? Hick replies, 
"I argue that it is possible to see an implicit claim to deity here. But on the other 
hand it is equally possible to see the material quite differently ... A strong strcam 
of contemporary New Testament research today holds that he did not in fact 
abrogate the Law ... and in pronouncing 
forgiveness for sins Jesus was, out of his 
vivid awareness of God's mercy, declaring God's forgiveness... not presuming 
himself to be God. " asi 
Hick acknowledges that possible interpretations arise out of presuppositions. 
450 Ibid., 145. 
451 JI lick, Tue Rainbow of Failhs, London, 1995,96 
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"It must be said that these are questions which the New Testament scholars will 
probably debate among themselves until the end of time. And I think you will 
notice that their interpretations are invariably correlated with their wider 
theological positions. If you want biblical confirmation for a conservative 
position, you can find it, and if you want biblical confirmation for a more liberal 
position you can find that. We all use the Bible selectively in the light of our 
theological outlook. " 452 
Hick's presupposition is getting along with people of other faiths, and belief in the divinity 
of Jesus simply gets in the way of harmony. Grace asks whether the Incarnation should not 
simply be accepted as a mystery, and Hick replies, "that might be acceptable if the literally 
understood doctrine did not have literal implications which are so damaging to our 
relationship with the people of other faiths. " 
453 
In other words, the divinity of Jesus proclaimed within the New Testament by John 
and Paul has to be set aside for pragmatic reasons. But the very pragmatism at work in 
relation to those of other faiths fails to take account of the fact that the Christian tradition 
has been indelibly shaped by John and Paul. What Hick says of polemical dialogue later in 
The Rainbow of Faiths could well be turned against his own kind of theologising. 
"A Christian tries to persuade a Muslim that the Prophet Muhammad's experience 
of hearing the words of the Qur'an came from his own conscious mind rather than 
being dictated by Gabriel on behalf of God, but this kind of polemical dialogue is 
usually fruitless except in producing alienation and enmity. " 454 
It does not take much imagination to see that Hick is doing exactly the same within the 
Christian tradition. Hick tries to persuade traditional Christians that the Apostolic and 
Patristic faith in Christ as human and divine is not founded on fact and therefore is not true. 
But Hick's dialogue with other Christians may be fruitless except in producing alienation 
and enmity, since these Christians hold that their faith in Christ is the logical outcome of 
452 %bid 
ass Ibid., 99. Hick shares the sentiments of Indian theologian Stanley Samartha, the first director of the 
Dialogue Programme of the World Council of Churches in the 1970's, who argues that "elevating Jesus to 
the status of God or limiting Christ to Jesus of Nazareth are both temptations to be avoided ... A Theocentric 
Christology avoids these dangers and becomes more helpful in establishing new relationships with 
neighbours of other faiths. " (S. J. Samartha, "The 
Cross and the Rainbow: Christ in a Mullircligious 
Culture", in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Religions. als. J. 1 lick 
and L. Swidler, New York, 1987,69-88,80) 
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tendencies in the life and teaching of the historical Jesus. This is the position of the 
Catholic theologian, Hans Küng, who comes somewhere between Cragg and Hick in his 
Christology in dialogue with Muslims. Hick used to hold the Incarnational Christology of 
Cragg. What is striking about Hick is the rationale behind his Copernican Revolution. 
Moving from Christocentrism to Theocentrism has been done as a result of contact with 
believers of other faiths. The Incarnation is an obstacle to good relations with Muslims and 
Jews, so a pragmatic attitude must entail dropping such a conceptualisation. 
In the desire to make himself a good neighbour, Hick has not really considered two 
consequences of his friendly overtures. The first has to do with those believers of other 
faiths he wants to get along with. They have concepts of what is appropriate to hold as 
true. In the case of Muslims, everything that the Qur'An says is true. The fact that flick is 
unwilling to endorse this conviction in its entirety puts him at odds with a fifth of the 
world's population. In what sense then does Hick love his Muslim neighbour, when he 
cannot affirm this essential item in Islam? 
The second consequence concerns Hick's ability to represent the Christian third of 
the world's population. He acknowledges that Christians who have seen a split between the 
Jesus of history and the Christ of faith have usually been content to accept the value of the 
latter. ass He thinks that faith in the Incarnation is a barrier to good relations with Muslims, 
but Christians who believe that Jesus is divine are just as capable of loving Muslims as 
Christians who do not. The condemnation of the vast majority of Christians to an 
inevitable conflict with Muslims because of their faith in the Incarnation and atonement 
seems premature. Pluralist and traditionalist Christians are equally capable of being good 
neighbours to people of other faiths, because although they see Jesus differently, they are 
454 J hick, The Rainbow of Faiths, 121. 
ass See the responses to Ilick's Theocentric Christology from theologians who uphold the incarnation as true 
in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered cd. G. D'Costa, New York, 1990. 
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able to love Muslims despite such differences. Love for Muslims is not dependent on 
theology alone. 
9.2. Hans Küng [b. 1928] 
Hans Küng has been a professor of theology at the University of Tübingen in Germany 
since 1960. He was an active participant in the proceedings of Vatican II in the early 
1960's, and has promoted the new understanding of the Catholic Church concerning people 
of other faiths that emerged from the Council. In 1985 he published Christianity and World 
Religions without having engaged in much encounter with Muslims. But the book opened 
the path to engagement with Muslims outside Germany. 456 
9.2.1. Christianity and World Religions 
In the section of his Christianity and World Religions concerned with Christianity and 
Islam, Küng believes it is vital to begin with the portrait of Jesus given in the Qur'än in 
conversation with Muslims. The fundamental issue for Christians is that, 
"The Qur'an should be interpreted from the standpoint of the Qur'an not from that 
of the New Testament or the Council of Nicaca. For the Qur'An Jesus is a prophet; 
a great prophet, like Abraham, Noah, and Moses - but nothing more. And just as in 
the New Testament John the Baptist is Jesus' precursor, so in the Qur'än Jesus is 
the precursor - and highly encouraging example - for Muhammad. " 437 
This does not mean that Küng is content to stay with the Jesus of the Qur'An, since he 
believes it is essential to challenge Muslims to accept the historical Jesus of the gospels 
who is not fully shown in the Qur'an. 
456 See the foreword to the second edition of Christianity and World Religions. New York, 1993, xii. 
457 H. Kling, Christianity and World Religions. New York, 1993,110. 
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"The portrait of Jesus in the Qur'än is all too one-dimensional, ill-defined, and 
devoid of substance - apart from the features on monotheism, the call for 
conversion in view of the judgment to come, and a few miracle stories. The 
historical Jesus was quite different. Despite what the Qur'an says, he did not 
uphold the Law. Rather he opposed every kind of legalism with his radical love and 
for this reason was executed. But this is precisely what the Qur'an, flying in the 
face of history, will not admit. " 458 
The gospels reveal Jesus to have been a man who promoted "not his own person, role, or 
dignity, but God's kingdom, God's name, God's will, which man is to fulfil through 
service to his fellow men and women. " 
459 Jesus' life and ministry were marked by his 
relationship to God, which shows a "oneness with God as his Father. 
" 460 This portrait of 
Jesus would not be impossible for a Muslim to integrate with the Qur'änic account, but 
Jesus also claimed to act on God's behalf 
"His claims went beyond those of a prophet, in that he assumed God's authority 
(especially with respect to the Law and the forgiveness of sins). He not only talked 
about forgiving sin, about challenging every hallowed tradition and rule, about 
tearing down all the boundaries separating clean and unclean, just and unjust - he 
s. No wonder he was accused of blaspheming God, condemned did all these thi49 
and executed" 
The historical Jesus made himself out to be more than a prophet by assuming God's 
authority to forgive in a way not seen before in the Jewish tradition, Ile did not simply 
pronounce that God had forgiven a sinner, but rather forgave the man himself on God's 
behalf. It was recognition of this action that prompted the disciples to sec Jesus' 
relationship with God in a unique light. However, it was only after the encounter of the 
disciples with the risen Jesus that they began to call him Son of God. "The crucified Jesus 
was made God's son through his resurrection and exaltation. " 
462 This means that the 
concept of sonship was for the early church "not a relationship of parentage, but an 
appointment ... not a physical 
divine sonship as Islam always assumed and rightly rejected 
458 Ibid., 111. 
459 Ibid., 116. 
460 Ibid., 117. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid., 118. 
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but God's choosing Jesus and granting him full authority. " 463 The picture is of shared 
authority between the Father and his appointed Son. If Christians could rest content with 
this picture of adoption then Muslims surely could find no difficulty with the Father and 
Son imagery. What then should Christians do with the concept of identity of being between 
God and Jesus that is expressed in the historic creeds? This development of faith in Christ 
arose from the Apostolic conviction that "God's word and will took on human form in 
Jesus. " 464 Therefore the church today should believe that there was "a unity of knowledge, 
will, action, and revelation between God and Jesus. " 
465 
But Muslims would still find difficulty with this Christian view of Jesus. Talk of 
unity between God and Jesus is suspect because it seems to raise the human Jesus to a 
position of equality with God. Kling asks what separates Christians from Muslims, and 
decides that the revelation of God "in Jesus Christ" marks off Christians from Muslims, 
who "recognise Jesus as one of the prophets, but no more. " 
4,66 Kling believes that he can 
persuade Muslims to take on board three aspects of the Jesus of the gospels. Firstly, the 
preaching and practice of Jesus relativizes the oppressive nature of Islamic law. Man has 
been set free, not from law, but from legalism. Secondly, Jesus' life, death and new life 
give us a new and deeper understanding of God as one who loves and has compassion for 
humanity. Thirdly, Jesus' death offers us a fresh source of meaning, however meaningless 
our suffering and failure may appear to be. 
467 This version of the historical Jesus is rather 
different from Cragg's or Hick's. There is virtually no place for Cragg's Jesus who comes 
to die for others out of love for them, but Kung's Jesus opposes the law and forgives sin, 
both of which are rejected by Hick as false interpretations. 468 
463 Ibid. 
464 Ibid., 119. 
465 Ibid 
416 Ibid., 120f. 
46' Ibid., 128. 
468 Kiing reflects a tradition in German theology that pictures Jesus replacing dependence on law keeping 
with faith in himself. For example, Walter Kaiser describes Jesus' authoritative teaching as being not so 
much against, but above that of Moses, and that he calyxd his disciples to have faith in him. (W. Kasper, 
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9.2.2. Dialogue with Hossein Nasr 
Kling was asked to engage in dialogue at Harvard University in 1984 with a leading 
Muslim scholar, Seyyed Hossein Nasr of George Washington University. The Iranian 
Hossein Nasr had an extensive knowledge of Christian thought, and was accustomed to the 
style of discourse found in contemporary Christian theology. Küng's presentation was in 
fact a condensed version of the chapter from Christianity and World Religions, which is 
analysed above. Nasr's response to Küng's Christology begins with Küng's criticism of the 
Qur'änic portrait of Jesus. "To suggest that the Qur'an had the wrong Christology makes 
absolutely impossible any dialogue with Islam ... It must always be remembered that for 
Muslims the Qur'an, the whole Qur'än and not only parts of it, is the word of God. " 469 
In other words, there is little use Kling suggesting that improvements need to be 
made in the Qur'änic picture. He must begin to dialogue on the basis that the Qur'än is the 
word of God that is not misguided in its portrait of Jesus. But how then is dialogue possible 
when the gospel account of Jesus is different? Nasr has a way through by suggesting that 
truth can be seen in apparently contradictory ways. 
"In the future if there is to be a serious Islamic-Christian dialogue on the question 
of Christology it will have to deal with this issue of whether modern epistemology 
and modem philosophy allow, in fact, a single reality to be seen in two different 
ways ys without causing what appears to the modern mind as logical contradiction. " 
Jesus the Christ. Tunbridge Wells,, 1976,102f. ) That Jesus forgave sin in his own right has been a standard 
interpretation in much German gospel scholarship. Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz sum up Jesus' charisma 
in a way that continues to support Kung's position. "Ile implicitly attributed to himself a special nearness to 
God. Ile endorsed his words by putting an `amen' in front of them as though he had received them from God. 
Ilis antitheses deliberately transcended the Torah without contradicting it. Ile reactivated the traditional 
metaphor of father in a way which indicated a special relationship to God. Ile promised the forgiveness of 
sins which as a rule was hoped for from God himself. 
" (G. Theissen and A. Men, The llistorical Jesus. 
London, 1998,560. ) By way of contrast, Hick's view that Jesus did not set himself above the Torah by 
asking for faith in himself reflects a particular strand of Anglo-Saxon theology. For instance, Ed Sanders 
thinks it is "virtually certain" that Jesus "did not explicitly oppose the law, particularly not laws relating to 
Sabbath and food. " Ile insists that it is "incredible" to hold that Jesus "was one of the rare Jews of his day 
who believed in love, mercy, grace, repentance and the forgiveness of sin. 
" (C. P. Sanders, Jesus and 
Judaism. London, 1985,326. ) 
469 S. 11. Nasr, "Response to Hans King", MW. (77,1987,96-105), 100. 
470 Ibid. 
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He illustrates his point by looking at the apparent contradiction between the Qur'An and the 
gospels over the crucifixion of Jesus. "I will stick my neck out as a Muslim and say that 
when the Qur'än states that the Christ was not crucified that does not necessarily mean that 
God did not want another segment of humanity to sec this very reality in a different way. " 
471 He seems to mean that God may have revealed two ways of seeing the same event. 
White the two ways cancel each other out on the level of human reasoning, we humans 
should always remember that God's thoughts are higher than ours. We cannot penetrate his 
thinking. We only receive revelation. But does this not imply that the gospel version of 
Jesus' death is revelation from God just as much as the Qur'änic denial? Nasr puts the 
answer into a transcendent mode. "It must be realised that neither the Islamic nor the 
Christian view exhausts the possibilities of the'Christic' reality in another universe as 
willed by God. " 472 
At the end of Nasr's response KUng had the opportunity to reply to Nasr's 
criticisms. King was not prepared to accept the suspension of judgement for some Christie 
reality beyond this world that might synthesise the thesis and antithesis of Islam and 
Christianity. "Let us say that the Gospels are wrong, and that the whole New Testament is 
wrong, that Jesus has not really been crucified. To say this from a source which comes 
from the seventh century is for an historically thinking man, I think, personally 
impossible. 473 
Given the opportunity to reply again to KUng, Nasr returned to the historicity of the 
crucifixion. 
"Whether he was crucified and died or whether, as the Muslims traditionally 
believe, God put someone else in his place and he was taken up to heaven, is not 
going to be either proven or disprovcn by historical texts of the period, because it 
is not the kind of phenomenon which can be exhausted by historical description 
471 Ibid., 101. 
'n Ibid. 
473 H. Kling, "Reply to Ilossein Nasr", MW. 121. 
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... Christ was 
in a sense too good to be crucified - to be killed. So no historical 
argument is going to destroy the truth, as you called it, of Islam by showing 
another version of sacred history. " 474 
Truth then cannot be killed since the word of God lasts forever. History is not the judge of 
truth. Even if Jesus did die on the cross, the significance of that event would still need to be 
drawn out. For Islam, the significance is that God is always victorious. Men may try to do 
away with truth but God will be the ultimate winner of the argument. 
Nasr repeated this double view of truth in a paper published in 1995, in which he 
identified seven outstanding problems for Islamic-Christian Dialogue. 
1. Islam rejects the Incarnation since the Absolute cannot enter into the domain of 
relativity. Only a symbolic Incarnation is possible. 
2. Islam claims finality in the current period of human history. Jesus himself predicted 
the role of the Paraclete who Muslims identify with the Prophet. 
3. The Qur'an is God's word. Few Christians have accepted this. But most Muslims 
see the Bible as abrogated or altered. 
4. Christians have limited the spread of Qur'anic Arabic in the last century and a half. 
5. Islamic law is not only a set of principles but also a set of legal codifications. 
Christians should not try to undermine this truth. 
6. Christianity and Islam have two contradictory accounts of the end of Jesus' life. 
7. The assumption of modernism and post-modernism that religion must inevitably be 
relegated to the private domain conflicts with the Islamic conviction that the whole of 
life is governed by the word of God. als 
The sixth point is of particular relevance to the debate with Kling. lie basically reiterates 
his earlier view that God may have revealed two different perspectives on the death of 
Jesus. 
aua S. H. Nasr, "Reply to Hans Küng", op cit., 128. 
475S. H. Nasr, "Comments on a Few Theological Issues in the Islamic-Christian Dialogue', in Christian. 
Muslin Encounters. eds. Y. Y, Haddad and W. Z. Haddad, Gainesville, 1995,458-465. 
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"Was Christ crucified or was he taken alive to Heaven and not crucified as asserted 
by Islam? Here one faces what seems to be an insurmountable obstacle. One could 
say that a major cosmic event at the end of the earthly life of Christ could in fact be 
`seen" and `known' in more than one way, and that it is God's will that Christianity 
should be given to `see' that-end in one way and Islam in another. " 476 
Nasr seems here to be comfortable with the notion that Islam is only one version of truth, 
but in other areas of dispute between Islam and Christianity he is unwilling to adopt a 
double theory of revelation. The other six issues mentioned by him all touch on the finality 
of the Qur'an as the truth given by God. In none of these six issues is he prepared to allow 
the validity of alternative sources of truth that would contradict revelation as Islam 
understands it. So the concession to Christians over their insistence on the crucifixion of 
Christ is not granted in other areas of dispute. 
9.23. An evaluation of King's Christology 
In his 1995 one volume survey of theology entitled Christianity: The Religious Situation cf 
Our Time, Küng reflects on the options for Christology in the light of world religions. Iie 
engages in dialogue with advocates of Theocentric Christology, agreeing that the historical 
Jesus must be the basis for Christology, but holding that Christians arc identified by their 
faith in Jesus alongside their faith in God. In relation to Muslims in particular, Christians 
should begin with, but cannot limit their view to, the portrait of Jesus found in the Qur'IIn, 
because they are convinced that God has revealed himself and has offered redemption to 
humanity through Jesus. 
The challenge of a Theocentric Christology is met by stressing that the New 
Testament as a whole regards Jesus as central to revelation and salvation. Kling repeats the 
differences between the historical Jesus and the faith of the early church from Christianity 
476 Aid., 464. 
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and World Religions, and re-affirms his commitment to the validity of the latter. Therefore 
the church cannot abandon faith in Jesus for a faith in God which could be defined more in 
terms of Jewish and Muslim forms of faith. Christians should continue to exercise faith in 
Christ as their way of believing in God. 
"It can be argued that the one God of Abraham himself constitutes the centre of the 
New Testament, its theocentricity. But the 'new' element in the New Testament is 
precisely the fact that this one God is never seen alone, but always together with 
the one who proclaimed him 'anew'... So while faith in the one God is unchanged, 
the centre of faith is defined afresh: Jesus' name stands for the kingdom of God, 
the coming of which he preached. Faith in God becomes specifically 
christological. " 477 
King seems to hold that God's rule has to be understood with reference to Jesus, though it 
is not clear to what extent Jesus represents God, or shares in God's rule. However, he 
thinks that the New Testament vision of participation by Jesus in that rule is still important 
today. If this conjunction of God and Christ in the attitude of the early church is the 
benchmark for Christian self-understanding, then Christians will clash with people of other 
faiths. Kling is aware of the need for sensitivity in relating to those whose faith in God 
excludes honouring Jesus in this way. Hick's complaint that equating Jesus with God 
means a failure of love for Muslims is taken seriously by Kling. The remedy is to step into 
the place where Muslims feel comfortable, and to see Jesus from their point of view, 
before making suggestions as to how a Christian view of Jesus enhances a Muslim one. 
The practical outcome of this approach for Christians entails dropping the language of the 
Nicene Creed in favour of New Testament expressions of Christology. Muslims cannot 
understand, let alone accept, theology built on Greek philosophical concepts. Therefore, 
thinking of Christology in terms of an ontological union between God and Jesus is not a 
useful way of doing theology in the world of today. "The divine clement in Jesus was 
emphasized so strongly and so exclusively at Nicaca that all the human characteristics of 
'77 II. Kling, Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Time. London, 1995,58 
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Jesus receded into the background. 99478A functional, rather than ontological, unity 
between Jesus and God is the only conceptualisation that is appropriate now. 479 
Kling does not really address the problems inherent in relating to the Jesus of the 
Qur'an in this book, but he does believe that Christology can commence from the Qur'an 
before ending up in the New Testament. As long as Christians set aside the convictions of 
the creeds, there can be a genuine conversation with Muslims about Jesus. 
"Down to the present day Islam, which accepts Jesus completely as prophet and 
even Messiah but rejects Hellenistic Christology, has not been able to understand 
that here we have a historical person and a personal human life. So isn't it 
necessary to begin to understand Jesus Christ again `from below' and to attach as 
much importance to his humanity as the Qur'än does, going on from there, to 
understand how in turn God's wisdom has taken human form? " aso 
The answer to this question of how the conjuction between God and Jesus should be 
expressed in the light of the Qur'än is not given by Küng. After a lengthy exposition of 
Patristic Christology, which he concludes is no longer adequate, KUng provides a summary 
creed that has little to do with the Jesus of the Qur'an. "The'heart' of Christian faith is not 
a theological theory but belief that God the Father works in a revealing, redeeming and 
liberating way in us through his Son Jesus Christ in the Spirit. " 481 But such a statement of 
faith is quite unacceptable to Muslims, since God cannot need Jesus to do anything for or 
in us. Rather Jesus must remain one of the sent ones who called others to offer acceptable 
worship to God. The borderline which may never be crossed is the Qur'Anic conviction 
that each individual is responsible for his or her own destiny. Kling, however, does not 
478 Ibid., 195. 
479 The view that ontological categories are no longer useful for Christology is shared by many contemorary 
theologians. Oscar Cullmann held that the New Testament writers did not conceive of Christ's relationship to 
God in terms of a unity of being, but in terms of a unity of thought and action. (0. Cullmann, The 
Christology of the New Testament London, 1959. ) Many modern theologians have bypassed the ontological 
Christology based on Nicaea and Chalcedon in favour of a functional Christology based on the New 
Testament. For example, John Macquarrie thinks the Chalcedonian depiction of human and divine natures is 
too static. Nowadays if we "move away from the static understanding of nature (physic) as a fixed essence, to 
the dynamic or progressive understanding of physis as 'emergence' or'coming into being', then the notion of 
the two natures 'concurring' in the person of Christ becomes intelligible. " (J. Macquarric, Jesus Christ in 
Modern Thought. London, 1990,385. ) 
480 Ibid. 
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discuss such a Muslim reaction. There is no serious consideration in this context of the 
provocative nature of the words "revealing, redeeming and liberating. " While it is true that 
Muslims can think of Jesus revealing God's will as God's messenger, he cannot be thought 
of as actually rescuing anybody from bondage. The only way that redemptive language can 
work is to apply it to the intellect so that he could be said to summon people from 
ignorance. 
But if Muslims respond that they are not redeemed from ignorance by Jesus but by 
the word that he brings, that of course is not his but God's only. So Jesus does not redeem 
but offers the way for others to redeem themselves. The same strictures apply to the idea of 
liberation. Jesus is a means by which people liberate themselves. In the light of his view 
that Islam provides salvation without a specifically Christian understanding of Jesus, do 
Muslims really need Jesus the way Christians need him? Kiing made himself famous in 
Roman Catholic circles for his 1964 address in Bombay in which he expounded the new 
view of Vatican II that, "God's saving will also embraces those who acknowledge the 
Creator and among them especially the Muslims, who profess the faith of Abraham and 
together with us adore the one God, the Merciful One, who will judge men on the Last 
Day. " 482 Küng put forward the idea that Christianity is the "extraordinary" way of 
salvation and the other religions are "ordinary" ways. In 1994 he re-affirmed his belief in 
these two ways of salvation. 
"For me as a Christian - to speak quite plainly here - Jesus Christ is and remains 
the way, the truth and the life (that is as it were my internal perspective), but (and 
this is at the same. time my external perspective) I cannot avoid noting that `the 
way, the truth, and the life' is for believing Jews the Torah, for Muslims the Qur'An 
and for other religions someone or something else. " 483 
481 II. Kling, Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Tinte, 305. 
482 See "The Constitution of the Church", article 16, in Documents of the Second Vatican Council cd. W. M. 
Abbott, New York, 1965. Cited by Kling in Christianity and World Religions, 1993, foreword xi. 
483 II. Kling, "World Peace - World Religions -World Ethic", in the special volume of Concilium entitled 
Islam: A Challenge for Christianity. 1994,127-139,136. 
230 
But then the question arises, why worry about communicating a Christian view of 
Jesus to Muslims if there is no need for them to depart from a Qur'änic basis of faith? 
Perhaps Küng should be content to explain a Christian view in dialogue without 
challenging the Islamic view of the crucifixion as he has done. Why should the Qur'än 
stand accused of flying in the face of history? If the Qur'an is an adequate vehicle for 
salvation then history hardly counts, and if Muslims can find God through Islam then they 
do not need to be told that their means of salvation is somehow less than adequate. Kling 
might reply that the Qur'änic portrait of Jesus is not adequate but that God is able to reveal 
truth, redeem sinners, and liberate oppressed humans through the Qur'an despite the denial 
of the crucifixion. Perhaps he would say that the New Testament is a more complete 
account of revelation, redemption and liberation, and that the point of communicating the 
Christ of the Bible is to offer that fuller version of salvation to Muslims. 
9.3. Kling, Hick and Cragg on Christology in dialogue with Muslims 
These three theologians share the common late twentieth century theological conviction 
that the Christological formulations of Nicaca and Chalccdon are no longer useful for 
Christology since they emphasise being rather than doing, static nature rather than active 
commitment. 
484 Cragg can speak for all three when he says, 
"We return from Chalcedon to Gethsemane and to a Christology of action as 
sufficing for a Christology of nature ... It is interesting to note that the Creeds and 
Chalcedonian Christology had ... no required theology of atonement. Content with 
the fact of the Cross they left the preaching of it to the Holy Spirit in the mind of 
the Church. It might have been well to have done the same with the incarnation 
had not Gnosticism and other perils needed refutation for there to be any authentic 
"ass redemption at all. 
48' For a helpful study of the Christology of Küng and Hick among other recent theologians sei; S. Cowdell, 
Is Jesus unique? New York, 1996. 
495 K. Cragg, The Lively Credentials of God. London, 1995,140f. 
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Hick and Küng hold that Hellenistic Christology is a barrier to talking about Christ to 
people who do not value Greek patterns of thought, and that New Testament Christology 
can best be read in Semitic categories of action rather than in Hellenistic categories of 
being, though Johannine Christology may be a fusion of the two. A return to a more 
Semitic reading of the New Testament may help Christians to dialogue with Muslims, 
though Hick's presentation is more rigorously `semitic' than Küng's. 
Cragg's Christology is about the self-giving of Jesus to reconcile humanity to God. 
This picture is dependent on the truth that Jesus alone among human beings is God in 
human flesh. Only the self-giving of God expressed in Christ redeems others from 
alienation to God. Cragg puts his efforts in dialogue with Muslims into persuading them 
that the Qur'än allows for God to interact with his creation to make Incarnation possible. 
The God of traditional Islamic interpretation is too small, and the `greatness' of God has to 
make room for the greatest act of all, that God was in Christ reconciling the world to 
himself. But this Incarnational Christology depends on the very ontological Nicene thought 
patterns that Cragg wishes to move away from, which only shows the difficulty of 
separating ontological and functional categories in Christology. 
Kung's Christology focuses on the life of Jesus rather than his atoning death. 
Indeed, Küng hardly mentions the atonement at all in dialogue with Muslims, preferring to 
emphasise that Jesus of Nazareth represented God in his tcaching and actions. This is seen 
especially in his authority to forgive sin directly and in his promulgation of an ethic of self- 
denial. He believes that Muslims can benefit from adopting this Jesus, who transcends the 
one they already know from the Qur'än. The knowledge of God's forgiveness and the life 
of self-denial need to become part of Islamic life. The cross of Christ can then become a 
symbol of forgiveness and self-giving rather than a symbol of God-forsakenness and 
human weakness. 
232 
Hick's Christology differs radically from those of Cragg and Kung- 'Mc real Jesus 
did not represent God in a unique way. He was a Jew who especially advocated love for 
God and neighbour in the spirit of the best of Jewish tradition. But this is also the burden 
of the great religious ones in human civilisation, therefore it is the task of Christians in 
dialogue to help others concentrate on the best in their traditions. Muslims are just as 
capable of loving God and neighbour as Christians, since the Qur'än emphasises these 
virtues. Dialogue ought to enable Christians and Muslims to work together to promote a 
common cause. Therefore it should be possible for Christians to overlook the denial of the 
crucifixion of Jesus in the Qur'än, seeing that this historical detail is not essential to 
bringing about love for God and neighbour. Cragg's Incarnational Christology gets in the 
way of a meeting of minds, and Küng's Jesus who uniquely represents God is not much 
better because he excludes any other humans from representing God in the same way. Ilick 
is much closer to an Islamic way of seeing Jesus than Kting or Cragg, but he speaks for a 
much smaller number of Christians than they do. Nevertheless, the appropriation of New 
Testament scholarly debate on the historical Jesus by all three shows the importance of the 
`real' Jesus to twentieth century theology. In the context of dialogue with Muslims, all 
three have drawn attention to material in the Qur'an that supports the `real' Jesus of the 
gospels. 
In the final analysis, Cragg, Küng and Hick have not developed Christology on the 
basis of the Qur'än, but rather have attempted to present a view of Christ already formed 
before interaction with the new context of Islamic ideas. They would probably hold a 
similar Christology even if put in another context of belief. However, their encounter with 
the Christ of Muslim faith has led them to draw various connections between Islamic 
perceptions and Christian ones. Cragg is more skilled at this task than Kong or IIick, and 
offers fresh ways for Muslims to see Christ by attempting to combine Islamic thought with 
mainstream Christian doctrine. This attempt on the part of Christians to suggest new 
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insights to Muslims about their own traditions is taken probably as far as it may go by a 
dramatic version of the life of Christ based on the four gospels that was produced in 1987 
for Muslim Arabs. The following chapter will examine this novel juxtaposition of Qur'Anic 
and gospel details that present Christ in Islamic idiom but with essentially Christian 
content. Sira al-Masih represents the culmination of earlier attempts to fuse the Qur'änic 
and gospel portraits by Pfander, Lügä and Cragg. 
416 
496 Sec the following chapter for a detailed critique of Sira al-MasTll. Larnaca, 1987. 
234 
Part Two. Twentieth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Ten 
The Portrait of Christ in Sira al-Masi z 
A new Arabic harmonisation of the four gospels appeared in 1987, which presented the life 
of Christ using Islamic terminology and Qur'anic style. The story of Jesus is divided into 
thirty chapters each headed by "in the name of God the merciful and compassionate one", 
combining material from all four gospels into one biographical account. It is written in 
rhyme with verse endings borrowed from the Qur'än, and throughout the story, key words 
and phrases from the Qur'an appear that are not found in standard translations of the 
gospels. This work takes the Qur'an more actively into the telling of the life of Christ than 
any of the apologetic writing surveyed in the thesis, though the eighth century Anonymous 
Apology and the presentation of Christ by Kenneth Cragg offer the closest parallels in 
terms of using Islamic thought forms. 
487 In other words, this Life of Christ is the most 
notable Christian attempt in the history of Christian-Muslim relations to view Christ from 
both Muslim and Christian perspectives. 
The production of the work began in 1977 with the collaboration of several 
Christians from Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant backgrounds, under the leadership of a 
Christian Palestinian poet and an American Protestant missionary. Their working method 
was based on the belief that the Qur'an could furnish words and ideas for a Christian life of 
Christ. 
"We believe it is time to consider the possibility that the Qur'an is itself a prophetic 
witness to the unity of God, both in the face of the 7`h Century Arabian idolatry and 
of the modern materialistic world in which we live. It is also a significant, albeit ' 488 
incomplete, witness to God's Messiah. 
See 2.2.2. for The Anonymous Apology and 8.1-4. for Cragg. 
488 D. Owen, "Project Sunrise: Principles, Description and Terminology", seedbed. (2,1987), 52. 
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This admission represents a fundamental paradigm shift for both the American evangelical 
David Owen and for the Middle Eastern Christians involved in the writing of The Life of 
Christ. The idea that the Qur'an is a prophetic word from God opens up fresh possibilities 
for the use of the Qur'än in Christian writing. Although David Owen, the editor in chief of 
The Life of Christ, believed that it faithfully translated the original Greek of the gospels 
into Arabic, perhaps it should be seen as an exercise in indigenous theology for Arabs from 
a Muslim background, since Qur'änic language is used in the translation in an 
unprecedented way. 489 For example, the use of the Qur'Anic name 'Isd for Jesus in The 
Life of Christ is a startling innovation for Christian Arabic writing, where the ancient 
Syriac Yasu'a is normally found. The kind of Christology implied by this use of Qur'änic 
terminology will be studied in this chapter. 
10.1. The life of 'Isä 
The use of the Qur'anic name 'Isä for Jesus in Sira al-Masih separates the work from 
available gospel translations in Arabic which all use Yasu'a, the Syriac title for Jesus used 
by Christians before and after the arrival of Islam in the Middle East. Preference for the 
Syriac name for Jesus in Arabic Bible translation can be seen in the Smith-Van Dyke 
version of 1866, Today's Arabic Version of 1978, and The Living Arabic Bible of 1988, as 
well as in the colloquial Moroccan New Testament of 1932 and the Algerian-Tunisian 
New Testament of 1965. However, Bible translators in other parts of the Muslim world 
489 Owen argued that The Life of Christ was a dynamically equivalent translation of the four gospels 
following the translation principles of the United Bible Societies. According to B. Nida, the first proponent of 
dynamic equivalence, translation should enable an audience to receive the communication of Scripture as 
closely as possible to the intention of the original authors. 
(E. A. Nida, Bible Translating. London, 1961. ) 
Owen believed that "contextualised Bible translation for the Muslim Arab world primarily calls for the use of 
Islamic theological terminology coupled with a high level of literary Arabic. The goal is a dynamically 
equivalent presentation of Scripture 
for the Muslim Arab readers of today. " (D. Owen, "Project Sunrise", 5 1) 
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have not hesitated to use the Qur'änic name. For example, the Urdu and Turkish New 
Testaments have 'Isa. 
The depth of feeling on the adoption of Ed in Arabic translation is illustrated by a 
debate between R. D. Bernard and John Mansour, both evangelical missionaries in the 
Arab world. Bernard objected to the use of'Isd in Sra al-Maslh because it is "not his God- 
given name", which means God saves. 'Isa has no meaning. 
490 Mansour, on the other 
hand, supports the use of'Isd by making the point that the Hebrew root underlying Yasu'a 
does not occur in Arabic. A proper equivalent for `God saves' would be Yahweh yyunaf, 
not Yasu'a. 491 
The use of'I. sd in Sra al-Masih is not totally unprecedented in Christian writing in 
Arabic. Amazing Events in Palestine ('ajäbu ma hadatha ji-frlastln) was published in 
Lebanon in 1974, and presents the birth and childhood of Jesus with illustrations that 
include Mary being visited by an angel as she sits under a date palm. This Qur'änic version 
of the birth story is certainly unusual in a Christian publication. The Qur'änic names Yalryyd 
and 'Isd are used for John the Baptist and Jesus. 
492 
The fact that Sira al-Masi-Ii uses '1sä rather than Yasu'a sends a signal to the 
Muslim reader that '1s7 of the Qur'an is the subject of the story. That this new Christian 
portrait does not ignore a Muslim understanding of Jesus is confirmed by the way'lsü 
seldom calls God `father'. 
10.2. How 'Isa speaks about God 
The characteristic name for God used by Jesus in the gospels is `Father', but in Stru al- 
Mastli he normally simply refers to `God'. For instance, the Lord's Prayer in Smith-Van 
490 R. D. Bernard, "You shall call his name Jesus", Seedbed. (7,1992), 35. 
491 J Mansour, "A Rose by Any Other Name", Seedbed (8,1993), 27. 
492 See Ajabu ma liadathaJ: filasfin. Beirut, 1974 
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Dyke, TAV, and LAB opens with abäna, `our Father', whereas Sra al-Masih has 
allahumma, `O God'. According to Owen, alläh is a better dynamic equivalent of the 
Greek word pater than ab for a Muslim reader, since ab probably conveys a biological link 
between Jesus and God. "To avoid crude, anthropomorphic misinterpretations by Muslim 
readers, the Father-Son metaphor is retained only where the context itself explains its 
significance. 
99 493 
Only nine times does 'Isa call God `father' in Sr-a; twice abän (chapter 24: 18, and 
18: 42), twice allah al-abäwi (8: 28, and 12: 21), twice abT (6: 10, and 16: 62), twice yü abüti 
(28: 5, and 6), and once yä abäta (29: 39). The first four references relate to how the 
disciples should think of God as a caring father who provides good things for them and arc 
not so controversial for a Muslim reader. 'Isä calls God abi `my father' when he says that 
his father is always at work and that he is working too, and when he tells his audience 
about what he has seen in his father's presence. He prays yd abät7 `0 my father' when he 
asks for the cup of suffering to be taken from him in the garden of Gethsemane, and yü 
abäta 10 father' when he commits his spirit into his father's hands on the cross. 
494 
Therefore only five references to God as father of 'Isa may possibly convey a 
biological connection between them. Compared with the sum of the references to God as 
the Father of Jesus in the conventional translations of the four gospels, Sra has virtually 
removed the problem posed by a more exact rendering of the Greek paler-. Ilowcvcr, the 
radical ascription of Fatherhood to God by the historical Jesus is scarcely heard by the 
Muslim. That price has been thought worth paying in order to circumvent a false 
understanding of Christ on the part of the modern Muslim. 
495 
493 D. Owen, op. cit., 56. For a detailed study of the Lord's Prayer in Sira al-1lfasilr see M Beaumont, "The 
Lord's Prayer in Smith-Van Dyke and Sirat al-Masih", Seedbed,. (5,1990,52-4) 
494 The equivalent gospel contexts for abdn are Matthew 23: 9, and Luke 11: 13; for allih al-abduy Matthew 
7: 11 and 10: 29; for Ably John 5: 17 and 8: 38; forya abäti Matthew 26: 39; and for ya abäta Luke 23: 46. 
495 The naming of God as `father' by Jesus is accepted as authentic by the vast majority of gospel scholars, 
and thus it can be argued that Sira 
is not so much a translation as a dramatisation in Islamic thought forms. 
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10.3. 'Isä is not `Son of God' or `Son of Man' 
Another striking feature of Sra is the absence of the titles `Son of God' and `Son of Man' 
found regularly in existing translations. 'Isä is called ibn `son' only three times in chapters 
1: 16,16: 59, and 23: 37. 
1. Chapter 1: 16 recounts the message of the angel Gabriel to Mary from Luke 
1: 31f. "A boy will be given to you whose name is Jesus, exalted in this world and the next 
(wajihan fi-l-dunya %va-l-akhirati), and he is to be called Son of the Most High". `Son of 
the Most High' is found in Smith Van-Dyke and LAV, although TAV has `Son of the Most 
High God'. The use of the Qur'änic phrase, "wajihan fi-l-dunya iva-l-akhirati ", is a 
surprise since it does not translate the Greek but adds a description of 'Isa from süra 3: 45 
of the Qur'än, where Gabriel announces the birth of Jesus to Mary; "al-Masi/zu 'Isü ibnu 
maryama ivajihanfi-l-dunya tiva-l-akhiraii" (the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary, exalted in 
this world and the next). Siva has re-interpreted the Lukan account by replacing `son' with 
`boy' possibly to show that the child was a normal human being. The Qur'änic exaltation 
of'Isä enables Sira to link his normal human beginning to the later astonishing 
achievement of his life and ministry. It appears that the exaltation begins in this world 
before ascending to the place where God dwells, since the Qur'änic phrase lends itself to 
this interpretation. However, Sra does represent 'Isä claiming a pre-existent state, as can 
be seen in section 10.4 of this chapter. So there is a tension between the Qur'änic and 
gospel accounts that is not resolved in Sira, leading to possible confusion on the part of the 
Muslim reader. 
2. Chapterl6: 59f, a rendering of John 8: 34-36 which contrasts the role of servants 
in a household with that of the son, is virtually identical to Smith Van-Dyke. The 
Johannine connection between the son of the house and the heavenly Father is kept in Situ 
at 16: 62; "If the son sets you free you will be free ... I speak of what I have seen in the 
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presence of God my Father". 'Isä is claiming to be a member of the family rather than a 
slave; "Whoever sins is a slave to sin. A slave does not always belong in the house but a 
son does. " 'Isa has family rights that by implication others do not have. Whether he is 
adopted or born into the family is not clear in the dialogue. This ambiguity might be the 
reason for the inclusion of `son' terminology here, since all other Johannine examples of 
`father-son' vocabulary are transformed into 'God-I' language in Sra. 
3. The third retention of `son' language comes at 23: 37 in the course of a story 
about the son of the vineyard owner being sent to retrieve the vineyard from rebellious 
tenants. This story provides indirect evidence for 'Isa's view of his own status, but does 
not amount to the use of `son' language by '1sä of himself. Sra then has been 
exceptionally sparing with `son' terminology. Furthermore, Jesus' favourite title for 
himself in the synoptic gospels, `Son of Man' is totally absent from the portrait. Owen 
argues that `Son of Man' does not communicate what Jesus intended, but rather is often 
understood to "imply that Jesus is not God". Therefore `Son of Man' is nearly always 
rendered as T. 
496 Owen reflects the opinion of Geza Vcrmcs, the Aramaic scholar, who 
argues that the expression `Son of Man' is really no more than a term for `I'. "In Galilean 
Aramaic, ie. the language of Jesus and his first followers, Son of Man was at least 
occasionally employed as a circumlocution. " 
497 Jesus also speaks of a future coming of the 
Son of Man in the synoptic gospels, but Vermes believes that these sayings are inauthentic. 
Morna Hooker agrees with Vermes that Jesus used `Son of Man' to refer to himself, but 
thinks that he applied the eschatalogical Son of Man idea of Daniel 7 to himself too. "Jesus 
used the phrase not because he was claiming to be the messianic Son of man, but because 
he accepted for himself the role of obedient faith which the term evokes. " 
498 Whether 
496 D. Owen, "Project Sunrise", 56. 
497 G. Vermes, Jesus The Jew. London, 1983,168. Maurice Casey supports the view that Son of Man "was a 
normal term for man which an 
Aramaic speaker might use to speak indirectly of himself. " (M. Casey, "Idiom 
and Translation: Some aspects of the 
Son of Man Problem", NTS. (41,1995,164-182), 169. 
498 M. Ilooker, Mark. London, 1991,93. 
240 
Jesus proclaimed himself as the future Son of Man is a matter of continued debate. Tom 
Wright holds that Jesus may have used Son of Man for "someone in my position" in Mt 
8: 20 and 11: 19, but the vast majority of uses relate to a future role, and that there is no 
need to view these as inauthentic. 499 
Sira avoids this discussion by rendering the future son of man as al-Mahdi. This is 
not a Qur'änic title, but is found in some of the Hadith concerning the end times, where al- 
Mahdi is the one who God sends to establish justice among humanity. 500 For example, 
Sra 25: 48 renders Matthew 25: 31, where Jesus speaks of the coming of the Son of Man to 
sit on a throne for judgment, as "the day is approaching; the hour of the Mahdi's glorious 
return with row upon row of angels; then he will sit on his throne. " However, the fact that 
al-Malhdi sits on a throne to rule seems to challenge an Islamic conviction that only God 
sits on a throne to rule humanity. In the Qur'än only God himself sits on a throne. His rule 
is bound up with his identity that must not be challenged by human pretenders. Süra 
23: 117 links his throne with his uniqueness. La illäha illa hüwa rabbu al-'arshi al-karimi 
(There is no God but he, Lord of the noble throne). So when Jesus claims to have a throne, 
which is linked to God alone more than twenty times in the Qur'an, an immediate 
challenge is mounted to the unity of God. Nevertheless Sira directs attention to a coming 
al-Mahd~t who represents God in the future judgement of humanity. Al-Mahdi does not rule 
in place of God but perhaps can be understood to rule the earth on God's behalf. 
This use of al-Mahdi for the future Son of Man is based on the theory that al-MAX 
is identical to 'Isa, which is not undisputed in Muslim scholarship. The lladith collections 
of Bukhäri and Muslim do not mention a coming al-Mahdi. According to these collections 
'Isti will return. However, Abli Dawüd, al-Tirmidhi, al-Nasä'i and the Musndd of Ibn 
Hanbal all record traditions concerning a coming al-Mahdi. Even before the collection of 
the HaPth, two schools of thought appeared that continue to recent times in Sunni Islam. 
499 N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God. London, 1996,517i.. 
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The first of these was represented by al-Hasan al-Ba$rn (d. 728) who maintained that '1sä 
was identical to al-Mahdi, but his contemporary Muhammad b. Sirin (d. 728) held that al- 
MahX would make an appearance before 'Isa, and that the latter would pray behind him. 
5°' In the light of this analysis, the use of al-Mahdi as a dynamically equivalent expression 
for the future Son of Man may be justified on the grounds of the identification of al-Mahdi 
with '1sä among some Muslim readers. 
The virtual disappearance of `the Son' from this life of'Isä changes the impression 
of 'Isü considerably, since the removal of an expression that Jesus gave to himself, `the 
Son of Man', means that the Muslim reader of Sira is unable to hear the strangeness of this 
name. The fact that scholars are divided about the correct interpretation of the phrase 
shows how enigmatic the name is. Following one theory about the meaning of `Son of 
Man', Sra opts for the use of the personal pronoun `I' as an equivalent. Owen's 
explanation for the adoption of this view appeals to an Aramaic substructure to the extant 
gospels in Greek. 
"Jesus was a Semite, and the original language of Jesus' teachings was a 
combination of Aramaic and Hebrew. To communicate to other Semitic peoples we 
may at times have to go behind the language of the Greek New Testament to its 
Aramaic-Hebrew origins in exegeting certain passages for our readers. " 502 
However, this argument can be used to support the retention of the Aramaic bar nasha (son 
of man) in Arabic. If bar nasha really was a circumlocation for `I' then it is surely very 
significant that the four gospel writers chose not to translate `Son of Man' as `1' when they 
produced their Greek versions. Either the gospel writers did not know what `Son of Man' 
meant or they felt that it was untransferable. In other words, none of them felt it 
appropriate to remove the ambiguity inherent in that Aramaic name. On this basis the 
grounds for using Ibn al-insän (Son of Man) would be very strong in any translation into 
500 See the article "Al-Mabdi, in EL vol 5, Leiden, 1986,1,231 It 
so' Ibid. 
502 D. Owen, "Project Sunrise", 52. 
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Arabic. This is the attitude of the TAV and LAV, but Sira charts a different course in 
communication, developing a portrait of Jesus that fits him into the Muslim thought world 
without paying too much attention to strict standards of translation. 
10.4. 'Isd with Allah from eternity 
The greatest challenge for Sra is the handling of material from the fourth gospel, for it is 
the gospel of John that explicitly proclaims a unifying bond between the Father and the 
Son. The Father-Son language common in John is replaced by alläh-ana (God-I). For 
instance, John 14: 10 "I am in the Father and the Father is in me" becomes "I am with God 
and God is with me" (inni ma'a allähi iva-inna alläha ma i) at Sra 27: 7. Then there is 
John's claim at the outset of his gospel that "the Word was God", which Sira omits. 
Nevertheless, Thomas' confession "my Lord and my God" (mawlaya iva illähi) is 
faithfully reproduced in the final chapter of S'ra. Could it be that this discovery of Thomas 
after the death and resurrection of Jesus is a model of how a Muslim reader might come to 
see Jesus? While a Muslim may have difficulties with ascribing divinity to Jesus, so did 
Jesus' first followers. Just as they came to see Jesus as united with God in such a way that 
Jesus ought to be worshipped, so perhaps Sra can lead a Muslim along the same path. 
There is perhaps also a connection between Thomas' confession at the end of the story and 
the announcement of the angel Gabriel at the beginning, where 'Isd is announced as "son 
of the Most High". Jesus' story begins and ends on the same note of divine identity. lie is 
worthy of worship at his birth by shepherds and astrologers just as he is due adoration by 
his disciples. Between these two events is the whole life of Jesus that acts as evidence for 
their validity. Sira has therefore retained from Johannine language only Thomas' ascription 
of divinity to Jesus. Thus only once is any identity of being acknowledged between Jesus 
and God from the stock of instances from the Fourth gospel. 
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Despite this, Sra has an emphasis on the eternity of'Isd that more than matches 
claims in the Fourth gospel that Jesus has come from the presence of the Father. The 
`word' of John 1: 1 is actually named as '1sä in the Prologue to Sra; "innama 'Isa 
kalimatu allähi min al-azali tamathala la-na basharan" (Jesus, word of God from cternity 
appeared among us as human). The connecting of 'RI with the eternal Word is daring, 
since John keeps a distinction between the Word existing in eternity and the Word entering 
time, and the Word is named after the enfleshment but not before. S'ra presents the pre- 
existence of Jesus in a way that John does not. While Sra removes John's portrait of the 
Son as metaphysically united with the Father there is an emphasis on a relationship 
between '1sä and Alläh that existed in eternity outside of time. 
This poses a challenge to the Muslim reader to think through the status of al- 
kalima. If God cast his word into Mary at the moment of Jesus' conception, then is his 
word not before time? Does Jesus not uniquely possess that word among humans? Can 
Jesus be thought of as possessing God's word in his conscious mind, rather than merely 
proclaiming it? '1sä speaks in Sra of having been with God before being sent by him. The 
pronouncement of Jesus about his relationship to Abraham from John 8: 39-59 is found in 
Sira 16: 62; "I am telling you what I have seen in God my Father's presence". Not only is 
this one of Sra's rare uses of `Father' on the lips of 'Isd but it is also an indication that 
'1sä claims to have a relationship with God based on sight. It is not just a question of 
hearing from God but more being in a fellowship of persons who are in close proximity, 
not merely a visionary state but the outcome of a pre-temporal relationship between 'Lsü 
and God. This is confirmed at the end of the passage at 16: 87, where 'Isa claims to be the 
eternal Word who is before Abraham; "And hütiva kalimatu al-azali wa qabla Ibrühirn". 
The addition of al-kalima to and makes the link between 'Isa and the descent of the Word 
clear. While John leaves behind the concept of the 
Word in his prologue, Sira re-introduces 
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it here. Whereas John describes Jesus as the Word, Jesus never uses the title `Word' of 
himself in the gospel, but in SFra '1sä does. 
Perhaps it is better to challenge Muslims over the pre-existence of 'Isa rather than 
unity of being between allah and '1sä, since the Qur'an does not criticise Christians for 
their belief in Jesus' pre-existence, but for undermining the unity of God by their attitude 
to Jesus. In playing down a unity of being between Jesus and God, sra is defusing the 
Muslim reader's natural response to a Christian presentation of the life of Jesus. In 
emphasising the eternal relationship between Jesus and God, Sra is encouraging the 
Muslim reader to think about Jesus from an unfamiliar angle. 
10.5. Isä seeks for faith in himself 
Another feature of John's gospel is the way that Jesus calls for faith in himself, and Sra 
follows this pattern. John asks his readers to exercise faith in Jesus and this too is repeated 
in Sira. An example of the latter comes at Sira 4: 19; "God offered up the Messiah out of 
love for humanity so that all who believe in him would not be lost but would have eternal 
life. " Apart from the replacement of `only son' with `the Messiah' the demand for faith is 
the same in SSra as in John 3: 16. An example of 'R7 asking for faith in himself can be 
found in 13: 25; "yuridu allahu an yu'minu bi-ya" (God wants you to believe in me). There 
are seven other places in Sra where faith in 'Isa is sought; 4: 28; 13: 30,33,48; 16: 22,51; 
21: 10; 24: 54; and 28: 1. 
How would a Muslim reader react to this portrait of Christ seeking faith in himself? 
The '1sä of the Qur'än says very little about faith, and when he speaks he asks for faith in 
God, but not faith in himself. He does however command his followers to obey him in sara 
3: 49. Could this be seen as a parallel to the 'Lcä of S'ra commanding trust in himself? lt 
might well do, since a Muslim is familiar with the 
fact that both Jesus and Muhammad had 
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followers who were expected to obey them. Faith in Jesus then becomes obedience to his 
commands. 
10.6. Isä forgives sin 
Sra 5: 45-50 follows Luke's version of the healing of the paralytic from Luke 5: 17-26, 
deviating only slightly. " Isä said to the man, `your sins are forgiven'. The religious 
leaders reacted to his pronouncement saying, `Only God forgives sin. Who is this who 
utters blasphemy? ' Perceiving their thoughts he said, `So that you may know that I have 
authority to forgive sin, I say to this man, get up and carry your mat and go home'. The 
man went out praising God. " There is no toning down here of the offence of'Isä 
pronouncing what only God can do. The reaction of the religious leaders in the story may 
well be that of the Muslim reader. Here, then, is a claim by 'Iva to a divine prerogative. He 
is claiming to act as God does, by his own authority. 
Luke records two more stories of sinners being pronounced forgiven by Jesus. Luke 
7: 36-50 concerns a woman who was known to have lived an immoral life anointing Jesus' 
feet. S`tra has a version of this story at 9: 24-34. Verses 30-34 contain the pronouncement 
of forgiveness. "'Isa said to Simon, `God has forgiven whatever sins she committed in the 
past". "'Isa said to the woman, `God has forgiven you'". For the Muslim reader there is 
no mistaking the challenge of a declaration that such a woman has already been forgiven 
by God. So the reaction of those present in the story, "Who is this that forgives sins? " 
becomes a reaction shared by a Muslim reader. The third story recorded by Luke at 19: 1- 
10, which contains a pronouncement of forgiveness, also reappears in Sira 22: 51-55. This 
is the account of Zacchaeus the hated tax-collector who surprisingly offers to pay back 
what he has stolen from the townspeople of Jericho after an encounter with Jesus. "'Isa 
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said to Zacchaeus, `Today you have been saved along with your household, you son of 
Abraham". S7ra emphasises the personal nature of Zacchaeus' salvation. 
The impact of these pronouncements of forgiveness is the authority that '1sä claims 
to exercise, 503 which is bound to challenge a Muslim reader. If the accent of forgiveness in 
Islamic tradition is eschatological, if forgiveness is finally only fully realised on the day of 
judgement, then this already realised forgiveness granted by 'Isa can only strike a Muslim 
reader as presumption at worst or exaggeration at best. Thus the gulf between the 'Isa of 
Sra and the expectations of the Muslim reader is unbridgeable within Islamic 
presuppositions. Sra has not avoided the difficulties inherent in presenting 'Isa as one 
who acts as God. 
10.7. 'Isd predicts his death by crucifixion 
While Sira plays down some of the Johannine expressions of the unity of Jesus and God, 
there is no similar attempt to reduce the tension of the cross. In Sra, 'Isa predicts his own 
death no less than eight times at 4: 18; 14: 37; 15: 27; 17: 38; 22: 13; 24: 47; 26: 1 and 28: 8.504 
On five of these occasions, 'Isa predicts that he will be crucified, whereas in the gospels 
Jesus mentions crucifixion only once. Sra 15: 27 adds a prediction of the crucifixion to the 
otherwise identical passage in Mark 9: 31. SSra 17: 38 has 'Isa claiming "no-one can kill 
me or crucify me of his own accord", which contrasts with Jesus in John 10: 17 who says 
"no-one takes my life from me". In Sira 24: 47 'Isa offers to his hearers, "the day I am 
lifted up on the cross I will draw all people to myself ", which may be compared with John 
503 Mainstream gospel scholars accept the historicity of Jesus' offer of forgiveness as part of his message of 
the kingdom. For example, N. T. Wright notes that "the point about Jesus' welcome to sinners was that he 
was declaring, on his own authority, that anyone who trusted in him and his kingdom-announcement was 
within the kingdom. " (N. T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God, 517f. ) 
504 Equivalent gospel contexts are in 3: 14f; Mk 8: 31; Mk 9: 31; in 10: 11-16; Mk 10: 33f; in 12: 47; Mt 26: 2; 
and Mk 14: 41. 
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12: 32f, "when I am lifted up from the earth I will draw all people to myself ." The final 
prediction in Sira 28: 8 also adds the crucifixion to the original account. "The time 
appointed by your Lord has come. The corrupt of the earth will kill him; they will crucify 
him. " Mark 14: 41 reads, "the hour has come for the Son of Man to be put into the hands of 
sinners. " Twice Sira offers a direct response to the denial of the crucifixion in the Qur'an 
at Sara 4: 157, "They did not kill him, they did not crucify him", by having 'Isa use the two 
verbs `kill' and `crucify' in a positive sense at 17: 38 and 28: 8. The 'Isa of Sira offers a 
different way of understanding the Qur'an than most Muslims would be prepared to accept. 
The overall impression of the eight predictions by 'Iva of his impending death is 
likely to be far reaching on the Muslim reader. Far from painting a Qur'änic portrait of 
God's messenger rescued from the murderous Jews, Si a drives home the New Testament 
centrality of the cross. The way the predictions are spread out over the thirty chapters 
makes the impact constant and regular. Sra, by not merging the death predictions of the 
four gospels into a narrow band of two or three predictions, has heightened the drama of 
the cross. 'Isa speaks of ransoming others by his death. Since 'Isa offers his life not just as 
a martyr to the cause of God's will, but also as a means of enabling spiritual life to arise in 
those who have faith in him, then the 'Isä of Sra is further distanced from the 'Iva of the 
Qur'än who comes to instruct but not to redeem. 
10.8. 'Isä offers his life to redeem others 
There are four references in Sira to the saving power of 'Isä's death. In chapter 13: 40 he 
pronounces, "this bread is my body which I give as a ransom ßdä) for all people". 13: 42 
adds, "unless you eat my flesh and drink my blood you will be among the lost. " John 6: 51 
and 53 read, "the bread I give is my body which I offer for the life of the world ... If you 
do not eat the flesh of the Son of Man or drink his blood you will not have life. " John does 
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not record the last supper though this discourse probably refers to it. 
505 Sira 22: 45 reads, "I 
have not come to get people to serve me but to be a saving ransom for many of you", 
which follows Mt 20: 28 closely. Lastly, S'ra 26: 1Of records the last supper with the 
ending, "this is my blood with which you gain access to intercession (al-shaf'a) if you 
hold onto the promise of the Merciful One (al-rahman)", which replaces "this is my 
blood.. . 
for the forgiveness of sins" in Mt 26: 27. Al-shara'a (advocacy, or intercession) 
appears thirteen times in the Qur'an. The context is most often the day of judgement, on 
which there will be nobody to intercede for unbelievers. Süra 19: 87 of the Qur'an, La 
yamlikuna al-sha'ata illä man ittakhadha 'inda al-rahmäni 'ahdan (They do not gain 
access to intercession unless they hold onto the promise of the Merciful One), provides a 
close parallel. '1sä in Sra offers to be the intercessor between people and God of which the 
Qur'an speaks. Sira, therefore, presents 'Isd using this Qur'anic language to show that he 
is the content of the covenant with al-rahman. To receive his body and blood by faith is to 
enact that covenant. By participating in this covenant, salvation from jahannam (Qur'an, 
Sara 19: 87) is guaranteed. Thus what the Qur'an announces about escape from judgemnt 
'1sä fulfils. 
This is an incredibly daring application of Qur'änic language to '1sä. Access to 
salvation comes by cleaving to him in the way that Christians have always done, by 
feeding on his body and blood. God's promise of salvation is mediated by 'Isci, so he is the 
intercessor that Muslims ought to turn towards. What is proclaimed in the Qur'an is found 
in the one who lays down his life for all. By now the Muslim reader may have reached the 
end of his patience. But he may also have come to understand what is vital to Christian 
faith. Now he may be able to sec why the Eucharist is so central to Orthodox and Catholic 
505 See, for example, D. M. Smith, "that an author could write 6: 52-58 with no thought of the Lord's Supper 
is difficult to believe, given the pervasiveness of the sacrament at an early date. " (D. M. Smith, The Theology 
of the Gospel of John. Cambridge, 1995,158. 
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worship, and why for most Protestants faith in the redeeming work of Christ is of first 
importance. 
10.9. Evaluation 
The Christology of Sira is firmly based on the accumulated portraits of the four gospels. 
The '1sä of Sra is clearly recognisable to a Christian familiar with the New Testament. 
The birth of 'Isa is basically the account in Matthew and Luke, with details derived from 
Süra 19 of the Qur'an. The teaching of'Isä is co-extensive with all four gospels, with little 
from the fourth gospel omitted. His healing work and his raising the dead are fully 
documented. The Qur'an has, of course, little to add to his teaching, but it is significant 
that the miracle of the making of birds from clay is not found in Sira. To the Muslim 
reader this signals that Sira is unwilling to acknowledge the veracity of a story about '1sä 
found in the Qur'an. In terms of Qur'anic material about 'Isä, then, Sira adds what does 
not contradict the gospel portraits. That 'Isä should be "exalted in this world and the next" 
fits with the way the gospel writers portray him; that 'Isä should, as a minor, transform 
clay into birds, does not, because his ministry commenced in adulthood. For the same 
reason 'Isd cannot speak as an infant of his future work as he does in Süra 19 of the 
Qur'an. In other words Sira does not attempt to build a new portrait of'Isü on the 
foundations of the Qur'an. Rather the opposite is the case, since the four gospels determine 
what is an acceptable picture of Jesus. Only those aspects of the Qur'an that merge with 
the gospels can be used. 
What is significant about Scra's Christology is the way the four gospels arc adapted 
for a Muslim readership. While the Qur'an is not the foundation of the portrait, it does 
have an influence on the way '1sä is actually presented. Attention paid to what the Qur'an 
denies about 'Isa makes Sera the most penetrating attempt so far by Christians to retell the 
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story of Jesus in a way that might commend itself to Muslims. This is most obvious in the 
rewriting of the Father-Son language. The great tradition of Christian apologetics to 
Muslims has, as we have documented, attempted to explain the Father-Son language. Sira, 
goes beyond this impasse by virtually removing the metaphor. The alleged biological bond 
between Jesus and God, which is keenly felt by Muslims to be at the back of Christian 
belief, can quietly be laid aside. This Christian document scarcely allows the allegation to 
surface. Where Father-Son language is used, the context shows that the relationship is a 
spiritual one. While an argument may be made for more Father-Son language to be 
retained, there can be no reasonable doubt that Sra has succeeded in removing a 
psychological obstacle in the mind of the Muslim reader. If apologists have always insisted 
that the relationship between Father and Son is only spiritual and never physical, then Sra 
has removed the need to make the argument. This is a considerable gain. 
Another gain for Sra is the careful handling of the Johannine language identifying 
Jesus as God. The simple removal of "the Word was God" from the story enables Jesus' 
claim to be "one with the Father" to become a unity of thought or will. This has far 
reaching consequences for the Muslim reader. Since Jesus is not actually identified with 
God in Sra, a Muslim reader is enabled to experience him in a familiar monotheistic 
framework. With the removal of explicit references to Jesus' identity of being with God, it 
becomes possible for a Muslim to be in the same position as a Jew in Jesus' own time. The 
question for both Jew and Muslim is "flow does this Jesus relate to the one true God? " 
Sira makes the point particularly strongly that '1sä volunteers to die according to 
the will of God. His death is no accident but is right at the centre of what he is trying to 
achieve in his life of service. The servant of God dies because it is where his service 
inexorably leads. But this service of God is also service of his fellow human beings. What 
God wills for '1sä is no less than a vicarious death that redeems others from bondage. Why 
God wills the death of'Isä is not answered in Stra, though it may remain a question in the 
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Muslim reader's mind. If others are enslaved, then '1sä knows his task is to release them by 
dying on their behalf. The death of '1sä becomes a focus of faith for his followers, and 
this is not the result of their own perception of him after the event, but quite clearly the 
teaching of'Isa himself. To remember his death is enjoined on his disciples by the master. 
Here Sra shows affinities with Pfander and Cragg in their emphasis on the atonement in 
the presentation of Jesus. It is as a result of his perfect obedience that Jesus' life has value 
for us. It is the release from sin that his death effects in us. In the end the cross is central to 
the Christology of Sira. Therefore, it is consistent with this centrality that Sra should be 
willing to play down Incarnational language such as "only begotten" but at the same time 
be willing to present 'Isd repeatedly predicting his coming death. Thus it is no surprise that 
Johannine language about the death of Christ is retained where most Incarnational 
Johannine language is not. 
In summary, this retelling of the story of Christ is a fresh and original attempt to 
attract Muslim readers to an essentially Christian narrative. By taking seriously the 
challenge concerning the sonship of Christ emanating from the Qur'an, Sira may enable 
Muslims to see the Christian claims about Christ from a new angle. This is an important 
advance in Christian-Muslim dialogue on Christ and may be the opening for other 
Christian initiatives in the future. Conversely, the Qur'änic denial of the crucifixion is dealt 
with in Sra not by displacement but by counterclaim. Whereas Christ hardly calls himself 
God's son, he repeats the prediction of his impending crucifixion more frequently in Sra 
than in the gospels. Perhaps this risk is too great, since the Muslim reader is far more likely 
to be offended by the repetition than he would by a more veiled account of the death of 
Christ. 
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Part Two. Twentieth Century Christology in Dialogue with Muslims 
Chapter Eleven 
The Christologies of Kenneth Cragg, John Hick, Hans Küng and Sira al- 
Masih, and Muslim Response 
The two questions asked of the ninth century apologists in chapter six may be profitably 
posed to their twentieth century equivalents. Firstly, what developments in Christology can 
be observed as a result of engagement with the Islamic context? Secondly, what impact did 
these presentations of Christology have on Muslims? The answer to the first question in the 
ninth century apologetics was little development in content but a considerable effort to 
defend established Christology in terms that Muslims might find acceptable. The answer 
now is similar. Cragg, Hick and King do not alter their Christologies to any extent in the 
Islamic context, but they do attempt to defend their established views in ways that might be 
understood by Muslims. Sra a1-Masih, however, is more an original appoach to 
Christology from within an Islamic context, rather than an already established view applied 
to it. The answer to the second question can be found in the dialogue partners of the three 
modern apologists. Only Hick's Christology is enthusiastically received for his acceptance 
of Islamic premises for the interpretation of Christ's significance. 
11.1. The Christology of Kenneth Cragg 
Cragg presents to Muslims the Incarnation and atonement as essentially true for them as 
much as for Christians. From The Call of the Minaret to Jesus and the Muslim he believes 
that Muslims need to believe in the revelation of God in Christ rather than merely the 
speech of God in Christ's mouth. In his early work he speaks of a personal revelation in 
Jesus of Nazareth that goes way beyond the normal Islamic idea that God speaks but does 
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not appear to humans. In his dialogue with al-Farügi, Cragg puts forward the argument 
about personal revelation in Incarnation as essential for Muslims to accept. 
506 The central 
point of Jesus and the Muslim is "truth through personality" though he acknowledges that 
the notion is difficult for Muslims to accept. Thirty years of apologetics by Cragg reveal 
how impenetrable the Islamic notion of revelation as speech alone actually remains. 
He presses Muslims to accept that personal revelation is the only means of divine 
identification with sinful humanity. By coming to deal with rebellious humans on their 
own ground God is seen to have put an end to their waywardness once and for all. But this 
focus on the atonement comes up against the fact that the death of Christ is denied by the 
Qur'an. To Muslims who are raised on this distortion of the truth Christians should 
proclaim that the cross is not the failure of God's prophet, but the door to victory over all 
that might defeat God's rule in the world he made. At the heart of personal revelation is the 
forgiveness of sin. If according to Islam God forgives without the cost of coming into 
relationship with sinful humans then that forgiveness is not nearly so profound as that 
which is offered through the death of the incarnate Christ. The true greatness of God is not 
the maintenance of a transcendent detachment from sin but an engagement with sin by its 
defeat on the cross. 507 
In the end this is the Apostolic gospel applied to an Islamic thought world, and so is 
not a Christology built on Islamic conceptions. Even though Cragg understands fully the 
nature of Muslim attitudes to Christ and to the Christian claims about him he adopts an 
unhelpful polemical tone that never really changes through his long career. He finds Islam 
guilty of turning Jesus into a successful prophet who is a scarcely recognisable figure when 
compared with the Jesus of history. 508 But this very aggressive tone is bound to make 
Muslims question whether Cragg is really taking Islam as seriously as he claims, and 
sob See 8.3. 
507 See 8.4. 
508 See 8.2. 
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whether he truly wants to dialogue with them on equal terms. In terms of the forgiveness of 
God, Muslims will doubtless continue to deny that God has restricted his freedom to the 
death of Christ as Cragg argues. For Cragg to place this historical necessity on God is to 
demean his greatness. Future dialogue would be better served by avoiding such direct 
assault on Islamic thought perhaps by arguing that God was under no necessity to forgive 
through the cross, but that he chose to show his compassion to humanity through the death 
of Christ. 
Cragg's insistence that the historical Jesus intended to die for the salvation of 
humanity leaves him at odds with most Christian gospel scholars, and opens himself to the 
criticism that he speaks on behalf of traditional conservative Christians who ignore the 
findings of Biblical scholarship when he claims otherwise. He is an exponent of the 
Christology of the early church but is unwilling to accept that this is the case because he 
wants to maintain that theology is firmly embedded in history. The difficulty for Cragg's 
Christology in dialogue with Muslims is that the latter are able to distinguish between the 
historical Jesus and the faith of the early church by studying the Christian scholarship that 
Cragg ignores. Nevertheless, Cragg does speak for the vast majority of Christians who 
uphold the Apostolic convictions of the Incarnation and atonement and they will continue 
to find inspiration from his determined efforts to persuade Muslims that God was in Christ 
reconciling humans to himself. 
11.2. The Christology of John Hick 
Hick's Christology once looked rather like Cragg's in that he held to the revealed status of 
the Incarnation and atonement until his adoption of Theocentrism. The shift in Hick's 
understanding of the role of Apostolic theology in Christology coincided with his 
encounter with people of other faiths in the late 1960's. Therefore his abandonment of the 
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beliefs that God was in Christ ontologically and that God dealt with sin through the cross 
was not solely related to an awareness of Muslim conceptions of Christ, but was also 
caused by a wider interaction with Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists. In terms of Islamic 
perceptions, Hick thinks that a functional rather than ontological relationship between 
Jesus and God is essential for common life. Being able to live together in harmony rather 
than in communal strife necessitates Christians seeing Jesus as a Spirit filled man who was 
exceptionally conscious of God, but not as a man who is the union of divine and human 
natures. This enables Muslims to agree with Christians that Jesus was among the greatest 
saints and enables Christians to agree with Muslims that Muhammad was among the 
greatest prophets of God to humanity. 
509 Hick's Christology is much more likely to be 
received warmly by Muslims than Cragg's since Jesus is aligned with other prophets in 
status, but at the same time is unlikely to be accepted by most Christians who view Christ 
as much more than a prophet. 
As far as the death of Jesus of Nazareth is concerned, there is no historical doubt 
for Hick that it took place, but the function of that death in the faith of the New Testament 
church need not be upheld by the modem church. If the latter could set aside the notion of 
atonement through the cross so central to the Apostolic testimony then good relations with 
Muslims may follow. After all, the forgiveness of God for human sin can be received 
without the narrow focus of the death of the Incarnate Christ. Salvation in its broadest 
sense has been achieved by many humans who knew nothing of the saving effects of 
Christ's death. So at this point in human history, Christians need to give full 
acknowledgement to these facts, even though they may continue to value the New 
Testament faith and the developed theology of the church for internal worship and life. In 
other words, Hick recommends a generous attitude on the part of Christians to the life of 
God in Islamic tradition that gives equality to Islamic spirituality. The `grace' of God has 
509See9.1.1. &2. 
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surely been at work in Muhammad and a host of his followers down the centuries just as 
much as in Jesus and many of his followers. Ultimately Christ is an exemplar for others of 
a true spiritual life, and he will always have an outstanding role for Muslims as well as 
Christians. 510 This attitude to divine forgiveness is likely to appeal to Muslims as true to 
Islam, but is not going to be accepted by the majority of Christians who maintain a definite 
connection between the death of Christ and forgiveness for sin. 
In the final analysis, by confining Christ to being an exemplar for the spiritual 
experience of others, Hick parts company with mainstream Christians who continue to 
uphold the Incarnation and atonement as true, and therefore he does not represent majority 
Christian opinion in dialogue with Muslims. Hick's pioneering Christology leaves him 
exposed on the fringes of Christianity with the result that he can only speak for a small 
number of like-minded theologians. Thus while providing an attractive portrait of Christ 
from a Muslim point of view, Hick may mislead Muslims into thinking that he is in the 
vanguard of a new approach to Christology that will become increasingly accepted by 
other Christians when this is unlikely to be the case. 
11.3. The Christology of Hans King 
Kling comes somewhere between Cragg and Hick in his estimation of Christ. He believes 
that the Incarnation was an Apostolic overlay on the much more modest claims of Jesus of 
Nazareth, who was proclaimed Son of God only after his death and resurrection. In fact 
this conviction of the early church did not initially involve an ontological identification 
between Jesus and God, but only a relationship of equal authority. If Christians could give 
up the more ontological identity between Father and Son found in later New Testament 
writing and in the creeds of the Patristic period, then relations with Muslims would 
510 See 9.1.3. 
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improve dramatically. Everything gained by two centuries of gospel scholarship should be 
harnassed by Christians in their expession of Christology at the end of the twentieth 
century. Muslims then would have no serious quarrel with Christians about the language of 
Christ's sonship, since it would refer only to an adopted rather than an essential status. All 
the arguments concerning eternal sonship mounted by Christians in the past then become 
redundant, and Christians and Muslims are able to relate on equal terms about Jesus. 
511 
Certainly, Kung's desire to eliminate ontology from Christology is likely to find a warm 
response from Muslims, but his denial of the Apostolic faith in the essentially divine 
character of Christ distances him from most Christians. 
Kling recognises that some details in the portrait of Christ in the gospels may yet 
cause conflict between Christians and Muslims. Jesus' criticism of the Jewish law implies 
a criticism of Islamic law, though Kling does not specify details of which parts of the latter 
come under scrutiny. He seems more concerned to promote Jesus' attack on organising 
spritual life around rule keeping, but concedes that this is a major difficulty for most 
Muslims who value such a form of community life. Another difficulty arises in the fact of 
the death of Jesus on the cross being annulled by the Qur'än. Kling challenges modem 
Muslims to engage in historical criticism of their scriptures in the same way that Christians 
have done with the Bible, and so accept the historical fact of the cross. He encourages 
Muslims to follow the suggestion of M. M. Ayoub that the denial of the crucifixion in Süra 
4: 157 can be understood as a denial of the death of God's `word'. 512 
Kung's polemical approach to the interpretation of the Qur'än is hardly likely to 
commend him to Muslims but he seems oblivious to this problem. Like Cragg he thinks 
history must win the argument over theology, though unlike Cragg he does not insist that 
God's forgiveness comes through the historical event of the death of Christ. Forgiveness 
may be granted by God to Muslims without the mediation of Christ's death as a sacrifice 
311 See 9.2.1. 
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for sin, so the value of Christ's death lies rather in the expession of God's love in the self- 
giving of Jesus, and the assurance that God is involved in human suffering to bring new 
meaning and hope. 513 
Kling then rejects Cragg's insistence on the Incarnation and atonement as essential 
to Christology and to ongoing relations with Muslims. On the other hand, he disagrees with 
Hick's reading of Jesus' attitude to Jewish law, and to his setting aside of the death of 
Jesus. Both of these details from the gospels must be upheld by Christians as historical 
facts and cannot merely be regarded as interpretations of Jesus' life that are negotiable 
because Muslims do not approve. On the contrary, one of the tasks of genuine dialogue 
between Christians and Muslims is to get consensus on the facts of history, and Muslims 
have to be persuaded that this is essential to good relations between the two faith 
communities. 
Like Hick, KUng has been interested in relationships between Christians and people 
of many different faiths rather than merely Christian relations with Muslims, so his 
Christology reflects this wider audience. His understanding of Christology in dialogue with 
Nasr does not differ in any important respect from that presented in his 1976 On Being a 
Christian, and his subsequent treatment of Christology in his 1995 Christianity: The 
Religious Situation of Our Time does not answer Muslim questions about Christian 
perceptions of Christ. Despite dialogue with Nasr, Küng does not make Islamic thought 
central to his construction of Christology, and this is bound to make his presentation of 
Christ seem to Muslims unconnected to their perceptions of him. 
Kung's Christology departs from mainstream Catholic doctrine which continues to 
insist on the Incarnation and atonement as essential to faith in Christ, and therefore his 
ability to represent his own church community in dialogue with Muslims is put in question. 
Muslims who wish to understand Catholic faith in Christ cannot rely on Kung's 
512 For Ayoub's view see 1.2.3 
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Christology and this limits the impact of the dialogue between Nasr and Kung to a large 
extent. 
11.4. The Christology of Sirs al-Masih 
The Christ of Sra a1-Masi is certainly similar to the Christ of the gospels in many 
respects. He performs the same miracles, tells the same stories, makes similar authoritative 
pronouncements in God's name, and sets himself on a collision course with Jewish leaders 
that leads to his arrest and crucifixion. However, he speaks a different kind of language 
from that found in the gospels in some respects. He rarely calls God his Father and never 
refers to himself as Son of man. Instead of speaking of the future Son of man, he talks 
about al-Mahdi coming at the end of the age. His followers never call him Son of God as 
they often do in the gospels. Sra's Christ has no identity of being with God, although he 
does appear to have an eternal relationship with him. Therefore the eternal Christ has a 
status of equal authority to God that is expressed in his teaching and actions in God's 
name. There is a kind of Incarnation in view here; the eternal Word becomes human, but 
there is no mention of the eternal Son taking flesh. Without doubt Sira has presented a 
form of Incarnation tailored to Muslim sensibilities over ideas of sonship. By virtually 
eliminating any talk of a father-son relationship between Jesus and God Sira has accepted 
the force of Qur'änic criticism of Christian thinking about Christ. 514 This imaginative 
reshaping of the gospel story avoids the need to advance an apologetic for traditional 
gospel language as Cragg and Kting have done. 
Sira has gone beyond anything seen in the history of Christian-Muslim dialogue. 
Cragg and Küng stand outside the Islamic world in their thinking, and do not hesitate to 
judge the Qur'än as containing an erroneous portrait of Christ. Sira is composed from 
113See9.2.1. &3. 
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within the Islamic world by Christians fully aware of the reality of life as a minority in an 
Islamic milieu. Only Sira among modern presentations of Christ for Muslims has accepted 
the full responsibility of speaking about Christ in terms that Muslims may receive without 
instantly rejecting as unsound. Muslims may well find this portrait congenial to their 
perceptions of Christ in such a way that they are enabled to see the fuller life of Christ 
found in the gospels as completing the summary details in the Qur'än. 
Even though Sra has overemphasised Christ's predictions of his crucifixion, the 
way that he speaks of his death inverts the Qur'änic denial in süra 4: 157, "they did not kill 
him, they did not crucify him" to drive the point home that he was killed, he was crucified. 
The very telling of the story makes use of Islamic language to suggest to Muslim readers 
another interpretation of the denial of Christ's death. Instead of seeing sara 4: 157 as 
simply wrong in the way that Cragg and Küng have done, Sra turns the negative statement 
into a positive one to offer Muslims a challenging new view of Christ's death. Once again 
Sra shows the importance of engaging with Muslims from within an Islamic worldview 
rather than coming from outside as Cragg and Küng have done. Still, the denial of the 
crucifixion may not so easily be undone by Sra's transformation of negation to affirmation 
and the basic contradiction between gospel testimony and Qur'änic counter claim remains 
a continuing problem for Christian-Muslim dialogue. In terms of answering the question 
about how Christology has developed as a result of engagement with the Islamic context, it 
is the case that Sira has taken that context more completely into the presentation of Christ 
than Cragg, King or Hick have done. 515 
Nevertheless, Sra has not replaced standard translations of the gospels in Arabic, 
and therefore has a limited role among Arabic speaking Christians. Whether such a 
contextual version of the gospels can become more widely accepted by Christians remains 
to be seen. In other words, Arab Muslims, who may be drawn to the Christ presented in 
514 See 10.2-4. 
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Sira, are still faced with the traditional portrait prized by Arab Christians as a whole with 
all the problems inherent in the established versions of the gospels that Sira has attempted 
to overcome. Once again, creative theology in dialogue comes up against traditional modes 
of expressing faith held by the majority to be essential. 
11.5. Muslim Responses to Christian Views of Christ in the twentieth century 
11.5.1. The truth about Christ comes from the Qur'än 
The Muslim dialogue partners of Cragg and Küng, al-Farügi and Nasr, both base their 
understanding of Christ on the Qur'änie portrait. Al-Farügi's discussion of the Incarnation 
depends on the assumption that the Qur'an forbids the association of God with any aspect 
of the world he created. In other words, the Qur'an prohibits the Christian notion of a 
descent of God to the earth to indwell a particular human being in Palestine. Thus any 
dialogue about Jesus of Nazareth has to be conducted on the basis of this Qur'änic 
restriction. Cragg's challenge to al-Farügi to make room for the possibility of Incarnation 
as part of God's freedom of action is met by the warning that God has revealed in the 
Qur'an that certain divine actions are inconceivable as contradictory to the character of 
God. If God is transcendent then he cannot be immanent in the created world, the latter 
cancels the former. Christ then must be seen as human but not divine. 516 
Nasr objects to Kting's criticisms of the Qur'An by asserting that for all Muslims 
without exception the whole of the Qur'an is the word of God and not just certain parts of 
it. Therefore Kiing's challenge to Muslims to reject the truth of süra 4: 157 and come to 
accept that Jesus was crucified is flatly turned down by Nasr on behalf of the worldwide 
Muslim community. No Muslim can state that a section of the Qur'an is wrong in its 
515 See 10.7. 
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claims, and Christians ought not to insist that Muslims do to the Qur'an what Christians 
have done to the Bible. If Christians want to dialogue with Muslims then they will have to 
adhere to this principle, otherwise no serious conversation can take place. 517 
The approach of Cragg and Kting to the Qur'an is not likely to be the best way 
forward for twenty-first century dialogue between Christians and Muslims, because any 
direct challenge to the authority of the Qur'an simply frustrates genuine dialogue. If 
Muslims are completely united in their conviction that the whole of the Qur'an is the 
unadulterated speech of God then Christians who attempt to dialogue with Muslims must 
accept that the starting point for dialogue is the acceptance of this Islamic premise. Even 
Hick fails to observe the principle when he asks Muslims to accept a variety of scriptures 
as equally revelatory, so that in the end the Qur'an is on the same level as Hindu or 
Buddhist sacred texts. Thus while accepting its spiritual value, he does not accord the 
Qur'an the status that Muslims do. A more fruitful approach to dialogue could arise if 
Christians were to develop concepts and arguments for their Christology from the teaching 
of the Qur'an in the way that Sira has done. 
11.5.2. The historical Jesus did not teach his equality with God in terms of the Trinity or 
the Incarnation 
Al-Farügi is adept at using Christian gospel scholarship to confound traditional Christian 
readings of the teaching of Jesus. Thus the Trinitarian ideas in Mat 28: 19 cannot be 
ascribed to Jesus but rather to the early church. The same applies, of course, to the 
Johannine emphasis on the eternal identity of the Word with God, and to the sayings of 
Jesus in the fourth gospel claiming eternal equality between himself and his Father. Cragg 
seems unwilling to discuss the disparity between the heightened Incarnational and 
516 See 8.3. 
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Trinitarian thought in the gospels and Jesus' own thought patterns, but it is clear that 
Muslims need to be treated to a more discriminating analysis of the gospels by Christians 
who dialogue on Cbristology. 518 
Siddiqi's approval of Hick's Christological ideas is related to Hick's ability to 
separate out the historical Jesus from the Christ of the early church's faith. Muslims seem 
happier to dialogue with Christians who accept the results of their own gospel scholars 
than with those who choose to ignore them. Hick's insistence that Jesus upheld Jewish law, 
only declared forgiveness on God's behalf and not on his own authority, and never 
presumed to be divine, is a good basis for dialogue with Muslims in the mind of Siddiqi. 
519 Nevertheless, some explanation of the rise of Incarnational and Trinitarian thought 
needs to be given by Christians in dialogue, lest the whole history of the Christian faith be 
left unexplained to Muslims. If Sharafuddin could call the Incarnation "an agelong blunder 
in Christian thought" 520 it is obviously vital that Christians can give an appropriate 
apologetic for the faith of the early church. 
Cragg does expound the message of Paul and John in Jesus and the Muslim but 
fails to adequately explain how their understanding of the Incarnation developed from the 
teaching of Jesus. His insistence on the awareness of the historical Jesus of his divinity on 
the one hand and his mission to die for the sins of humanity on the other means that for 
Cragg there is only a small step between Jesus' self revelation and the early church's faith 
in him. However, if Jesus did not teach his Incarnation or his atonement for sinful 
humanity then another account is required of how the Apostolic message arose. Kling 
explores this shift in Christianity: The Religious Situation of Our Time but not in the 
context of a Muslim readership. Therefore a major task of future dialogue must be the 
sly See 9.2.2. 
518 See 8.3. 
519 See 9.1.2. 
520 Ibid. For a similar assessment of the Incarnation as a mistaken development in Christian thought see M. 
'Ata al-Rabim, Jesus-A Prophet of Islam, London, 1977. 
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careful explanation of the development of New Testament faith in the Incarnation, 
atonement and Trinity, all of which are present in the very gospels that provide information 
about the historical Jesus. If the gospels are composed in the light of faith in the 
Incarnation, atonement and Trinity then presentations of Christ for Muslims should benefit 
from unfolding the reasons behind this process. 
11.5.3. Nasr's two kinds of Revelation 
The suggestion of Nasr that God may have intended to reveal the death of Christ to 
Christians and the non-crucifixion of Christ to Muslims is intriguing even if it is 
idiosyncratic. No doubt he adopted this scheme to make room for the historical fact of the 
cross while at the same time maintaining the veracity of the Qur'änic denial of the fact. 
However, he failed to maintain the same double view of revealed truth in relation to other 
aspects of Qur'änic dispute with the Bible. Thus Islamic law which is clearly given in the 
Qur'än is non-negotiable as revelation from God, and Christians should not attempt to 
challenge the revealed character of that law in dialogue. Any dialogue on ethics must come 
up against the disparity between the ethics of Jesus and the Qur'än, but Nasr is warning 
that Muslims are not ready to make concessions on revelation in this area, except perhaps 
to allow each community to follow their own understanding of right behaviour. 521 This 
discussion of Islamic law as the revealed will of God does have a bearing on the suggestion 
of some Christians that dialogue with Muslims should in future avoid theological ideas and 
concentrate on ethics. The conclusion to the thesis will examine this proposal in the light of 
Nasr's refusal to allow Christians to question the revelatory character of Qur'änic ethics. 
52L See 9.2.2. 
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The Qur'änic insistence that Jesus came with the same message as Abraham and Moses 
and that he confirmed the Torah brought to the Jews could be a basis for Christian-Muslim 
dialogue if Sanders and Hick are right about Jesus' attitude to Jewish law. If Jesus 
confirmed the law rather than definitively undermining it then he may appear to Muslims 
as a recognisable figure. Certainly, Hick hopes that the new view of Jesus as an upholder 
of the law will create a new climate for Christian-Muslim relations. Nevertheless, Küng's 
trenchant rejection of this interpretation of Jesus' teaching shows that debate on specific 
details of Christ's teaching may continue without consensus for some time to come. If 
Jesus wanted to replace law keeping with faith as the majority of gospel scholars believe 
then the Sanders-Hick school of interpretation may struggle to become representative of 
mainstream Christian thought. 
As a result of this divide Muslims will doubtless be able to argue that the lack of 
consensus among gospel scholars demonstrates the inherent weakness of the gospels as 
authentic source material for the life of Christ. Traditional accusations of corruption of the 
pure Injil brought by Jesus will continue to be fuelled by these disagreements between 
Christians over the actual teaching of Jesus. 
11.6. Conclusion 
Developments in Christology are seen in the way Islamic concerns are addressed by the 
Christian apologists. Cragg has a more thorough understanding of Muslim thought than 
Kling or Hick and thinks the main issue for dialogue is an inadequate Muslim view of the 
transendence of God. If Muslims could accept that transendence includes immanence then 
the Incarnation would become intelligible for them. For Cragg, the development is not so 
much in Christology as in the doctrine of God. Kling and Hick leave behind an 
Incarnational Christology as no longer acceptable for modem Christians who want to 
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dialogue with people of other faiths. Kling thinks that the early Apostolic belief that Jesus 
was adopted by God can be retained but that the later ideas of eternal sonship and 
ontological equality between Christ and God must be discarded. Christ reveals the 
authority of God in his teaching, the power of God in his healings, and the love of God in 
his death. He believes that this more semitic Christology will appeal to Muslims. Hick 
thinks that this portrait is still too far removed from the real Jesus who was only a human 
channel for God's authority, power and love. He claimed no unique divine qualities for 
himself. If Christians could jettison the whole Apostolic superstructure placed on Jesus 
then relations with people of other faiths would dramatically improve, and Christians 
would be able to accept other religious leaders, such as Muhammad, on equal terms with 
Christ. Kling and Hick do not address Islamic thought in isolation from other religious 
worldviews, though they believe that their Christologies foster dialogue with Muslims. 
Sra presents Christ as an obedient servant of God who is able to teach with divine 
authority, perform mighty divine deeds, and die as a means of bringing God's forgiveness 
to wayward humans. There are hints of him having an eternal origin and equality of status 
with God, but these are not emphasised to allow Muslims to appreciate this Christian life 
of Christ without rejecting it outright. Here Muslim perceptions meet gospel scholarship to 
produce a contextualised life of Christ that makes a unique contribution to 
Christian/Muslim dialogue. 
The response by the Muslim dialogue partners shows that any insistence on aspects 
of Christology that contradict the Qur'änic account of Christ fails to convince. Cragg's 
reinterpretation of transcendence is unnacceptable to al-Farügi because the Qur'än does not 
support it. God cannot become human on any sane reading of the Qur'än, and Christians 
ought not to give misleading Qur'änic interpretations in dialogue with Muslims. Kung's 
accusation that the Qur'än is wrong about the cross offends Nasr who points out that 
dialogue should be conducted on non-polemical principles. Hick's cirenic approach to 
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Islamic ideas hides a more aggressive tone when Siddiqi challenges him to admit the truth 
of divine revelation. Hick's failure to acknowledge revelation on Islamic terms counts 
against his seemingly more Islamic account of Christ. Sira's attempt to turn the Qur'änic 
denial of the crucifixion into a prediction of the cross would probably be regarded by 
Muslims as completely illegitimate. 
On the other hand, Muslims do appreciate the Christian effort to reinterpret Christ 
in human terms. Nasr hails Küng and Siddiqi applauds Hick for taking Islamic convictions 
seriously in their presentations of Christ. Certainly their very human Jesus is more 
acceptable to Muslims as a starting point for dialogue than Cragg's Incarnate Christ, whose 
humanity is rather muted in the process of carrying out of his divine mission to redeem 
humanity. Sira's hidden Incarnate Christ could therefore be helpful in dialogue with 
Muslims, since Christ speaks and acts as one called by God to serve his people. While it is 
true that Sira's Christ sometimes suggests that he acts on the basis of a divine status, for 
the most part he is recognisably human to a Muslim reader. There is much then to be 
gained in dialogue on Christology by presenting the life of Christ in such a way that 
Muslims can meet the Christ of history before they are asked to consider the faith of the 




12.1. Ninth and Twentieth century presentations of Christ for Muslims 
This thesis has analysed Christian apologetic writing on Christ from the two most creative 
periods of Christian-Muslim relations. During the early decades of the ninth century, 
Christian theologians in the Middle East engaged in debate with Muslim intellectuals on 
the basis of a common language and shared ideas, which represented a significant 
development in Christian appreciation of Islam over earlier apologetic writing. Subsequent 
Christian presentations of Christology for Muslims over many centuries failed to match 
those of the ninth century for creativity and insight into Muslim categories of thought. 
Dialogue between Christians and Muslims in the last decades of the twentieth century 
produced another creative period of Christian apologetics. Some theologians saw the 
importance of presenting Christology in dialogue with Muslims and opened up fresh 
avenues of thinking about Christ in Islam and Christianity. 
12.1.1. Ninth century defence of the Incarnation as compatible with Islamic thought 
The characteristic of ninth century apologetics was the attempt to argue for the truth of the 
Incarnation on the basis of premises acceptable to Muslims. This effort was determined by 
the fact of Islamic political control in the Middle East that had two conequences for 
Christians. Firstly, since considerable numbers of nominal Christians were embracing 
Islam, Christian leaders felt the need to mount a credible intellectual defence of the truth of 
Christianity in order to stem the transfers out of their community. In addressing Christians, 
Abü Qurra, Abü Rä'ila and 'Ammär were trying to demonstrate that Christianity was 
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actually a more complete account of truth than that given in Islam. In other words, the 
revelation of God according to Islam was not so much untrue as incomplete. Therefore 
members of the churches could maintain their faith in Christ without sacrificing their 
intelligence. Secondly, since Christians were not free to directly criticise Islam in their 
writing, theologians had to use indirect ways to uphold Christian ideas when addressing 
Muslims. Thus they never at any time opposed the teaching of the Qur'än as false, but 
rather based Christian truth on Qur'änic teaching. This appeal to foundational truths in 
Islam allowed these apologists to argue that Christian truth was compatible with the 
teaching of Islam when rightly understood. 
While eighth century apologists had made a beginning in defence of the 
Incarnation, the three early ninth century theologians surveyed took debate to higher levels 
of sophistication. For example, Patriarch Timothy's defence of the Incarnation in 781-2 
was a careful explanation of the two natures - two hypostases Nestorian Christology, which 
did not attempt to argue for the divine becoming human in Christ on Islamic principles. 
'Ammär, the Nestorian theologian of the generation after Timothy, not only expounded 
Nestorian Christology to Muslims but also argued that the Incarnation was essential to the 
knowledge of God by human beings. Indirectly, 'Ammär was criticising Islam for 
witholding that knowledge in the restriction of revelation to God's speech. Christianity, 
according to 'Ammar offered a fuller and therefore truer account of revelation in the union 
of the divine and human natures of Christ. In this way, the ninth century theologian argued 
with Muslims on their terms rather than merely making intelligible to Muslims what 
Christians believed. 
All three ninth century apologists attempted to argue for the immanence of God in 
time and space as a way of defending the truth of the Incarnation by joining in current 
Islamic debate about the relationship between God and the created world. So Abü Rä'ita 
quoted Muslim interpretation of the throne texts of the Qur'an to argue that God's 
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relationship with Jesus is akin to his relationship to his throne in that he is both in one 
place and in every place simultaneously. Since Muslims could envisage divine immanence 
alongside divine transcendence they could be led to see Christ as a focus for the 
immanence of the transcendent God. Al-Bägilläni's rejection of the parallel between God 
sitting on a throne and indwelling a human body shows that the argument was taken 
seriously by Muslims long after the early ninth century. 
Another feature of the three ninth century apologists was their attempt to deal with 
Islamic denials of Christological convictions. Since the Qur'än denied that God took a son, 
Abü Qurra usually and Abii Rä'ita and'Ammär always avoided the title `Son of God' in 
favour of `Word of God'. In addition, they spoke not of God taking a son, but of the Word 
taking a body, most probably to deflect Muslim attention away from the Qur'änic text 
towards the genuine Christian understanding of Christ's divine status. If Muslims could 
comprehend that Christians actually accepted the denial that God took a son then they 
might be willing to consider the Christian conviction that the Incarnation meant the 
appropriation of a human body by the divine Word. Despite disagreement between the 
three apologists over the manner of the `taking' they could unite on the basic fact that it 
happened. This indirect criticism of Islamic thought was consonant with their position as 
Christian subjects of Islamic rule, and serves as an example to modern Christians in 
dialogue with Muslims of the re-use of Qur'Anic language by Christians to aid 
communication in particularly sensitive areas. 
The denial of the death of Christ was more challenging for the ninth century 
apologists, though 'Ammär developed good illustrations from life to show the value of the 
self-giving of Christ for needy humans. However, none of the three were able to turn the 
text of the Qur'än to good account in explaining the crucifixion that was so 
comprehensively denied there. The limits of dialogue appear to have been reached at this 
point despite the effort to harness Muslim perceptions of Christ on their part. The fact that 
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modern apologists have not been able to improve on the performance of these ninth 
century writers in respect of the denial of the cross shows just how intractable this text of 
the Qur'än remains. 
12.1.2. Twentieth century presentation of the historical Jesus as supplementing the 
QurIanic portrait of Christ 
Whereas the ninth century apologists were concerned with defending a developed theology 
of Incarnation, their twentieth century counterparts were preoccupied with historical 
concerns underlying a developed theology. Since an emphasis on the facts of history was a 
characteristic of European theological writing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it is 
hardly surprising that modern Christians engaged in dialogue with Muslims about Christ 
should begin with his biography. Cragg, Küng, Hick and Sra all shared the conviction that 
Muslims had partial knowledge of the historical Jesus in the Qur'än that needed to be filled 
out by more detailed information found in the gospels. The assessment of the Qur'änic 
contribution varied. Kling complained not only of the paucity but also the distortion of 
history in the Qur'anic account of Jesus. Cragg too held the Qur'an to be falsifying the 
historical fact of the crucifixion while at the same time symbolically alluding to the 
historical event of the last supper. While ninth century apologists had refrained from 
criticising the truth of the Qur'an, these two twentieth century theologians did not hesitate 
to judge the Qur'an to contain historical error. They reasoned that the Qur'an should be 
subjected to historical scrutiny just as the gospels had been, in order to separate developed 
theology from historical fact. This was why the Qur'an was commended by Cragg and 
King for mentioning the healing ministry of Jesus but reproved for denying his 
crucifixion. 
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While Cragg and Kiing stressed the essential nature of history for faith, Hick 
abandoned his earlier agreement with this view for his later theory that faith can be 
divorced from history altogether. Thus Hick's criticism of the Qur'än for failing to contain 
an accurate historical account of the death of Jesus was muted by his abandonment of the 
importance of history for faith. Muslims and Christians can agree to differ on the fact of 
the cross since salvation is found through religious experience rather than knowledge of 
history, and thus they should celebrate their common faith in God arrived at by different 
routes and leave aside evident differences over the historical Jesus. Sira, on the other hand, 
turned the Qur'änic denial text into an affirmation, so challenging Muslims to accept that 
the Qur'an is wrong to deny what happened to Christ. In the end, all four twentieth century 
examples of apologetic writing held that the Qur'an was wrong about the end of Jesus' life. 
The denial of the cross by Muslims remained an impenetrable wall for Christians engaged 
in dialogue. 
Modem apologetics dealt with the denial of sonship in a variety of ways. Cragg 
talked of `filiality' to avoid biological nuances and he argued that Christ's eternal status is 
akin to the eternal status of the Qur'än in order to make a case for the Incarnation. In 
contrast, Kting and Hick argued that the Incarnation was redundant in contemporary 
Christology and should no longer be a cause of division between Christians and Muslims. 
King was prepared to retain the title of `son'in the sense of Christ being adopted by God, 
but Hick decided that it was too great a barrier to dialogue to be kept in use. SYra followed 
Hick for the most part except in a few situations where the title clearly had no biological 
reference. These responses to the denial of sonship demonstrate the search for genuine 
communication on the part of Christians in dialogue with Muslims. Perhaps the best 
solution was to avoid the idea as much as possible. 
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Nevertheless, the historical fact that Jesus called himself `son of man' was largely 
ignored in these modern presentations. Sira's removal of the favourite title from Jesus' lips 
illustrates the sensitivity felt over the word `son' appearing at all in a life of Christ. This 
wariness over `son of man' contrasts strangely with the polemical defence of the cross in 
modern writing for Muslims. A case could be made for Christians to separate out two types 
of `son' ascription, one by Jesus himself that did not assert equality with God, and `son of 
God' applied to him by others to mean identity of status but not by Jesus himself. Kling 
pointed out that the claim of Jesus to a special relationship with God as his `father' was 
raised to a higher level by the early church in the ascription of a divine status to Jesus, but 
he made little of the distinction in his dialogue with Nasr. In the final analysis, the 
presentation of the historical Jesus for Muslims stood in need of greater precision over the 
use of the title `son' than was actually offered in the writing surveyed. 
12.2. Types of Christology in ninth and twentieth century apologetics 
The ninth century apologists shared a common Incarnational Christology even though they 
disagreed over the exact manner of the union of the divine with the human in Christ. In the 
twentieth century Cragg and Sira also held to aspects of an Incarnational Christology. 
However, Küng and Hick believed that modern Christians could no longer think of a 
descent of the divine in Christ despite the long tradition of such a belief in the church. 
Kling suggested that the man Jesus was given divine status as a result of his ministry rather 
than prior to his birth as Christian tradition taught. Hick let go of divine entry concepts 
altogether, preferring to see Jesus as a man supremely at one spiritually with God. 
274 
12.2.1. Christ as divine and human: five versions of Incarnational Christology 
The versions of the incarnation by Abü Qurra, Abü Rä'ita, 'Am när, Cragg and Sira can be 
classified as ontological or functional. The three ninth century writers believe in an 
ontological union of the divine and human in Christ, but the two twentieth century 
representatives hold to a more functional union of the divine and human. Among the three 
ontological Christologies, Abü Rä'ita represents the Word/flesh Alexandrian tradition, 
which took the divine to be the operative principle in Christ. In this Christology, the 
humanity of Christ is a passive receptacle for divine thought and action. At the other 
extreme, 'Ammar represents the Word/human nature Antiochene tradition, which 
understood a union of two separate natures in Christ. In this Christology, the humanity of 
Christ is in active co-operation with the divine nature throughout the life of Christ, with the 
result that there is a genuine interplay between the human and divine minds in Christ in 
thought and action. Abü Qurra's adherence to the Chalcedonian definition is seen in his 
insistence that after the union of the Word with the human nature taken from Mary and 
perfected from corruption there was complete harmony between the two minds in Christ. 
The two modern functional Christologies avoid the idea of a union of being in 
Christ. Cragg thinks that an ontological union is neither reflected in early New Testament 
Christology nor is adequate in modem times. He has no doubt however, that the descent of 
the divine is essential for a right understanding of the significance of Jesus of Nazareth. 
Sra presents Jesus as claiming an eternal existence but not an ontological union with God. 
Here the Johannine unity of being is removed from Jesus' speech while the logos is named 
as Jesus existing from the beginning. Thus in Sira Christ may not be ontologically united 
with God but he exists with God before entering time as a human being. 
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Abü R . 'ita's one nature Christology seems least likely to make sense to Muslims 
since he insists that Christ had only a divine mind. In other words, a Muslim would rightly 
understand him to believe that Jesus was not a human being in the normal sense, but God 
hidden in a human body. Jesus then appeared to be human but according to Abü Ra'ita was 
actually divine. In order to avoid this conclusion Abü Rä'ita borrowed the Islamic idea of 
divine attributes and applied it to Christ, with the result that Christ is the divine Word who 
has two attributes of divinity and humanity. This allows him to argue that the humanity of 
Christ is not totally obscured by his divinity as a Muslim may imagine. Christ did feel pain 
and did die in his human attribute, but the divine attribute was untouched by suffering. 
Still, this would be no solution for a Muslim who would be able to point out that in this 
scheme the Word does not feel pain or die, and so the mind of Christ remains aloof from 
all weakness and suffering. Christ then is simply not human. Ultimately, the Word/flesh 
tradition fails to allow for a truly human Christ and as such is an inadequate Christology. 
'Ammär's two nature Christology surely would fare better with Muslims, since 
Christ is regarded by him as having a human mind as well as a human body, and thus is 
recognisable as a human being. In addition, 'Ammar's Christ has real struggles in 
performing the will of God that suggest a dialectical relationship between his two natures. 
The human side of Christ is tested to the end of his life in order to show perfect obedience 
to God even though Christ has a divine side that presumably has no difficulty fulfilling 
God's commands. This ambivalence in Christ is a precursor of modern psychological 
understanding of competing drives in humans and makes 'Ammar's Christ seem real to 
modern people. Muslims could see this Christ as human yet not understand the connection 
between his humanity and his divinity. They might think that the divinity of Christ either is 
incapable of enabling the humanity to do the will of God or is essentially cut off from the 
humanity when Christ suffers pain and death. Whichever way 'Ammar puts the case they 
would probably conclude that the divinity is compromised by the humanity. Finally, the 
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Word/human nature tradition gains on the human side of Christ but loses the importance of 
the divine in him. A better balance is needed in the dual characteristic of Christ's thinking 
and acting. 
Abü Qurra's Chalcedonian version of the two natures Christology offers a stronger 
integration between the divine and human in Christ. For Abü Qurra, Christ's human mind 
is always in tune with his divine mind, so that there is no struggle in carrying out the will 
of God. There is no lifelong testing of the human mind but rather a harmonious co- 
operation in which the divine mind informs and influences the human one to think and act 
appropriately. Thus when the human nature feels pain and succumbs to death, the divine 
nature is still very much working in Christ to 'compensate for the suffering taking place in 
the human nature. Christ may suffer and die but Christ at the same time does not suffer or 
die, since the two minds experience different realities simultaneously without cancelling 
the other out. Muslims might be able to see their own view of God's messengers always 
thinking and acting in the will of God in this Christology. However, the co-operation 
between the divine and human minds in Christ would not fit into their conception of Jesus 
as one of those messengers. While they could accept a co-operation between the human 
mind of Christ and God's mind in terms of Christ receiving messages from God, they 
could not agree to the divine mind implanted in Christ as presented here. Nevertheless, of 
the three ninth century Christologies, Abü Qurra's is the most satisfactory, since his Christ 
is far more integrated in thought and action than 'Ammar's dialectical Christ, and far more 
human than Abü Rä'ita's one dimensional Christ. 
Cragg dismisses Chaledonian Christology as undynamic and static and so seeks for 
a more realistic way of combining the divine and human in Christ. Ile represents much 
twentieth century theology in wishing to move away from ontological to functional 
categories in Christology. But in order to achieve a more dynamic portrait of the 
Incarnation along the lines of the hymn to Christ in Philippians 2, he jettisons talk of divine 
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and human natures in favour of divine presence. Thus God was present in Christ revealing 
himself through the teaching and actions of Jesus of Nazareth. Some were willing to 
acknowledge the presence of God in this remarkable man, but others refused to accept the 
evidence before them. Cragg believes it is important not to argue that Jesus' disciples 
invested him with divinity after his death, but to steadfastly hold that they recognised his 
divine power, authority and character while he lived with them. He was as much the 
eternal Lord of the cosmos before his resurrection and exaltation as he would be in the 
experience of the early church that worshipped him as such. For Cragg, the central point of 
Christology is the personal revelation of God in Christ, but this cannot be expressed in the 
ontological language of the ancient creeds. When we look at Christ we see God, and that 
should suffice for a modem creed. Muslims could certainly see a human being in Cragg's 
Christ, since there is no talk of a divine mind thinking and acting. However, they would 
probably fail to spot God in Christ's teaching and actions, since any Godly words and 
deeds they come across in the gospel accounts could simply be attributed to Jesus 
performing the will of God as prophets normally do. Therefore a functional Christology is 
capable of being interpreted by Muslims as a great man functioning in the will of God, but 
not as a great man functioning as God. Nevertheless, a Christology of divine presence 
bridges the gap bewteen the Apostle Paul and modem psychology in a way that makes 
better sense at the end of the twentieth century than the ontological Christology of John's 
gospel and the Patristic period. 
Sra's Christology also reflects the same modem unease about ontological 
categories in the removal of the Johannine claims that Jesus is one with the Father, and that 
the Word is God. There is no testimony to an identity of being between Jesus and God in 
this life of Christ, but Jesus does talk of existing before Abraham, and Jesus the Word 
certainly was with God at the beginning of the world. Therefore, Jesus pre-existed his 
human life in another spiritual state that predated creation. This is Incarnation of the Word 
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of God without specifying the relationship between Jesus the divine Word and Jesus the 
human. Sra has stripped away the ontological Christology found in the fourth gospel while 
retaining claims to an equality of status between Jesus and God made there. This in turn 
enhances Jesus' authority to forgive sin directly, rather than merely in God's name, taken 
from the synoptic gospels and repeated unchanged here. Jesus then functions as God in 
offering forgiveness because he existed with God in eternity. Muslims would relate to 
Christ in Sra more easily than in the gospels themselves since the titles `father' and `son' 
are virtually absent and Jesus never claims an identity of being with God. The two main 
difficulties for Muslims are the pre-existence of Jesus and his redeeming death. Sra's 
functional Christology goes some way towards meeting the needs of modern Christians for 
a Christ who is credible as a human being but who also displays divine characteristics, but 
the decision to keep the eternity of the Word but not the identity between Christ and God 
from the fourth gospel will probably strike them as inconsistent and untenable. 
12.2.2. Christ as a man appointed to divine status 
The importance of Christology from below rather than from above is argued for by Küng 
and results in his seeing Jesus of Nazareth as elevated to a position of divine authority 
because of his committed obedience to God. Kling believes that the idea of the descent of 
theWord is a late development in the thinking of the early church and that modem 
Christology ought to go back to the more functional Christology of Paul and Luke for 
inspiration. Their Christ is appointed to a divine position and this elevation of Jesus to 
divine status should be the theme of modern Christology rather than the notion of a pre- 
existent Christ found in John and deutero-Pauline literature. This is Küng's way of doing 
Christology from below and might strike a cord with Muslims for the basic acceptance that 
Christ was just the same as any other human at the outset of his life. After all, the five 
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versions of the Incarnation detailed above are inescapably determined by the non-Islamic 
notion that Jesus had a form of pre-existence. At least King inhabits the same world as 
Muslims in his insistence on beginning with the human Jesus. Whether they would 
welcome the appointment of Christ to a divine role is another matter. Certainly, those 
Muslims who believe that Muhammad has a continuing role as advocate for human 
wrongdoing under God may not find this Christology so difficult to understand. Jesus, like 
Muhammad, has been granted authority that normally is exercised by God. Kling, however, 
seems to believe that Christ reveals God in himself in a way that goes beyond the Muslim 
understanding of Muhammad's role, and therefore his Christology transcends what 
Muslims would be comfortable with. 
Modem Christians who share Küng's distaste for Incarnational Christology would 
probably agree with him in his basic approach, but Incarnationalists will question whether 
Christ could be appointed to divine status after a purely human beginning, and whether 
Luke and Paul really believe in an appointment Christology. If the hymn to Christ in 
Philippians 2 is pre-Pauline or even from Paul himself then the notion of a divine descent 
was there at the beginning of the early church and did not emerge in a subsequent period. If 
this is the case modern Christians have to accept that the early church believed from the 
first that Christ was the one who came down from God to raise humanity up. In other 
words, King's rejection of divine descent places his Christologry outside mainstream 
Christian belief and therefore reduces his appointment Christology to a speculative 
proposal that lacks firm grounding in tradition. 
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12.2.3. Christ as a man in spiritual identity with God 
Hick's Christ is not divine at all and therefore looks more like the Qur'anic Christ than any 
of the above versions. Hick holds that a spiritually aware Jesus is more acceptable for 
Muslims than a divine Christ, and that the need to find an accommodation with people of 
other faiths inevitably leads Christians to reshape their traditional beliefs to fit into a wider 
religious consciousness. In doing so he puts forward a reductionist scheme where the 
historical Jesus is merely a monotheistic Jew who was elevated to divine status by the 
church. His call to modem Christians to stop insisting on the universal Lordship of Christ 
in favour of an allegiance to the universal presence of the Real expressed in a rainbow of 
religious traditions is unlikely to be heeded by many of them. The vast majority of 
Christians will probably carry on believing in the Apostolic testimony to Christ that Hick 
has abandoned. Muslims will doubtless continue to welcome Hick's purely human Christ 
as a breath of fresh air from the Christian side, hoping that others will follow his lead. 
However, Christology in dialogue with Muslims should not depend on participants who are 
unrepresentative of a significant Christian constituency, so a Hickian approach to Jesus can 
only have a marginal value for Christian/Muslim dialogue. 
12.2.4. Dialoguing with Muslims on the Incarnation 
If neither Hick's purely human spiritual Christ nor Küng's Christ appointed to divine status 
adequately represents received tradition then some kind of Incarnational Christology is 
required. The two modem examples, Cragg and Sira, show that none of the three ninth 
century Christologies can be used today without significant change. At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, Christians do not tend to think of an ontological identity of being 
between Christ and God, and therefore the relationship between Christ and God has to be 
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expressed in more functional categories. Cragg's notion of Christ as the personal revelation 
of God is part of the solution, but the descent of the divine still needs to be articulated 
within this framework. Therefore, recognition of Christ's eternal pre-existence is essential 
within the concept of revelation in history. Si a's attempt to promote an eternal and 
temporal Christ is noteworthy, and provides a model for future dialogue that takes Muslim 
perceptions seriously. 
12.3. Prospects for dialogue on Christology 
Future dialogue about Christ between Christians and Muslims will depend on the way the 
Qur'anic denials of sonship and the crucifixion and the developed Islamic conviction that 
the Incarnation is impossible are dealt with. Perhaps the first of these issues is simpler to 
handle, but the historicity of the cross and the transcendence of God disallowing 
Incarnation are much more demanding. As a result of these seemingly unbridgable 
differences between Muslims and Christians some voices are calling for dialogue to avoid 
Christology and to concentrate on the ethical teaching of Jesus instead. However, the 
authority of Jesus' teaching depends on the assessment made of his status, and that takes 
dialogue back to the question of the revelation of God in Jesus, unless appeal is made 
solely to human reason. 
12.3.1. Christ as `son' 
There is substantial agreement among the Christian and Muslim writers surveyed that the 
title `son' is metaphorical rather than literal. Christians commonly pointed out that God is 
`father' to Christ his `son' not in a biological manner, but in a way that is analogous to a 
human family relationship. Ayoub and Nasr accepted this symbolic understanding of 
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Christ as son but called for greater clarity in the use of the image by Christians. One way to 
do this would be to talk of `father' and `son' as metaphors of identity between God and 
Jesus. This identity can firstly be interpreted through the discourse of the historical Jesus 
when he calls God `my father' in intimate terms, suggesting a relationship akin to a 
familial one. Secondly, the faith of the early church in Christ may be explored through the 
way the title `son of God' is applied to Jesus. For the first Christians the connection 
between God and Jesus was so unique that the latter could bring others into the family of 
God on the basis of that special relationship. Muslims might be open to such a relational 
interpretation, particularly those who see Muhammad as having a similar role of advocacy 
for others before God. Therefore progress is possible in future dialogue on the Qur'änic 
denials that God took a son, or that he begets, since Muslims and Christians alike can stand 
on the truth of these statements. 
12.3.2. The crucifixion of Christ 
The gap between Christians and Muslims is as wide as ever over the fact of the crucifixion, 
so that there does not seem to be much room for future resolution of the Qur'änic denial of 
the cross. Ayoub's suggestion that the denial be read in theological rather than historical 
terms holds some promise because of his acceptance of the fact of Jesus' death on the 
cross. Perhaps other Muslims will come to see that the Qur'an denies the complete defeat 
of Christ rather than the event of the crucifixion. Certainly, Christians can agree with 
Ayoub that God's truth is not defeated by the death of Christ, and would probably be 
willing to affirm Ayoub's interpretation of the Qur'an. Christians for their part may be able 
to add to Ayoub's reading the idea that the raising of Jesus to God that comes immediately 
after the denial of the crucifixion also proves that the death of Christ does not defeat his 
purpose. This is of course how Christians understand the raising of Christ from the dead. If 
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Ayoub's acceptance of the death of Christ becomes popular among Muslims then they may 
be open to the Christian conviction of God's complete victory over evil expressed in the 
lifting up of Christ. 
12.3.3. The Incarnation 
The biggest gap between Christians and Muslims is the Christian belief in the indwelling 
of the divine in Christ. Unless Muslims develop a more dynamic concept of the 
transcendence of God they will not be able to agree with the Christian notion of a real 
divinity in Christ. Muslims for their part are pleased when Christians give up the idea of 
divine presence in Christ and presumably hope that more Christians will follow Hick's 
example. So this standoff between Muslims and Christians seems set to continue. 
Christians might take the initiative in trying to make sense of the Incarnation by following 
the example of the ninth century apologists in their appeal to anthropomorphic language in 
the Qur'an. They might argue: if God acts in the created world then he is not so 
transcendent that he is separated from it; and if his action relates to a particular place and 
time then he is not simply outside space and time; and if he delegates decision making to 
humans then his transcendence is co-ordinated with history. Christians could perform a 
useful role as interrogators of an Islamic belief in transcendence that is in need of reform in 
the twenty-first century. Perhaps this is the period of history in which Muslims will begin 
to develop a view of God co-operating with human thought and decision rather than 
controlling it. Perhaps Muhammad may come to be seen as co-operating with God in the 
production of the Qur'än rather than being merely an empty mouthpiece. If such 
developments take place, then the idea of the indwelling of the divine in Christ will 
become more intelligible, if not more acceptable to Muslims. 
284 
12.3.4. The ethics of Jesus 
Since belief in the status of Christ causes dispute between Christians and Muslims it might 
seem simpler to avoid dialogue on his status and discuss his teaching instead. The leading 
American Catholic theologian on inter-faith dialogue, Paul Knitter, has proposed that 
debate about doctrine should give way to dialogue on behaviour. According to Knitter, 
belief in Christ is "primarily a matter of acting with and like Christ. " 522 Christians should 
live out the kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed as a "spirit-filled mystic and a social 
prophet. " 523 Knitter has had more experience in dialogue with Hindus and Buddhists, but 
his call is echoed by Pierre Claverie, Catholic Bishop of Oran in Algeria. In a letter entitled 
`Believing in Dialogue' he indicates five fruitful issues for Christian-Muslim dialogue: 
submission to God, secularism, democracy, the role of women, and the status of non- 
Muslims. 524 All five subjects relate to personal and social ethics, since submission to God, 
in Claverie's mind, has to do with behaviour rather than belief. Agreement on the ethics of 
Jesus may remain a challenge for Christians if the debate between Hick and KUng about 
Jesus' attitude to the Jewish law continues to divide interpreters of the gospels. Division 
among Muslims about the contemporary relevance of Qur'änic law may well be a feature 
of twenty-first century Islam. If Claverie's topics are discussed, Muslims will probably be 
as divided over each of them as Christians over the teaching of Jesus, therefore, dialogue 
on the teaching of Jesus will be no more straightforward than dialogue on his status. The 
authority of his teaching will have to be faced when a clash between his teaching and 
Islamic tradition emerges. Whether Muslims will be prepared to grant him the authority to 
522 P. Knitter, Jesus and the Other Nantes: Christian Mission and Global Responsibility. New York, 1996, 
69. 
523 P. Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue and Global Responsibility. New York, 1995, 
93. 
524 p Claverie, Leitres ei Messages D'Algerie. Paris, 1996,66. 
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challenge Islamic norms is a difficult question to answer. It is because Christians believe in 
the divine status of Christ that they grant him the authority to instruct them, so in the end, 
dialogue on the teaching of Christ cannot avoid dialogue on Christology. 
12.4. Final words 
The thesis has shown different strategies in dialogue on Christology in the ninth and 
twentieth centuries. Some drew heavily on Christian tradition and attempted to commend 
received views of Christ in terms Muslims might understand if not accept. In the modem 
period, others developed fresh ways of perceiving Christ and offered their new insights to 
Muslims. Both ninth and twentieth century apologists took Islamic concerns seriously 
enough to challenge Muslims to rethink their perception of Christ, but there were no major 
breakthroughs over the denial of the cross or the divinity of Christ. In terms of future 
dialogue on Christ it may be possible to bypass these difficulties by discussing the ethics of 
Jesus. However, if Muslims question his authority to teach there will be a continuing need 
for creative Christology in dialogue with Muslims. 
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Glossary of Arabic terminology 
ahdatha: to bring into being 
akhadha: to take 
agänim: hypostases (of the Trinity) 
azali: eternal 
bashari: human 
bi, r: righteousness 
bunuivwa: sonship 
dhät: essence 
Iiadith: traditions of the Prophet Muhammad 
tralla: to indwell 
haykal: temple 
liulül: indwelling (of the divine in the human) 
infil: the book revealed to Jesus according to the Qur'än 
insän: human being 
ittakhadha: to take (to oneself) 
jahannam: hell 
jahiliyya: period of ignorance before the revelation of the Qur'an 
jasad: body 
jawhar: substance, essence 
kalima: word 
khalaqa: to create 
lähüti: divine 
libäs: clothing 
mahall: dwelling place 
